Thus far, I've come across two streams of denial of the a priori, a posteriori distinction, which I take would be a fatal blow to Austrian philosophy. Or, maybe it wouldn't, but I'm not sure how we'd formulate Austrian methodology without it. Anyone, one is the Quinean argument, which philosophers seem to look at, acknowledge, and then promptly ignore. Myself, I'm not terribly impressed with the Quinean objection, and in fact I wrote a paper some years back criticizing it, and don't worry much about it. The other one is the Randian objection, which I'm even less concerned about, because it strikes me as absurd, and little more than an assertion. My question, though, is not about defending the distinction, but rather about how an Objectivist would view Austrian arguments. In particular, since Rand asserts that the ultimate justification of any statement must be experience, she denies any a priori knowledge. So, what would she do with "Man acts." Logically, there's only two choices: deny it, or say it is justified by experience. But what experience could possibly justify it? We have experience of man behaving, and making choices, but on what experiential basis can we conclude that:a) They choose their most highly valued ends and b) this fact generalizes to other men, who we haven't observed? So denial is the logical possibility, and Rand would not accept the "standard" Austrian argument against denial, since it is not experience-bound. So far so bad, but then we see that Rand uses some form of it for her necessary/contingent metaphysics - natural facts not involving human intervention are necessary, but man-made actions are contingent in order to keep free will. So, man-made actions, alone among all facts, are not determined by their constituent parts. What, then, explains how a man acts? If she has already had to deny human action, and behavior is not naturally determined, what's left? Has she worked herself into a hole here, or am I missing something?
The term "man acts" is vague, so let's rephrase it as "to the extent that man acts, he always acts to maximize his values." Here are some of the observations necessary to prove this claim:
Furthermore, to make a universal claim, you would need to show that attempting to negate this principle creates a contradiction. For example, you can't claim that a man acted to towards lesser value over a greater one because the act of choosing one value over another IS the act of prioritizing it. (That is not to say that the greater value is a greater value to his life, or that it provides a greater material benefit -Objectivism does not claim that men always act selfishly, rationally, or consistently. Objectivism also does not claim that men act, but only that to the extent that they act, they act to maximize certain values.)
But my question remains - will observing each of the things you point to (to the extent that they can be observed - many don't seem amenable to observation either) lead me to conclude the truth of human action? Just why does any amount of observation allow me to know that any of the observed choices maximized any values? Rather, that conclusion seems to be an interpretation I place upon the observations - the physical actions do not carry the import of action, only behavior.
This is not a fatal blow to Austrianism, although it would be a fatal blow to any number of epistemological positions. Here is a good paper on Aristoteleanism (and by extension Objectivism) and the Austrian method:
http://www.veritasnoctis.net/docs/aristotelianapriorism.pdf
to the extent that they can be observed - many don't seem amenable to observation either
You can't perceive philosophical abstractions directly. However all of the facts I mentioned can be derived from observation. It takes a full philosophical system to develop integrate epistemology and metaphysics, and by their application, form an integrated view of human nature. Hence, Objectivism.
But my question remains - will observing each of the things you point to lead me to conclude the truth of human action? Just why does any amount of observation allow me to know that any of the observed choices maximized any values?
My claim is than man acts to maximize values, not that actions maximize values. By going to the kitchen to make a ham sandwich I demonstrate a preference for a ham sandwich over continuing to watch the tube. But if I'm out of ham, I will not achieve the desired value because I need to the grocery instead.
Rather, that conclusion seems to be an interpretation I place upon the observations - the physical actions do not carry the import of action, only behavior.
You can't derive purpose from merely perceiving action. It's necessary to grasp volition first. As volitional beings, we perceive it directly, and can extrapolate it to other men.
" Rand asserts that the ultimate justification of any statement must be experience, she denies any a priori knowledge"
rand assertion here that justification of statement must be experience, is she basing that on apriori knowledge or experience?
if she is basing it on apriori it denies itself
is she bases it on experience, well, how would that be done?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
HeroicLife:You can't derive purpose from merely perceiving action. It's necessary to grasp volition first. As volitional beings, we perceive it directly, and can extrapolate it to other men.
Ah, so we grasp volition first, and no observation will force it upon us - is it not then a priori knowledge?
i havent read Rand, but the way JAlanKatz writes about her epistemology it sounds more like Logical Positivism than anything else
No, she was not a logical positivist; she was an Aristotelean. As I said, give that paper a read. It is illuminating.
nirgrahamUK: " Rand asserts that the ultimate justification of any statement must be experience, she denies any a priori knowledge" rand assertion here that justification of statement must be experience, is she basing that on apriori knowledge or experience? if she is basing it on apriori it denies itself [if] she bases it on experience, well, how would that be done?
[if] she bases it on experience, well, how would that be done?
It can't be. The statement must assume its own truth in order to even attempt going about proving itself. "Every statement is justified in experience" does not allow the experience of an attempt at empirical falsification and thus cannot meet its own standard. Rather, it falls apart in a pile of self-contradiction.
I was going to make this very same post before you beat me to the punch.
"Melody is a form of remembrance. It must have a quality of inevitability in our ears." - Gian Carlo Menotti
No, volition is self-evident. It's axiomatic. Any attempt to deny volition assumes that you have volition. Fore more, check out the Ayn Rand Lexicon's entry.
Also, check out my Wiki entry on axioms.
HeroicLife, you put forth the following observations:
It appears to me, then, that there will always be a top "desired" value (need?) (which might change upon the circumstances) that Man pursues. And that translates into perpetual (human) action. Do you agree?
Hooper: Reality is objective - it has identity Man qua man is a conceptual being Consciousness perceives, but cannot change reality Man's values are not automatic (he is volitional), and therefore he must choose which values to pursue Man is capable of altering reality, if he acts in accordance with its nature Man is a mortal being with limited resources at his disposal, and therefore cannot immediately achieve all values he could possible desire Man must therefore choose which values to pursue out of all possible values The act of pursuing certain values over others requires the volitional choice to prioritize certain values over others (whether done consciously or subconsciously) Therefore, to the extent that man acts, he acts to maximize his values.
Does anyone besides me see an inconsistancy here? Points 3 and 5 cannot be both true. Either one can change reality or not. Reality itself cannot be changed but one can change his environment, condition or situation.
Also, I disagree that man always acts to maximize his values. Often I will do something that is not the highest on my marginal utility list, but something much lower. The difference is the variation in the concept of "now". If my highest priority in life is to get out of debt and a lower priority is to go to London for a vacation, I may still go on vacation (now) which opposes my higher priority. This implies that my overall marginal priority list may take a back seat to my immediate priority list. This doesn't mean that I have changed the order of my overall list of utilities, only that "now" my list has changed, or possibly that "now" I am concerned with a lower item on my list rather than the one higher.
IMHO I think Mises had a much better grasp on this than Rand.
Donald Lingerfelt:Also, I disagree that man always acts to maximize his values. Often I will do something that is not the highest on my marginal utility list, but something much lower. The difference is the variation in the concept of "now". If my highest priority in life is to get out of debt and a lower priority is to go to London for a vacation, I may still go on vacation (now) which opposes my higher priority.
I don't see anything in the Austrian literature which would indicate that "highest value" means "highest value for the rest of your life." Instead, the claim that man acts to maximize his values should be understood, marginally, as referring to his present value scale. Marginal analysis can only talk about what you prefer now. Goals, as lasting longer than now, can only be understood in terms of what present action they impel you to.
There is no question that the basic view of the world (set of assumptions or observations, like the ones put forth by HeroicLife) that underlies Objectivism overlaps significantly with the one that underlies the Austrian School. Objectivism holds that “Reason is Man's only means of perceiving reality, his only source of knowledge, his only guide to action, and his basic means of survival,” and “The pursuit of [Man’s] own rational self-interest and of his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his life” (Source: http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/about/intro_ob.html). Taken separately, the second statement (axiom) might suggest that Man pursues an overall, “for the rest of his/her life” value. However, the combined two statements imply that, over time, Man’s knowledge changes, and so does his/her self-interest and happiness. And that, as I said earlier, further implies perpetual action, or continuous pursuit of a changing self-interest and happiness.
So, it seems to me that Objectivism and the Austrian School are actually complementing each other. Objectivism points out to the permanent existence of a highest value, or goal, of the moment, while the Austrian School points out the perpetual action generated by the pursuit of that value. Please correct me if I am wrong.
JAlanKatz’s initial questions, “What, then, explains how a man acts?” remains unanswered, though. Does Objectivism have any answers?
Donald Lingerfelt: Also, I disagree that man always acts to maximize his values. Often I will do something that is not the highest on my marginal utility list, but something much lower. The difference is the variation in the concept of "now". If my highest priority in life is to get out of debt and a lower priority is to go to London for a vacation, I may still go on vacation (now) which opposes my higher priority. This implies that my overall marginal priority list may take a back seat to my immediate priority list. This doesn't mean that I have changed the order of my overall list of utilities, only that "now" my list has changed, or possibly that "now" I am concerned with a lower item on my list rather than the one higher.
Actually, what you "think" your priorities are and what you do can be contradictory. This shows that your "true" priority was to do what you actually do, not what you think you want to do.
So if your highest priority in life is to get out of debt you will not go to London. If you go to London it shows that the vacation is actually a higher priority than getting out of debt. What you actually do at every moment shows you highest priority. What you might like to do, or what you think you should do doesn't matter. Just because you think something is a higher or lower priority doesn't really matter either, only what you do matters and that is the action that you take. There is no such thing as an "overall marginal priority" and an "immediate marginal priority" list. There may be, what I would like to do, and what I actually do lists however. Motivations for doing something is more in the realm of psychology.
JAlanKatz:Thus far, I've come across two streams of denial of the a priori, a posteriori distinction, which I take would be a fatal blow to Austrian philosophy. Or, maybe it wouldn't, but I'm not sure how we'd formulate Austrian methodology without it. Anyone, one is the Quinean argument, which philosophers seem to look at, acknowledge, and then promptly ignore. Myself, I'm not terribly impressed with the Quinean objection, and in fact I wrote a paper some years back criticizing it, and don't worry much about it. The other one is the Randian objection, which I'm even less concerned about, because it strikes me as absurd, and little more than an assertion. My question, though, is not about defending the distinction, but rather about how an Objectivist would view Austrian arguments. In particular, since Rand asserts that the ultimate justification of any statement must be experience, she denies any a priori knowledge. So, what would she do with "Man acts." Logically, there's only two choices: deny it, or say it is justified by experience. But what experience could possibly justify it? We have experience of man behaving, and making choices, but on what experiential basis can we conclude that:a) They choose their most highly valued ends and b) this fact generalizes to other men, who we haven't observed? So denial is the logical possibility, and Rand would not accept the "standard" Austrian argument against denial, since it is not experience-bound. So far so bad, but then we see that Rand uses some form of it for her necessary/contingent metaphysics - natural facts not involving human intervention are necessary, but man-made actions are contingent in order to keep free will. So, man-made actions, alone among all facts, are not determined by their constituent parts. What, then, explains how a man acts? If she has already had to deny human action, and behavior is not naturally determined, what's left? Has she worked herself into a hole here, or am I missing something?
Cogito ergo sum. I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am.Action can not exist without an actor.
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