Estoppel - Argumentation Ethics - Aggression

AJ:

Stephen:

Objectivity and subjectivity arise insofar as statements are agent relative (applying to some) and agent neutral (applying to all). Ethical statements are imperative/normative instead of descriptive or causal/logical. Because certain rules/modes/conventions must be followed for someone to even demand that someone else follow a certain rule or convention, those rules/modes/conventions are agent neutral and objective a priori.

Thank you for the clear statement. I do see what you mean. However, this seems to apply only, as you say, to those who wish to "demand that someone else follow a certain rule or convention." There are two modes of arguing on one's own behalf that make sense to me: 1. Trying to convince others that their self-interests may align with mine (ex: "Don't hang me or this bad thing may result for you"), and 2. Working within others' moral or legal frameworks to convince them that their law or their morality is consistent with some result that I want.  What you seem to be getting at with "demand that someone else follow a certain rule or convention" just seems a subset of mode 1. To put a finer point on it, I don't see the purpose of trying to convince others to follow an entire rule or convention when all you really need or want is for others to give you a specific result (which could be the product of a theoretically infinite set of possible rules or conventions that happen to agree on that result).

No offense AJ, but you have a way of taking something that is simple and clear cut and confusing the hell out of it.

I guess because people value principles and just expediency. I suppose if I were arguing with barbarians I'd use your method. But if I were arguing with a normal person, I'd try to show them that they wouldn't feel justified in their present action if the roles were reversed. I would also point out the asocial character of their present action. Namely, if everyone where to do it, life would be far more miserable for them and the ones they love. And if they appeal to some higher principle, such as equality, I might try a discourse ethics approach.

AJ:

Stephen:

Now, can you give me an answer to my question?

The one about proving my words have objective meaning? I already covered that one - if it's a different one let me know.

You still haven't given me a direct answer. Now can you or can't you?

twistedbydsign99:

Since I'm a consequentialist I have to respond to this :) Couldn't it be that the appeal to consequence is an appeal to the other persons preference? Like "I know you really prefer libertarianism, so don't you think that causing force to be initiated would be immoral?" In other words one could object that the consequences would show a self contradiction.

I think when ppl appeal to consequences, they are attempting to demonstrate that the means chosen by an actor will not result in the state of affairs which they desire. It has nothing to do with moral principle, otherwise the distinciton is nugatory.

Stephen:

I think when ppl appeal to consequences, they are attempting to demonstrate that the means chosen by an actor will not result in the state of affairs which they desire. It has nothing to do with moral principle, otherwise the distinciton is nugatory.

I think that could be an over simplification. Personally I have chosen anarchism as a political philosophy because of its consequences, not because I'm religious or appealing to some higher authority.

AJ:

However, this seems to apply only, as you say, to those who wish to "demand that someone else follow a certain rule or convention."

I spent few hours reading about Estopell and Argumentation Ethics. Both seem to be making the same 'profound' statement:

"If everyone was nice, then no one could argue for not being nice without abdicating his niceness. Hence, everyone and everything would be nice -- naturally and objectively so."

Z.

 

 

z1235:

I spent few hours reading about Estopell and Argumentation Ethics. Both seem to be making the same 'profound' statement:

"If everyone was nice, then no one could argue for not being nice without abdicating his niceness. Hence, everyone and everything would be nice -- naturally and objectively so."

False. Being nice is not a precondition of argumentation. If *everyone* were nice, then you would not *need* to argue for people to be nice. It would be pointless. If *not* everyone is nice, then you could have a not-nice person engage in argumentation. The nice-advocate coudl not say that the un-nice person is contradicting himself by engaging in argument and not being nice at the same time, since they are not contradictory. So, you are just wrong.

Neither is self-ownership. When someone else owns me he can allow me to argue with him over my ownership. Or I could just start the argument violating his me-ownership.

scineram:

Neither is self-ownership. When someone else owns me he can allow me to argue with him over my ownership. Or I could just start the argument violating his me-ownership.

In what way does he own you in your example? In principle or in fact.

In the same sense you want to be a self-owner.

z1235:

I spent few hours reading about Estopell and Argumentation Ethics. Both seem to be making the same 'profound' statement:

"If everyone was nice, then no one could argue for not being nice without abdicating his niceness. Hence, everyone and everything would be nice -- naturally and objectively so."

nskinsella:

False. Being nice is not a precondition of argumentation. If *everyone* were nice, then you would not *need* to argue for people to be nice. It would be pointless. If *not* everyone is nice, then you could have a not-nice person engage in argumentation. The nice-advocate coudl not say that the un-nice person is contradicting himself by engaging in argument and not being nice at the same time, since they are not contradictory. So, you are just wrong.

Fair enough. Is this one closer?

"No one (nice or not) could argue for not being nice without simultaneously rejecting niceness. Hence, everyone and everything would be nice -- naturally and objectively so."

My point (and it seems, the point of most critiques of Estopell and AE) is that they are circular: they both claim to prove the very assumption needed for the proof itself. They prove objective ethics by assuming objective ethics. I hope I am wrong, in which case I would love to learn what I am missing. 

Z.

 

 

 

 

z1235:

z1235:

I spent few hours reading about Estopell and Argumentation Ethics. Both seem to be making the same 'profound' statement:

"If everyone was nice, then no one could argue for not being nice without abdicating his niceness. Hence, everyone and everything would be nice -- naturally and objectively so."

nskinsella:

False. Being nice is not a precondition of argumentation. If *everyone* were nice, then you would not *need* to argue for people to be nice. It would be pointless. If *not* everyone is nice, then you could have a not-nice person engage in argumentation. The nice-advocate coudl not say that the un-nice person is contradicting himself by engaging in argument and not being nice at the same time, since they are not contradictory. So, you are just wrong.

Fair enough. Is this one closer?

"No one (nice or not) could argue for not being nice without simultaneously rejecting niceness. Hence, everyone and everything would be nice -- naturally and objectively so."

My point (and it seems, the point of most critiques of Estopell and AE) is that they are circular: they both claim to prove the very assumption needed for the proof itself. They prove objective ethics by assuming objective ethics. I hope I am wrong, in which case I would love to learn what I am missing.

You say it's circular, but the example you give was a bad one. They are not circular: they refer to propositions that the participants in argumentation cannot dispute.

As an example, it is possible to have a universe with no life, no consciousness, even no argumentation. But we do NOT have such a universe and this is argumentatively indisputable. It is simpy impossible to coherently argue that there is no such thing as life, or arguentation, say--you have to be alive and arguing to argue.

As for your new attempt: ""No one (nice or not) could argue for not being nice without simultaneously rejecting niceness. Hence, everyone and everything would be nice -- naturally and objectively so.""

this does not follow at all. First, what does it mean to "reject niceness"? Second, what's wrong without rejecting niceness, and arguing for not being nice? Your second sentence does not follow at all. Maybe someone really thinks people should be meaner. This is not incoherent at all.

What does "nice" have to do with it?

My understanding is that the aggressor can't make a coherent objection to anyone doing such and such thing to him (we would call it violating property rights), since he felt it is okay to do those things to others. It's about justifying punishment, not consequences or proving our brand of morality.

nskinsella, olovetto:

Perhaps overly enthusiastically and somewhat clumsily I tried to use "nice" as a connection point between Estoppel and AE. Please correct me if I am off: In Estoppel, "is nice" = "cares if he can coherently object to anything"; "is not nice" = "doesn't care, e.g. is a hypocrite". In AE, "is nice" = "recognizes self-ownership"; "is not nice" = "rejects self-ownership". Both theories argue that arguing for niceness (or the incoherence of arguing against it) inevitably proves that niceness (natural rights, objective ethics, self-ownership) is axiomatic thus transcends the need for a proof. My point is that this is only relevant to "nice" agents, i.e. agents who already accept the a priori of niceness. Both theories "prove" niceness (objective ethics) ONLY if niceness is accepted a priori (hence, the circularity assertion). In some sense they are preaching to the converted, and have no logical or convincing power over the rest. 

Z.

 

z1235:

nskinsella, olovetto:

Perhaps overly enthusiastically and somewhat clumsily I tried to use "nice" as a connection point between Estoppel and AE. Please correct me if I am off: In Estoppel, "is nice" = "cares if he can coherently object to anything"; "is not nice" = "doesn't care, e.g. is a hypocrite". In AE, "is nice" = "recognizes self-ownership"; "is not nice" = "rejects self-ownership". Both theories argue that arguing for niceness (or the incoherence of arguing against it) inevitably proves that niceness (natural rights, objective ethics, self-ownership) is axiomatic thus transcends the need for a proof.

It shows that only the NAP is justified, and that any ethic that is contrary to the NAP cannot be justified, siply because justification is argumentative justification, so that any justification has to be compatible with whatever norms are necessarily presupposed in argumentation itself. So the only question, I see it, is whether or not there ARE any norms presupposed in argumentation. If so, what are they? I think there clearly are norms, and they are the grundnorms of libertarianism.

My point is that this is only relevant to "nice" agents, i.e. agents who already accept the a priori of niceness. Both theories "prove" niceness (objective ethics) ONLY if niceness is accepted a priori (hence, the circularity assertion). In some sense they are preaching to the converted, and have no logical or convincing power over the rest. 

Re your last sentence: if so, so what? Imagine a world where there "are" "natural rights" (whatever it means for natural rights to "exist"), and that you have a Randian Natural Law Ultimate Proof of them. Or, one handed down by God: the ultimate proof of rights. Still, there will be two classes of people: those who choose (for whatever reason) to respect your rights, and those who choose to violate them. For the former, if you give them your Ultimate Proof, you are preaching to the converted. For the latter, they aer still free to say, "okay, nice proof," and then proceed to bash you in the head.

So what is the difference betwwen this type of proof and AE? They are exactly the same in this respect.

nskinsella:

It shows that only the NAP is justified, and that any ethic that is contrary to the NAP cannot be justified, siply because justification is argumentative justification, so that any justification has to be compatible with whatever norms are necessarily presupposed in argumentation itself. So the only question, I see it, is whether or not there ARE any norms presupposed in argumentation. If so, what are they? I think there clearly are norms, and they are the grundnorms of libertarianism.

The only norm ACTUALLY presupposed in argumentation is de facto control of one's head during the length of the argument. There's no need whatsoever to presuppose: (1) exclusive (2) permanent control over that head (much less the rest of the body), nor is there the necessity to presuppose one's (3) right to such control. Argumentation between two heads can go on for a very long time without ANY of the above three AE presuppositions. In anticipation of your response ("Yes, but whoever was denying the above three presuppositions wouldn't be nice, and I was only talking about nice people here. No slaves, slave-owners, and hypocrites allowed."), this is exactly what I was talking about when I said that the proof merely uses a priori assertions in order to prove them. 

nskinsella:

So what is the difference betwwen this type of proof and AE? They are exactly the same in this respect.

No difference. If you presuppose that 2+2=5 is correct in order to prove that 2+3=6 (in a system in which the number X after the '+' sign is really X+1), then that proof would have no meaning whatsoever (or would be utterly wrong!) for the proponents of the system in which the number X after the '+' sign is merely X.

Z.

 

nskinsella:

It shows that only the NAP is justified, and that any ethic that is contrary to the NAP cannot be justified, siply because justification is argumentative justification, so that any justification has to be compatible with whatever norms are necessarily presupposed in argumentation itself. So the only question, I see it, is whether or not there ARE any norms presupposed in argumentation. If so, what are they? I think there clearly are norms, and they are the grundnorms of libertarianism.

As I argued above self-ownership is not one of them.

You argued. But how could you do that without owning yourself? One does wonder.

Why could I not? Are you trying to beg the question?

I don't think you understand what begging the question means, nor what apodictic means.

Whining and completely not grasping the point in 3...2...1...

AJ:

Unlike Kinsella, I'm not proposing any moral, ethical, or legal standards.

Use your utilitarianism then...

AJ:

Why would I be interested in this question?

"Anyone who says they are not interested in politics is like a drowning man who insists he is not interested in water."

So...

Can you explain to me why the individual should behave ethically? Yes, or no?

AJ:

Conza88:

AJ:

But I have not attempted to disprove objective ethics.

Because you can't. Or can you? - Fancy giving it a shot?

I would love to give it a shot, if anyone could define it as a meaningful concept.

We've already covered elsewhere that property rights are constant... did we not? What matters is how they are dealt with. The only logical conclusion is 100% self ownership... via the process of elimination; all others end up in absurdity.

"What do we mean by "natural law"? In its simplest definition, natural law is that "unwritten law" that is more or less the same for everyone everywhere. To be more exact, natural law is the concept of a body of moral principles that is common to all humankind and, as generally posited, is recognizable by human reason alone. Natural law is therefore distinguished from -- and provides a standard for -- positive law, the formal legal enactments of a particular society.

Since law must always be some dictate of reason, natural law also will be some dictate of reason. In fact, it is law discovered by human reason. Our normal and natural grasp of the natural law is effected by reason, that is, by the thinking mind, and in this service reason is sometimes called "conscience." We, in all our human acts, inevitably see them in their relation to the natural law, and we mentally pronounce upon their agreement or disagreement with the natural law. Such a pronouncement may be called a "judgment of conscience." The "norm" of morality is the natural law as applied by conscience. Lastly, we can say that the natural law is the disposition of things as known by our human reason and to which we must conform ourselves if we are to realize our proper end or "good" as human beings.

To sum it up, then, we can say that the natural law:

    * is not made by human beings;
    * is based on the structure of reality itself;
    * is the same for all human beings and at all times;
    * is an unchanging rule or pattern which is there for human beings to discover;
    * is the naturally knowable moral law;
    * is a means by which human beings can rationally guide themselves to their good."

AJ:

Conza88:

Also do you believe in absolute truth?

For example? If you mean, do I believe statements like, "Something can't be both green and not green at the same time," then definitely yes.

Does man have a nature?

AJ:

Conza88:

Who determines whether the consequences are good or bad?

If I say, "If you hang me, you'll feel guilty" (for instance), and the listener agrees and decides that he doesn't want to feel guilty, he may refrain. The net consequences would be "good or bad," meaning here desirable or undesirable for him.

So... all you are trying to do is persuade? Isn't that what you deplore natural rights for? You have no feasible political ethical objection to robbery, rape or murder? The listener disagrees or doesn't care about feeling guilty, and does not refrain...  The net consequences would be "good or bad," meaning here desirable or undesirable for him.

How do you know what the advocates of the particular policy consider desirable? How do you know what their value-scales are now or what they will be when the consequences of the measure appear?

Ahh.. and where does that leave the victim?

"Utilitarianism seems to rob the words good and bad of their specifically ethical character.  The utilitarian cannot make a distinction between guilt and simple error.  The person who robs a bank to achieve happiness has made a mistake in qualitatively the same sense as a person who overcooks a steak.  (I do not believe Yeager specifically addresses this type of objection.)

In fact, we can go further.  Is it really true, for example, that Josef Stalin acted against his interests, even in the long run?  Does the utilitarian really concede that our possible condemnation of Stalin is purely an empirical matter?  (It might be true that had every other Soviet acted in his true interests, dictatorship would have been impossible.  But this is dodging the issue.)"

AJ:

Conza88:

What does that have to do with justice and the law?

Depends on a lot of things - how we define justice

How do you define justice? I believe I've asked this before and didn't get a response to it.

AJ:

Conza88:

Are you able to explain why an individual should behave morally? What are your objections to stealing, murder, rape?

I don't see any role for ethical central planning or central judgment. My personal objections matter only insofar as I personally get to decide the law, no? My personal "objections" to such acts would just consist of explanations as to why those things are contrary to my interests as well as what I can only presume to be the interests of others (can't say for sure because I'm not them). If I can get people to see why doing such things is not in their interests, and why punishing those things is in their interest, that seems to me the most likely way to convince them to refrain from and/or punish such acts.

Political ethical objections to stealing, murder and rape - you are equating that to ethical central planning? Are you able to explain why an individual should behave morally? Was the above a yes or no to that?

Your personal objections are meaningless, which is why I'm asking for your political ethical objections... if you have anything.

What is the difference between you, and a nihilist who understands economics?

nskinsella:

It shows that only the NAP is justified, and that any ethic that is contrary to the NAP cannot be justified, siply because justification is argumentative justification, so that any justification has to be compatible with whatever norms are necessarily presupposed in argumentation itself. So the only question, I see it, is whether or not there ARE any norms presupposed in argumentation. If so, what are they? I think there clearly are norms, and they are the grundnorms of libertarianism.

z1235:

The only norm ACTUALLY presupposed in argumentation is de facto control of one's head during the length of the argument. There's no need whatsoever to presuppose: (1) exclusive (2) permanent control over that head (much less the rest of the body), nor is there the necessity to presuppose one's (3) right to such control. Argumentation between two heads can go on for a very long time without ANY of the above three AE presuppositions. In anticipation of your response ("Yes, but whoever was denying the above three presuppositions wouldn't be nice, and I was only talking about nice people here. No slaves, slave-owners, and hypocrites allowed."), this is exactly what I was talking about when I said that the proof merely uses a priori assertions in order to prove them. 

Unless someone can respond to this refutation, I propose that we close this subject by concluding that Estoppel and Argumentation Ethics are plain silly and prove nothing. It is quite astonishing that (especially) AE could still muster enough credibility to even become a discussion subject TWO DECADES after its introduction, with such an obvious refutation staring everyone in their faces. 

Z.

 

do you think that two tape recorders set off to play synchronously in a room constitutes an argument or does it merely produce sounds which if they had been spontaneously produced by two agents would constitute an argument ?

do you understand that you can't argue with a wall?

do you understand that arguing is not merely making 'sounds with your voice' , is not merely 'issuing forth speech'?

 

nirgrahamUK:

do you think that two tape recorders set off to play synchronously in a room constitutes an argument or does it merely produce sounds which if they had been spontaneously produced by two agents would constitute an argument ?

do you understand that you can't argue with a wall?

do you understand that arguing is not merely making 'sounds with your voice' , is not merely 'issuing forth speech'?

Non-sequitur + strawman => grasping at straws. Tape-recorders and/or walls were neither used nor implied in the refutation. Again: "There's no need whatsoever to presuppose: (1) exclusive (2) permanent control over that head (much less the rest of the body), nor is there the necessity to presuppose one's (3) right to such control."

Z.

 

 

 

z1235:

Unless someone can respond to this refutation

What refutation? All I saw was a complete lack of understanding of ontology on your part.

 

 

Knight_of_BAAWA:

What refutation?

This one:

"The only norm ACTUALLY presupposed in argumentation is de facto control of one's head during the length of the argument. There's no need whatsoever to presuppose: (1) exclusive (2) permanent control over that head (much less the rest of the body), nor is there the necessity to presuppose one's (3) right to such control. Argumentation between two heads can go on for a very long time without ANY of the above three AE presuppositions."

Knight_of_BAAWA:

All I saw was a complete lack of understanding of ontology on your part.

Thanks for sharing your observation. That's all?

z.

 

z1235:

Again: "There's no need whatsoever to presuppose: (1) exclusive (2) permanent control over that head (much less the rest of the body), nor is there the necessity to presuppose one's (3) right to such control."

I don't understand what this means or why it is important. I thought the point of argumentation ethics is that you are making a performative contradiction when you argue against self-ownership. It is a negative proof.

 

z1235:

Knight_of_BAAWA:

All I saw was a complete lack of understanding of ontology on your part.

Thanks for sharing your observation. That's all?

that's all that's needed.

z1235:

There's no need whatsoever to presuppose: (1) exclusive (2) permanent control over that head (much less the rest of the body), nor is there the necessity to presuppose one's (3) right to such control. Argumentation between two heads can go on for a very long time without ANY of the above three AE presuppositions."

1 - thanks for arguing.

2 - you proved it, but don't realize that

3 - are you possessed by a demon or an angel?

4 - i see no refutation

E. R. Olovetto:

I thought the point of argumentation ethics is that you are making a performative contradiction when you argue against self-ownership. It is a negative proof.

it is the point.

Knight_of_BAAWA:

What refutation?

z1235:

This one:

Which one? All I saw was a complete lack of understanding of ontology on your part. But thanks for believing that your complete lack of understanding constitutes a refutation. Makes me chuckle.

z1235:

Again: "There's no need whatsoever to presuppose: (1) exclusive (2) permanent control over that head (much less the rest of the body), nor is there the necessity to presuppose one's (3) right to such control."

E. R. Olovetto:

I don't understand what this means or why it is important. I thought the point of argumentation ethics is that you are making a performative contradiction when you argue against self-ownership. It is a negative proof.

It's not a proof. It's a mere assertion, and a silly one, at best. For all you know, I could be a slave arguing the benefits of slavery right here on this forum -- my slave-owner allowing me two hours of online argumentation a day, except Tuesdays when she owns me fully free and clear. Thus, I neither have (1) exclusive, (2) permanent control over my head (much less the rest of my body, as even during the two hours of allowed argumentation my slave-owner gets to do whatever she wants with me, though it can sometimes get distracting) neither do I have (or claim, or want to claim) any (3) RIGHT to such control over myself. How EXACTLY am I contradicting myself by arguing against self-ownership? Please point to the performative contradiction.

This is so silly that I have to question the sanity of anyone that would take AE seriously, much less consider it a proof of ANYTHING at all. 

Z.

 

Knight_of_BAAWA:

Which one? All I saw was a complete lack of understanding of ontology on your part. But thanks for believing that your complete lack of understanding constitutes a refutation. Makes me chuckle.

Again, that's all? Mmm-kay, I'm going to go ahead and chalk this up as: "I really have nothing to say so I'm going to hand-wave my way out of the room."

Z.

 

Knight_of_BAAWA:

Which one? All I saw was a complete lack of understanding of ontology on your part. But thanks for believing that your complete lack of understanding constitutes a refutation. Makes me chuckle.

z1235:

Again, that's all?

That's all I need. So why don't you just hand-wave your way out of the room, while the rest of us understand the nature of the concept "individual".  One does wonder how you ever passed basic arithmetic if you can't understand the concept of unit/single/individual.

 

z1235:

my slave-owner allowing forcing me two hours of online argumentation  mere speech that contains words that if spoken by a free un-coerced person could be understood as demonstrating that i was party to an argument 

nirgrahamUK:

z1235:

my slave-owner allowing forcing me two hours of online argumentation  mere speech that contains words that if spoken by a free un-coerced person could be understood as demonstrating that i was party to an argument 

Thanks for making my circularity point with which I started. How convenient to prove argumentation ethics by simply (a priori) defining *argumentation* as something exclusively done by self-owned agents (by definition!): "You see, by my definition of *argumentation*, you couldn't possibly be *arguing* unless you owned yourself fully, thus, magically I have just proven that, indeed, one couldn't possibly *argue* against self-ownership without contradicting himself." What profound depth. 

By defining *flying* as *touching the ground most of the time*, I could easily prove that pigs can, indeed, *fly*.  

Z.

 

you are arguing with me?

you suppose that if you present me with well reasoned propositions that could form an argument, i might be persuaded to reject my former position and accept yours,by the force of reason and acknowledgement of truth, and this grounds your understanding that you are arguing with me?

but what if an evil philosopher has a gun to my head, and says type or die. says give the Hoppean arguments or die. do not concede your position to the interlocutor or die.

what would your posts amount to?

nirgrahamUK:

but what if an evil philosopher has a gun to my head, and says type or die. says give the Hoppean arguments or die. do not concede your position to the interlocutor or die.

So what? For all I know, that may be EXACTLY what's going on right now. The validity of an argument is independent of the source that produces it and of the circumstances under which it is produced. It's either there or not. It's either good or bad. That's all. From what I've seen so far, yours is more the latter than the ... (sorry, my slave-mistress just tickled me) .. former, so you better shape up or your evil philosopher's finger may start to get itchy on the trigger. 

Z.

 

 

Z.,

you keep arguing, so, you keep proving argumentative ethics.

z1235:

So what?

so this is to help you distinguish between rational argumentation and mere charades. do you think there is never a charade, that all things superficially purporting to be arguments are arguments? i must conclude that you do.

z1235:

For all I know, that may be EXACTLY what's going on right now

and so would you be arguing with me, or not? i presume you think you would be arguing with me....

z1235:

The validity of an argument is independent of the source that produces it and of the circumstances under which it is produced.

yes, the validity of something understood as being a possible logical argument, does have its validity independant of circumstance surrounding its elucidation. but logical arguments are something different from two people engaged in the activity of rational argumentation. I suppose you don't know that, or didn't before i just told you that now. interesting though isnt it?

wilderness:

Z.,

you keep arguing, so, you keep proving argumentative ethics.

Except I'm not proving anything. It is you that needs to point to my performative contradiction in order to prove AE. You can't point to it because it simply isn't there. Please keep up with the discussion instead of simply parroting Hoppe's jingle, as if repeating it 1000 times is going to make it any less silly. 

Btw, I may have to leave soon, as my argumentation time-slot is about to expire, and my slave-mistress is getting antsy to have me all to herself. 

Z.

 

 

z1235:

Btw, I may have to leave soon, as my argumentation time-slot is about to expire, and my slave-mistress is getting antsy to have me all to herself. 

so when has she allotted for the charade to continue? in the meantime i will talk to this wall, the neighbours will think i am arguing with someone on the phone. they will be wrong.

l8r alligator