Knight_of_BAAWA:I still think you don't understand the nature of the concepts involved.
If you understood it then you'd think that I do.
Z.
wilderness: Are you going to argue the truth of what argumentation is compared to dialogue? Are they NOT verbally communicating, ie. that which is consistent with posting in this forum?
Are you going to argue the truth of what argumentation is compared to dialogue? Are they NOT verbally communicating, ie. that which is consistent with posting in this forum?
They are both forms of verbal communications, but their intent and purpose is different. Remember Mises' foundations of praxeology:
"Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals [.]"
The end and goal of an argument makes it wholly different from that of a dialogue.
The fallacies of intellectual communism, a compilation - On the nature of power
z1235:If you understood it then you'd think that I do.
Seriously kid: you need to stop thinking that people are just going to spoon-feed you everything. That's not the way the world works. Sooner you realize that, the better. Now I suggest you start using your brain, rather than trying to be smugly ignorant.
Stranger: They are both forms of verbal communications, but their intent and purpose is different. Remember Mises' foundations of praxeology: "Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals [.]" The end and goal of an argument makes it wholly different from that of a dialogue.
ok.
But my point is *posting in this forum* and what that wholly means and entails. It entails purposeful behavior. It is rational. And to argue against what is rational is to argue against being able to post in this forum - yet - some people post in this forum yet argue against their ability, ie. what provides the capacity (intellect), to do so. It is always an argument based on the honesty of what the person IS doing, ie. posting in this forum. Thus, the honesty of the individuals action declared by their very own posting involves the ethics of their action. Posting in this forum is not an action of initating physical aggression and it necessitaties intellect and the ability to reason in a non-violent manner. It is completely consistent with liberty. What is not consistent with honesty is to argue against what necessities posting in this forum, ie. intellect and reason.
Juan:I don't think that talking about proofs and contradictions means one is necessarily commited to a mathematics-like kind of proof. Even if the term "performative contradiction" sounds a bit more technical, I think it's being correctly used in the context of AE and AE-like positions.
Maybe so. It's hard to tell exactly Hoppe's intent in that regard, so I guess we'll have to leave it at that.
Juan:I'd say that the proof does rely on logic - all proofs must rely on logic. But unless we are dealing with explicit mathematical/formal subjects, we don't ask for definitions all the time. Constantly asking for definitions seems odd to me, but if you think it's a legitimate thing to do, then I think you are bound to define all terms you use, which for some reason you declined to do..
I only constantly ask for definitions because I haven't got a clear definition for the central concepts. It's not that I want the words to be mathematics-level clear, just that I can't really analyze any of the discussion (without being uncharitable) when there still seem to be many possible interpretations for some of the terms. The main example that probably underlies all the others is elaborated here in response to KoB.
Juan:It is true that an argument is 'persuasive' if the target of the argument thinks the argument is right, but that's a tautology of sorts and a form of solipsism. Say, people who favor communism would be persuaded by commie arguments, That doesn't mean that the arguments are 'right'.
I agree with this. It's just a tautology, and persuasiveness doesn't imply normative rightness of any sort.
Juan:In particular, arguments that assume certain ethical positions and reason logically from those positions can be very persuasive, and valid, if the audience shares those starting ethical positions. But that assumes the problem away in my opinion, and even if people share some ethical premises, they tend to reject the conclusions of those premises. For instance lots of people claim to not support theft, BUT favor taxation. It's not that hard to show that taxation and theft are the same thing, yet people remain unconvinced.
In particular, arguments that assume certain ethical positions and reason logically from those positions can be very persuasive, and valid, if the audience shares those starting ethical positions.
I agree. I guess I'm saying that I don't think that an argumentation-ethics-like argument concerning taxation/theft would have any additional convincing power over the "You agree theft is wrong, but taxation is theft, so you must agree taxation is wrong" argument you explained.
Juan:I wonder though why would we want to avoid using persuasive arguments (even if flawed) if our aim is persuassion ?
Well, if they are flawed then they may be initially persuasive, but eventually the flaw will probably be discovered and it could backfire. (Although then we could make a case that such an argument isn't really "persuasive" in the end.) My point in saying that we don't want to present flawed arguments, even if they are persuasive, was just to make clear that I'm not meaning to suggest that kind of persuasive argument when I use the term persuasive.
Juan:Say you neighbor likes to kidnap people and turn them into cat food. That's a different matter which doesn't deal only with your neighbor's 'subjective preferences'. Whether your neighbor is justified in doing what he likes, or not, is a moral problem, and the 'solution' is not to just say that what is right is whatever an individual thinks is right for him.
I agree that it wouldn't be a solution for people to say, "What is right is whatever the perpetrator thinks is right." That wouldn't solve the problem, even from a consequentialist perspective. So I see one thing that you don't mean, but I don't see what you do mean, by the idea of objective right and wrong.
Juan:That may be true to some degree, though I think you are not only objecting to the 'style' so to speak of Hoppe's presentation but to the substance of the whole natural rights position ?
Yes. I think several of these points all revolve around the idea [mentioned above] of what it could mean for right and wrong to be objective, so if you're interested, that would be the point to focus discussion on.
Juan:Even if he doesn't explicitly try to argue his case invoking property rights, his actions are in a way not very consistent. He thinks he can use other people's stuff (that's why he steals) but he would object to people 'stealing back' from him, even without opening his mouth.
Sure, I can see that people would feel perfectly justified in stealing from him. They would say, "Turnabout is fair play."
Juan:They would say, "If you really believed in property rights, you wouldn't have stolen!" Yes. And isn't that an appeal to logic and consistency ?
They would say, "If you really believed in property rights, you wouldn't have stolen!"
I think it's more like an appeal to honesty. They're saying, essentially, "You say (or imply) that you believe in property rights, but your stealing proves you a liar (or disingenuous)."
Juan:But the claim of hypocrisy is based on a logical analysis. Furthermore, the concept of hyposcrisy is a moral concept. For people who believe in 'subjective' morality the concept should be practically meaningless ?
Probably more accurate for me to say honesty, because hypocrisy is maybe a little fuzzy of an idea. A person can still subjectively reject dishonesty, or refuse clemency on those grounds if that's how their personal morals are.
Juan:At any rate, I don't trust people whose standard of justice is to 'maximize social utility'.
Well, in the context of someone's subjective ethics, that would only be their own personal standard of justice. I certainly wouldn't trust a politician whose claimed standard of justice was to maximize social utility, but if we're in anarchy I don't see the problem really, because such a person isn't going to get to decide what law binds you or me.
Why anarchy fails
I think several of these points all revolve around the idea [mentioned above] of what it could mean for right and wrong to be objective, so if you're interested, that would be the point to focus discussion on.
AJ: J: Even if he doesn't explicitly try to argue his case invoking property rights, his actions are in a way not very consistent. He thinks he can use other people's stuff (that's why he steals) but he would object to people 'stealing back' from him, even without opening his mouth. Sure, I can see that people would feel perfectly justified in stealing from him. They would say, "Turnabout is fair play."
J: Even if he doesn't explicitly try to argue his case invoking property rights, his actions are in a way not very consistent. He thinks he can use other people's stuff (that's why he steals) but he would object to people 'stealing back' from him, even without opening his mouth.
AJ: J: Yes. And isn't that an appeal to logic and consistency ? I think it's more like an appeal to honesty. They're saying, essentially, "You say (or imply) that you believe in property rights, but your stealing proves you a liar (or disingenuous)."
J: Yes. And isn't that an appeal to logic and consistency ?
AJ: J: At any rate, I don't trust people whose standard of justice is to 'maximize social utility'. Well, in the context of someone's subjective ethics, that would only be their own personal standard of justice.
J: At any rate, I don't trust people whose standard of justice is to 'maximize social utility'.
I certainly wouldn't trust a politician whose claimed standard of justice was to maximize social utility, but if we're in anarchy I don't see the problem really, because such a person isn't going to get to decide what law binds you or me.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan:Well, I already stated why I don't see the way you ask for clarification as completely consistent. I think that in any discussion, asking for some clarification of some terms is needed. However that's different from trying to refute arguments by asking for definitions all the time, or asserting that the arguments are unclear because allegedly the definitions are unclear.
In any given statement, there's usually only one term I want clarification on. But as things are stated and restated by different people in different forms, the actual words change - one time it's phrased in terms of "rights," another time in terms of "right and wrong," another in terms of "justification," etc. - so at each juncture I need to ask anew, which makes it look like I am always asking for definitions. Also, I think these things have many interpretations, and most of all I don't usually get an answer even if I ask, so I have to ask again. Often people aren't interested in answering. Being all that as it may, somehow or other - and even if it's bothersome - I think we need the definitions out in the open if we want to have any semblance of a coherent discussion.
Juan:Well if the perpetrator doesn't get to "define" what is "right", who does ?
This gets into the objective ethics issue, which I think you indicate below you're not interested in, but for what its worth my answer would be: Maybe no one gets to define what is "right" for everyone.
Juan:I've seen endless discussion about amoralism. I doubt one more discussion will be especially productive...
OK.
Juan: Maybe I wasn't clear enough. A is the thief. If B, the victim, tries to get his stuff back, B is not stealing back. When I said "steal back" I meant that as a joke of sorts. B is getting back his stuff, which he legitimately owns. He's not stealing anything.
In that case they could say, "You took my stuff, so I will take 'your' stuff (actually it's mine)."
Juan:What I'm saying is that A doesn't have a consistent theory and even if he doesn't invoke a theory his actions (trying to keep the loot) are 'inconsistent'.
Agree on the first part, but not sure how you got to the second. As a silly example, he could for instance believe he's God and actually rightfully owns everyone's stuff. Then he'd be consistent. So I think whether he is consistent (with his theory) or not depends on what his theory is.
Juan: It is both. But I don't see what you mean by honesty, since you seem to be unsure about the meaning of 'morally right' and 'morally wrong' ?
By "honesty" I just mean telling the truth vs. telling a lie (i.e., saying something contrary to fact), or implying a truth vs. implying a lie (i.e., implying something contrary to fact - i.e., being disingenuous).
Juan:I don't know what subjective ethics is.
An individual's own principles and/or opinions about what is right and what is wrong, backed I suppose by their moral sense, their experiences, and their reasoning.
Juan:I do know that 'justice' can't be subjective.
Subjective justice would probably just mean the sense of a particular individual that "justice" has been done regarding a particular incident or person, backed I suppose by their sense of justice, their experience, and their reasoning.
Juan:Now, according to utilitarianism, what is just is whatever 'maximizes social utility' and that happens to be an empty formula - which means that justice is whatever the utilitarian mob fancy it is.
Yeah, that is "greatest happiness" utilitarianism. Then there is Mises's utilitarianism, which is more like consequentialism. These terms aren't really meaningful, though, until their scope is fully explained. For example, someone might follow deontological moral code because he believes it has good consequences. Then he'd be a utilitarian in the Misesian sense even though we could also call him a deontologist. Likewise a deontologist might say they are a deontologist because it has good consequences.
Juan:I don't see how that makes any difference at all. Politicians are human after all. If utilitarianism is 'good' then why not let politicians put it into practice ?
With politicians, I don't think it really matters what standards they purport to have - whether utilitarianism or natural rights, for example. They will do what they want.
Juan:Furthermore, I don't know what you mean by anarchy. I am a libertarian who favors a free society, not anarchy per se. A free society means that individual rights are unconditionally respected - a free society can only exist when 'objective' justice is respected.
By "anarchy" I mean a condition where there is no monopoly state. I'm saying that without a state, no one person or theorist will have a large say in what kind of law binds you or me. It seems to me that in the absence of a monopoly state, "the chips will fall where they may," so we can only hope or speculate that society will be how we like it. Fortunately I think there are reasons why society probably will have many or all the features of the free society you may be envisioning.
Juan:Utilitarians and amoralists don't believe in 'individual' justice. They are socialists whose a/moral compass is guided by collectivistic notions of "social utility', or who don't have a moral compass at all. See for instance Mises and his support for military slavery because, in his mind, 'praxeological law'(whatever that is) said that military slavery was OK.
If Mises supported conscription, then certainly he hadn't fully extracted himself the collectivist paradigm, but I've seen other passages where he admits that the right of self-determination should be brought down to the single individual "if possible." He seems to have been conflicted on that issue, but I think that if we were to say that that was because of his utilitarianism, we would be looking at the "proximate causes" of his conclusion. Mises's utilitarianism wasn't about maximizing social utility, it was just about personal self-interest (consequentialism) in the broadest sense. So I don't suppose it was his utilitarianism by itself, but his utilitarianism in combination with lingering vestiges of collectivism that led him to that position. As long as consequentialism is understood as being purely individual, I don't think there is a problem.
Justification, as in, using some non-arbitrary criteria to defend a proposition or proposal.
AJ: for right and wrong to be objective
for right and wrong to be objective
Right and wrong are not objective, and I don't think that is the case being made, is it?
The AE argument simply points out that one cannot deny the NAP without it being a performative contradiction. You can deny the NAP all you want as a man walking the street. But when you have violated the NAP and find yourself being aggressed against, this is when you would want to assert some right to freedom and you cannot because it would involve a performative contradiction.
And I do not assume it to be ethics. I reject ethics, as many people do. Instead of resting political theory on moral grounds, I view political theory as a social construct. Nobody has any rights. Natural rights do not exist. We can all reject any contract with our fellow humans and kill and be killed, and in doing so we will not have committed any wrongs; we will not have violated any natural rights because natural rights do not exist.
But that option is unacceptable to many people. So we say, hey, I want a right to self ownership so I am going to assert that right, and invite you to assert a similar right. By asserting the right, and having others consent to that right, the right is established.That's the nature of rights - they are social constructs.
Now you say, "no, I don't have to recognize your right to self ownership." That's true. You don't. But then that rejection of self ownership boomerangs back on you, and you're fair game.
Individualism
John Scott:I reject ethics
but
John Scott:Now you say, "no, I don't have to recognize your right to self ownership." That's true. You don't. But then that rejection of self ownership boomerangs back on you, and you're fair game.
Does "you're fair game" mean something other than "we're not wrong to act against you"?
AJ:Does "you're fair game" mean something other than "we're not wrong to act against you"?
No, it means precisely that. We are not wrong to rape, kill, butcher or otherwise act upon our desires. How could one be wrong when they are no rules? Right and wrong are non-existent, so it's neither right nor wrong to do with you as I please.
But basically what you've done here:
John Scott: So we say, hey, I want a right to self ownership so I am going to assert that right, and invite you to assert a similar right. By asserting the right, and having others consent to that right, the right is established.That's the nature of rights - they are social constructs. Now you say, "no, I don't have to recognize your right to self ownership." That's true. You don't. But then that rejection of self ownership boomerangs back on you, and you're fair game.
So we say, hey, I want a right to self ownership so I am going to assert that right, and invite you to assert a similar right. By asserting the right, and having others consent to that right, the right is established.That's the nature of rights - they are social constructs.
...is announce that you will treat those who don't recognize your right to self-ownership differently from those who do. The idea of AE, I believe, is to justify that different-treatment.
AJ: But basically what you've done here.. ...is announce that you will treat those who don't recognize your right to self-ownership differently from those who do. The idea of AE, I believe, is to justify that different-treatment.
But basically what you've done here..
Yes, I will first announce my NAP. Then I justify it. Do you know what justify means? It is to provide a rational basis for a theory. The rational basis for the enforcement of NAP is that it is axiomatic. You cannot deny self ownership while at the same time complaining about your self ownership being impinged upon.
John Scott:You cannot deny self ownership while at the same time complaining about your self ownership being impinged upon.
Well I obviously can deny it (it's physically possible), so I assume you mean that I cannot rightfully deny it. But you've said you reject ethics, so I'm confused as to what you're saying.
AJ: John Scott:You cannot deny self ownership while at the same time complaining about your self ownership being impinged upon. Well I obviously can deny it (it's physically possible), so I assume you mean that I cannot rightfully deny it. But you've said you reject ethics, so I'm confused as to what you're saying.
As I said, justification is act of providing a rational basis for an argument. Not practical. When somebody says "you cannot say that 2+2+5!," he isn't saying that you are somehow prevented from physically uttering those words. He's saying that you cannot do so rationally.
You can of course deny NAP. You did and you do. The problem is can you deny self ownership while at the same time asserting a claim that you have a right to be free? In essence, the question is, can you deny self ownership while at the same time asserting self ownership?
The question is not, as you seem to think, whether or not somebody can deny self ownership. We can all do that. The problem is denying self ownership while at the same time asserting self ownership.
And, in regard to ethics, yes, I reject ethics. The divorce of laws from ethics. Note that it is not unethical to be guilty of a performative contraction, it's just illogical.
Ah, I see. In that case, this has been covered before.
Which bit do you wish to invoke?Sorry, I'd rather not assume you are arguing one thing when in fact you are arguing another.
Thanks.
This thread is pretty long, but all the answers are in there and in the other one I linked. Here're the short answers:
John Scott:The problem is can you deny self ownership while at the same time asserting a claim that you have a right to be free? In essence, the question is, can you deny self ownership while at the same time asserting self ownership? The question is not, as you seem to think, whether or not somebody can deny self ownership. We can all do that. The problem is denying self ownership while at the same time asserting self ownership.
I can deny self-ownership for another person, but assert it for myself. Nothing illogical about that.
John Scott:Note that it is not unethical to be guilty of a performative contraction, it's just illogical.
Even if this were true, so what? A thief may performatively contradict himself. Does some harm befall him?
AJ: I can deny self-ownership for another person, but assert it for myself. Nothing illogical about that.
You can deny self ownership for another person. I highly recommend you do so. Why would you grant self ownership to somebody who hasn't granted you the same?
But if you deny self ownership to somebody who has granted you the same, you have lost the grounds for your own self ownership and your own self ownership evaporates like so much morning mist.
John Scott:But if you deny self ownership to somebody who has granted you the same, you have lost the grounds for your own self ownership and your own self ownership evaporates like so much morning mist.
What do you claim were the grounds for my self-ownership in the first place?
AJ: What do you claim were the grounds for my self-ownership in the first place?
Your assertion of self ownership coupled with my recognition of that self ownership in exchange for your recognition of my similar claim to self ownership.
John Scott: AJ: What do you claim were the grounds for my self-ownership in the first place? Your assertion of self ownership coupled with my recognition of that self ownership in exchange for your recognition of my similar claim to self ownership.
That sounds pretty good. I don't think that is quite what AE is saying, but this article seems to take a very similar approach. (It's about IP, but the real meat of it is near the end when he talks about implicit contracts between people engaged in a joint action.) I think you may find Schaefer's argument interesting.
AJ: John Scott: AJ: What do you claim were the grounds for my self-ownership in the first place? Your assertion of self ownership coupled with my recognition of that self ownership in exchange for your recognition of my similar claim to self ownership. That sounds pretty good. I don't think that is quite what AE is saying, but this article seems to take a very similar approach. (It's about IP, but the real meat of it is near the end when he talks about implicit contracts between people engaged in a joint action.) I think you may find Schaefer's argument interesting.
Looks like an interesting article. Thanks!
Bump for the upcoming debate on this topic =)
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
Will there be debate? Between who?
ERO is going to dash Lilburne's position on rocks with one sentence. Or so he claims.