From Wikipedia:Natural law or the law of nature (Latin: lex naturalis) is a theory that posits the existence of a law whose content is set by nature and that therefore has validity everywhere.
I just don't agree with it even in its description. How can you get a law from nature? Isn't nature the "law of the jungle"?Here I stick to the idea that you can't state an ought from an is. Self-ownership and free-will ARE, but they don't suppose, determinate or even relates to the idea of private property. Private property is beneficial, for sure, just like the non-agression principle, but their merits come from other sources, not from "nature".
ivanfoofoo:How can you get a law from nature?
By using your reason.
For example, an a priori law would be the fundamental economic axiom "humans act".
An empirical "law" would be the law of gravity.
The former is known to be absolutely true, just by considering it. The latter must be proved, and can never be known to be absolutely true.
Anarcho Mercantilist:Juan has pointed out the contradiction of one prescibing a moral code that rejects the moral code in itself.
zefreak has pointed out that human subjects prescribe morality.
How can I agree with both sides ?
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
GilesStratton: zefreak: I wouldn't consider myself an amoralist, I just believe value, hence morality is subjective. See, I can sympathize with this. Now, I don't want to drag this down into a debate about religion, but I think that God is necessary for some of morality.
zefreak: I wouldn't consider myself an amoralist, I just believe value, hence morality is subjective.
hashem: ivanfoofoo:How can you get a law from nature? By using your reason. For example, an a priori law would be the fundamental economic axiom "humans act". An empirical "law" would be the law of gravity. The former is known to be absolutely true, just by considering it. The latter must be proved, and can never be known to be absolutely true.
What I meant, is how you can get an "ought to be" law from nature. You can get axioms, but where is a huge leap from there to an universally valid "ought to be" statement.
ivanfoofoo:What I meant, is how you can get an "ought to be" law from nature.
You don't. That's the whole point of natural law. I think you're confused...here we go again..........
hashem: Own means to possess. Look it up. It's not a new word or a new definition. Own has always meant to be in possession of. The mysterious "own" you are referring to is actually the property right in something. But you can't have property rights unless you first have a property in your person, and you can't have that unless it is derived from natural law. Wilmot of Rochester:True, I exist, but existence and control does not mean ownership. Yes, it does. You are your mind, which is in possession of your body. You own yourself. You can't not own yourself. Wilmot of Rochester:Ownership entails either one of two things, impossibility of trespass or immorality of trespass. That's completely absurd. It has nothing to do with either of those! You are literally making things up. You are trying to avoid the property right problem by ignoring it altogether and making up a magical new concept called "own", which is in blatant contrast to the real meaning of the word. You are skipping past the whole problem of property rights to invent a mystical, unheard of concept of "ownership". What you are calling "ownership" is really the property right to something. To own only means to possess. Own means to possess. To have property which would be immoral to violate, is to have a property right in it. But you can't have rational morals grounded in reason unless they are derived from natural law ethics, which is in turn derived from natural law. And you can't have property rights in anything unless you first have a property right in your person -- again, back to natural law.
Own means to possess. Look it up. It's not a new word or a new definition. Own has always meant to be in possession of. The mysterious "own" you are referring to is actually the property right in something. But you can't have property rights unless you first have a property in your person, and you can't have that unless it is derived from natural law.
Wilmot of Rochester:True, I exist, but existence and control does not mean ownership.
Yes, it does. You are your mind, which is in possession of your body. You own yourself. You can't not own yourself.
Wilmot of Rochester:Ownership entails either one of two things, impossibility of trespass or immorality of trespass.
That's completely absurd. It has nothing to do with either of those! You are literally making things up. You are trying to avoid the property right problem by ignoring it altogether and making up a magical new concept called "own", which is in blatant contrast to the real meaning of the word.
You are skipping past the whole problem of property rights to invent a mystical, unheard of concept of "ownership". What you are calling "ownership" is really the property right to something. To own only means to possess.
Own means to possess. To have property which would be immoral to violate, is to have a property right in it. But you can't have rational morals grounded in reason unless they are derived from natural law ethics, which is in turn derived from natural law. And you can't have property rights in anything unless you first have a property right in your person -- again, back to natural law.
Hashem, you are not looking at the definitions in any detail.
What does own mean? Sure, you can point to a dictionary like I point to the GDP when saying, "we're in a recession," but it doesn't really answer the question in depth does it? If ownership is just existence, then you really haven't proven anything substantial have you? Trees exist, do they own themselves? Most libertarians - well... here anyways - would find that absurd. Why? Because trees don't reason? Well, under what understanding of "reason"? Do animals own themselves when they reason out problems? Like a dog that learns to use a chair to jump up onto the kitchen table in steps, for example.
Own means to possess. OK. Well, what does possess mean? What qualifies something as being in possession of? How does one come to possess a property? What is the characteristic of a possession? This is the deeper analysis of meaning, hashem. One that is being ignored in these libertarian like circles that merely serve to feed into the same dogma established by individuals as flawed as anyone else.
You can equate what I'm saying with property rights, if you like. The fact is, however, that when understanding what ownership means in detail, it is not mere existence or control or possession in the commonly understood thought.Ownership, from a moral sense, tends to imply some ethic, this of course shouldn't be debatable from your camp, which so values property ownership. Self-ownership, from your existential stance, is a fact of mere existence, because I own myself - until, of course, I ask you to explain why I own myself and the only thing we can come up with is a roundabout circle of logic or a simply false error, i.e. that I own myself because I am in possession of myself, or I own myself because no one or nothing else can control me.
If you say I own something, and deduce it from the belief that I control it, then ownership is merely control of a subject, yes? But no! You go further, it is self-ownership because only I can control myself, right? But again, you go further! Ownership is mere existence because I exist and thus possess myself! But again...
But you run into a clear problem when it comes to an explanation, hashem. Why do I own myself all of the time - or even some of the time? Because I control myself? So, if someone else trespasses against me to control me and my thoughts, which is a demonstratable and observed potential occurence, do I then belong to them? If not, why not?
existence is elsewhere
Juan:What do you mean, oh Lord Rochester ? (have you talked to the King lately ?)
He banished me a good many years ago. ;-)
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I have written my second attempt as a series of comments at Polycentric Order. I have re-posted that on this forum. This attempt might have convinced wilderness.
I have written my second attempt as a series of comments at Polycentric Order. I have re-posted that on this forum. This attempt might have convinced wilderness.
"maximization of profit" the way you used it is - liberty. Very good post Anarcho-Mercantilist. Very good indeed. The one linked in the quote I provided of you. What I see is the same understandings are being discussed, but only with different words in what your post portrayed. I've perceived this as well and it takes mental leap to be able to perceive from differing positions or language usage. It takes intellectual effort and I thank you for that effort. I agree with your post and didn't see anything that I could refute.
Edit: Yet, it's also obvious that some are fearful of justice and liberty - I have no idea why, so, they try to find a way around it. Those that focus only on the individual and don't recognize natural rights would have no problem with the individual Hitler to be present. It's all subjective and a Hitler when alive "is", so, they go along with it. It's sad. That's how they come across. So I would like to see more intellectual contributions by them to hurdle this deduction that their view promotes, but they seem to not be able to find the rational.
Wilmot of Rochester:What does own mean?
The real word? Or your newly invented magical concept, which is merely a weakly disguised attempt to avoid the property rights problem? What you are calling "own" is really having a property right in something -- but you can't admit that because you would concede natural law, your biggest fear. You can't have property rights unless you first have rights, and you can't have rights unless you ground them in something (natural law).
Wilmot of Rochester:Own means to possess. OK. Well, what does possess mean?
Exactly! None of it has anything to do with property rights. That's what I am pointing out. The point you are trying to make can only be understood in the context of property rights.
Wilmot of Rochester:The fact is, however, that when understanding what ownership means in detail, it is not mere existence or control or possession in the commonly understood thought.
Ok, so, own doesn't mean what it really means, instead, it is to be understood as your mysterious new concept which is a thinly disguised attempt to avoid the property rights problem.
Consider defining: rights, property, property right in one's person, property rights.
Wilmot of Rochester:He banished me a good many years ago. ;-)
Juan: GilesStratton: zefreak: I wouldn't consider myself an amoralist, I just believe value, hence morality is subjective. See, I can sympathize with this. Now, I don't want to drag this down into a debate about religion, but I think that God is necessary for some of morality. That is pretty good. It shows how both moral subjectivism and man-made theism are pretty similar and morally bankrupt. It also shows how both right wing conservatives and some strands of 'progressives' are actually on the very same camp.
In order to avoid terminological conflation, we will use "ethical apriorism" to describe a school of ethics.
We will define "ethical apriorism" as the methodology in which we could deduce moral codes from reason alone, without reference to subjective preferences, human passions, and human desires. For example, the subjective preference of "not being murdered" is irrelevant to the question "is murder moral?" Whether murder is moral or immoral can be determined by reason alone, without reference to human passions. Same with the question "is adultery moral?" or "is blackmail moral?" Human emotions are irrelevant in determining whether these are moral or not. Only reason and "logical consistency" can determine if they are moral or not.
Because ethical apriorism does not ground morality from human passions, it directly contrasts with Lilburne's eolutionary biological approach to ethics. In addition, ethical apriorism argues that reason alone can deduce ethics, without referencing any value-statements. Therefore, it denies the "is-ought" dichotomy, because reason alone can deduce "oughts."
Ethical aprorism can uses many logical arguments in deducing ethics from reason alone. One common argument used within ethical aprorism is the "argument by performative contradiction." Examples of ethical aprorism include Hans-Hermann Hoppe's argumentation ethics, Stephan Kinsella's estoppel argument, and neo-Aristotelian derivation of "ought" from "is" because they contain performative contradiction arguments.
Juan and Hashem perfectly fits into the description of an "ethical apriorist".
My question is, that do you define "ethical objectivism" exactly like how I define "ethical apriorism"? Do you treat these two terms as synonyms? Conversely, do you define "ethical subjectivism" as any ethical system that does not fall under "ethical apriorism"? If you do, then I have just disambiguated your terms so zefreak and I can debate with your guys without the terminological difficulties.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
ivanfoofoo: From Wikipedia:Natural law or the law of nature (Latin: lex naturalis) is a theory that posits the existence of a law whose content is set by nature and that therefore has validity everywhere. I just don't agree with it even in its description. How can you get a law from nature? Isn't nature the "law of the jungle"?Here I stick to the idea that you can't state an ought from an is. Self-ownership and free-will ARE, but they don't suppose, determinate or even relates to the idea of private property. Private property is beneficial, for sure, just like the non-agression principle, but their merits come from other sources, not from "nature".
Nature is here. Where are you if not in nature? And no it's not the "law of the jungle". There's a reason natural law is also called a universal law. Watch this: universal>>univers>>universe. This is the universe. This is all it simply is stating. There is more on this here.
Quotes from that link:
"'Logos' means 'account' and 'physis' means 'nature'. So while thetheologi (poets, prophets, and priests) accounted for things with reference to gods, the physiologi accounted for things with reference to nature."
"To answer that, one must understand Aristotle's conception of 'nature.' Aristotelean nature is an endogenous drive of change or rest (or as many Aristotelean scholars say, an 'inherent principle of change or rest')."
"What Thales seems to have meant when he said that all things have soul is that things move according to their own natures(endogenous drives), and not according to the exogenous actions of mysterious gods."
------
This "endogenous drive" is also understood as inclination or tendency. So in reference to human nature the discussion is about the tendency of the human individual. In other words, to reason what a person tends to do.
John Tyndall:This question of absorption [of colors], considered with reference to its molecular mechanism, is one of the most subtle and difficult in physics. We are not yet in a condition to grapple with it, but we shall be by-and-by. Meanwhile we may profitably glance back on the web of relations which these experiments reveal to us. We have, firstly, in solar light an agent of exceeding complexity, composed of innumerable constituents, refrangible in different degrees. We find, secondly, the atoms and molecules of bodies gifted with the power of sifting solar light in the most various ways, and producing by this sifting the colours observed in nature and art. To do this they must possess a molecular structure commensurate in complexity with that of light itself. Thirdly, we have the human eye and brain, so organized as to be able to take in and distinguish the multitude of impressions thus generated. The light, therefore, at starting is complex; to sift and select it as they do, natural bodies must be complex; while to take in the impressions thus generated, the human eye and brain, however we may simplify our conceptions of their action, must be highly complex. Whence this triple complexity? If what are called material purposes were the only end to be served, a much simpler mechanism would be sufficient. But, instead of simplicity, we have prodigality of relation and adaptation--and this, apparently, for the sole purpose of enabling us to see things robed in the splendours of colour. Would it not seem that Nature harboured the intention of educating us for other enjoyments than those derivable from meat and drink? At all events, whatever Nature meant--and it would be mere presumption to dogmatize as to what she meant -- we find ourselves here, as the upshot of her operations, endowed, not only with capacities to enjoy the materially useful, but endowed with others of indefinite scope and application, which deal alone with the beautiful and the true.
ivanfoofoo: Isn't nature the "law of the jungle"?
Isn't nature the "law of the jungle"?
Also, we are talking about human nature. Must we repeat this? Are you that blind to this? It is human nature to reason. Humans are not beasts. Humans may devolve into beastly ways, but within our natural we have the potential and can thus reason. Our nature does not prevent us from thinking and having rational discourse. No wonder you are all over the place with this. Some of the basics are missing from your understanding. There is much more to human nature than having to continually discuss these struggles between justice and criminals. Human nature is much more beautiful and does much more in life than having to continually confront these base urges. Do you paint?
Anarcho-Mercantilist:In order to avoid terminological conflation, we will use "ethical apriorism" to describe a school of ethics.
Of course, you mean, "In order to avoid having to do any research on the topic so as to comprehend the concepts of natural law and natural law ethics." Why not just use the right words? The concepts have been around and defined and perfected for ages.
Natural law are the laws of nature. Natural law ethics are the ethics derived from natural law according the the nature of whatever is being discussed, in this case, humans.
Anyway, I don't think natural law is a priori. It seems natural law is discovered empirically through reason.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: I have written my second attempt as a series of comments at Polycentric Order. I have re-posted that on this forum. This attempt might have convinced wilderness. "maximization of profit" the way you used it is - liberty. Very good post Anarcho-Mercantilist. Very good indeed. The one linked in the quote I provided of you. What I see is the same understandings are being discussed, but only with different words in what your post portrayed. I've perceived this as well and it takes mental leap to be able to perceive from differing positions or language usage. It takes intellectual effort and I thank you for that effort. I agree with your post and didn't see anything that I could refute. Edit: Yet, it's also obvious that some are fearful of justice and liberty - I have no idea why, so, they try to find a way around it. Those that focus only on the individual and don't recognize natural rights would have no problem with the individual Hitler to be present. It's all subjective and a Hitler when alive "is", so, they go along with it. It's sad. That's how they come across. So I would like to see more intellectual contributions by them to hurdle this deduction that their view promotes, but they seem to not be able to find the rational.
hashem:Anyway, I don't think natural law is a priori. It seems natural law is discovered empirically through reason.
Sorry, but Hume blasted to pieces the idea that our experience can lead to any apodictic laws 200 years ago. Black swans do actually exist.
Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found.
- Edmund Burke
Juan:He did no such thing. Hume is a caricature of empiricism and of himself.
The problem of induction still stands.
laminustacitus: The problem of induction still stands.
It does nothing to refute empirical praxeological axioms. And I don't see it doing much to destroy natural laws. Humans do indeed act.
The problem of induction is worthless much of the time.
Humans require nourishment to survive longer than 3 days. Are you to refute that because it was arrived at empirically?
hashem: Wilmot of Rochester:What does own mean? The real word? Or your newly invented magical concept, which is merely a weakly disguised attempt to avoid the property rights problem? What you are calling "own" is really having a property right in something -- but you can't admit that because you would concede natural law, your biggest fear. You can't have property rights unless you first have rights, and you can't have rights unless you ground them in something (natural law). Wilmot of Rochester:Own means to possess. OK. Well, what does possess mean? Exactly! None of it has anything to do with property rights. That's what I am pointing out. The point you are trying to make can only be understood in the context of property rights. Wilmot of Rochester:The fact is, however, that when understanding what ownership means in detail, it is not mere existence or control or possession in the commonly understood thought. Ok, so, own doesn't mean what it really means, instead, it is to be understood as your mysterious new concept which is a thinly disguised attempt to avoid the property rights problem. Consider defining: rights, property, property right in one's person, property rights.
Ugh. This is why I despise this cutting and pasting in your arguments technique used here. It really doesn't allow for understanding on your part.
In any case, you didn't really answer anything I had to say, so I imagine the conversation is over - chalked up to inability to see into any depth other than what you want to see to support your argument.
The point I was making, however, was that for all your talk of ownership and words, you're not looking too deep into what you're saying or what the concept you're talking about entails. I think this is what makes your argument so poor.
I mean, if you do have to rely on language to make an argument, shouldn't that be an indication of its strength? Just a thought for the next person you talk to about this issue.
Juan:Moral subjectivism is different from the subjectivity of value in economics by the way - a distinction beyond the understanding of zefreak and the other members of the stirner church, it seems.
You never did clarify that position. How is it different, and why? Is value subjective or not? What values are not subjective, and why?
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
hashem: Own means to possess. Look it up. It's not a new word or a new definition. Own has always meant to be in possession of. The mysterious "own" you are referring to is actually the property right in something. But you can't have property rights unless you first have a property in your person, and you can't have that unless it is derived from natural law.
Ok then, lets use your terminology. I "own" myself. How do you derive property rights from that, without conflating "own" with a property right?
zefreak:You never did clarify that position.
How is it different, and why?
Is value subjective or not? What values are not subjective, and why ? .
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: I have written my second attempt as a series of comments at Polycentric Order. I have re-posted that on this forum. This attempt might have convinced wilderness. "maximization of profit" the way you used it is - liberty. Very good post Anarcho-Mercantilist. Very good indeed. The one linked in the quote I provided of you. What I see is the same understandings are being discussed, but only with different words in what your post portrayed. I've perceived this as well and it takes mental leap to be able to perceive from differing positions or language usage. It takes intellectual effort and I thank you for that effort. I agree with your post and didn't see anything that I could refute.
I have not written that article. I also disagree with it. I critiqued that article in the comments section. I linked to it to show my criticism.
wilderness: Edit: Yet, it's also obvious that some are fearful of justice and liberty - I have no idea why, so, they try to find a way around it. Those that focus only on the individual and don't recognize natural rights would have no problem with the individual Hitler to be present. It's all subjective and a Hitler when alive "is", so, they go along with it. It's sad. That's how they come across. So I would like to see more intellectual contributions by them to hurdle this deduction that their view promotes, but they seem to not be able to find the rational.
I believe that you have conflated two different definitions of "natural right." The first is alienable rights, such as those granted by the U.S. Constitution. The second is the rights derived from the natural law of Rothbard. In what sense do you mean "natural rights"? I have already mentioned this same terminological conflation at my blog.
I believe that you have strawmanned the "moral subjectivists" and the "moral nihilists". There are multiple definitions of these two terms. So be sure to define what you mean by "moral subjectivists" or "moral nihilsts" before you critique them. Even though some "moral subjectivists" and "moral nihilists" denies rights (which has multiple definitions), they would actually oppose Hitler. Some are "subjectivists" or "nihilists" in the epistemological level only.
The definition of "natural law" is ambiguous. For instance, Rothbard does not explicitly deny that natural law denies passions and emotions to ground it. Yet, in actual practice, Rothbard's "natural law" actually denies emotions and passions. Therefore, Rothbard's definition of "natural law" is incomplete. One could only get a complete definition of Rothbard's "natural law" by reading his whole book the Ethics of Liberty.
Is "natural law" the same to my definition of "ethical aprorism"? Both Rothbard and Hoppe identify themselves as "natural law" theorists. In addition, my definition of "ethical apriorism" is in accord to the ethical methodology of both Rothbard and Hoppe. Therefore, I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is the same as "natural law".
I invented the term "ethical apriorism" as a replacement for "natural law" because of the ambiguity of the latter. I used "ethical apriorism" to avoid semantic confusion. My use of "ethical apriorism" is just a name only. Therefore, it does not necessarily imply that it is actually apriori. You can replace the term "ethical apriorism" to anything you like, such as "ethical Rothbardianism" or "hashem-ism". I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is about the same as the definition of "natural law", but without the buzzwords such as "natural" or "human nature".
*steals anarcho-mercantalist's means of production*
*beats chest*
Juan: zefreak:You never did clarify that position. What else do you want me to say ? You've confused economics and morals. I can't solve your confusion. How is it different, and why? Moral subjectivism is a doctrine (...) dealing with morals (interpersonal relations) whereas 'subjective value' in economics is only concerned with the valuations of economic goods done by individual actors. Is value subjective or not? What values are not subjective, and why ? . What value are you talking about ? Moral values ? Or valuable potatoes ?
Please do not confuse the two different definitions of "moral subjectivism." In the first sense, "subjectivism" is used descriptively. In the second sense, "subjectivism" is used presciptively.
There is nothing self-contradictory of "descriptive moral subjectivism". Yet, as you have repeatively demonstrated, both literally and sarcastically, that "prescriptive moral subjectivism" is a self-refuting idea. "Presciptive moral subjectivism" is self-refuting because it prescribes a moral code which denies the moral code in itself.
But not so with "descriptive moral subjectivism." "Descriptive moral subjectivism" is an idea that "only human subjects prescribe morality. neither divine entities nor higher spirits prescribe morality."
I bet that zefreak is using "moral subjectivism" in the descriptive sense and Juan is using "moral subjectivism" in the prescriptive sense. Juan is correct that "prescriptive moral subjectivism" is self-contradictory. zefreak is correct that "descriptive moral subjectivism" is not self-contradictory. Both users have used "moral subjectivism" in two different senses of the term.
However, you cannot get a non-ambiguous definition of "moral subjectivism" from any mainstream dictionary. They have failed to warn us that there are at least two different senses of the term. They only provide one definition, which could be interpreted in both senses.
From now on, please specify in which sense you mean by "moral subjectivism" to avoid terminological conflicts. Same with the definition of "moral nihilism". There is "descriptive moral nihilism" and "prescriptive moral nihilsm". Obviously, "prescriptive moral nihilism" is self-refuting, but in the descriptive sense it is not.
Please remember: When using the terms nihilism, objectivism, or subjectivism, please mention whether you are using it in the descriptive or the presciptive sense. Failure to clarify will cause complete chaos!
zefreak:Ok then, lets use your terminology.
Great, because we live on Earth and speak English.
zefreak:I "own" myself. How do you derive property rights from that, without conflating "own" with a property right?
You don't, that's the point. The whole concept of ownership is worthless to the idea of property rights. The property right in one's person is derived from that the nature of humans requires that humans be allowed the right to themselves. Rights are derived from that human nature requires humans to have them in order to survive.
"As reason tells us, all are born thus naturally equal, i.e., withan equal right to their persons, so also with an equal right totheir preservation . . . and every man having a property in hisown person, the labour of his body and the work of his handsare properly his own, to which no one has right but himself; itwill therefore follow that when he removes anything out ofthe state that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixedhis labour with it, and joined something to it that is his own,and thereby makes it his property. . . . Thus every man havinga natural right to (or being proprietor of) his own person andhis own actions and labour, which we call property, it certainlyfollows, that no man can have a right to the person or propertyof another: And if every man has a right to his person andproperty; he has also a right to defend them . . . and so has aright of punishing all insults upon his person and property." -- Elisha Williams
*sigh* The circularity of axoimatic "self-ownership" rears its head again, and again, and again.
Brainpolice: *sigh* The circularity of axoimatic "self-ownership" rears its head again, and again, and again.
In my opinion, all performative contradiction arguments are circular in the sense that they presuppose its premises as logically sound. For example, the self-ownership principle presupposes "ownership". The "law of human action" presupposes the concept of "action" as an abstraction of human behavior. Descartes' conciousness axiom presupposes that the concept "I" is static and atomistic. If the concept "I" is either not static nor atomistic, then the whole argument fails. LaughingMan0X demonstrates that. The conciousness axiom presuposses the concept "I" as static and atomistic. It is arbitrary to assume its staticness and atomicity. It is a form a cognitive dissonance to assume staticness and atomicity.
Please note that although performative contradiction arguments are logically consistent, they are not logically sound. Cognitive dissonance leads us to invent performative contradiction arguments.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I have not written that article. I also disagree with it. I critiqued that article in the comments section. I linked to it to show my criticism.
That was a bit deceptive then. But no matter...
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I believe that you have conflated two different definitions of "natural right." The first is alienable rights, such as those granted by the U.S. Constitution. The second is the rights derived from the natural law of Rothbard. In what sense do you mean "natural rights"? I have already mentioned this same terminological conflation at my blog.
I've been using the same natural rights the whole time. Life (person), liberty, and property. From what I typed above I have no clue how you could have determined all of what you commented here. I know you like to write long for clarification, but I think you may read into things too much... but so be it. It's a process.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I believe that you have strawmanned the "moral subjectivists" and the "moral nihilists".
I believe that you have strawmanned the "moral subjectivists" and the "moral nihilists".
See. I don't even get into these conversations about "moral subjectivists" and etc, etc... I've been saying long before you brought this up in this thread that to get into subjectivism and objectivism are only going to make the clarifications have to become longer and longer. It's not a surprising conclusion and not a new idea. Books are even written about this, so, somebody has taken it that far to point out the lack of explanatory power that subjective and objective carry. But if I've strawmanned, let's see why you say so...
Anarcho-Mercantilist: There are multiple definitions of these two terms. So be sure to define what you mean by "moral subjectivists" or "moral nihilsts" before you critique them.
There are multiple definitions of these two terms. So be sure to define what you mean by "moral subjectivists" or "moral nihilsts" before you critique them.
See that's your first problem. I never said they were either of these terms. You say here, "you mean by" and "before you"... and yet I've never even typed those concepts in my posts as explanations or concepts to be used. So more about nothing, unfortunately. But let's continue...
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Even though some "moral subjectivists" and "moral nihilists" denies rights (which has multiple definitions),
Even though some "moral subjectivists" and "moral nihilists" denies rights (which has multiple definitions),
Not multiple definitions, but go on... It's also since I've defined them according to my perception which thereby gives any other person the opportunity to point out where they don't agree with the definitions - yet - they don't argue over the definitions they are arguing over rights in and of themselves. They don't want them. It's clear-cut and dry. Your going on rambling I think about a whole lot of nothing, but let's continue more...
Anarcho-Mercantilist: they would actually oppose Hitler. Some are "subjectivists" or "nihilists" in the epistemological level only.
they would actually oppose Hitler. Some are "subjectivists" or "nihilists" in the epistemological level only.
So they don't have the foresight in other words to reject a Hitler. I can explain how to reject a Hitler in knowledge before-hand. They don't have the explanatory power to do so.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: The definition of "natural law" is ambiguous. For instance, Rothbard does not explicitly deny that natural law denies passions and emotions to ground it. Yet, in actual practice, Rothbard's "natural law" actually denies emotions and passions. Therefore, Rothbard's definition of "natural law" is incomplete. One could only get a complete definition of Rothbard's "natural law" by reading his whole book the Ethics of Liberty.
No Rothbard doesn't reject emotions and passions. Again you reading into this too much. Just cause he doesn't talk about baseball bats when he discusses natural law doesn't mean baseball bats don't exist. Rothbard in the "Ethics of Liberty" specifically pointed out he was not going to get into the details of natural law in that book since numerous other people have written on the topic, thus, that was not the focus of his book - simple.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Is "natural law" the same to my definition of "ethical aprorism"? Both Rothbard and Hoppe identify themselves as "natural law" theorists. In addition, my definition of "ethical apriorism" is in accord to the ethical methodology of both Rothbard and Hoppe. Therefore, I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is the same as "natural law". I invented the term "ethical apriorism" as a replacement for "natural law" because of the ambiguity of the latter.
I invented the term "ethical apriorism" as a replacement for "natural law" because of the ambiguity of the latter.
You invented a word cause of your incomplete understanding in other words.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I used "ethical apriorism" to avoid semantic confusion. My use of "ethical apriorism" is just a name only. Therefore, it does not necessarily imply that it is actually apriori. You can replace the term "ethical apriorism" to anything you like, such as "ethical Rothbardianism" or "hashem-ism". I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is about the same as the definition of "natural law", but without the buzzwords such as "natural" or "human nature".
I used "ethical apriorism" to avoid semantic confusion. My use of "ethical apriorism" is just a name only. Therefore, it does not necessarily imply that it is actually apriori. You can replace the term "ethical apriorism" to anything you like, such as "ethical Rothbardianism" or "hashem-ism". I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is about the same as the definition of "natural law", but without the buzzwords such as "natural" or "human nature".
lol... you replaced a word cause you don't like the buzzwords "natural" or "human nature"....lol Too funny. Yet they mean the same thing... I call that arrogance and a lacking of effort on your part to understand the simple words that have been traditionally used that have good explanatory power. I can't help it that you don't understand or have a distaste of "nature". Or as I've seen in another post you have a fetish with a completely good concept for personal reasons and thereby want to try to rewrite history. Yes it's called arrogance on your part.
It's circular cause it's self-evident. In other words, it's what we naturally do and to have to explain what we naturally do IS to become circular for the paradox points out that such a line of thinking goes no further. Paradoxes are good signs. Now if you've been thinking along the lines of something and come across a paradox and it's a real paradox (is circular) and you don't like it then (1) make sure the systematic thought that closes out with the paradox is descriptive of what is actually happening, is, scientific or (2) try other systematic exercises of thought and see where they lead you without throwing away any of the same facts. But a paradox is good without such you wouldn't see the boundaries of any concept.
wilderness: I've been using the same natural rights the whole time. Life (person), liberty, and property. From what I typed above I have no clue how you could have determined all of what you commented here. I know you like to write long for clarification, but I think you may read into things too much... but so be it. It's a process.
You used "natural rights" in the first sense of alienable rights. For example, those granted by the U.S. Constitution. It is ironic that you used "natural rights" contrary to what Rothbard had meant, contrary to the subject of this thread. I am glad that you clarified this.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: I believe that you have strawmanned the "moral subjectivists" and the "moral nihilists". See. I don't even get into this conversations about "moral subjectivists" and etc, etc... But if I've strawmanned, let's see why you say so...
See. I don't even get into this conversations about "moral subjectivists" and etc, etc... But if I've strawmanned, let's see why you say so...
You failed to clarify what you had meat by "moral subjectivism" (whether it's "ethical non-apriorism", "anti-natural law", "prescriptive ethical subjectivism", or "descriptive ethical subjectivism"). Please read my post about the terminological confusions before you go on. Thanks.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: they would actually oppose Hitler. Some are "subjectivists" or "nihilists" in the epistemological level only. So they don't have the foresight in other words to reject a Hitler. I can explain how to reject a Hitler in knowledge before-hand. They don't have the explanatory power to do so.
Please demonstrate why "moral nihilists" does not have the "explanatory power to do so." Please specify what you mean by "moral nihilism" (prescriptive or descriptive). And specify if "moral nihilism" is anything besides "ethical aprorism" as how I defined it. That would clarify that a lot.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: The definition of "natural law" is ambiguous. For instance, Rothbard does not explicitly deny that natural law denies passions and emotions to ground it. Yet, in actual practice, Rothbard's "natural law" actually denies emotions and passions. Therefore, Rothbard's definition of "natural law" is incomplete. One could only get a complete definition of Rothbard's "natural law" by reading his whole book the Ethics of Liberty. No Rothbard doesn't reject emotions and passions.
No Rothbard doesn't reject emotions and passions.
I meant that Rothbard rejected emotions and passions as a basis for the moral code. I will requote my past comment on defining "ethical apriorism" to demonstrate what Rothbard had meant:
Anarcho-Mercantilist: We will define "ethical apriorism" as the methodology in which we could deduce moral codes from reason alone, without reference to subjective preferences, human passions, and human desires. For example, the subjective preference of "not being murdered" is irrelevant to the question "is murder moral?" Whether murder is moral or immoral can be determined by reason alone, without reference to human passions. Same with the question "is adultery moral?" or "is blackmail moral?" Human emotions are irrelevant in determining whether these are moral or not. Only reason and "logical consistency" can determine if they are moral or not.
wilderness: You invented a word cause of your incomplete understanding in other words.
That isn't an objection.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: I have not written that article. I also disagree with it. I critiqued that article in the comments section. I linked to it to show my criticism. That was a bit deceptive then. But no matter... wilderness: You invented a word cause of your incomplete understanding in other words. Anarcho-Mercantilist: I used "ethical apriorism" to avoid semantic confusion. My use of "ethical apriorism" is just a name only. Therefore, it does not necessarily imply that it is actually apriori. You can replace the term "ethical apriorism" to anything you like, such as "ethical Rothbardianism" or "hashem-ism". I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is about the same as the definition of "natural law", but without the buzzwords such as "natural" or "human nature". lol... you replaced a word cause you don't like the buzzwords "natural" or "human nature"....lol Too funny. Yet they mean the same thing... I call that arrogance and a lacking of effort on your part to understand the simple words that have been traditionally used that have good explanatory power. I can't help it that you don't understand or have a distaste of "nature". Or as I've seen in another post you have a fetish with a completely good concept for personal reasons and thereby want to try to rewrite history. Yes it's called arrogance on your part.
Is it useful when I had invented the terms "presciptive ethical subjectivism" and "descriptive ethical subjectivism" to clarify it? It is very useful and essential to resolve semantic conflicts.
"Ethical aprorism" is a broader category than "natural law" because it does not regard the multiple confusing definitions of "nature" and "natural". This makes it easier to critique. If I refute "ethical aprorism", then "natural law" is also refuted because it is a form of ethical apriorism.
Even if you argue that the terms "nature" and "natural" are not confusing, I will still refute Rothbard's "natural law" if I refute "ethical apriorism" because "ethical aprorism" is broader than "natural law".
zefreak:I'll be waiting, considering the content of your last few posts.
I hope I did not keep you waiting too long...
How do you mean this by the way...
zefreak: majevska: "Ownership," conventionally defined is not synonymous with neurological control of actions. Let's say you claim to own a particular teddy bear-- do you mean that you can telepathically control the actions of the teddy bear? What about your heart? You have no direct conscious neurological control over its actions; do you not own it?
majevska: "Ownership," conventionally defined is not synonymous with neurological control of actions. Let's say you claim to own a particular teddy bear-- do you mean that you can telepathically control the actions of the teddy bear? What about your heart? You have no direct conscious neurological control over its actions; do you not own it?
"Ownership," conventionally defined is not synonymous with neurological control of actions. Let's say you claim to own a particular teddy bear-- do you mean that you can telepathically control the actions of the teddy bear? What about your heart? You have no direct conscious neurological control over its actions; do you not own it?
This is comparing apples and oranges, you are not a teddy bear, nor is a teddy bear a sentient creature, now lets say your wife, do you own your wife?
zefreak: majevska: De jure and de facto ownership are meaningful descriptive terms, normative claims of ownership, are a different beast entirely. What a lot of people are doing in this thread is equivocating normative claims of ownership with descriptive claims. It makes sense for neurological connections to be evidence of de facto ownership, but it's not evidence of cosmic de jure ownership, i.e. natural law. . I don't see any evidence for the existence of universal de jure ownership in humans.
majevska: De jure and de facto ownership are meaningful descriptive terms, normative claims of ownership, are a different beast entirely. What a lot of people are doing in this thread is equivocating normative claims of ownership with descriptive claims. It makes sense for neurological connections to be evidence of de facto ownership, but it's not evidence of cosmic de jure ownership, i.e. natural law. . I don't see any evidence for the existence of universal de jure ownership in humans.
De jure and de facto ownership are meaningful descriptive terms, normative claims of ownership, are a different beast entirely. What a lot of people are doing in this thread is equivocating normative claims of ownership with descriptive claims.
It makes sense for neurological connections to be evidence of de facto ownership, but it's not evidence of cosmic de jure ownership, i.e. natural law. . I don't see any evidence for the existence of universal de jure ownership in humans.
De jure and de facto ownership are reasoned descriptive terms, why should it not be how one ought to live, would you rather be living outside of reason?
The second statement quoted basically says self ownership is a matter of fact by way of evidence of Neurological connections, but somehow this cannot be translated into a "law", I am supposing because the poster is under some impression that humans should not be held accountable for their actions....
It sounds like the ocean, smells like fresh mountain air, and tastes like the union of peanut butter and chocolate. ~Liberty Student
Wilmot of Rochester:Meaning that it's not about whether natural law exists or not, it's what natural law achieves in matters - like violent "crimes" - that it deals with, which is nothing.
Natural law gives you freedom to act, all choices from curling in a ball and crying like a sissy to fighting back are an achievement of natural law, what you are now confusing is natural law and "the" law, which achieves no end to violent "crime" or any crime for that matter, it just defines what is a crime...
wilderness: Yet, it's also obvious that some are fearful of justice and liberty - I have no idea why, so, they try to find a way around it.
Fear of responsibility for their actions...
One way to refute Rothbardian natural law is to refute ethical apriorism. Because ethical apriorism is a broader category than Rothbardian natural law, refuting the former will consequentially refute the latter.
How do we refute ethical apriorism then? I found three ways. The first way is to refute the proposition: "ethics only requires reason alone, with no grounding by emotions or passions." Lilburne already did that, and hence he has legitimately refuted Rothbardian natural law.
A second way to refute ethical apriorism is to refute the legitimacy of the argument by performative contradiction. I have summarized my points against the performative contradiction argument in my blog and some forum posts here.
A third way to refute ethical aprorism is to refute that we can derive normative ethical commands from descriptive statements, like refuting that we can derive an "ought" from an "is". Rothbardian natural law uses "nature" as an "is."
Anarcho-Mercantilist: You used "natural rights" in the first sense of alienable rights. For example, those granted by the U.S. Constitution. It is ironic that you used "natural rights" contrary to what Rothbard had meant, contrary to the subject of this thread. I am glad that you clarified this.
First off, it doesn't say anywhere in the constitution: life, liberty, and property. tiring...
Secondly, natural rights that I'm using are the same that Lock and Rothbard used. Same natural rights that have been used on this forum by various people in various threads. *sigh*
Anarcho-Mercantilist: You failed to clarify what you had meat by "moral subjectivism" (whether it's "ethical non-apriorism", "anti-natural law", "prescriptive ethical subjectivism", or "descriptive ethical subjectivism"). Please read my post about the terminological confusions before you go on. Thanks.
I NEVER typed "moral subjectivism". I NEVER brought it up - so - deductively - I couldn't MEAN anything by it. But I'll reread your post and let you know from which position I am coming from on those concepts though.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Please demonstrate why "moral nihilists" does not have the "explanatory power to do so." Please specify what you mean by "moral nihilism" (prescriptive or descriptive). And specify if "moral nihilism" is anything besides "ethical aprorism" as how I defined it. That would clarify that a lot.
Ok. Why I say that is because you said they don't have the knowledge process (epistemological). Thus are not knowledgeable about such a thing. If you meant something else please clarify.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I meant that Rothbard rejected emotions and passions as a basis for the moral code. I will requote my past comment of "ethical apriorism" to demonstrate what Rothbard had meant:
I meant that Rothbard rejected emotions and passions as a basis for the moral code. I will requote my past comment of "ethical apriorism" to demonstrate what Rothbard had meant:
I don't know if Rothbard "rejected" it in the sense you mean. Rothbard, as I said, didn't write the "Ethics of Liberty" to get into natural law that much - that's what he stated. I've read his "For a New Liberty..." and he mentions nothing about this either. So what book are you talking about of Rothbards? So something like passions and such wouldn't have even come up in his book as he stated why. Now if you go back to Aristotle, he goes on and on about passions and emotions while discussing actions having to do with voluntary choices at the same time. I've stated this before. Pursuit of happiness encompasses emotions, passions, and rational thought. Aristotle goes on extensively about this in his Ethics book. And Plauche goes on about this in his dissertation for it's a common understanding for people that understand the pursuit of happiness which Jefferson included as a inalienable right in the Declaration of Independence cause of his readings from Hutcheson and Locke discussed pursuit of happiness too. Now I don't think pursuit of happiness is an inalienable right within the scope of lawful justifications but it is a human action. So I disagree with Jefferson on this point, but this is becoming a tangent for anybody that intellectually has come this far (meaning I've discussed this with others and so far my disagreement seems well-founded but this does nothing to the concept whatsoever it merely changes it's genus name in the family tree of Natural Law). But the reason I brought this up is because Natural Law of human nature and thus all the nuisances of human nature in general such as human biology, ethics, kinesiology, culture, psychology, etc.. is a whole systemic array of understanding. In other words, human nature can be studied and understood in various ways. All of these preferences and natural rights can be understood by one principle: pursuit of happiness. So if you understand this principle you will find nobody has left out passions, emotions, and rationality in the systematic thought of Natural Law.
ok. Sound good. But that's what Natural Law is about and Natural law is much much more. You are merely providing a term about reasons own action in deducing moral codes. Whether that exists or not, such a term elsewhere, I don't know. But the thing is Natural Law isn't confined to an individuals own reasoning of moral codes. They are confirmed in interpersonal relations too. So Natural Law is not only in ones head but is inducted too. Natural Law is scientific. It is demonstrable.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: That isn't an objection.
It's not an objection, but it's your reason it would seem.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Is it useful when I had invented the terms "presciptive ethical subjectivism" and "descriptive ethical subjectivism" to clarify it? It is very useful and essential to resolve semantic conflicts.
I don't know. Time will tell. But I don't get into the subjective and objective stuff, as noted. I simply stick with "value". I can value something or not. I can value something objective or subjective. I can discarded, meaning, I can not value something that is objective or subjective. It's up to me.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: "Ethical aprorism" is a broader category than "natural law" because it does not regard the multiple confusing definitions of "nature" and "natural". This makes it easier to critique. If I refute "ethical aprorism", then "natural law" is also refuted because it is a form of ethical apriorism.
No it's not a "broader category" it is a smaller category from what I see. Nature is not confusing. We live in nature. It's only people that don't go outside and forget we live in a natural world that get confused. Natural Law is also called universal law - and you know why? - cause we live in the universe. The boundaries of place are defined as to where the law of nature and thus the law of the universe occur. They occur in nature. They occur in the universe. It's not a challenging concept.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Even if you argue that the terms "nature" and "natural" are not confusion, then I will still refute Rothbard's "natural law" if I refute "ethical apriorism". Because "ethical aprorism" is broader than "natural law".
Even if you argue that the terms "nature" and "natural" are not confusion, then I will still refute Rothbard's "natural law" if I refute "ethical apriorism". Because "ethical aprorism" is broader than "natural law".
It's not broader at all. It's a concept about a specific event: reasoning moral codes. That's not broad at all. That is actually very, very tiny compared to what natural law covers.