Juan:Sorry, are you so ill informed as to suggest that fields are NOT material ?? Is that what you are saying ???
How do fields work is what I meant. How they interact with other material, the result of such interaction cannot be reduced to a material itself.
We should probably start a new thread to allow for organized discussion on the topic.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Lilburne: zefreak:My position, as well as I am able to express it, is that the law of identity, excluded middle, and other axioms of formal logic are necessary to conceptualize and understand reality, but do not "enforce" themselves on material reality. They may be seen as descriptive, or representational of material behavior but without conciousness these concepts do not come into being. Particles don't stop moving if there are no concious beings, but the representation does not exist. Well conceived, and well put.
zefreak:My position, as well as I am able to express it, is that the law of identity, excluded middle, and other axioms of formal logic are necessary to conceptualize and understand reality, but do not "enforce" themselves on material reality. They may be seen as descriptive, or representational of material behavior but without conciousness these concepts do not come into being. Particles don't stop moving if there are no concious beings, but the representation does not exist.
Well conceived, and well put.
Yes it is, but how he gets from there to there in detail is lacking. He is saying one thing here and then when it comes down to explaining it further, zefreak, seems to not know what he initially said. I also think he rejects human descriptions cause they are from humans, and thus, a fundamental problem that I see in his position. Even though these human descriptions are as he said here, "They may be seen as descriptive or representational of material behavior...". Yet he says "may" and he is therefore unwilling to except the universal truth that a human may conceive cause of this one word: may. That, I think, boils the argument down, at least for me. So because of this "may" he rejects positions cause to him they only may exist.
zefreak: Light is light. Reflection is a change in direction of a particle. It is the result of photons interacting with electrons.
Light is light. Reflection is a change in direction of a particle. It is the result of photons interacting with electrons.
Yes light is light however for light to travel it needs to be in ray format therefore material. Getting to this micro level is difficult to conceptualize because they are so small. Trillions of oxygen molecules are now flying around you right now. Pretty nifty stuff.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
wilderness: Lilburne: zefreak:My position, as well as I am able to express it, is that the law of identity, excluded middle, and other axioms of formal logic are necessary to conceptualize and understand reality, but do not "enforce" themselves on material reality. They may be seen as descriptive, or representational of material behavior but without conciousness these concepts do not come into being. Particles don't stop moving if there are no concious beings, but the representation does not exist. Well conceived, and well put. Yes it is, but how he gets from there to there in detail is lacking. He is saying one thing here and then when it comes down to explaining it further, zefreak, seems to not know what he initially said. I also think he rejects human descriptions cause they are from humans, and thus, a fundamental problem that I see in his position. Even though these human descriptions are as he said here, "They may be seen as descriptive or representational of material behavior...". Yet he says "may" and he is therefore unwilling to except the universal truth that a human may conceive cause of this one word: may. That, I think, boils the argument down, at least for me. So because of this "may" he rejects positions cause to him that only may exist.
Yes it is, but how he gets from there to there in detail is lacking. He is saying one thing here and then when it comes down to explaining it further, zefreak, seems to not know what he initially said. I also think he rejects human descriptions cause they are from humans, and thus, a fundamental problem that I see in his position. Even though these human descriptions are as he said here, "They may be seen as descriptive or representational of material behavior...". Yet he says "may" and he is therefore unwilling to except the universal truth that a human may conceive cause of this one word: may. That, I think, boils the argument down, at least for me. So because of this "may" he rejects positions cause to him that only may exist.
What? I meant "may" as in "can". In other words it is instrumental to perceive them as descriptive or representational of material behavior...
The laws of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction are normative rules invented by humans. They function like tools which help us understand and analyze "reality." Like all tools, these rules have flaws. In addition, because I reject the soundness of the performative contradiction argument, I reject the belief that we can derive those three laws from performative contradiction arguments. For example, Juan's sacrasm cannot convince me that we cannot "reject" the law of identity.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
zefreak:How do fields work is what I meant. How they interact with other material, the result of such interaction cannot be reduced to a material itself.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Anarcho-Mercantilist:The laws of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction are normative rules invented by humans.
What in nature transgresses these laws? If your argument is that we construct our reality through rationalization [ I think that is Kant but I may be incorrect ] then shouldn't these laws become nonexistent before or after humanity?
For example, Juan's sacrasm cannot convince me that we cannot "reject" the law of identity.
Brainpolice: *sigh* The circularity of axoimatic "self-ownership" rears its head again, and again, and again.
*sigh* The circularity of axoimatic "self-ownership" rears its head again, and again, and again.
You know, I think the self-ownership principle and the natural rights idea is fine, as long as it's taken as JUST being an assumed point.
My problem comes when we start believing that ethics are objectively constant and universal when I just can't say that they are.
existence is elsewhere
Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: You used "natural rights" in the first sense of alienable rights. For example, those granted by the U.S. Constitution. It is ironic that you used "natural rights" contrary to what Rothbard had meant, contrary to the subject of this thread. I am glad that you clarified this. First off, it doesn't say anywhere in the constitution: life, liberty, and property. tiring... Secondly, natural rights that I'm using are the same that Lock and Rothbard used. Same natural rights that have been used on this forum by various people in various threads. *sigh* Rothbard had defined "natural rights" as rights derived from his natural law. Other philosophers used the term "natural rights" without an underlying "natural law." Such philosophers include the framers of the U.S. Constitution. They defined "natural rights" as the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: You used "natural rights" in the first sense of alienable rights. For example, those granted by the U.S. Constitution. It is ironic that you used "natural rights" contrary to what Rothbard had meant, contrary to the subject of this thread. I am glad that you clarified this. First off, it doesn't say anywhere in the constitution: life, liberty, and property. tiring... Secondly, natural rights that I'm using are the same that Lock and Rothbard used. Same natural rights that have been used on this forum by various people in various threads. *sigh*
Anarcho-Mercantilist: You used "natural rights" in the first sense of alienable rights. For example, those granted by the U.S. Constitution. It is ironic that you used "natural rights" contrary to what Rothbard had meant, contrary to the subject of this thread. I am glad that you clarified this.
You used "natural rights" in the first sense of alienable rights. For example, those granted by the U.S. Constitution. It is ironic that you used "natural rights" contrary to what Rothbard had meant, contrary to the subject of this thread. I am glad that you clarified this.
First off, it doesn't say anywhere in the constitution: life, liberty, and property. tiring...
Secondly, natural rights that I'm using are the same that Lock and Rothbard used. Same natural rights that have been used on this forum by various people in various threads. *sigh*
Rothbard had defined "natural rights" as rights derived from his natural law. Other philosophers used the term "natural rights" without an underlying "natural law." Such philosophers include the framers of the U.S. Constitution. They defined "natural rights" as the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
No they didn't. Jefferson and others clearly knew of natural law. Inalienable and alienable rights are descriptions of how natural rights can be conceived. Hutcheson in the 1700's came up with these terms (inalienable and alienable). So it goes: Natural Law>natural rights>alienable and inalienable rights.
It is thought in this way respectively: family>genus>species.
I have been saying natural rights are derived from Natural Law so again I saying what Rothbard is saying along with Hutcheson and Locke.
Natural rights are life, liberty, and property. Pursuit of happiness, if you want to understand what that means, then read this. It contains all rights, so, I can see why Jefferson applied pursuit of happiness. It is a more complicated topic that I don't think you are ready to discuss yet.
Quote of Jefferson:
"A right to property is founded in our natural wants, in the means with which we are endowed to satisfy these wants, and the right to what we acquire by those means without violating the similar rights of other sensible beings." --Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours, 1816
I'll come back to the rest of your post in another post.
Juan: zefreak:How do fields work is what I meant. How they interact with other material, the result of such interaction cannot be reduced to a material itself. What ? What 'result' are you talking about ? A ball bounces off a wall. Two material entities interacting. What is it that CAN'T be reduced to a material phenomenon in that case ?
Lets start over. You objected to the claim that consciousness is the "result" of material factors but is not itself material. Maybe I can rephrase that and avoid the clunky metaphors. Consciousness is the catch-all term for the many ways the brain processes, stores, and combines information in such a way that we "see" entities consisting of color, texture, and smell even though this is simply a representation.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: You used "natural rights" in the first sense of alienable rights. For example, those granted by the U.S. Constitution. It is ironic that you used "natural rights" contrary to what Rothbard had meant, contrary to the subject of this thread. I am glad that you clarified this. First off, it doesn't say anywhere in the constitution: life, liberty, and property. tiring... Secondly, natural rights that I'm using are the same that Lock and Rothbard used. Same natural rights that have been used on this forum by various people in various threads. *sigh* Even some "descriptive ethical nihilists" can defend the rights to life, liberty, and property, while remaining consistent with their beliefs. Even though some of them may deny "rights" on the descriptive epistemlogical level, they nevertheless refrain from murder, respect the property of their neighbors, and may even support Austrian economics. The inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property do not only belong to "natural rights" philosophers; all sorts of people use it--from the framers of the U.S. Constituiton, to some descriptive ethical nihilists. I previously claimed "natural rights" as an irrelevant topic in this thread. "Natural rights", in the sense of inalienable rights, does not merely belong to Rothbardian natural law, but belong to a whole array of different ethical systems.
Even some "descriptive ethical nihilists" can defend the rights to life, liberty, and property, while remaining consistent with their beliefs. Even though some of them may deny "rights" on the descriptive epistemlogical level, they nevertheless refrain from murder, respect the property of their neighbors, and may even support Austrian economics. The inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property do not only belong to "natural rights" philosophers; all sorts of people use it--from the framers of the U.S. Constituiton, to some descriptive ethical nihilists.
I previously claimed "natural rights" as an irrelevant topic in this thread. "Natural rights", in the sense of inalienable rights, does not merely belong to Rothbardian natural law, but belong to a whole array of different ethical systems.
You confuse and thus don't perceive that natural rights, the genus, has the species of alienable and inalienable rights. If they follow natural rights but reject natural rights, then? A is not A. I'm not going for this contradiction.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: You failed to clarify what you had meat by "moral subjectivism" (whether it's "ethical non-apriorism", "anti-natural law", "prescriptive ethical subjectivism", or "descriptive ethical subjectivism"). Please read my post about the terminological confusions before you go on. Thanks. I NEVER typed "moral subjectivism". I NEVER brought it up - so - deductively - I couldn't MEAN anything by it. But I'll reread your post and let you know from which position I am coming from on those concepts though. You typed the word "subjectivism", which can refer to "moral subjectivism". You also used "moral nihilism". You can do the same thing with "moral nihilism" too. For example, you have to at least distinguish between "descriptive moral nihilism" and "prescrptive moral nihilism".
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: You failed to clarify what you had meat by "moral subjectivism" (whether it's "ethical non-apriorism", "anti-natural law", "prescriptive ethical subjectivism", or "descriptive ethical subjectivism"). Please read my post about the terminological confusions before you go on. Thanks. I NEVER typed "moral subjectivism". I NEVER brought it up - so - deductively - I couldn't MEAN anything by it. But I'll reread your post and let you know from which position I am coming from on those concepts though.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: You failed to clarify what you had meat by "moral subjectivism" (whether it's "ethical non-apriorism", "anti-natural law", "prescriptive ethical subjectivism", or "descriptive ethical subjectivism"). Please read my post about the terminological confusions before you go on. Thanks.
You failed to clarify what you had meat by "moral subjectivism" (whether it's "ethical non-apriorism", "anti-natural law", "prescriptive ethical subjectivism", or "descriptive ethical subjectivism"). Please read my post about the terminological confusions before you go on. Thanks.
I NEVER typed "moral subjectivism". I NEVER brought it up - so - deductively - I couldn't MEAN anything by it. But I'll reread your post and let you know from which position I am coming from on those concepts though.
You typed the word "subjectivism", which can refer to "moral subjectivism".
You also used "moral nihilism". You can do the same thing with "moral nihilism" too. For example, you have to at least distinguish between "descriptive moral nihilism" and "prescrptive moral nihilism".
I think you have Juan and I confused. I don't like to discuss subjectivism and objectivism on the grounds of the confusion such concepts lead to. I've been that way since I've entered this forum, trust me.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: That isn't an objection. It's not an objection, but it's your reason it would seem. I would have used "ethical naturalism" to refer to Rothbardian natural law. However, all of the sources defined "ethical naturalism" ambiguously. For example, these definitions failed to clearly specify if it considers human passions as a determinator of morality. As I quoted above, Rothbardian natural law does not consider human passions as a determinator.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: That isn't an objection. It's not an objection, but it's your reason it would seem.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: That isn't an objection.
That isn't an objection.
It's not an objection, but it's your reason it would seem.
I would have used "ethical naturalism" to refer to Rothbardian natural law. However, all of the sources defined "ethical naturalism" ambiguously. For example, these definitions failed to clearly specify if it considers human passions as a determinator of morality. As I quoted above, Rothbardian natural law does not consider human passions as a determinator.
Again I don't know if Rothbard thinks passions are absent from ends. He never brought it up in the two books I've read, the ones I've quoted. So point out to me where Rothbard rejects passions and emotions.
As I've stated before I understand the pursuit of happiness which includes passions, emotions, and rational principles the way Aristotle and Plauche define such terms. I don't know how far Locke or Hutcheson gets into base appetities and their relational role with rational principles. I have not read them, but I'm inclined to think Locke and Hutcheson also would agree since their discussions on happiness are related to Aristotles concept from what I've briefly read by them.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: "Ethical aprorism" is a broader category than "natural law" because it does not regard the multiple confusing definitions of "nature" and "natural". This makes it easier to critique. If I refute "ethical aprorism", then "natural law" is also refuted because it is a form of ethical apriorism. No it's not a "broader category" it is a smaller category from what I see. Nature is not confusing. We live in nature. It's only people that don't go outside and forget we live in a natural world that get confused. Natural Law is also called universal law - and you know why? - cause we live in the universe. The boundaries of place are defined as to where the law of nature and thus the law of the universe occur. They occur in nature. They occur in the universe. It's not a challenging concept. I meant "broader category" to point out that Rothbardan ethical naturalism is a form of ethical apriorism. Similar to the idea that ethical naturalism is a form of ethical realism. You also said that ethical aprorism "is very, very tiny compared to what natural law covers". Because Rothbardian natural law is a form of ethical aprorism, ethical aprorism does not need to have as much detail than Rothbardian natural law. I have defined ethical apriorism as a category of a few schools similar to Rothbardian natural law. Ethical apriorism is an abstraction of several different schools of ethical thought that rejects passions as a determinator of morality and rejects the is-ought gap.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: "Ethical aprorism" is a broader category than "natural law" because it does not regard the multiple confusing definitions of "nature" and "natural". This makes it easier to critique. If I refute "ethical aprorism", then "natural law" is also refuted because it is a form of ethical apriorism. No it's not a "broader category" it is a smaller category from what I see. Nature is not confusing. We live in nature. It's only people that don't go outside and forget we live in a natural world that get confused. Natural Law is also called universal law - and you know why? - cause we live in the universe. The boundaries of place are defined as to where the law of nature and thus the law of the universe occur. They occur in nature. They occur in the universe. It's not a challenging concept.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: "Ethical aprorism" is a broader category than "natural law" because it does not regard the multiple confusing definitions of "nature" and "natural". This makes it easier to critique. If I refute "ethical aprorism", then "natural law" is also refuted because it is a form of ethical apriorism.
"Ethical aprorism" is a broader category than "natural law" because it does not regard the multiple confusing definitions of "nature" and "natural". This makes it easier to critique. If I refute "ethical aprorism", then "natural law" is also refuted because it is a form of ethical apriorism.
No it's not a "broader category" it is a smaller category from what I see. Nature is not confusing. We live in nature. It's only people that don't go outside and forget we live in a natural world that get confused. Natural Law is also called universal law - and you know why? - cause we live in the universe. The boundaries of place are defined as to where the law of nature and thus the law of the universe occur. They occur in nature. They occur in the universe. It's not a challenging concept.
I meant "broader category" to point out that Rothbardan ethical naturalism is a form of ethical apriorism. Similar to the idea that ethical naturalism is a form of ethical realism.
You also said that ethical aprorism "is very, very tiny compared to what natural law covers". Because Rothbardian natural law is a form of ethical aprorism, ethical aprorism does not need to have as much detail than Rothbardian natural law. I have defined ethical apriorism as a category of a few schools similar to Rothbardian natural law. Ethical apriorism is an abstraction of several different schools of ethical thought that rejects passions as a determinator of morality and rejects the is-ought gap.
Again, show me where Rothbard rejects passions. Aristotle, a very rational man, discusses the relation between passions, rationality, and universals (as well as particulars aka facts) very thoroughly. Rothbards refers to Aristotle's classical laws (natural laws) and I would venture to guess he read Aristotle and knew how passions fit into this. So show me where Rothbard rejects passions from being relational in this scheme of human action.
' In natural-law philosophy, then, reason is not bound, as it is in modern post-Humean philosophy, to be a mere slave to the passions, confined to cranking out the discovery of the means to arbitrarily chosen ends. For the ends themselves are selected by the use of reason; and "right reason” dictates to man his proper ends as well as the means for their attainment. For the Thomist or natural-law theorist, the general law of morality for man is a special case of the system of natural law governing all entities of the world, each with its own nature and its own ends. "For him the moral law . . . is a special case of the general principles that all finite things move toward their ends by the development of their potentialities."[14] And here we come to a vital difference between inanimate or even non-human living creatures, and man himself; for the former are compelled to proceed in accordance with the ends dictated by their natures, whereas man, "the rational animal," possesses reason to discover such ends and the free will to choose.'
' David Hume is the philosopher supposed by modern philosophers to have effectively demolished the theory of natural law. Hume's “demolition” was two-pronged: the raising of the alleged “fact-value” dichotomy, thus debarring the inference of value from fact,[15] and his view that reason is and can only be a slave to the passions. In short, in contrast to the natural-law view that man's reason can discover the proper ends for man to follow, Hume held that only the emotions can ultimately set man's ends, and that reason's place is as the technician and handmaiden to the emotions. (Here Hume has been followed by modern social scientists since Max Weber.) According to this view, people's emotions are assumed to be primary and unanalyzable givens.
Professor Hesselberg has shown, however, that Hume, in the course of his own discussions, was compelled to reintroduce a natural-law conception into his social philosophy and particularly into his theory of justice, thus illustrating the gibe of Etienne Gilson: “The natural law always buries its undertakers.” For Hume, in Hesselberg's words, “recognized and accepted that the social . . . order is an indispensable prerequisite to man's well-being and happiness: and that this is a statement of fact.” The social order, therefore, must be maintained by man. Hesselberg continues:
But a social order is not possible unless man is able to conceive what it is, and what its advantages are, and also conceive those norms of conduct which are necessary to its establishment and preservation, namely, respect for another's person and for his rightful possessions, which is the substance of justice. . . . But justice is the product of reason, not the passions. And justice is the necessary support of the social order; and the social order is necessary to man's well-being and happiness. If this is so, the norms of justice must control and regulate the passions, and not vice versa.[16]
Hesselberg concludes that “thus Hume's original 'primacy of the passions' thesis is seen to be utterly untenable for his social and political theory, and . . . he is compelled to reintroduce reason as a cognitive-normative factor in human social relations.”[17]
Indeed, in discussing justice and the importance of the rights of private property, Hume was compelled to write that reason can establish such a social ethic: “nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and uncommodious in the affections”—in short, reason can be superior to the passions.'
Ethics of Liberty
zefreak: wilderness: Lilburne: zefreak:My position, as well as I am able to express it, is that the law of identity, excluded middle, and other axioms of formal logic are necessary to conceptualize and understand reality, but do not "enforce" themselves on material reality. They may be seen as descriptive, or representational of material behavior but without conciousness these concepts do not come into being. Particles don't stop moving if there are no concious beings, but the representation does not exist. Well conceived, and well put. Yes it is, but how he gets from there to there in detail is lacking. He is saying one thing here and then when it comes down to explaining it further, zefreak, seems to not know what he initially said. I also think he rejects human descriptions cause they are from humans, and thus, a fundamental problem that I see in his position. Even though these human descriptions are as he said here, "They may be seen as descriptive or representational of material behavior...". Yet he says "may" and he is therefore unwilling to except the universal truth that a human may conceive cause of this one word: may. That, I think, boils the argument down, at least for me. So because of this "may" he rejects positions cause to him that only may exist. What? I meant "may" as in "can". In other words it is instrumental to perceive them as descriptive or representational of material behavior...
Then why reject Natural Law and the natural rights derived thereof? They are descriptive.
wilderness: zefreak: wilderness: Lilburne: zefreak:My position, as well as I am able to express it, is that the law of identity, excluded middle, and other axioms of formal logic are necessary to conceptualize and understand reality, but do not "enforce" themselves on material reality. They may be seen as descriptive, or representational of material behavior but without conciousness these concepts do not come into being. Particles don't stop moving if there are no concious beings, but the representation does not exist. Well conceived, and well put. Yes it is, but how he gets from there to there in detail is lacking. He is saying one thing here and then when it comes down to explaining it further, zefreak, seems to not know what he initially said. I also think he rejects human descriptions cause they are from humans, and thus, a fundamental problem that I see in his position. Even though these human descriptions are as he said here, "They may be seen as descriptive or representational of material behavior...". Yet he says "may" and he is therefore unwilling to except the universal truth that a human may conceive cause of this one word: may. That, I think, boils the argument down, at least for me. So because of this "may" he rejects positions cause to him that only may exist. What? I meant "may" as in "can". In other words it is instrumental to perceive them as descriptive or representational of material behavior... Then why reject Natural Law and the natural rights derived thereof? They are descriptive.
I don't reject natural law, but reject that natural rights can be derived from them. Also, natural rights are prescriptive, not descriptive. Right is a normative concept, and even if a certain action is "natural", it does not logically follow that it is "right".
It just so happens that I share many similar values with natural rights ethics. The only difference is that I do not think natural rights are epistemically justified. They are not self-evident.
Anarchist Cain: ' In natural-law philosophy, then, reason is not bound, as it is in modern post-Humean philosophy, to be a mere slave to the passions, confined to cranking out the discovery of the means to arbitrarily chosen ends. For the ends themselves are selected by the use of reason; and "right reason” dictates to man his proper ends as well as the means for their attainment. For the Thomist or natural-law theorist, the general law of morality for man is a special case of the system of natural law governing all entities of the world, each with its own nature and its own ends. "For him the moral law . . . is a special case of the general principles that all finite things move toward their ends by the development of their potentialities." And here we come to a vital difference between inanimate or even non-human living creatures, and man himself; for the former are compelled to proceed in accordance with the ends dictated by their natures, whereas man, "the rational animal," possesses reason to discover such ends and the free will to choose.'
' In natural-law philosophy, then, reason is not bound, as it is in modern post-Humean philosophy, to be a mere slave to the passions, confined to cranking out the discovery of the means to arbitrarily chosen ends. For the ends themselves are selected by the use of reason; and "right reason” dictates to man his proper ends as well as the means for their attainment. For the Thomist or natural-law theorist, the general law of morality for man is a special case of the system of natural law governing all entities of the world, each with its own nature and its own ends. "For him the moral law . . . is a special case of the general principles that all finite things move toward their ends by the development of their potentialities." And here we come to a vital difference between inanimate or even non-human living creatures, and man himself; for the former are compelled to proceed in accordance with the ends dictated by their natures, whereas man, "the rational animal," possesses reason to discover such ends and the free will to choose.'
First off, this seeming to be a quote from the from "Ethics of Liberty" is therefore in contradiction to what Anarcho and Lilburne have said about Rothbard.
Secondly, "right reason", as Aristotle discusses too, is a means of choosing where our happiness, our desires aka passions will end. Thus, this is a very good quote above.
Anarchist Cain: ' David Hume is the philosopher supposed by modern philosophers to have effectively demolished the theory of natural law. Hume's “demolition” was two-pronged: the raising of the alleged “fact-value” dichotomy, thus debarring the inference of value from fact, and his view that reason is and can only be a slave to the passions. In short, in contrast to the natural-law view that man's reason can discover the proper ends for man to follow, Hume held that only the emotions can ultimately set man's ends, and that reason's place is as the technician and handmaiden to the emotions. (Here Hume has been followed by modern social scientists since Max Weber.) According to this view, people's emotions are assumed to be primary and unanalyzable givens. Professor Hesselberg has shown, however, that Hume, in the course of his own discussions, was compelled to reintroduce a natural-law conception into his social philosophy and particularly into his theory of justice, thus illustrating the gibe of Etienne Gilson: “The natural law always buries its undertakers.” For Hume, in Hesselberg's words, “recognized and accepted that the social . . . order is an indispensable prerequisite to man's well-being and happiness: and that this is a statement of fact.” The social order, therefore, must be maintained by man. Hesselberg continues: But a social order is not possible unless man is able to conceive what it is, and what its advantages are, and also conceive those norms of conduct which are necessary to its establishment and preservation, namely, respect for another's person and for his rightful possessions, which is the substance of justice. . . . But justice is the product of reason, not the passions. And justice is the necessary support of the social order; and the social order is necessary to man's well-being and happiness. If this is so, the norms of justice must control and regulate the passions, and not vice versa. Hesselberg concludes that “thus Hume's original 'primacy of the passions' thesis is seen to be utterly untenable for his social and political theory, and . . . he is compelled to reintroduce reason as a cognitive-normative factor in human social relations.” Indeed, in discussing justice and the importance of the rights of private property, Hume was compelled to write that reason can establish such a social ethic: “nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and uncommodious in the affections”—in short, reason can be superior to the passions.' Ethics of Liberty
' David Hume is the philosopher supposed by modern philosophers to have effectively demolished the theory of natural law. Hume's “demolition” was two-pronged: the raising of the alleged “fact-value” dichotomy, thus debarring the inference of value from fact, and his view that reason is and can only be a slave to the passions. In short, in contrast to the natural-law view that man's reason can discover the proper ends for man to follow, Hume held that only the emotions can ultimately set man's ends, and that reason's place is as the technician and handmaiden to the emotions. (Here Hume has been followed by modern social scientists since Max Weber.) According to this view, people's emotions are assumed to be primary and unanalyzable givens.
But a social order is not possible unless man is able to conceive what it is, and what its advantages are, and also conceive those norms of conduct which are necessary to its establishment and preservation, namely, respect for another's person and for his rightful possessions, which is the substance of justice. . . . But justice is the product of reason, not the passions. And justice is the necessary support of the social order; and the social order is necessary to man's well-being and happiness. If this is so, the norms of justice must control and regulate the passions, and not vice versa.
Hesselberg concludes that “thus Hume's original 'primacy of the passions' thesis is seen to be utterly untenable for his social and political theory, and . . . he is compelled to reintroduce reason as a cognitive-normative factor in human social relations.”
Two concepts that stick out above in that last sentence. Judgment and understanding. Aristotle discusses these as how practical wisdom is demonstrated, in other words, how humans act. These biological faculties are the moral processes of the brain. This process of judging and understanding is the moral process. The definition of moral has been good judgement and good understanding for thousands of years. It's not a new concept and is biologically based. With right reason the moral code is demonstrated as what Aristotle called the "state of character" which is virtue in human action. It is demonstrated with practical wisdom physically as two people shake hands in a friendly manner (that's one example).
wilderness: First off, this seeming to be a quote from the from "Ethics of Liberty" is therefore in contradiction to what Anarcho and Lilburne have said about Rothbard. Secondly, "right reason", as Aristotle discusses too, is a means of choosing where our happiness, our desires aka passions will end. Thus, this is a very good quote above.
I'm just backing you up I was discussing Humeian passions a few days ago. I wish I remembered this quote then.
Anarchist Cain: wilderness: First off, this seeming to be a quote from the from "Ethics of Liberty" is therefore in contradiction to what Anarcho and Lilburne have said about Rothbard. Secondly, "right reason", as Aristotle discusses too, is a means of choosing where our happiness, our desires aka passions will end. Thus, this is a very good quote above. I'm just backing you up
I'm just backing you up
Thank you! Much appreciated!!
Juan:For example, Juan's sacrasm cannot convince me that we cannot "reject" the law of identity. Sorry, I asked a question. Instead of seeing it as sarcasm you 'should' answer it (or not if you don't want to, but...). So, here's a car. It can be a blue car. Or it can be a NOT-blue car. So, either the car IS blue or it is NOT blue or ? What is the third option I'm missing ?
Does a aqua car count as blue? How about an indigo car? Does the car look entirely blue at all places? Or do you mean that some of its parts look blue?
The law of identity does not take account of the grey areas and specific details. The law of identity fails to take note on the logical soundness of the statements.
Read Alfred Korzybski's Science and Sanity for a criticism of the three laws of Aristotelian logic.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Juan:For example, Juan's sacrasm cannot convince me that we cannot "reject" the law of identity. Sorry, I asked a question. Instead of seeing it as sarcasm you 'should' answer it (or not if you don't want to, but...). So, here's a car. It can be a blue car. Or it can be a NOT-blue car. So, either the car IS blue or it is NOT blue or ? What is the third option I'm missing ? Does a aqua car count as blue? How about an indigo car? Does the car look entirely blue at all places? Or do you mean that some of its parts look blue? The law of identity does not take account of the grey areas and specific details. The law of identity fails to take note on the logical soundness of the statements. Read Alfred Korzybski's Science and Sanity for a criticism of the three laws of Aristotelian logic.
No. Juan asked if a blue car is blue. Not an aqua car, not a indigo car. A blue car. wow
wilderness: Anarchist Cain: ' In natural-law philosophy, then, reason is not bound, as it is in modern post-Humean philosophy, to be a mere slave to the passions, confined to cranking out the discovery of the means to arbitrarily chosen ends. For the ends themselves are selected by the use of reason; and "right reason” dictates to man his proper ends as well as the means for their attainment. For the Thomist or natural-law theorist, the general law of morality for man is a special case of the system of natural law governing all entities of the world, each with its own nature and its own ends. "For him the moral law . . . is a special case of the general principles that all finite things move toward their ends by the development of their potentialities." And here we come to a vital difference between inanimate or even non-human living creatures, and man himself; for the former are compelled to proceed in accordance with the ends dictated by their natures, whereas man, "the rational animal," possesses reason to discover such ends and the free will to choose.' First off, this seeming to be a quote from the from "Ethics of Liberty" is therefore in contradiction to what Anarcho and Lilburne have said about Rothbard.
Rothbard explictly denies passions to ground ethics. See Rothbard's last paragraph.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness: Anarchist Cain: ' In natural-law philosophy, then, reason is not bound, as it is in modern post-Humean philosophy, to be a mere slave to the passions, confined to cranking out the discovery of the means to arbitrarily chosen ends. For the ends themselves are selected by the use of reason; and "right reason” dictates to man his proper ends as well as the means for their attainment. For the Thomist or natural-law theorist, the general law of morality for man is a special case of the system of natural law governing all entities of the world, each with its own nature and its own ends. "For him the moral law . . . is a special case of the general principles that all finite things move toward their ends by the development of their potentialities." And here we come to a vital difference between inanimate or even non-human living creatures, and man himself; for the former are compelled to proceed in accordance with the ends dictated by their natures, whereas man, "the rational animal," possesses reason to discover such ends and the free will to choose.' First off, this seeming to be a quote from the from "Ethics of Liberty" is therefore in contradiction to what Anarcho and Lilburne have said about Rothbard. Rothbard explictly denies passions to ground ethics. See Rothbard's last paragraph.
No he doesn't. He discusses "right reason". That's an Aristotelean concept. It's a means.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Does a aqua car count as blue? How about an indigo car?
Aqua and indigo are their own separate colors.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Does the car look entirely blue at all places?
In discussing the paint color of the car, the viewer is in fact looking at the cab paint.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Or do you mean that some of its parts look blue?
This sounds like a petty argument to propose. It is as if a scratch in a car somehow disproves that a blue car is not a blue car. I think that is essentially absurd.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:The law of identity does not take account of the grey areas and specific details.
The fact that it supposedly lacks specific details is the fault of the individual for not properly taking the issue seriously. Are we somehow disproving the law of identity by going into deep ponderance over an item? I think not. Your 'gray areas' are a product of not fully carrying out your own logic.
BTW you have yet to respond to my previous statement about the Aristotelian laws supposedly not existing without humanity.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Brainpolice: *sigh* The circularity of axoimatic "self-ownership" rears its head again, and again, and again. In my opinion, all performative contradiction arguments are circular in the sense that they presuppose its premises as logically sound. For example, the self-ownership principle presupposes "ownership". The "law of human action" presupposes the concept of "action" as an abstraction of human behavior. Descartes' conciousness axiom presupposes that the concept "I" is static and atomistic. If the concept "I" is either not static nor atomistic, then the whole argument fails. LaughingMan0X demonstrates that. The conciousness axiom presuposses the concept "I" as static and atomistic. It is arbitrary to assume its staticness and atomicity. It is a form a cognitive dissonance to assume staticness and atomicity. Please note that although performative contradiction arguments are logically consistent, they are not logically sound. Cognitive dissonance leads us to invent performative contradiction arguments.
In my opinion, all performative contradiction arguments are circular in the sense that they presuppose its premises as logically sound. For example, the self-ownership principle presupposes "ownership". The "law of human action" presupposes the concept of "action" as an abstraction of human behavior. Descartes' conciousness axiom presupposes that the concept "I" is static and atomistic. If the concept "I" is either not static nor atomistic, then the whole argument fails. LaughingMan0X demonstrates that. The conciousness axiom presuposses the concept "I" as static and atomistic. It is arbitrary to assume its staticness and atomicity. It is a form a cognitive dissonance to assume staticness and atomicity.
Please note that although performative contradiction arguments are logically consistent, they are not logically sound. Cognitive dissonance leads us to invent performative contradiction arguments.
I agree.
Aristotle:
"The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work. Now there are three things in the soul which control action and truth -- sensation, reason, desire.
Of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact that the lower animals have sensation but no share in action.
What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire."
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: You used "natural rights" in the first sense of alienable rights. For example, those granted by the U.S. Constitution. It is ironic that you used "natural rights" contrary to what Rothbard had meant, contrary to the subject of this thread. I am glad that you clarified this. First off, it doesn't say anywhere in the constitution: life, liberty, and property. tiring... Secondly, natural rights that I'm using are the same that Lock and Rothbard used. Same natural rights that have been used on this forum by various people in various threads. *sigh* Even some "descriptive ethical nihilists" can defend the life, liberty, and property, of others while remaining consistent with their beliefs. Even though some of them may deny "rights" on the descriptive epistemlogical level, they nevertheless refrain from murder, respect the property of their neighbors, and may even support Austrian economics. The inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property do not only belong to "natural rights" philosophers; all sorts of people use it--from the framers of the U.S. Constituiton, to some descriptive ethical nihilists. I previously claimed "natural rights" as an irrelevant topic in this thread. "Natural rights", in the sense of inalienable rights, does not merely belong to Rothbardian natural law, but belong to a whole array of different ethical systems. You confuse and thus don't perceive that natural rights, the genus, has the species of alienable and inalienable rights. If they follow natural rights but reject natural rights, then? A is not A. I'm not going for this contradiction.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: You used "natural rights" in the first sense of alienable rights. For example, those granted by the U.S. Constitution. It is ironic that you used "natural rights" contrary to what Rothbard had meant, contrary to the subject of this thread. I am glad that you clarified this. First off, it doesn't say anywhere in the constitution: life, liberty, and property. tiring... Secondly, natural rights that I'm using are the same that Lock and Rothbard used. Same natural rights that have been used on this forum by various people in various threads. *sigh* Even some "descriptive ethical nihilists" can defend the life, liberty, and property, of others while remaining consistent with their beliefs. Even though some of them may deny "rights" on the descriptive epistemlogical level, they nevertheless refrain from murder, respect the property of their neighbors, and may even support Austrian economics. The inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property do not only belong to "natural rights" philosophers; all sorts of people use it--from the framers of the U.S. Constituiton, to some descriptive ethical nihilists. I previously claimed "natural rights" as an irrelevant topic in this thread. "Natural rights", in the sense of inalienable rights, does not merely belong to Rothbardian natural law, but belong to a whole array of different ethical systems.
Even some "descriptive ethical nihilists" can defend the life, liberty, and property, of others while remaining consistent with their beliefs. Even though some of them may deny "rights" on the descriptive epistemlogical level, they nevertheless refrain from murder, respect the property of their neighbors, and may even support Austrian economics. The inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property do not only belong to "natural rights" philosophers; all sorts of people use it--from the framers of the U.S. Constituiton, to some descriptive ethical nihilists.
Some descriptive ethical nihilists may defend the life, liberty, or property of others through the defensive application of violence. That falls under the definition of a "right". Therefore, the descriptive ethical nihilists support "rights" in this sense. I was using a different definition of "inalienable rights" than what the natural rights philosophers had used.
wilderness: I think you have Juan and I confused. I don't like to discuss subjectivism and objectivism on the grounds of the confusion such concepts lead to. I've been that way since I've entered this forum, trust me.
You use the words "subjective" and "objective" all the time without any quotes. So I assumed that you do not know that it leads to confusion. Could you explain why you use such words without any quotes?
wilderness:Again, show me where Rothbard rejects passions.
I meant that Rothbard rejected passions in the sense that he rejected that "ends" must be grounded by passions. Of course, any sound ethical system must incorporate passions. But they do not necessarily ground passions as "ends". That's what I am criticising Rothbard for. He did not ground passions as "ends".
You see that last sentence says we have reason to "discover such ends" due to "free will to choose". That says nothing about denial of passions. It's a means of happiness and desires to use rational principles or else base appetities would rule humans thus humans would be irrational and never rational - which is false. I think humans can be very rational. I don't see a denial of passions in that quote. I see a choice. So find a direct quote of Rothbard explicitly denying passions.
"Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means."
AM:The law of identity does not take account of the grey areas and specific details.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I was using a different definition of "inalienable rights" than what the natural rights philosophers had used.
I was using a different definition of "inalienable rights" than what the natural rights philosophers had used.
Once you complete your own language you ought to let us know first before you start using it and reject how natural rights philosophers have been using such terms for centuries. I don't know what to think of this response by you.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness: I think you have Juan and I confused. I don't like to discuss subjectivism and objectivism on the grounds of the confusion such concepts lead to. I've been that way since I've entered this forum, trust me. You use the words "subjective" and "objective" all the time without any quotes. So I assumed that you do not know that it leads to confusion. Could you explain why you use such words without any quotes?
No I don't. Why are you stuck on this? I use this word, I don't use this word... I've said repeatedly way before you brought it up, even in this thread, that subjective and objective lead to confusion. Ask Juan I discussed with him around the time I first joined this forum. So drop it. It's a dead issue.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness:Again, show me where Rothbard rejects passions. I meant that Rothbard rejected passions in the sense that he rejected that "ends" must be grounded by passions. Of course, any sound ethical system must incorporate passions. But they do not necessarily ground passions as "ends". That's what I am criticising Rothbard for. He did not ground passions as "ends".
Did Rothbard even discuss "ends" this way? Where? Quote it?
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I meant that Rothbard rejected passions in the sense that he rejected that "ends" must be grounded by passions. Of course, any sound ethical system must incorporate passions. But they do not necessarily ground passions as "ends". That's what I am criticising Rothbard for. He did not ground passions as "ends".
Rothbard "Ethics of Liberty":
"And this is uniquely man's nature; man, as Aristotle pointed out, is the rational animal, or to be more precise, the rational being. Through his reason, the individual man observes both the facts and ways of the external world, and the facts of his own consciousness, including his emotions: in short, he employs both extraspection and introspection. Crusoe, we have said, learns about his ends and about how to attain them. But what specifically does his learning faculty, his reason, do in the process of obtaining such knowledge? It learns about the way things work in the world, i.e., the natures of the various specific entities and classes of entities that the man finds in existence; in short, he learns the natural laws of the way things behave in the world. He learns that an arrow shot from a bow can bring down a deer, and that a net can catch an abundance of fish. Further, he learns about his own nature, about the sort of events and actions that will make him happy or unhappy; in short, he learns about the ends he needs to achieve and those he should seek to avoid."
Notice Rothbard states here to be specific:
"...including his emotions..."
"...learns about his ends... what specifically does his learning faculty, his reason, do in the process of obtaining such knowledge?" (Again points out reason is a means to learn of ends, ends that include emotions and therefore "his own nature" as pointed out specifically in the last sentence)
"Further, he learns about his own nature, about the sort of events and actions that will make him happy or unhappy; in short, he learns about the ends he needs to achieve and those he should seek to avoid." (happy or unhappy (ends) he is learning using reason (the means) about)
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: I was using a different definition of "inalienable rights" than what the natural rights philosophers had used. Once you complete your own language you ought to let us know first before you start using it and reject how natural rights philosophers have been using such terms for centuries. I don't know what to think of this response by you.
I did not invent a new connotation of "inalienable rights." I used "inalienable rights" as simply rights that cannot be bought, sold, or transferred from one individual to another. That's the mainstream definition.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: wilderness:Again, show me where Rothbard rejects passions. I meant that Rothbard rejected passions in the sense that he rejected that "ends" must be grounded by passions. Of course, any sound ethical system must incorporate passions. But they do not necessarily ground passions as "ends". That's what I am criticising Rothbard for. He did not ground passions as "ends". Did Rothbard even discuss "ends" this way? Where? Quote it?
Murray Rothbard: In short, in contrast to the natural-law view that man's reason can discover the proper ends for man to follow, Hume held that only the emotions can ultimately set man's ends, and that reason's place is as the technician and handmaiden to the emotions. (Here Hume has been followed by modern social scientists since Max Weber.) According to this view, people's emotions are assumed to be primary and unanalyzable givens. [...] Hume was compelled to write that reason can establish such a social ethic: “nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and uncommodious in the affections”—in short, reason can be superior to the passions.'
In short, in contrast to the natural-law view that man's reason can discover the proper ends for man to follow, Hume held that only the emotions can ultimately set man's ends, and that reason's place is as the technician and handmaiden to the emotions. (Here Hume has been followed by modern social scientists since Max Weber.) According to this view, people's emotions are assumed to be primary and unanalyzable givens. [...] Hume was compelled to write that reason can establish such a social ethic: “nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and uncommodious in the affections”—in short, reason can be superior to the passions.'
Anarcho-Mercantilist:I did not invent a new connotation of "inalienable rights." I used "inalienable rights" as simply rights that cannot be bought, sold, or transferred from one individual to another. That's the mainstream definition.
No wonder you reject the law of contradiction.
wilderness: Rothbard: "Further, he learns about his own nature, about the sort of events and actions that will make him happy or unhappy; in short, he learns about the ends he needs to achieve and those he should seek to avoid." (happy or unhappy (ends) he is learning using reason (the means) about)
Rothbard:
This is also what the pursuit of happiness is as Aristotle first brought up by stating in his Ethics: "Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself."
That's a teleological statement. The same way "pursuit of happiness" is understood. It is teleological. An end in and of itself. Aristotle discusses how happiness is the ultimate good and perfect virtue of humans. etc. etc...
Same happiness Locke discusses, Hutcheson, and Rothbard, by the looks of it, was not ignorant of this either.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I did not invent a new connotation of "inalienable rights." I used "inalienable rights" as simply rights that cannot be bought, sold, or transferred from one individual to another. That's the mainstream definition.
Ok. So therefore you see inalienable rights are a species of the genus natural rights.
wilderness: Did Rothbard even discuss "ends" this way? Where? Quote it?
Yes and? It means passions don't rule reason. A reasonable person can choose amongst his/her passions and many other complexities of the world a good way to act. What are you trying to say? He doesn't reject passions. He's stating reason is a means. Happiness is teleological and reason by free-will can make deliberate actions not overridden by involuntary passions at all times. We can choose from a pool of passions and assess the natural world as to what actions we will take. That's a rational person, but in no way does that mean we don't have emotions. Rothbard explicitly spells this out word for word in the quote I provided. He states reason is a means to learn ends, ends that include happiness.
Anarchist Cain: Anarcho-Mercantilist:I did not invent a new connotation of "inalienable rights." I used "inalienable rights" as simply rights that cannot be bought, sold, or transferred from one individual to another. That's the mainstream definition. Anarcho-Mercantilist: I was using a different definition of "inalienable rights" than what the natural rights philosophers had used. No wonder you reject the law of contradiction.
Exactly! I don't think Anarcho-Mercantilist can admit he's messy and all over the place on this.
Harry Felker: Wilmot of Rochester:Meaning that it's not about whether natural law exists or not, it's what natural law achieves in matters - like violent "crimes" - that it deals with, which is nothing. Natural law gives you freedom to act, all choices from curling in a ball and crying like a sissy to fighting back are an achievement of natural law, what you are now confusing is natural law and "the" law, which achieves no end to violent "crime" or any crime for that matter, it just defines what is a crime...
Wilmot of Rochester:Meaning that it's not about whether natural law exists or not, it's what natural law achieves in matters - like violent "crimes" - that it deals with, which is nothing.
Natural law gives you freedom to act, all choices from curling in a ball and crying like a sissy to fighting back are an achievement of natural law, what you are now confusing is natural law and "the" law, which achieves no end to violent "crime" or any crime for that matter, it just defines what is a crime...
But why is it a crime to violate this "natural law"? This is my search. Why is it unethical to "aggress"?
wilderness:Exactly! I don't think Anarcho-Mercantilist can admit he's messy and all over the place on this.
I feel neglected, I proposed several questions to him that he did not answer. You get all the attention!
Wilmot of Rochester:But why is it a crime to violate this "natural law"? This is my search. Why is it unethical to "aggress"?
By what right does one have the ability to aggress? Whether you believe in God or Evolution, when humans were created it was not as if one were given the fundamental ethic to make him/herself the master and the other the slave.