February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Contradictory things do happen. For example, humans believe in contradictory economic doctrines. Humans are part of the universe. Therefore, the universe suffers from contradictory economic doctrines. Furthermore, the law of non-contradiction does not describe the universe.
More ambiguity, more vagaries. Demonstrate that a contradiction exists and stop resorting to linguistic sleight of hand to avoid answering objections people make. Are you deliberately so vague? Is it an argumentative tactic? If so, desist, you are doing little but annoying your interlocutors... Believing contradictory doctrines (especially where this is due to cognitive dissonance or compartmentalisation) proves nothing of the sort; it just proves that some people do not think through all the consequences of their beliefs. What a harebrained way of proving that contradictions exist. Also, when you say it does not "describe" the universe, you mean to say contradictions exist, like rocks that are both rocks and not rocks (at the same time, at the same place, don't try slither away by omiting time, or paradoxes, which betray gaps in human understanding more so than anything else.) Or am I to assume you don't believe such nonsense but rather are making some trivial point dividing logic and its laws, i.e. more semantics?
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
In several of my previous posts, I tried to demonstrate a point that the law of non-contradiction has just as about the same arbitrariness as the law of gravity, the law of thermodynamics, the law of natural selection, the law of the Coriolis effect, and the inverse square law. For example, we cannot deny the law of non-contradiction in the exact same sense like we cannot deny the law of natural selection. The law of non-contradiction does not have a special priority nor superiority over the five other laws in my example. Jon, I would agree with your claim that the law of non-contradiction does describe the universe, if you mean it in this sense, and only in this sense.
However, if I agree with you, then we have just used the law of non-contradiction in two completely different senses. In the last paragraph, we have used the law of non-contradiction in the descriptive sense explaining the universe, just like how the law of natural selection explains the universe.
We could still use the law of non-contradiction in the normative sense, as in applying the three laws of Aristotelian logic. We would normatively value the law of non-contradiction, as in practicing how to reason correctly in the Aristotelian paradigm.
We should warn us that the descriptive and normative sense of the law of non-contradiction completely differ in meaning. We cannot derive the law of non-contradiction in the normative sense from the law of non-contradiction in the descriptive sense. Conflating these two senses implies that we have a poor intuitive understanding of how the Aristotelian laws of logic relate to the universe.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:The performative contradiction argument is not a sound argument. So even if you will believe that I contradicted myself, I will not.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Then I disagree with you.
While I actually agree with him that the performative contradiction argument fails (although he strawmanned neo-artistotileans; Plauche rejects the performative contradiction argument), you all have just learned what I learned a while ago from his trolling of the comments section of my blog: for the most part, all he does is engage in semantic nitpicking that is irrelevant to the point. Considering such behavior, as well as the polemical nature of the username that he goes by (*eyeroll*), I still am mystified about the extent to which he can be considered as being serious or not.
Another thing: the law of non-contradiction in general and the performative contradiction argument are two separate things. It does not inherently follow from rejecting Hoppe, Kinsella and Molyneux's specious arguments that one necessarily rejects the law of non-contradiction. Performative contradictions are not "formal" contradictions internal to or between concepts or statements.
For example, a pacifist who supports the state is engaging in a formal contradiction because the concepts are simply incompatible. But that's not the same thing as a performative contradiction. A performative contradiction would be an ideological pacifist that engaged in violence, or someone who ideologically supports some kind of violence who behaves like a pacifist (the latter is more in the spirit of how the performative contradiction argument tends to be used). It's a contradiction between theory and action, not internal to a theory. The problem is that a contradiction between someone's ideology and their behavior is not in and of itself a logical disproof of their ideology. At best, all that it manages to prove is hypocrisy.
How did this end up in the graveyard?? This has been the most lively and most involved thread that has literally ever existed on the Mises.org forums! It has remained on the top 5 topics list and been more widely discussed than any other topic EVER. It's certainly relevant to political theory! If not, then at least the general area.
hashem: How did this end up in the graveyard?? This has been the most lively and most involved thread that has literally ever existed on the Mises.org forums! It has remained on the top 5 topics list and been more widely discussed than any other topic EVER. It's certainly relevant to political theory! If not, then at least the general area.
I do not know, but if it us any consolation, I got precisely what I wanted from this...
It sounds like the ocean, smells like fresh mountain air, and tastes like the union of peanut butter and chocolate. ~Liberty Student
Brainpolice:Another thing: the law of non-contradiction in general and the performative contradiction argument are two separate things. It does not inherently follow from rejecting Hoppe, Kinsella and Molyneux's specious arguments that one necessarily rejects the law of non-contradiction. Performative contradictions are not "formal" contradictions internal to or between concepts or statements.
No post
At most, I think only 5% of the adult population would need to stop cooperating to have real change.
Juan:Ha. I didn't realize that there's a thread graveyard...and that we are in it !
This topic: 1,252 posts, with 32 authors, in 20 days.Second longest topic: 837 posts, with 43 authors, in 67 days.Third longest topic: 668 posts.This topic: 63 pages -- and counting...Second longest topic: 42 pages.Third longest topic: 34 pages.
I also don't think this thread should be deleted. I still intend to answer wildnerness's questions, but probably won't get around to it today. Hopefully the thread won't be gone by then.
Plus, you know the topic is going to pop up in another thread. At least this way we can keep it organized.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
I've moved the topic out of the thread graveyard for now, I don't know who moved it (or why) so it may be moved back in a short while.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
While I actually agree with him that the performative contradiction argument fails
To clarify, Plauche et al reject particular ethical arguments arising from performative contradictions, not the notion in general or other ethical arguments that did work and yet arose in such a way.
Juan:Yeah, looks like this is getting nowhere. By performative contradiction maybe he alludes to the fact that using an axiom implies that you can't refute it. But, despite being bound by logic like any mortal, AM thinks he's not bound by logic...sorry! by Aristotelian logic...
We should not "reject" the Aristotelian laws of logic (identity, the excluded middle, and non-contradiction) in the sense of rejecting them entirely. Rather, we should "reject" them in the sense that they could create potential problems. If we "prove" them by logic, it still does not imply that they do not lack flaws. Specifically, we should reject the performative contradiction argument to prove these three laws. A "proof" of them by the performative contradiction argument does not imply that we should presume them as "self-evident," irrefutable," "undeniable," or "apodictic," regardless of its context.
Alfred Korzybski has emphasized that the non-Aristotelian system has more generality than the Aristotelian system, similar to the idea that general relativity has more generality than Galilean relativity. Robert Murphy also has emphasized the same analogy when he claimed that marginal utility theory has more generality than the labor theory of value.
A school of epistemology called "general semantics" found problems in Aristotelian logic. Specifically, it argues the problems in the identification of entities. For example, it has criticized the law of identity for its lack of precision in describing real-world entities. Korzybski invented the motto "the map is not a territory" to note that no language could exactly map everything in the real-world.
While neither general semantics nor Korzybski himself have criticized the performative contradiction argument, the performative contradiction argument indeed exemplifies how the Aristotelian system fails. Hans-Hermann Hoppe's "self-ownership" argument failed because of the flaws within the performative contradiction argument. More specifically, it failed because the performative contradiction argument confused the "higher level abstractions" with the "lower level abstractions."
In Hoppe's argument for his "self-ownership principle", he presupposed that either no property rights or full Lockean property rights can hold. Hoppe has failed to consider other candidates as his premise, such as Proudhonian property rights, Marxian property rights, a slave who does not own much property, and a person who partially owns his property. Because Hoppe forced two options as the premise—either no property rights or Lockean property rights—he tricks the reader to accept full Lockean property rights on the grounds that the former entails a performative contradiction.
In this context, the idea "property rights" qualifies the "higher level abstraction" and the idea "Lockean property rights" qualifies the "lower level abstraction." Hoppe has confused confused the levels of abstractions in the sense that he assumed "Lockean property rights" as implicit in the higher-level abstraction "property rights."
Descartes has also confused the levels of abstraction in his conciousness axiom, sometimes termed as "cogito, ergo sum." This conciousness axiom presupposes that the concept "I" as quiescent and atomistic. If the concept "I" does not have either quiescence or atomicity, then the whole argument fails. LaughingMan0X has demonstrated that. We thus find it arbitrary to assume its quiescence and atomicity. We find it a type of cognitive dissonance to assume quiescence and atomicity.
Besides the confusion of orders of abstractions (sometimes termed as the confusion of levels of abstractions), the performative contradiction argument sometimes merges facts and values, thus rejecting the fact-value dichotomy entirely.
Some would criticize the fact-value dichotomy by suggesting that scientific research requires value-judgments. Value-judgments or ideology may even bias scientific research. However, science does not by itself conclude normative ethical commands. Scientific research requires value-judgments in the sense that it requires requires intelligence, motivation, and creativity.
Why should we defend the fact-value dichotomy? Why should we separate values from facts? Because it eliminates bias in science and in ethical systems. In fact, all ethical systems ultimately have a value-judgment not derived from facts. Even ethical apriorism has an implicit value-judgment assumed. For example, Rothbardian natural law assumes a value-judgment that "what is natural is what is right." Even though Kant himself claimed that his deontological system does not bias values, the categorical imperative implicitly assumes a value-judgment that "it is right to ground morality on free will." Besides ethics, logical systems also assume implicit value-judgments.
We normatively value the Aristotelian laws of logic in the sense that we value the identification of entities as a tool for reasoning. We value the law of identity not because the performative contradiction argument "proves" it, but because we find it useful as a tool for reasoning. Indeed, deriving the law of identity from the performative contradiction argument seems circular. When we "prove" the law of identity by the performative contradiction argument, we value the law of identity as flawless and correctly applies to everywhere. However, we should reject the idea of "the law of identity as a flawless law that correctly applies to everywhere." Certainly, the law of identity could have flaws in logical soundness.
Korzybski's idea of non-allness refers to the idea that "what a pencil is, is what a pencil is not." For example, "mathematics is an art in the sense that mathematicians find beauty practicing number theory and that developing mathematical theorems requires creativity as in art." However, "mathematics is not an art in the sense that it does not express one's emotions as in art."
"Computer programming is an art in the sense that it requires creativity and that programmers enjoy writing elegant code." However, "computer programming is not an art in the sense that it does not require an audience to see the its elegant code."
The above shows that the law of non-contradiction does not hold for statements such as "mathematics is not a science" and "computer programming is an art." What else does it not hold? It does not hold for any type of categorization. Simply that no two objects have the same properties and attributes in all of its aspects and contexts. Korzybski criticizes the soundness of the law of identity because of this.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Brainpolice:Another thing: the law of non-contradiction in general and the performative contradiction argument are two separate things. It does not inherently follow from rejecting Hoppe, Kinsella and Molyneux's specious arguments that one necessarily rejects the law of non-contradiction. Performative contradictions are not "formal" contradictions internal to or between concepts or statements.And we didn't know that?
I clarified it in response to AM, because I believe he was shifting in and out of conflating the two.
A school of epistemology called "general semantics" found problems in Aristotelian logic.
Practically all you ever engage in is "general semantics". It's ridiculous and annoying when it's taken to the point of ignoring actual formal debate and the qualatative content of what people are actually saying.
Brainpolice: A school of epistemology called "general semantics" found problems in Aristotelian logic. Practically all you ever engage in is "general semantics". It's ridiculous and annoying when it's taken to the point of ignoring actual formal debate and the qualatative content of what people are actually saying.
Brainpolice, as you may or may not know we don't agree on many things but I am however in total agreement with you on this issue. Like I previously stated, this is not 20 pages of him disproving the three laws. Merely 20 pages of him bickering over what it is called.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
I wonder if these "general semantics" epistemologists are trolls.
Brainpolice: Knight_of_BAAWA: Brainpolice:Another thing: the law of non-contradiction in general and the performative contradiction argument are two separate things. It does not inherently follow from rejecting Hoppe, Kinsella and Molyneux's specious arguments that one necessarily rejects the law of non-contradiction. Performative contradictions are not "formal" contradictions internal to or between concepts or statements.And we didn't know that? I clarified it in response to AM, because I believe he was shifting in and out of conflating the two.
True that one could reject Hoppe, Kinsella, and Molyneux without necessarily rejecting the law of non-contradiction. For example, one can reject them by rejecting the performative contradiction argument, asserting the "fact-value dichotomy," or even denouncing the persuasiveness of the argument itself.
I could have said "I reject the law of identity" or "I reject the law of the excluded middle" instead of saying that "I reject the law of non-contradiction." This thread happened to brought up a separate discussion about how the law of non-contradiction relates to the universe, along with an unrelated discussion against the performative contradiction. It therefore made it seem like I had conflated the law of non-contradiction with the performative contradiction.
Aristotle had "proved" the performative contradiction argument from the other Aristotelian laws of logic. "Rejecting" those Aristotelian laws will therefore "reject" the performative contradiction argument in a sense. Nevertheless, we should "reject" the Aristotelian laws in a sense that they create potential problems. See my last post for reasons we should "reject" these laws in that sense.
Anarchist Cain: Brainpolice: A school of epistemology called "general semantics" found problems in Aristotelian logic. Practically all you ever engage in is "general semantics". It's ridiculous and annoying when it's taken to the point of ignoring actual formal debate and the qualatative content of what people are actually saying. Brainpolice, as you may or may not know we don't agree on many things but I am however in total agreement with you on this issue. Like I previously stated, this is not 20 pages of him disproving the three laws. Merely 20 pages of him bickering over what it is called.
See my post on how we should refute ethical apriorism ("Ethical apriorism" includes the ethics of Rothbard, Hoppe, Kinsella, Molyneux, Kant, Rand, Rasmussen, and Uyl).
Anarcho-Mercantilist: How do we refute ethical apriorism then? I found three ways. The first way is to refute the proposition: "ethics only requires reason alone, with no grounding by emotions or passions." Lilburne already did that, and hence he has legitimately refuted Rothbardian natural law. A second way to refute ethical apriorism is to refute the legitimacy of the argument by performative contradiction. I have summarized my points against the performative contradiction argument in my blog and some forum posts here. A third way to refute ethical aprorism is to refute that we can derive normative ethical commands from descriptive statements, like refuting that we can derive an "ought" from an "is". Rothbardian natural law uses "nature" as an "is."
How do we refute ethical apriorism then? I found three ways. The first way is to refute the proposition: "ethics only requires reason alone, with no grounding by emotions or passions." Lilburne already did that, and hence he has legitimately refuted Rothbardian natural law.
A second way to refute ethical apriorism is to refute the legitimacy of the argument by performative contradiction. I have summarized my points against the performative contradiction argument in my blog and some forum posts here.
A third way to refute ethical aprorism is to refute that we can derive normative ethical commands from descriptive statements, like refuting that we can derive an "ought" from an "is". Rothbardian natural law uses "nature" as an "is."
I have already refuted the performative contradiction argument the third time and asserted the fact-value dichotomy in my last major post. Both do not necessarily have any relation to general semantics.
I have only used "general semantics" as a counter-criticism against a few users like Juan, nirgraham, Anarchist Cain, and Knight who asserted the performative contradiction argument as a "necessary given." They believe that "it is a performative contradiction to reject the performative contradiction argument." Therefore, I can only refute that circular argument by working outside the Aristotelian system. They had forced me to use my only option—general semantics.
You, yourself conceded that the truths of the Aristotelian law would exist in nature whither or not humanity existed in it. Therefore, you yourself rationally stopped your own argument that the laws are merely a product of the human subjective mind that are open to refutation. I'm justing waiting for one side of your brain to catch up with the other.
Anarchist Cain: You, yourself conceded that the truths of the Aristotelian law would exist in nature whither or not humanity existed in it. Therefore, you yourself rationally stopped your own argument that the laws are merely a product of the human subjective mind that are open to refutation. I'm justing waiting for one side of your brain to catch up with the other.
You may want to clarify what you meant by "open to refutation":
Anarcho-Mercantilist:We should not "reject" the Aristotelian laws of logic (identity, the excluded middle, and non-contradiction) in the sense of rejecting them entirely. Rather, we should "reject" them in the sense that they could create potential problems.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: You may want to clarify what you meant by "open to refutation":
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Humans create the Aristotelian laws of logic just like how humans create art, language, and customs.
Humans create the Aristotelian laws of logic just like how humans create art, language, and customs.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: The laws of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction are normative rules invented by humans. They function like tools which help us understand and analyze "reality." Like all tools, these rules have flaws. In addition, because I reject the soundness of the performative contradiction argument, I reject the belief that we can derive those three laws from performative contradiction arguments. For example, Juan's sacrasm cannot convince me that we cannot "reject" the law of identity.
The laws of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction are normative rules invented by humans. They function like tools which help us understand and analyze "reality." Like all tools, these rules have flaws. In addition, because I reject the soundness of the performative contradiction argument, I reject the belief that we can derive those three laws from performative contradiction arguments. For example, Juan's sacrasm cannot convince me that we cannot "reject" the law of identity.
It is back in the thread graveyard.
Certainly not. Humans learn laws, they don't create them.
AM:Because Hoppe forced two options as the premise—either no property rights or Lockean property rights—he tricks the reader to accept full Lockean property rights on the grounds that the former entails a performative contradiction.
Why should we defend the fact-value dichotomy? Why should we separate values from facts? Because it eliminates bias in science and in ethical systems. In fact, all ethical systems ultimately have a value-judgment not derived from facts.
We normatively value the Aristotelian laws of logic in the sense that we value the identification of entities as a tool for reasoning.
We value the law of identity not because the performative contradiction argument "proves" it, but because we find it useful as a tool for reasoning.
I have already refuted the performative contradiction argument
I have only used "general semantics" as a counter-criticism against a few users like Juan, nirgraham, Anarchist Cain, and Knight who asserted the performative contradiction argument as a "necessary given."
Therefore, I can only refute that circular argument by working outside the Aristotelian system. They had forced me to use my only option—general semantics.
Juan:By the way, language is built upon logic. There's no way for "semantics" to refute logic without semantics refuting itself.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Alfred Korzybski has emphasized that the non-Aristotelian system has more generality than the Aristotelian system, similar to the idea that general relativity has more generality than Galilean relativity. Robert Murphy also has emphasized the same analogy when he claimed that marginal utility theory has more generality than the labor theory of value.
Juan: AM:Because Hoppe forced two options as the premise—either no property rights or Lockean property rights—he tricks the reader to accept full Lockean property rights on the grounds that the former entails a performative contradiction. Actually the premise is : we either engage in [voluntary interaction] or in [non voluntary interaction] and of course there's no third possibility. You can complain about Hoppe equating voluntary interaction with a specific conception of property rights, but even in this case, property rights are either some definite and 'natural' position or not, meaning, again, that there's not much room to claim that radically different systems of property rights are possible. Why should we defend the fact-value dichotomy? Why should we separate values from facts? Because it eliminates bias in science and in ethical systems. In fact, all ethical systems ultimately have a value-judgment not derived from facts. Nonsense. By the way, why 'should' 'value free' scientists eliminate bias ? Aren't they unbiased by definition (ha). We normatively value the Aristotelian laws of logic in the sense that we value the identification of entities as a tool for reasoning. Nonsense. You can't escape logic regardless of you valuing it or not. We value the law of identity not because the performative contradiction argument "proves" it, but because we find it useful as a tool for reasoning. And why are these laws 'useful' for reasoning ? I have already refuted the performative contradiction argument Rather, you don't know what an axiom is. I have only used "general semantics" as a counter-criticism against a few users like Juan, nirgraham, Anarchist Cain, and Knight who asserted the performative contradiction argument as a "necessary given." Logic is indeed a necessary given. Good luck refuting it.
You have just clarified what you believe and disbelieve in.
At least you had caught my mistake of defining science. You also had noticed that the universe does not "obey" scientific laws; scientific laws help explain the properties of the universe.
The law of gravity and the law of natural selection are "scientific laws", but the laws of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction are not "scientific laws." The three laws of logic do not function as "scientific laws" which explain the properties of the universe. When applied to reasoning, the Aristotelian laws of logic do not describe the universe; they function as normative rules which help humans reason correctly. By "normative rules", I mean rules derived from at least a value-judgment. We derive the laws of identity, the excluded middle, and non-contradiction from the performative contradiction because we value logical consistency. We, in turn, value logical consistency because it helps us to accurately explain the properties of the universe. We value accuracy because scientists like accuracy as an end, or as a means to further the development of technology based on scientific laws.
Refer to my last major post on how science requires value-judgments just as logic:
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Value-judgments or ideology may even bias scientific research. However, science does not by itself conclude normative ethical commands. Scientific research requires value-judgments in the sense that it requires requires intelligence, motivation, and creativity.
Value-judgments or ideology may even bias scientific research. However, science does not by itself conclude normative ethical commands. Scientific research requires value-judgments in the sense that it requires requires intelligence, motivation, and creativity.
However, I categorize a belief or system as "normative" when it fits outside the category of "science." Even science requires value-judgments and normative rules in a sense that it requires the laws of logic (both Aristotelian or non-Aristotelian) to explain and derive scientific theories. However, the laws of logic and science are normative in different senses. The laws of logic helps us to explain and derive scientific theories, but science does not derive the laws of logic by itself. Only human value-judgments do. Humans value logical consistency, so they derive the laws of logic.
Main Argument:Science, by definition, does not derive any value-judgments purely by itself. Humans derive the laws of logic from their value-judgments. Therefore, science cannot derive the laws of logic by itself.
* When reading this, be careful to not conflate the laws of logic with logic itself.
Juan: Anarcho-Mercantilist:Therefore, I can only refute that circular argument by working outside the Aristotelian system. They had forced me to use my only option—general semantics. I'm sorry to inform you that "general semantics" has even less value than theistic fairy tales.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Therefore, I can only refute that circular argument by working outside the Aristotelian system. They had forced me to use my only option—general semantics.
I'm sorry to inform you that "general semantics" has even less value than theistic fairy tales.
Anyway, Alfred Korzybski's Science and Sanity endorsed Freud's psychoanalysis, Pavlov's behaviorism, psychiatric quackery, and archaic neurology, along with a myriad of other flaws. However, Korzybski's book mentioned several important points against the Aristotelian system, at least according to my particular interpretation of his work.
I discovered Korzybski's work only about three months ago. Before that time, my comments at Brainpolice's blog had no influence from general semantics. Please note that my defense of the fact-value dichotomy has nothing to do with general semantics.
However, I will repeat my justifications of using general semantics in this thread:
Anarcho-Mercantilist:I have only used "general semantics" as a counter-criticism against a few users like Juan, nirgraham, Anarchist Cain, and Knight who asserted the performative contradiction argument as a "necessary given." They believe that "it is a performative contradiction to reject the performative contradiction argument." Therefore, I can only refute that circular argument by working outside the Aristotelian system. They had forced me to use my only option—general semantics.
Refer to this recent post for reasons that everything in this thread stays relevant to the topic "Proving Natural Law."
Juan:AM, Please show an exception to the law of the excluded middle.
Please show an exception to the law of the excluded middle.
First Example
A car headlight is a kind of lamp. A lamp is a kind of furniture. Therefore, a car headlight is a kind of furniture.
However, the law of the excluded middle excludes this possibility: A car headlight is not a kind of furniture.
Second Example
All mammals are warm-blooded. The naked mole rat is cold-blooded. Therefore, the naked mole rat is not a mammal.
However, the law of the excluded middle excludes this possibility: The naked mole rat is a mammal.
Third Example
Cars are vehicles with wheels. Wheels are round. Therefore, vehicles with flat "wheels" are not cars.
However, the law of the excluded middle excludes this possibility: Vehicles with flat wheels are cars.
To prevent cherry-picking of the above examples, we will stop showing any more exceptions to the law of the excluded middle.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:A car headlight is a kind of lamp. A lamp is a kind of furniture. Therefore, a car headlight is a kind of furniture.
Let us theorize that a car headlight is a type of lamp [I think that is ridiculous, a headlight is its own device] however you state that it is a kind of something thereby indicating there are varying forms of it. To then assume that because it is a kind of something then assume that is the only thing is a contradiction. Therefore there are multiple kinds of lamps and it does not necessarily follow that a car headlight is a kind furniture simply because it is a kind of lamp.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: All mammals are warm-blooded. The naked mole rat is cold-blooded. Therefore, the naked mole rat is not a mammal. However, the law of the excluded middle excludes this possibility: The naked mole rat is a mammal.
There are multiple reasons for being a mammal. One can even be a monotreme.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Cars are vehicles which have wheels. Wheels are round. Therefore, Vehicles with flat "wheels" are not cars.
Cars are vehicles which have wheels. Wheels are round. Therefore, Vehicles with flat "wheels" are not cars.
Why is a car only a car if it has wheels?
How about you define the law of the excluded middle to begin with?
"Finally, in our world of numerous kinds of entities, anything must be either a or it won't be; in short, it will either be a or non-a. Nothing can be both. This gives us the third well-known law of classical logic: the Law of the Excluded Middle: everything in the universe is either a or non-a."
Anarchist Cain: Anarcho-Mercantilist: All mammals are warm-blooded. The naked mole rat is cold-blooded. Therefore, the naked mole rat is not a mammal. However, the law of the excluded middle excludes this possibility: The naked mole rat is a mammal. There are multiple reasons for being a mammal. One can even be a monotreme.
This means that we cannot identify an "essence" for all mammals. We can only define a "mammal" either by prototypes of a typical mammal; or by exemplars of the abstracted characteristics of all mammals.
The prototype and exemplar theories contrast with Aristotelian essentialism. Aristotelian essentialism refers to the belief that we cannot necessarily identify an "essence" for an entity.
Aristotelian essentialists believe that something "is" either A or not-A. However, we find it hard to identify if the naked mole rat, the platypus, or an ancestor of the mammal "is" either a mammal or not a mammal. For example, the prototype theory only regards to the degree an entity falls under the label "mammal" by its degrees of similarity to the prototypical mammal.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:This means that we cannot identify an "essence" for all mammals. We can only define a "mammal" either by prototypes of a typical mammal; or by exemplars of the abstracted characteristics of all mammals.
If there are multiple tenets to being something then it does not follow that we can define what a mammal means.
Here I can do it:
1. Is it warm-blooded?
2. What are its birthing actions?
Two questions that can define what is and isn't a mammal.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Aristotelian essentialists believe that something "is" either A or not A. We find it hard to identify if the naked mole rat, the platypus, or an ancestor of the mammal "is" either a mammal or not a mammal.
A platypus IS a monotreme.