Conza88: AJ: He seems to be saying that property rights (as he conceives of them) will come about organically on the market, and through human reason. I would say this, though, allows for Mises's version of utilitarianism, where reason can help us determine which kind of system of law works best for our aims. This I can agree with. "our aims"- Whose aims? Ahh the utilitarians.. where did individualism suddenly go, eh?
AJ: He seems to be saying that property rights (as he conceives of them) will come about organically on the market, and through human reason. I would say this, though, allows for Mises's version of utilitarianism, where reason can help us determine which kind of system of law works best for our aims. This I can agree with.
He seems to be saying that property rights (as he conceives of them) will come about organically on the market, and through human reason. I would say this, though, allows for Mises's version of utilitarianism, where reason can help us determine which kind of system of law works best for our aims. This I can agree with.
"our aims"- Whose aims? Ahh the utilitarians.. where did individualism suddenly go, eh?
"our aims" means "libertarians' aims"
Conza88: AJ: This doesn't address the point I was making. To recap, Rothbard said, "Any discussion of policy is inherently normative. You can't have free markets unless you have property rights." However, property rights in Rothbard's statement only applies to de facto (Rothbardian) rights, not normative ones. But even if we must have de facto Rothbardian property rights in order to have free markets, that does not imply that Rothbardian property rights are normative. Hence the quote seems to be a glaring non sequitur. Except it's not. This may make it clearer what is meant. It becomes fairly obvious there is no non sequitur. Policy deals with law, yes? Law as a Nornative Discipline - Murray Rothbard
AJ: This doesn't address the point I was making. To recap, Rothbard said, "Any discussion of policy is inherently normative. You can't have free markets unless you have property rights." However, property rights in Rothbard's statement only applies to de facto (Rothbardian) rights, not normative ones. But even if we must have de facto Rothbardian property rights in order to have free markets, that does not imply that Rothbardian property rights are normative. Hence the quote seems to be a glaring non sequitur.
This doesn't address the point I was making. To recap, Rothbard said, "Any discussion of policy is inherently normative. You can't have free markets unless you have property rights."
However, property rights in Rothbard's statement only applies to de facto (Rothbardian) rights, not normative ones. But even if we must have de facto Rothbardian property rights in order to have free markets, that does not imply that Rothbardian property rights are normative. Hence the quote seems to be a glaring non sequitur.
Except it's not. This may make it clearer what is meant. It becomes fairly obvious there is no non sequitur. Policy deals with law, yes?
Law as a Nornative Discipline - Murray Rothbard
De facto law (rights) refers to law (rights) that are actually enforced. The excerpt you posted doesn't address that.
Again, "You can't have free markets unless you have property rights" only necessarily refers to de facto rights. This implies nothing about anything normative.
AJ: Conza88:I found this vaguely disturbing. What does hatred have to do with scholarship? Yes, of course we don't like the State, but here Rothbard seems to imply that a good libertarian scholar should "hate [the State] deep in his belly." Who said it did? Who is "we"? Whom else are you speaking for?
Conza88:I found this vaguely disturbing. What does hatred have to do with scholarship? Yes, of course we don't like the State, but here Rothbard seems to imply that a good libertarian scholar should "hate [the State] deep in his belly."
I simply observed that most readers here don't like the State. I think it's clear I'm not trying to say anything on anyone's behalf.
Conza88: Why Be Libertarian? - It's not so much a hatred of the state & status quo, but a love of liberty & freedom - a passion for justice! Are you a Libertarian AJ? Why are you one? Is it for the "intellectual parlor game" perhaps?
Why Be Libertarian? - It's not so much a hatred of the state & status quo, but a love of liberty & freedom - a passion for justice!
Are you a Libertarian AJ? Why are you one? Is it for the "intellectual parlor game" perhaps?
Because I think I would be happier in a libertarian society, and that most people would probably be happier as well (which would make me even happier). Passion for liberty is good, I agree. That's a positive emotion.
Conza88:I'm guessing some folks don't believe in absolute truth? And as such, call systems that profess as such to be "monopolies".. on truth - would that be correct?
For me, it's two steps different from that: 1) I don't reject absolute truth, but universal ethical truth; and 2) It's not that a system that professes to be the universal ethical truth is "monopolistic," it's that its enforcement in the legal system for "all courts" (or even the basis thereof, if that basis has any real unalterable substance at all) would be monopolistic. Naturally, if the basis for the legal system can be interpreted so radically as to become absolutely anything, it would be meaningless in the first place (and then it would cease to be monopolistic).
Why anarchy fails
AJ: For me, it's two steps different from that: 1) I don't reject absolute truth, but universal ethical truth; and 2) It's not that a system that professes to be the universal ethical truth is "monopolistic," it's that its enforcement in the legal system for "all courts" (or even the basis thereof, if that basis has any real unalterable substance at all) would be monopolistic. Naturally, if the basis for the legal system can be interpreted so radically as to become absolutely anything, it would be meaningless in the first place (and then it would cease to be monopolistic).
No. A monopoly is enforced by initiated coercion. Liberty is the absence of initiated coercion. Therefore, liberty is absolutely not a monopoly.
And you have been saying all laws are of property rights - thus property rights are a universal ethical truth pertaining to the specie ie. justice, of this genus ie. universal ethical truth. All = universal.
Again name a different law other than property rights that do not conflict with them and are distinctly different than property rights ie. mine and thine.
AJ, your use of words is inconsistent to what your are seemingly trying to convey and pulls the dialogue back to points already discussed that you ought to know very well by now. Please clarify better.
wilderness:And you have been saying all laws are of property rights - thus property rights are a universal ethical truth pertaining to the specie ie. justice, of this genus ie. universal ethical truth.
As I've said and implied several times now, this is a non sequitur given that the definitions of property rights are wildly different among various legal systems.
AJ: wilderness:And you have been saying all laws are of property rights - thus property rights are a universal ethical truth pertaining to the specie ie. justice, of this genus ie. universal ethical truth. As I've said and implied several times now, this is a non sequitur given that the definitions of property rights are wildly different among various legal systems.
Name another law other than property rights.
wilderness: Name another law other than property rights.
Law(s) against lying to congress.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
He means natural law, not some creation of a legislature.
Knight_of_BAAWA: He means natural law, not some creation of a legislature.
Oh, sorry.
The Law of Marginal Utility.
Adam Knott: wilderness: Name another law other than property rights. Law(s) against lying to congress.
Obviously that conflicts with property rights. Why do you support this law?
Adam Knott: Knight_of_BAAWA: He means natural law, not some creation of a legislature. Oh, sorry. The Law of Marginal Utility.
That involves property. Name one that doesn't violate property rights and is distinctly not in need of them. Keep the eye on the ball. This is about liberty and the free market. A law that would differ yet exist side-by-side with property rights. You brought up it. Give me knowledge.
Knight_of_BAAWA:He means natural law, not some creation of a legislature.
Adam Knott:Oh, sorry. The Law of Marginal Utility.
I've often wondered whether economics is truly a normative science. There seems to be subtle ethical assumptions in regards to the basis of terminology.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
AJ:"our aims" means "libertarians' aims"
And those who are not libertarians? Of course Mises version of utilitarianism has nothing to say when individuals consider the praxeological arguments and go against them, and it has nothing to say as to why individuals should behave morally / ethically.
AJ: Conza88: AJ: This doesn't address the point I was making. To recap, Rothbard said, "Any discussion of policy is inherently normative. You can't have free markets unless you have property rights." However, property rights in Rothbard's statement only applies to de facto (Rothbardian) rights, not normative ones. But even if we must have de facto Rothbardian property rights in order to have free markets, that does not imply that Rothbardian property rights are normative. Hence the quote seems to be a glaring non sequitur. Except it's not. This may make it clearer what is meant. It becomes fairly obvious there is no non sequitur. Policy deals with law, yes? Law as a Nornative Discipline - Murray Rothbard De facto law (rights) refers to law (rights) that are actually enforced. The excerpt you posted doesn't address that. Again, "You can't have free markets unless you have property rights" only necessarily refers to de facto rights. This implies nothing about anything normative.
"You can't have free markets unless you have [PRIVATE] property rights"
"The key to the theory of liberty is the establishment of the rights of private property for each individual's justified sphere of free action can only be set forth if his rights of property are analyzed and established." - Preface Ethics of Liberty
Oh no, the excerpt DOES address that. Every de facto/ legal right has a set of NORMATIVE "ought to" propositions within it. Here it is again, to refresh yours and others memories.
Law as a Normative Discipline - Murray Rothbard
If ethics is a normative discipline that identifies and classifies certain sets of actions as good or evil, right or wrong, then tort or criminal law is a subset of ethics identifying certain actions as appropriate for using violence against them. The law says that action X should be illegal, and therefore should be combated by the violence of the law. The law is a set of "ought" or normative propositions.
Many writers and jurists have claimed the law is a value-free, "positive" discipline. Of course it is possible simply to list, classify and analyze existing law without going further into saying what the law should or should not be.[2] But that sort of jurist is not fulfilling his essential task. Since the law is ultimately a set of normative commands, the true jurist or legal philosopher has not completed his task until he sets forth what the law should be, difficult though that might be. If he does not, then he necessarily abdicates his task in favor of individuals or groups untrained in legal principles, who may lay down their commands by sheer fiat and arbitrary caprice.
Thus, the Austinian jurists proclaim that the king, or sovereign, is supposed to lay down the law, and the law is purely a set of commands emanating from his will. But then the question arises: On what principles does or should the king operate?[3] Is it ever possible to say that the king is issuing a "bad" or "improper" decree? Once the jurist admits that, he is going beyond arbitrary will to begin to frame a set of normative principles that should be guiding the sovereign. And then he is back to normative law.
Modern variants of positive legal theory state that the law should be what the legislators say it is. But what principles are to guide the legislators? And if we say that the legislators should be the spokesmen for their constituents, then we simply push the problem one step back, and ask: What principles are supposed to guide the voters? Or is the law, and therefore everyone's freedom of action, to be ruled by arbitrary caprice of millions rather than of one man or a few?[4]
Even the older concept that the law should be determined by tribal or common-law judges, who are merely interpreting the custom of the tribe or society, cannot escape normative judgments basic to the theory. Why must the rules of custom be obeyed? If tribal custom requires the murder of all people over six feet tall, must this custom be obeyed regardless? Why cannot reason lay down a set of principles to challenge and overthrow mere custom and tradition? Similarly, why may it not be used to overthrow mere arbitrary caprice by king or public?
As we shall see, tort or criminal law is a set of prohibitions against the invasion of, or aggression against, private property rights; that is, spheres of freedom of action by each individual. But if that is the case, then the implication of the command, "Thou shall not interfere with A's property right," is that A's property right is just and therefore should not be invaded. Legal prohibitions, therefore, far from being in some sense value-free, actually imply a set of theories about justice, in particular the just allocation of property rights and property titles. "Justice" is nothing if not a normative concept.
Notes
[2] Ronald Dworkin, however, has pointed out that even positive legal analysis necessarily involves moral questions and moral standards. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), chaps. 2, 3, 12, 13. Also see Charles Fried, "The Law of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History," Journal of Legal Studies (March 1980): 340.
[3] The Austinians, of course, are also smuggling in a normative axiom into their positive theory: The law should be what the king says it is. This axiom is unanalyzed and ungrounded in any set of ethical principles.
[4] Again, these modern, democratic variants of positive legal theory smuggle in the unsupported normative axiom that statutes should be laid down by whatever the legislators or the voters wish to do. [Or market? Like redheads, eh? For what are consumers but more than one vote eh?]
"De facto law (rights) refers to law (rights) that are actually enforced."
Why must the law be obeyed or enforced? If the law requires the murder of all people over six feet tall, must this be obeyed regardless? Why cannot reason lay down a set of principles to challenge and overthrow mere custom and tradition? [or legal positivism] Similarly, why may it not be used to overthrow mere arbitrary caprice by king or public?
Within those statements are normative ones.
AJ: Passion for liberty is good, I agree. That's a positive emotion.
Passion for justice. Do you have a conception or theory of justice? What is it?
Laughing Man:I've often wondered whether economics is truly a normative science. There seems to be subtle ethical assumptions in regards to the basis of terminology.
That would be the fault of the economists or the language itself, not the science.
Conza88:Every de facto/ legal right has a set of NORMATIVE "ought to" propositions within it.
Oh? You yourself posted the following definition from Long:
"• Normative rights: the claims that ought to be respected and protected.
• Legal rights: the claims that a given legal institution officially announces it will respect and protect.
• De facto rights: the claims that actually receive respect and protection in a given society."
wilderness: AJ: wilderness:And you have been saying all laws are of property rights - thus property rights are a universal ethical truth pertaining to the specie ie. justice, of this genus ie. universal ethical truth. As I've said and implied several times now, this is a non sequitur given that the definitions of property rights are wildly different among various legal systems. Name another law other than property rights.
How is that at all relevant, given what I wrote? You quote me as saying that "all laws are of property rights" and then you ask me to name another law besides property rights. You're not making sense.
So, what does "right(s)" itself mean?
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
AJ: Conza88:Every de facto/ legal right has a set of NORMATIVE "ought to" propositions within it. Oh? You yourself posted the following definition from Long: "• Normative rights: the claims that ought to be respected and protected. • Legal rights: the claims that a given legal institution officially announces it will respect and protect. • De facto rights: the claims that actually receive respect and protection in a given society."
That I did and nothing has changed; they all still apply. It flows. The Natural law approach determines what they should actually be; that is why the above definitions / clarifications appear in the context under the title: Natural Law's function: guidance, not protectionWhat it is without any guidance, normative statements that have nothing to do with Liberty, nor Natural Law are smuggled in and called 'value free' when they are in fact not. As is highlighted and explained in the excerpt you didn't address.
Normative Rights -> Legal Rights -> Defacto Rights
Natural Law -> Natural Rights -> Natural Justice
It would be good if you could address the other questions.
AJ: wilderness: AJ: As I've said and implied several times now, this is a non sequitur given that the definitions of property rights are wildly different among various legal systems. Name another law other than property rights. How is that at all relevant, given what I wrote? You quote me as saying that "all laws are of property rights" and then you ask me to name another law besides property rights. You're not making sense.
wilderness: AJ: As I've said and implied several times now, this is a non sequitur given that the definitions of property rights are wildly different among various legal systems. Name another law other than property rights.
AJ: As I've said and implied several times now, this is a non sequitur given that the definitions of property rights are wildly different among various legal systems.
So property rights are THE one and ONLY law that ALL laws are derived of?
Angurse:That would be the fault of the economists or the language itself, not the science
Well of course it would be strange to blame economics for assumed ethical statements since it is just a academic discipline and not a rational agent.
Laughing Man: I've often wondered whether economics is truly a normative science. There seems to be subtle ethical assumptions in regards to the basis of terminology.
In economics, each proposition consists of "if X, Y". To use that information to form a political ideology, you must add an explicit or (more often) implicit assumption of "I want Y" or "we want Y".
1. If X, Y.
2. We want Y to exist.
3. Therefore, we should want to cause X.
The "normative" aspect exists outside economics. The "normative" aspect involves the determination of what "we" want.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan: In economics, each proposition consists of "if X, Y". To transform that into a political ideology, you must add an explicit or (more often) implicit assumption of "I want Y" or "we want Y". 1. If X, Y. 2. We want Y. 3. Therefore, we should cause X. The "normative" aspect exists outside economics. The "normative" aspect involves the determination of what "we" want.
In economics, each proposition consists of "if X, Y". To transform that into a political ideology, you must add an explicit or (more often) implicit assumption of "I want Y" or "we want Y".
2. We want Y.
3. Therefore, we should cause X.
And the basis for economics is explaining human behavior [ in a certain sphere ] or explaining what means to pursue to get to our ends. So I think there will always be such an element of want. I see this a great deal in the history community, attempts at objectivity. I don't think it achievable but being unable to achieve it does not mean one cannot find truth or speak truth.
I. Ryan: In economics, each proposition consists of "if X, Y". To use that information to form a political ideology, you must add an explicit or (more often) implicit assumption of "I want Y" or "we want Y". 1. If X, Y. 2. We want Y to exist. 3. Therefore, we should want to cause X.
If statements are hypothesis ie. assumptions, opinions. Austrian economics includes a prior ie. principles, certainities. Could you phrase this another way? Austrian economics doesn't exclude hypothesis but doesn't exclude a prior either. That's why it's considered rational.
Laughing Man: And the basis for economics is explaining human behavior [ in a certain sphere ] or explaining what means to pursue to get to our ends. #1 [So I think there will always be such an element of want.] I see this a great deal in the history community, attempts at objectivity. I don't think it achievable but being unable to achieve #2 [it does not mean one cannot find truth] or speak truth.
And the basis for economics is explaining human behavior [ in a certain sphere ] or explaining what means to pursue to get to our ends. #1 [So I think there will always be such an element of want.] I see this a great deal in the history community, attempts at objectivity. I don't think it achievable but being unable to achieve #2 [it does not mean one cannot find truth] or speak truth.
Laughing Man:
In my opinion, you have inadvertently (or perhaps intentionally) stated the foundational basis of praxeology. Consider this from Mises:
"The starting point of praxeology is a self-evident truth, the cognition of action, that is, the cognition of the fact that there is such a thing as consciously aiming at ends." (The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p.5)
I consider "aiming at ends" and "wanting" identical in the science of human action. So I read your #1 as saying the same thing as Mises: There will always be an element of want. In my opinion, this is exactly the point Mises was trying to make. Therefore, the concept of wanting---since there will always be an element of want---is the foundational concept of praxeology. I.e., the founding concept or phenomenon from which other deductions are made.
Mises says this: It is a self-evident truth that there is action (aiming at ends, wanting, striving, trying to, etc...)
You say this: Just because there will always be wanting does not mean we cannot find truth.
I say this: In your saying there will always be wanting, you have uncovered a self-evident truth.
This is and was Mises's basis for the foundation of praxeology.
Aristotle discusses human action and desire, etc... too. That's an old idea. Mises wasn't stating anything new here. Not saying you didn't know this... now my question that I had asked you.
wilderness: If statements are hypothesis ie. assumptions, opinions.
If statements are hypothesis ie. assumptions, opinions.
What? Why?
wilderness: Austrian economics includes a prior ie. principles, certainities. Could you phrase this another way? Austrian economics doesn't exclude hypothesis but doesn't exclude a prior either. That's why it's considered rational.
Austrian economics includes a prior ie. principles, certainities. Could you phrase this another way? Austrian economics doesn't exclude hypothesis but doesn't exclude a prior either. That's why it's considered rational.
I really do not understand what you are trying to say, there. Phrase what what other way? What does "rational" mean?
I. Ryan: wilderness: If statements are hypothesis ie. assumptions, opinions. What? Why?
I'm not going to define "if" for you. You defined the whole statement yourself. You said if X then Y, correct? So do X and get Y? But to know how to cause X and what Y is relies upon facts. I wasn't disagreeing with you here.
I. Ryan: wilderness: Austrian economics includes a prior ie. principles, certainities. Could you phrase this another way? Austrian economics doesn't exclude hypothesis but doesn't exclude a prior either. That's why it's considered rational. I really do not understand what you are trying to say, there. Phrase what what other way? What does "rational" mean?
You stated if X, Y is what economics does. Obviously not all economics deal in "if's". Austrian economics for one involves principles.
on rational
wilderness: You stated if X, Y is what economics does. Obviously not all economics deal in "if's". Austrian economics for one involves principles.
A principle constitutes the connection between the "X" and the "Y" in the statement "if X, Y". The connective "if" only specifies that the principle exists, not what the principle is.
For clarification, the rationality of Austrian economics is that 'if-statements' are used but principles too. Thus facts and propositions are important for the whole theory (any theory).
I should have mentioned, though, that I meant that each proposition of applied economics is an if-statement. For "normative" questions and the propositions of political ideologies involve applied economics, not just pure economics.
(I am not sure whether I am correct in the claim of the first sentence of this post, though.)
I. Ryan: I should have mentioned, though, that I meant that each proposition of applied economics is an if-statement. For "normative" questions and the propositions of political ideologies involve applied economics, not just pure economics. (I am not sure whether I am correct in the claim of the first sentence of this post, though.)
"If the "given situation" conforms to a certain pattern, certain other features must also be present, for their presence is "deducible" from the pattern originally postulated. The analytic method is simply a way of discovering the necessary consequences of complex collocations of facts---consequences whose counterpart in reality is not so immediately discernible as the counterpart of the original postulates. It is an instrument for "shaking out" all the implications of given suppositions. Granted the correspondence of its original assumptions and the facts, its conclusions are inevitable and inescapable." (bold and italics added)
(Lionel Robbins: An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, p. 121-122)
An explanation of an "if" statement of the type I. Ryan is referring to.
It is important to note that there is a distinction to be made between "consequences" which connote temporal sequence, and "co-presences" which do not.
In Mengerian exact theoretical social science, the idea of co-presence (coexistence) plays a significant role. It is common for Menger to write about "the laws of the coexistence and of the succession of phenomena" or "on the basis of the laws of the coexistence and of the succession of phenomena."
So we can't forget that exact laws do not have to mean temporal succession---they can refer to the necessary "co-presence" or coexistence of phenomena. The law of marginal utility is one such law.
When we aim for a specific state of affairs, and we say that by exact "if-then" law, some other thing must come with this state of affairs, this other thing need not be conceived of as following temporally the original state aimed at. We can conceive the "other thing" as necessarily co-present with the original thing we aim for.
Adam Knott:In my opinion, you have inadvertently (or perhaps intentionally) stated the foundational basis of praxeology. Consider this from Mises:
All action is purposeful behavior
AJ: I found this vaguely disturbing. What does hatred have to do with scholarship? Yes, of course we don't like the State, but here Rothbard seems to imply that a good libertarian scholar should "hate [the State] deep in his belly." It's as if he hates the fact that his own rejection of the State is only his opinion. As if he hates the fact that natural rights are only persuasive concepts (very good ones!), but not logically necessary ones. Hence the overreaching with the flawed "proofs" of self-ownership, which I believe do a tremendous disservice to the whole libertarian cause by opening it up to easy logical criticism from the outside.
I found this vaguely disturbing. What does hatred have to do with scholarship? Yes, of course we don't like the State, but here Rothbard seems to imply that a good libertarian scholar should "hate [the State] deep in his belly." It's as if he hates the fact that his own rejection of the State is only his opinion. As if he hates the fact that natural rights are only persuasive concepts (very good ones!), but not logically necessary ones. Hence the overreaching with the flawed "proofs" of self-ownership, which I believe do a tremendous disservice to the whole libertarian cause by opening it up to easy logical criticism from the outside.
Very well put. Rothbard and all this nonsense about good/evil, proper/rogue, and "one and true law/ethics/morality" reeks of religious fundamentalism. Allegations that "true" intellect MUST inevitably "discover" this "natural law" (which, btw, is sitting pretty in REALITY waiting to be discovered by REASON), are nothing but a clumsy re-hash of the centuries old religious fundamentalism's claim that "true" love of God MUST inevitably "discover" some "God's Law" (sitting there to be discovered by true believers). Basing the viability of anarcho-capitalism on this nonsense, would doom it to failure before it ever even takes off.
Z.
z1235:Very well put. Rothbard and all this nonsense about good/evil, proper/rogue, and "one and true law/ethics/morality" reeks of religious fundamentalism. Allegations that "true" intellect MUST inevitably "discover" this "natural law" (which, btw, is sitting pretty in REALITY waiting to be discovered by REASON), are nothing but a clumsy re-hash of the centuries old religious fundamentalism's claim that "true" love of God MUST inevitably "discover" some "God's Law" (sitting there to be discovered by true believers). Basing the viability of anarcho-capitalism on this nonsense, would doom it to failure before it ever even takes off.
I would recommend you read more works by Aristotle. Natural law and its discovery isn't necessarily based on religion. Rothbard makes mention of this in the opening of Ethics of Liberty and Rothbard himself wasn't really a theist. What are we to base anarcho-capitalism on?
Z, please stop performing contradictions.
k, thanx, bye..
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Laughing Man:What are we to base anarcho-capitalism on?
Logic, epistemology... common sense. They really aren't that bad.
yes, logic and epistemology, and the fact that humans act entail private property ethics
I read the bit where you say that logic and epistemology aren't all that something, but i'm not sure what you are saying that they are not. they really aren't that what?
z1235: Very well put. Rothbard and all this nonsense about good/evil, proper/rogue, and "one and true law/ethics/morality" reeks of religious fundamentalism. Allegations that "true" intellect MUST inevitably "discover" this "natural law" (which, btw, is sitting pretty in REALITY waiting to be discovered by REASON), are nothing but a clumsy re-hash of the centuries old religious fundamentalism's claim that "true" love of God MUST inevitably "discover" some "God's Law" (sitting there to be discovered by true believers). Basing the viability of anarcho-capitalism on this nonsense, would doom it to failure before it ever even takes off.
z1235, i know you are basically angry. I obviously can't say that for sure, but from most of your recent posts my intuition is taking a more than wild stab at it. You haven't been able to argue accept most recently in favor of your explicit consent that 'initiating physical aggression is an axiom' in that pin stand thread, which is unfortunate that you (A) would pervert what an axiom is (B) make humans out to be pure violence (C) argue for initiating coercion.
I ask why you attack my or anybody's free-will?
nirgrahamUK:yes, logic and epistemology, and the fact that humans act entail private property ethics
The last one is debatable, luckily the first two are more than enough.
nirgrahamUK:I read the bit where you say that logic and epistemology aren't all that something, but i'm not sure what you are saying that they are not. they really aren't that what?
It was sarcasm. Logic and epistemology are a great base for AC.
Angurse:It was sarcasm. Logic and epistemology are a great base for AC.
Do you mean AE [ Austrian economics ]?
You'd be interested in Xeer law