thelion:It's not sell or don't:
Those are the same.
thelion:1. I'm never selling the higher-order goods if I'm selling a lower-order good. I'm selling a lower-order good, nothing more.
Sure. Only the tangible product is sold. The information just comes with it.
thelion:2. Unless I sell my information on a Capital market, I don't sell it.
thelion:3. I sell what the information produces, which is a consumption good. This is not synonymous to me with selling information too if I value the information. If I was selling a computer and information to make it, I would ask (once) a great lump sum. But instead, I sell the computer, for a smaller sum: and with a contract that you only buy the computer.
Sure. Only the tangible product is sold. The information just comes with it. (If you stipulate such a contract then there isn't any problem)
thelion:4. If you buy a computer to reverse engineer it you break the agreement by which you paid less for the computer than I was willing to sell it. Remember, all exchange is voluntary. If I didn't agree to it, and you take it, its theft. I agreed with provision. Buy my computer like this, or don't.
Only if such an agreement is arrived at upon purchase, it certainly isn't implied in any standard sale currently though.
thelion:The information isn't common knowledge until I sell it (yes, once: 1 or 0). But if I never sell the information in the first place, but only computer and contract, then I have never made my information public, because anyone who accepted my offer of lower price agreed to contract. They are bound by contract, else they have committed theft.
thelion: It IS exactly theft, because it is a breaking of contract.
It IS exactly theft, because it is a breaking of contract.
Violating a contract isn't necessarily the same as theft.
thelion:5. Never forget every item you buy comes with a notice of this sort. When you buy it at that price you accept that notice, else you don't buy it.
That is simply false. I just purchased a pair of sneakers, there was absolutely no agreement stating that I couldn't use the patterns, stitching styles, materials, colors, etc... nothing.
thelion: Example: It is like interest. If you borrow X and pay monthly interest, then I maintain ownership of X, whereas you maintain ownership of temporal disposal of X (for the time period T) in exchange for Y (for the time period T). Because you pay interest, its not that you own X, in the sense of not having to pay back principle X and interest Y. You pay back the principle too, but in installments along with interest payments.
Example: It is like interest.
If you borrow X and pay monthly interest, then I maintain ownership of X, whereas you maintain ownership of temporal disposal of X (for the time period T) in exchange for Y (for the time period T).
Because you pay interest, its not that you own X, in the sense of not having to pay back principle X and interest Y. You pay back the principle too, but in installments along with interest payments.
It isn't anything like interest.
thelion: I think the debate is getting sidetracked. The question is not formulated in the proper way. Does cost of inputs mean out puts are valuable? No. But that not the question. Neither is monopoly the question, although legalistic interpretations often confuse the question into: copyright holder has monopoly; it is violated; pay damages. There was a case where a company I know produced a good, but a couple years later a larger company applied to patent and patented the good. They don't produce it; first company, however, lost lawsuit. Now nobody produces good. But this is miscarriage of justice. It is not that the knowledge wasn't valuable: the first company sued the second company, to get back its right. Let's begin with a different perspective. Common knowledge is not valuable. No one ever has to choose between a scarce object and a known formula, says Mises. But what about a formula that is not common knowledge? Suppose A owns land, on which A own factory B. Suppose private provision of security. A has a formula that is not common knowledge. Assume C physically trespasses into B. If A catches C in the act, B is punished. But what if A never catches C in the act, however, B physically trespasses into C repeatedly. Does B escape punishment? No. This is violation of property; private or public provision of security will see to C.Or A will see to C, whenever he meets C. Now, assume there was a formula in A's factory B, that is not common knowledge. C trespasses into B, then leaves, and reveals the formula. A has lost something valuable. In other words, if we privately or publicly don't treat knowledge as property, then corporate spying is punished just as trespassing, when it, in fact, causes greater loss of wealth to A then trespassing of A's property. If I am threatened with a knife to reveal my business knowledge, does the knife-wielder go unpunished if he doesn't, pardon the language, stick me? We must follow Menger and Mises , in ascribing value to anything that is scarce. Anything valuable is property. Its just a mechanism for economic calculation. Property is a question of calculation given division of labour. For instance, interest is result of time-preference. Temporal disposal of goods is valuable; it is property, but it is not a physical quantity. Bohm-Bawerk denied temporal disposal is valuable, however, Mises showed Menger was right. If someone takes my computer for a time, then gives it back; and all this without permission, don't I get interest for time I lost computer? Don't I get damages? Is interest not physical, hence not property? In conclusion, we are entering a variant of the debate for and against interest. Except instead of interest, we are talking about another not-physical but valuable thing: knowledge of physical quantities. As that was solved, so we should solve this. Mises' and Hayek's whole case for calculation rests, for instance, of value of knowledge of time and space. As there, so here. After all, remember what Gossen, and then Bohm-Bawerk wrote, all people do control orderings of physical forces when they are producing goods. Is not knowledge of how to produce a good?
I think the debate is getting sidetracked. The question is not formulated in the proper way.
Does cost of inputs mean out puts are valuable? No. But that not the question. Neither is monopoly the question, although legalistic interpretations often confuse the question into: copyright holder has monopoly; it is violated; pay damages. There was a case where a company I know produced a good, but a couple years later a larger company applied to patent and patented the good. They don't produce it; first company, however, lost lawsuit. Now nobody produces good. But this is miscarriage of justice. It is not that the knowledge wasn't valuable: the first company sued the second company, to get back its right.
Let's begin with a different perspective.
Common knowledge is not valuable. No one ever has to choose between a scarce object and a known formula, says Mises. But what about a formula that is not common knowledge?
Suppose A owns land, on which A own factory B. Suppose private provision of security. A has a formula that is not common knowledge. Assume C physically trespasses into B.
If A catches C in the act, B is punished. But what if A never catches C in the act, however, B physically trespasses into C repeatedly. Does B escape punishment? No. This is violation of property; private or public provision of security will see to C.Or A will see to C, whenever he meets C.
Now, assume there was a formula in A's factory B, that is not common knowledge. C trespasses into B, then leaves, and reveals the formula.
A has lost something valuable.
In other words, if we privately or publicly don't treat knowledge as property, then corporate spying is punished just as trespassing, when it, in fact, causes greater loss of wealth to A then trespassing of A's property.
If I am threatened with a knife to reveal my business knowledge, does the knife-wielder go unpunished if he doesn't, pardon the language, stick me?
We must follow Menger and Mises , in ascribing value to anything that is scarce. Anything valuable is property. Its just a mechanism for economic calculation. Property is a question of calculation given division of labour.
For instance, interest is result of time-preference. Temporal disposal of goods is valuable; it is property, but it is not a physical quantity. Bohm-Bawerk denied temporal disposal is valuable, however, Mises showed Menger was right.
If someone takes my computer for a time, then gives it back; and all this without permission, don't I get interest for time I lost computer? Don't I get damages? Is interest not physical, hence not property?
In conclusion, we are entering a variant of the debate for and against interest. Except instead of interest, we are talking about another not-physical but valuable thing: knowledge of physical quantities. As that was solved, so we should solve this. Mises' and Hayek's whole case for calculation rests, for instance, of value of knowledge of time and space. As there, so here.
After all, remember what Gossen, and then Bohm-Bawerk wrote, all people do control orderings of physical forces when they are producing goods. Is not knowledge of how to produce a good?
This is a very good post. The anti information as property group have no answer for the theft of information dilemma. If the only penalty is trespassing when your valuable information is stolen then computer hacking and industrial espionage become basically legal from this libertarian perspective. An employee of the company would basically face no penalty at all given they would not even be trespassing. So an employee could copy and sell any data they wanted without fear of any reprisal.
Ultimately, the Kinsella types fail because the market does in fact treat information as property, the market isn't waiting for Kinsella and his lackeys to approve it or not.
Kinsella and his kool aid followers fail to distinguish between the different levels of distribution of information and how this effects the treatment of information in the market. The market has solved this problem, scarce information is property.
Maxliberty:If the only penalty is trespassing when people look around your home then breaking and entering in furtherance of 'home tourism' is legal. An tourist of your home would basically face no penalty at all given they would not even be trespassing. So a tourist could copy and sell any books and DVD's about 'whats in your home' without fear of any reprisal.
first off. looking around and writing books arent crimes. trespassing and hacking networks are crimes.
the fact that looking around and writing books arent crimes doesnt make trespassing and hacking to be not crimes.
now if you are quiblling about severity of crime, say so.
p.s. dont quote me or use any of my ideas here-in. i withold from you my IP rights over it.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Maxliberty: thelion: I think the debate is getting sidetracked. The question is not formulated in the proper way. Does cost of inputs mean out puts are valuable? No. But that not the question. Neither is monopoly the question, although legalistic interpretations often confuse the question into: copyright holder has monopoly; it is violated; pay damages. There was a case where a company I know produced a good, but a couple years later a larger company applied to patent and patented the good. They don't produce it; first company, however, lost lawsuit. Now nobody produces good. But this is miscarriage of justice. It is not that the knowledge wasn't valuable: the first company sued the second company, to get back its right. Let's begin with a different perspective. Common knowledge is not valuable. No one ever has to choose between a scarce object and a known formula, says Mises. But what about a formula that is not common knowledge? Suppose A owns land, on which A own factory B. Suppose private provision of security. A has a formula that is not common knowledge. Assume C physically trespasses into B. If A catches C in the act, B is punished. But what if A never catches C in the act, however, B physically trespasses into C repeatedly. Does B escape punishment? No. This is violation of property; private or public provision of security will see to C.Or A will see to C, whenever he meets C. Now, assume there was a formula in A's factory B, that is not common knowledge. C trespasses into B, then leaves, and reveals the formula. A has lost something valuable. In other words, if we privately or publicly don't treat knowledge as property, then corporate spying is punished just as trespassing, when it, in fact, causes greater loss of wealth to A then trespassing of A's property. If I am threatened with a knife to reveal my business knowledge, does the knife-wielder go unpunished if he doesn't, pardon the language, stick me? We must follow Menger and Mises , in ascribing value to anything that is scarce. Anything valuable is property. Its just a mechanism for economic calculation. Property is a question of calculation given division of labour. For instance, interest is result of time-preference. Temporal disposal of goods is valuable; it is property, but it is not a physical quantity. Bohm-Bawerk denied temporal disposal is valuable, however, Mises showed Menger was right. If someone takes my computer for a time, then gives it back; and all this without permission, don't I get interest for time I lost computer? Don't I get damages? Is interest not physical, hence not property? In conclusion, we are entering a variant of the debate for and against interest. Except instead of interest, we are talking about another not-physical but valuable thing: knowledge of physical quantities. As that was solved, so we should solve this. Mises' and Hayek's whole case for calculation rests, for instance, of value of knowledge of time and space. As there, so here. After all, remember what Gossen, and then Bohm-Bawerk wrote, all people do control orderings of physical forces when they are producing goods. Is not knowledge of how to produce a good? This is a very good post. The anti information as property group have no answer for the theft of information dilemma. If the only penalty is trespassing when your valuable information is stolen then computer hacking and industrial espionage become basically legal from this libertarian perspective. An employee of the company would basically face no penalty at all given they would not even be trespassing. So an employee could copy and sell any data they wanted without fear of any reprisal.
I fail to see where in the employee handbook it says that employees are allowed to copy information from their computers and distribute it to unauthorized persons. Btw, *cough*strawman*cough*.
Maxliberty:Ultimately, the Kinsella types fail because the market does in fact treat information as property, the market isn't waiting for Kinsella and his lackeys to approve it or not. Kinsella and his kool aid followers fail to distinguish between the different levels of distribution of information and how this effects the treatment of information in the market. The market has solved this problem, scarce information is property.
You're not distinguishing between the information itself and the information a expressed on a medium. Btw, how is copying stealing? If you, Madliberty, tell me of your idiotic idea to build a house out of JELLO, and I then go ahead a build a house out of JELLO and sell it, how exactly have I stolen from you?
Btw, Madliberty, you can quote me, but at a cost of $0.00001 per word.
To paraphrase Marc Faber: We're all doomed, but that doesn't mean that we can't make money in the process. Rabbi Lapin: "Let's make bricks!" Stephan Kinsella: "Say you and I both want to make a German chocolate cake."
Maxliberty: This is a very good post. The anti information as property group have no answer for the theft of information dilemma. If the only penalty is trespassing when your valuable information is stolen then computer hacking and industrial espionage become basically legal from this libertarian perspective. An employee of the company would basically face no penalty at all given they would not even be trespassing. So an employee could copy and sell any data they wanted without fear of any reprisal. Ultimately, the Kinsella types fail because the market does in fact treat information as property, the market isn't waiting for Kinsella and his lackeys to approve it or not. Kinsella and his kool aid followers fail to distinguish between the different levels of distribution of information and how this effects the treatment of information in the market. The market has solved this problem, scarce information is property.
MaxLiberty,
Please address an earlier post of mine in which I state the following (paraphrasing):
- Why presume value and rights are related? You can have one without the other. All value is subjective.
- Kinsella and company argue that the medium in which the information is contained is property. Therefore contracts involving this property are legitimate. In your example of the worker taking information from the company's computer system - they were granted the authority to access the information through contract. That same contract would (in almost all cases) restrain the employee, and their mouth, hands, etc, from communicating this information without proper approval. If there was no such contract in place, then yes, they would be able to take and spread the information as they wish.
- You continue to speak of the market's treatment of IP. I believe Kinsella's argument is partially rooted in the fact that IP could not exist without the state. The market has nothing to do with it. He is rather explicit about this, yet you continue to ignore it. If you disagree, please offer some kind of reasoning. In a free market, there would be no way for a person to 'defend' himself against IP violation, as nothing is being stolen from them. He would need to initiate violence against another using their own property. Your counter with the computer/hacker example ignores private contracts and the property that is a computer, which must be breached to obtain said information.
Keep you doped with religion and sex and TV. And you think you're so clever and class less and free. But you're still f***ing peasants as far as I can see.
There's room at the top they are telling you still. But first you must learn how to smile as you kill, if you want to be like the folks on the hill.
nirgrahamUK:first off. looking around and writing books arent crimes. trespassing and hacking networks are crimes.
If information can not be stolen, which is your theory, then taking data is not theft. You might be guilty of trespassing but not theft and if the trespass is minimal then any damages will also be minimal, but the data stolen could be very valuable.
What is the appropriate damages for hacking into a computer for 10 minutes without any measurable disruption to your computer system and taking one million dollars worth of data? With your theory, the answer is basically zero.
freewheeler:Why presume value and rights are related? You can have one without the other. All value is subjective.
Can you buy or sell something that is not property? Can you buy and sell information?
freewheeler:Kinsella and company argue that the medium in which the information is contained is property. Therefore contracts involving this property are legitimate. In your example of the worker taking information from the company's computer system - they were granted the authority to access the information through contract. That same contract would (in almost all cases) restrain the employee, and their mouth, hands, etc, from communicating this information without proper approval. If there was no such contract in place, then yes, they would be able to take and spread the information as they wish.
If I can restrain you with contract then why can't I restrain your copying of music with contract? In the case of the employee, what would the damages be if they stole all of the data since, from your perspective, the data has no value and can not be owned by the company. Where is the theft of stealing something that can not be owned? How can you have damages if the data by your definition can not be owned by anybody?
freewheeler:You continue to speak of the market's treatment of IP. I believe Kinsella's argument is partially rooted in the fact that IP could not exist without the state. The market has nothing to do with it. He is rather explicit about this, yet you continue to ignore it. If you disagree, please offer some kind of reasoning. In a free market, there would be no way for a person to 'defend' himself against IP violation, as nothing is being stolen from them. He would need to initiate violence against another using their own property. Your counter with the computer/hacker example ignores private contracts and the property that is a computer, which must be breached to obtain said information.
IP exists now without the state so why would this stop? If I have information and you don't then I own that information and you don't, it is very simple. The market destroys Kinsella's theory because it demonstrates that information is property and it treats it accordingly. Whatever mental gymnastics you want to put yourself through to say that nobody buys information, they only buy the medium has been proven false.
Maxliberty: This is a very good post. The anti information as property group have no answer for the theft of information dilemma. If the only penalty is trespassing when your valuable information is stolen then computer hacking and industrial espionage become basically legal from this libertarian perspective. An employee of the company would basically face no penalty at all given they would not even be trespassing. So an employee could copy and sell any data they wanted without fear of any reprisal.
There isn't a dilemma about theft of information. There are contract violations with consequences and trespassing which is hardly legal from a libertarian perspective, particularly standard propertarians.
Angurse:There isn't a dilemma about theft of information.
According to you information can not be stolen. So the dilemma is what is the consequence of hacking or industrial espionage? Answer, none.
Once you determine that information is not property then copying that information even if it involves trespassing can't be punished, so the loss of very valuable information under your theory is without consequence. Also, under your view the employee under contract faces potentially more severe consequences than the person who openly hacks in and copies the data, after all the thief does not have a contract.
http://www.theonion.com/content/news/report_yankees_trademarked_yankees
Menger has 4 points of 'What is Goods-Character?' The Fifth point is scarcity, ina snwer: "What is a Good?' Anything meeting those five points is a good. It has an owner. It is property, else it can never be the subject of economic calculation.
Does any one read the contracts that come with software? The IP laws aren't required. I am not arguing that government IP laws are required. Only a contract is required. If I sell a disk with a contract, and not otherwise, to get disk and source code AT THAT PRICE is breaking the contract, because such a contract exists. If such a contract doesn't exist, then no scarce good is involved insofar human action.
Consider how much Microsoft, John, Smith, etc. would ask without that contract? As much as the source code is worth. With the contract, $50. If you buy source code, then both parties have voluntarily agreed to exchange. If not, then theft. If exchange is not voluntary, libertarians shouldn't recognize it.
In response to this point, lots of ad hominem arguments, which don't address this point. I don't say government is required for enforcement of copyright law. In the private provision of security, one can provide for security of any good. For instance, in the same way as somebody doesn't repay principle in loan. After all, what is the good that is bought for interest payments? Its temporary disposal of goods.
Lots of nonsense surround IP law, true; but that is not evidence that there are limits to property. Property, as Jorg Hulsmann wrote, is anything that is a means of human action. This is a good definition. Use it.
[Something happened to server? Page froze then double post. Who knows. Anyway, since post is up, may as well use it.]
As in a small business, I have patents for instance, for defense against later patent trolling. So I sympathize with Kinsella's point of view. But that doesn't mean that property rights are more limited then what is means of human action.
Maxliberty: According to you information can not be stolen. So the dilemma is what is the consequence of hacking or industrial espionage? Answer, none. Once you determine that information is not property then copying that information even if it involves trespassing can't be punished, so the loss of very valuable information under your theory is without consequence. Also, under your view the employee under contract faces potentially more severe consequences than the person who openly hacks in and copies the data, after all the thief does not have a contract.
Nonsense, you are (once again) completely overlooking the act of trespassing. The rate of punishment for such an offense isn't fixed(nor would it consistently hover around zero). You are act is the offense, punishment is based upon the effects of the act.
thelion:Does any one read the contracts that come with software? The IP laws aren't required. I am not arguing that government IP laws are required. Only a contract is required. If I sell a disk with a contract, and not otherwise, to get disk and source code AT THAT PRICE is breaking the contract, because such a contract exists. If such a contract doesn't exist, then no scarce good is involved insofar human action.
And that is a proper contract, nobody is arguing against the companies right to contract.
thelion:Consider how much Microsoft, John, Smith, etc. would ask without that contract? As much as the source code is worth. With the contract, $50. If you buy source code, then both parties have voluntarily agreed to exchange. If not, then theft. If exchange is not voluntary, libertarians shouldn't recognize it.
Thats a very flimsy argument, there is such a thing a freeware, which started Microsoft.
thelion:Lots of nonsense surround IP law, true; but that is not evidence that there are limits to property. Property, as Jorg Hulsmann wrote, is anything that is a means of human action. This is a good definition. Use it.
By that definition, people are property. Contractual agreements don't necessarily equate property at any rate.
People are property. Their own. My body is means of my action; yours is yours; John's is John's, Bob's is Bob's, etc.
So yes, property is means of human action, viz something fitting Menger's 5 points.
thelion: People are property. Their own. My body is means of my action; yours is yours; John's is John's, Bob's is Bob's, etc. So yes, property is means of human action, viz something fitting Menger's 5 points.
Why did you shoehorn "their own" in there? By Hulsmanns definition, you are also the property of others.
Nope; no more than the whole of China is the "property" of a person. It can't be. Why not? Because a single person couldn't use the whole of China as a marginal quantity. This is Hulsmann's example, BTW.
You could force me to do something, but then again I am the one doing it. I can always refuse, even on pain of death hypothetically, and nothing more could be done about it. People can't be each others property.
There is no such thing as an ACTING MARGINAL QUANTITY. Dogs, cats, trees, rocks, can be marginal quantities; humans cannot.
thelion: Nope; no more than the whole of China is the "property" of a person. It can't be. Why not? Because a single person couldn't use the whole of China as a marginal quantity. This is Hulsmann's example, BTW. You could force me to do something, but then again I am the one doing it. I can always refuse, even on pain of death hypothetically, and nothing more could be done about it. People can't be each others property. There is no such thing as an ACTING MARGINAL QUANTITY. Dogs, cats, trees, rocks, can be marginal quantities; humans cannot.
"anything that is a means of human action"
I can use others as a means for my own ends, they can be tool, just like a horse.
"You could force me a horse to do something, but then again I am the one doing it the horse is the one doing it. I The horse can always refuse, even on pain of death hypothetically, and nothing more could be done about it. People Horses can't be each others property."
If you you want to change or refine your earlier claim by all means.
A horse has not the logical capacity of people. Horse don't write math proofs; humans do. Non-algorithmic behavior is what makes humans actors, as opposed to horses.
A horse hasn't got a mental concept of death; it has instinct. It's not refusing.
Shovels don't refuse to dig holes. They just don't. That is a physical fact, not a phenomenal category.
People, however, can refuse to dig holes. Tools are tools, but when talking about people, we say: division of labour.
Mises' book is called HUMAN ACTION, not HORSES CAN ACT... TOO.
Edit: Hopefully, you understand that "tool" is a purely rhetorical saying, when said about a person. Hammers and shovels cannot possibly choose to do or not do. Humans choose. If I do as you asked, you have convinced else coerced me, etc.
thelion: A horse has not the logical capacity of people. Horse don't write math proofs; humans do. Non-algorithmic behavior is what makes humans actors, as opposed to horses.
Not all humans actually have such capacity either though. And you have you to actually explain why such attributes render something counter to your prior definition of property at all. You have much work* to do.
thelion:A horse hasn't got a mental concept of death; it has instinct. It's not refusing.
Not all humans have such a capacity either though. And acting upon instinct and not complying is still refusal, you are trying to change your terms. (Or possibly the terms themselves)
thelion:Shovels don't refuse to dig holes. They just don't. That is a physical fact, not a phenomenal category.
Horses ain't** shovels, they just ain't**. That is a physical fact, not a phenomenal category.
thelion:People, however, can refuse to dig holes.
As can horses.
thelion:Mises' book is called HUMAN ACTION, not HORSES CAN ACT TOO, coauthor Peta.
Read it.
"A means is what serves to the attainment of any end, goal, or aim. Means are not in the given universe; in this universe there exist only things. A thing becomes a means when human reason plans to employ it for the attainment of some end and human action really employs it for this purpose. Thinking man sees the serviceableness of things, i.e., their ability to minister to his ends, and acting man makes them means. It is of primary importance to realize that parts of the external world become means only through the operation of the human mind and its offshoot, human action. External objects are as such only phenomena of the physical universe and the subject matter of the natural sciences. It is human meaning and action which transform them into means. Praxeology does not deal with the external world. but with man's conduct with regard to it."
Simply put; Humans are means.
*Backtracking
**Special thanks to Americans for introducing that gem of a word to me
Your citation, notice, agrees with me. Mises said things, not human actors.
When we talk about human actors, we leave Crusoe economy and enter division of labour.
Is there such a thing as division of labour between horses?
If I see you as a means, and you see me as a means, you don't own me and I don't own you. We begin division of labour. If it were me and land, or me and a spoon, unless its someone else's, it simply is property of my action.
Also, if there were only things, then economics isn't required. Linear programming would solve any problem of action. But here are objects and subjects. Subjects can never be objects; not really, because human action not your own is never certain in causation from your want of it to its occurrence.
Edit: Hold on a minute, are we arguing, on a libertarian forum, whether a person owns himself or not?
Angurse:Nonsense, you are (once again) completely overlooking the act of trespassing. The rate of punishment for such an offense isn't fixed(nor would it consistently hover around zero). You are act is the offense, punishment is based upon the effects of the act.
I am not ignoring the act of trespassing. It is simply that the act of trespassing that causes at most minimal physical damage to your property is not going to be punished by anything more severe than repairing whatever damaged occurred. If I hack into your computer network and only copy data you will be hard pressed under your philosophy to have any grounds for any sizeable restitution. After all, I have not damaged any property, nor taken anything property, by your definition.
Angurse:punishment is based upon the effects of the act.
Exactly. Anything that isn't property never enters into preferences, but since information can enter into preferences, it is somebody's property.
thelion: Your citation, notice, agrees with me. Mises said things, not human actors. When we talk about human actors, we leave Crusoe economy and enter division of labour. Is there such a thing as division of labour between horses?
"A thing becomes a means when human reason plans to employ it for the attainment of some end and human action really employs it for this purpose."
People are frequently employed. There is no reason that other humans cannot also be one’s means. In fact, in Socialism Mises made it even clearer:
In the means of production men serve as means, not as ends. For liberal social theory proves that each single man sees in all others, first of all, onlymeans to the realization of his purposes, while he himself is to all others a means to the realization of their purposes; that finally, by this reciprocalaction, in which each is simultaneously means and end, the highest aim of social life is attained—the achievement of a better existence for everyone.
By your theory of property - anything that is a means of human action- everyone owns everyone. Its a massive failure.
No, that's division of labour. They are means of satisfaction of my wants, not my personal action. They act, to satisfy my wants, and I theirs, and we gain because our preference ordering are reverse.
My preference ordering is not another person's preference ordering. That's it. Spoon has no preference ordering. If unclaimed, I take it, and my preference ordering is synonymous to mine. It is my property.
Maxliberty:I am not ignoring the act of trespassing. It is simply that the act of trespassing that causes at most minimal physical damage to your property is not going to be punished by anything more severe than repairing whatever damaged occurred. If I hack into your computer network and only copy data you will be hard pressed under your philosophy to have any grounds for any sizeable restitution. After all, I have not damaged any property, nor taken anything property, by your definition.
You have absolutely no way of determining that, you are just repeating an assertion. And There is still an effect whether property was damaged at all, the easiest case of mental damages comes to mind.
Maxliberty:And since there has been no effect since no property was taken or damaged then there is no punishment. If the data is not your property how can you complain when I take it. The example of the employee eliminates the trespass issue. Since the data is not yours taking it is no loss to you.
And There is still an effect whether property was damaged at all, the easiest case of mental damages comes to mind. Its quite easy to complain, your actions resulted in the unwanted exposure of my data, depending on the nature of the data, potentially costing me millions. Its really just a function of tort law.
thelion: No, that's division of labour. They are means of satisfaction of my wants, not my personal action. They act, to satisfy my wants, and I theirs, and we gain because our preference ordering are reverse.
"Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life"
Human action is the satisfaction of wants.
thelion:My preference ordering is not another person's preference ordering. That's it. Spoon has no preference ordering. If unclaimed, I take it, and my preference ordering is synonymous to mine. It is my property.
Great. And? (That doesn't counter what you've already defined as property"anything that is a means of human action.")
One cannot have human action with human action as a marginal quantity, unless the implied second actor has agreed, or is doing that for his own reasons. This is implied in our calling the second actor an actor.
Property is means of human action. Personal action, because there is no aggregate of persons viz aggregate of their preference rankings. A person is never means to my end. His action is, potentially, means to my end. But his action is his property. We barter, so that I may obtain his action, and he mine; and this is called division of labour.
It makes no sense to say human action, of another person, is my personal human action in the sense of absolute property of my person. Our premises forbid that inference. The human actions, in that case, are of two persons, prefering two means for two different ends.
thelion: One cannot have human action with human action as a marginal quantity, unless the implied second actor has agreed, or is doing that for his own reasons. This is implied in our calling the second actor an actor.
The exact same is true for a horse, they don't automatically pull plows. No, they do it for their own reasons.
thelion: Property is means of human action. Personal action, because there is no aggregate of persons viz aggregate of their preference rankings. A person is never means to my end. His action is, potentially, means to my end. But his action is his property. We barter, so that I may obtain his action, and he mine; and this is called division of labour.
Making a distinction between a human and the labour of a human doesn't help your case as the horses action is, potentially, means to my end. But its action is its property. Even if you need make such an unnecessary distinction, it still doesn't help your case. Calling it division of labour, doesn't remove the fact the the other human is acting as a means to your end. Just as a horse does.
thelion: It makes no sense to say human action, of another person, is my personal human action in the sense of absolute property of my person. Our premises forbid that inference. The human actions, in that case, are of two persons, prefering two means for two different ends.
It makes about as much sense as saying the action of a horse is my personal human action. None. The distinctions you are making only hurt your case that "anything that is a means of human action" can be property. Its a poor, poor definition of property.
Humans are the only actors, in the full sense of the word.
Horse don't reason, you see. They are closer to spoons, although they do have some reasoning ability. Its not enough, however, for syllogism even. Ravens are more intelligent: they can use pulleys. But are they really interchangable with humans? Do they act or do they have instinct, which is not action in the Mises uses it, and he points this out early in Human Action (passage about why babies have no memory of being a fetus)?
Since horse are not actors, you cannot make the syllogism and claim contradiction: nego consequentiam.
On the other hand, when I say the movements and behavior of a horse are my property, it makes as much a sense as the behavior of the spoon is my property: whatever I do with the horse or the spoon, is what happens to the spoon or the horse. It doesn't work backwards: a horse doesn't do anything with me. The horse idea is a diversion.
You have fallacy of confusing an ATTRIBUTE of SOME objects (reason) (humans) with a CLASS of objects (humans, horses, trees, hamsters, etc).
BTW, its the fine points of separating all goods which are important in questions like this. So long as horses don't manipulate preference orders such as humans, they are property of humans or not property at all, and humans are only their own property.
thelion: Humans are the only actors, in the full sense of the word. Horse don't reason, you see. They are closer to spoons, although they do have some reasoning ability. Its not enough, however, for syllogism even. Ravens are more intelligent: they can use pulleys.But are they really interchangable with humans? Do they act or do they have instinct (which is not action in the Mises uses it, and he points this out early in Human Action (passage about why babies have no memory of being a fetus)? Since horse are not actors, you cannot make the syllogism and claim contradiction.
Horse don't reason, you see. They are closer to spoons, although they do have some reasoning ability. Its not enough, however, for syllogism even. Ravens are more intelligent: they can use pulleys.But are they really interchangable with humans? Do they act or do they have instinct (which is not action in the Mises uses it, and he points this out early in Human Action (passage about why babies have no memory of being a fetus)?
Since horse are not actors, you cannot make the syllogism and claim contradiction.
Not enough reasoning ability for what? Why is reason the line of demarcation? Why not number of chromosomes? What about people who don't have reasoning ability?
You are just drawing arbitrary lines to make up for a poor definition.
thelion:On the other hand, when I say the movements and behavior of a horse are my property, it makes as much a sense as the behavior of the spoon is my property: whatever I do with the horse or the spoon, is what happens to the spoon or the horse. It doesn't work backwards: a horse doesn't do anything with me. The horse idea is a diversion.
No it doesn't. Spoons don't behave.
Spoons and horse are objects manipulated by humans. Its not possible to do this with humans, because each person has a preference ordering. No other entity, or object, except humans, has such preference orderings. No other entity acts.
There is no arbitrary distinction.
Property is only that related to human action. As in individual. And that means individual humans, not horse, and so on. These are our premises. Everything else is more complex phenomena of multiple human actors.
[Actually, even more precisely: humans can check mathematical proofs and logical proofs, which is non-algorithmic calculation. Nothing else can do this, hence one cannot predict humans to treat them as physical things when they act.)
thelion:Spoons and horse are objects manipulated by humans. Its not possible to do this with humans, because each person has a preference ordering. No other entity, or object, except humans, has such preference orderings. No other entity acts.
That is just nonsense. Humans manipulate humans daily.
thelion:There is no arbitrary distinction.
There is. Now its lack of "preference of ordering" again why is that the objective line of demarcation?
thelion:Property is only that related to human action. As in individual. And that means individual humans, not horse, and so on. These are our premises. Everything else is more complex phenomena of multiple human actors.
Horses are related to human action, they are potential means to my ends. As is any other human. Your premises are made or arbitrary whims.
Your definition of property has now changed as well. Its gone from "anything that is a means of human action" to "anything except humans even though their actions can be means" to "anything that satisfies my personal actions - but still not humans" to "only has X reasoning ability - which isn't enough" to "only that related to human action."
'Humans manipulate humans daily.'
Now your playing pure dialectics with the english language, and the word manipulate. That can continue forever, however, you leave the discussion of economics and science.
Reason is not an arbitrary distinction. Its the major distinction between praxeology and economics, and the rest of science.
Its why there is economics rather than physics: you don't 'manipulate' humans as you do spoons. One is a nonreasoning entity, another makes choices. One acts in a regular way, the other does not necessarily. This is what Mises argued since 1933 to 1962 in his last book: plants, cats, dogs, rocks are not human actors, and human actors can't be treated as the former.
When you equate horses, spoons, and humans, you leave Austrian theory (and economics for that matter.)
thelion:Reason is not an arbitrary distinction. Its the major distinction between praxeology and economics, and the rest of science.
Yet we are talking about property. You continue to try and shift.
thelion:Its why there is economics rather than physics: you don't 'manipulate' humans as you do spoons. One is a nonreasoning entity, another makes choices. One acts in a regular way, the other does not necessarily. This is what Mises argued since 1933 to 1962 in his last book: plants, cats, dogs, rocks are not human actors, and human actors can't be treated as the former.
And you cannot 'manipulate' horses as you do spoons. Your last sentence lacks any substance. Yes, humans differ, and what? Via your definition on what can be property - "anything that is a means of human action" - they fit. I've asked repeatedly why reason is the line of demarcation, and you've ignored it... repeatedly.
thelion:When you equate horses, spoons, and humans, you leave Austrian theory (and economics for that matter.)
There isn't an Austrian Theory on what can and cannot be property.
Angurse:You have absolutely no way of determining that, you are just repeating an assertion.
No I am just using common sense. Awarding damages must be based on the damage caused. In this case we have no physical damage or property taken. If the data has no intrinsic value then copying it can not be grounds for damages, mental or otherwise. You can not be damaged by losing something that has no value.
Angurse:And There is still an effect whether property was damaged at all, the easiest case of mental damages comes to mind.
Mental damages for losing something which you claim can not be owned. This line of thinking makes sense if you own the information, if you don't own the information then you can't claim damages when it is copied.
Angurse:Its quite easy to complain, your actions resulted in the unwanted exposure of my data, depending on the nature of the data, potentially costing me millions. Its really just a function of tort law.
If I own the data it is a function of tort law and in fact whoever has the data now would be required to give it back, even an unknowing third party, just like buying a stolen car. However, if as you claim, the data can not be owned by anyone then you can't claim damages for something that is not yours.
Please explain your inconsistencies.
Maxliberty:No I am just using common sense. Awarding damages must be based on the damage caused. In this case we have no physical damage or property taken. If the data has no intrinsic value then copying it can not be grounds for damages, mental or otherwise. You can not be damaged by losing something that has no value.
No you aren't. Once you commit aggression (trespass) on physical integrity, its perfectly sensible for you to be held liable for any results. And nothing ever has intrinsic value.
Maxliberty:Mental damages for losing something which you claim can not be owned. This line of thinking makes sense if you own the information, if you don't own the information then you can't claim damages when it is copied.
Mental damages is just an example, you seem to fail to grasp that. You don't need to own information (whether it be emotions or ideas) for you to be effected by the acts (physical trespassing) of the aggressor. Basic common law spells this out.
Maxliberty: If I own the data it is a function of tort law and in fact whoever has the data now would be required to give it back, even an unknowing third party, just like buying a stolen car. However, if as you claim, the data can not be owned by anyone then you can't claim damages for something that is not yours. Please explain your inconsistencies.
You are just shoehorning assertions into your argument. Functions of tort law, such as mental damages and emotional distress existed without any conception of the damaged party owning their emotions
Angurse, for your position to have oooomph, you may need to argue that Tort Law that your refer to is consistent with Libertarianism. I have a hunch it might not be; but this is mere speculation in advance of hearing your positive argument in this regard.
p.s. it does not bother me if the penalty for not-crimes is nill. in fact; i feel it appropriate.
knowing something that someone else knew before you first knew it does not a crime make.
information is not rival. and people do not own the market value of their property but only the property itself.
nirgrahamUK:Angurse, for your position to have oooomph, you may need to argue that Tort Law that your refer to is consistent with Libertarianism. I have a hunch it might not be; but this is mere speculation in advance of hearing your positive argument in this regard.
Its entire foundation rests on the violation of (physical) property. What the resulting restitution would be is certainly debatable, but just saying it would be zero seems is silly. I can't see any inconsistency with libertarianism.
nirgrahamUK: p.s. it does not bother me if the penalty for not-crimes is nill. in fact; i feel it appropriate. knowing something that someone else knew before you first knew it does not a crime make. information is not rival. and people do not own the market value of their property but only the property itself.
Agreed. But thats not the discussion. What about actual crimes committed, like trespassing? If you agree its a crime, would you disagree that the aggressor is still liable for (non-physical) damages unintended or not? (Obviously the victim would have to prove such responsibility)
Angurse:Agreed. But thats not the discussion. What about actual crimes committed, like trespassing? If you agree its a crime, would you disagree that the aggressor is still liable for (non-physical) damages unintended or not? (Obviously the victim would have to prove such responsibility)
However, your position is that copying data is not any form of damage because data can not be owned. So your argument prevents the copying of data being used as damages. If no one is injured by copying data then it is not a source of damages.
If I steal a car and it is not your car then you can not claim damages mental or otherwise, because it is not yours. If the data isn't yours then having it copied causes no harm.