A political program has two tasks:
The distinction between normative, legal, and de facto rights is helpful in understanding these tasks:
Step (1) remains the same. We can understand Step (2) as the task of transforming normative rights into legal rights, and legal rights into de facto rights. Put differently, Step (1) is the end, and Step (2) is the means.
Now, libertarianism is a theory of justice holding that all human relationships should be voluntary (corresponding to Step [1]). The task facing the libertarian, then, is Step (2): How can a libertarian society be achieved?
One method is converting everyone to libertarianism; moral convictions will lead people to act in accordance with the principles of justice. But in its extreme form this is equivalent to assuming a New Libertarian Man, i.e. an unrealistic change in human nature.
A more promising method is creating an institutional structure that will give people incentives to act justly. Libertarian anarchists hold that anarchism (the absence of a monopoly legal system) is the best institutional structure for bringing about and maintaining a libertarian society.
(Incidentally, minarchists almost always fail to fully address Step (2). They propose a theory of normative rights, and hold that writing these into a paper document will transform them into legal rights. But they provide no account of how legal rights become de facto rights. Merely writing them down isn't enough; what is needed is an institutional structure that gives people incentives to act justly. After all, the Soviet Constitution guaranteed all sorts of nice-sounding rights for its citizens, but since it was enforced by a totalitarian state, it turned out to be completely worthless. My own view is that minarchists cannot accomplish this task: given the nature of government as a monopolistic legal system, there cannot be any institutional constraints on its power. All the minarchist can rely on to keep government limited is ideology and public vigilance.)
It is important to recognize that anarchism and libertarianism are not the same thing. Anarchism is an institutional structure, whereas libertarianism is a theory of justice. The former is purely descriptive, whereas the latter is normative. Moreover, there is no necessary reason why anarchism must be libertarian. An anarchist society could conceivably be a Hobbesian jungle where private crime runs rampant and libertarian rights are constantly violated. On the other hand, I would argue that libertarianism must be anarchist, because only anarchism is consistent with libertarian rights.
With these remarks in mind, I want to investigate the compatibility of Murray Rothbard's and David Friedman's versions of anarchism. Both thinkers viewed their brand of anarchism as very different from the other's. For example, Rothbard wrote that he was opposed to
a kind of David Friedmanite anarchism, where there is no law, only people engaging in exchange and buying people out. If you have a group that wants to kill redheads, the redheads will have to buy them off if they value their hair. I think this is monstrous, the kind of anarchism would indeed be chaos. Just because there is a demand for something doesn't mean it should be fulfilled.
And as Friedman commented about his Machinery of Freedom:
As my friend Jeff Hummel pointed out, my model of anarchy was very different from the pre-existing competing model of anarcho-capitalism [i.e. Rothbard's], in which there was a single, consensus legal system. In mine legal systems are competing ... so you have a sort of market pressure toward generating optimal legal rules.
(Although, Friedman has also said that he's "not sure we ever did clash on ... how the legal code of an anarcho-capitalist society gets produced.")
Ed Stringham has also distinguished between Rothbardian and Friedmanite anarchism. In the Introduction to his Anarchy and the Law, he writes:
Where Rothbard argues for anarchism based on rights, Friedman argues for anarchism based on efficiency. Friedman's vision differs from that of Rothbard because Friedman believes that anarchist laws need not be libertarian. Under a market for law people would be free to choose any rules they wish and the resulting outcome would be determined by net willingness to pay. (p.3)
Now, I of course agree that Rothbard was a natural rights theorist, whereas Friedman is a consequentialist. But I think Rothbard, Friedman, and Stringham are overstating the differences between Rothbardian and Friedmanite anarchism.
To begin with, Rothbard objects to an anarchism "where there is no law, only people engaging in exchange and buying people out." Presumably by "law" Rothbard is referring to rights; but is he talking about normative, legal, or de facto rights? Not normative rights, since these exist regardless of how society is organized. Rothbard's worry seems to be that Friedman is not adequately addressing Step 2, i.e. ensuring that normative rights are also legal and de facto rights.
So Rothbard's problem is that Friedman's anarchism might not be libertarian. Friedman, however, has explicitly acknowledged this point:
I have described how a private system of courts and police might function, but not the laws it would produce and enforce; I have discussed institutions, not results. ... Whether these institutions will produce a libertarian society—a society in which each person is free to do as he likes with himself and his property as long as he does not use either to initiate force against others—remains to be proven. (Machinery of Freedom, p.172)
As discussed above, libertarianism is a theory of justice. But normative rights cannot become de facto rights on their own. A libertarian society can be achieved primarily by two methods: creating an ideological movement (i.e. converting everyone to libertarianism), or creating an institutional structure that will give people incentives to be libertarian. Friedman is explicitly using this second method, and he concludes that "the laws of an anarcho-capitalist society should be heavily biased toward freedom." (p.173)
Rothbard, however, is not content to rely only on an institutional structure to achieve libertarianism. He also calls for an ideological movement, in the form of a Libertarian Law Code:
a legal code which would be generally accepted, and which the courts would pledge themselves to follow. The legal code, simply, would insist on the libertarian principle of no aggression against person or property, define property rights in accordance with libertarian principle, set up rules of evidence (such as currently apply) in deciding who are the wrongdoers in any dispute, and set up a code of maximum punishment for any particular crime. (For a New Liberty, p.282)
Rothbard wants libertarianism to be widely accepted as an ideology. Although he accepts that the institutional structure of market competition will keep outlaw (unlibertarian) courts in check (p.291-93), Rothbard believes that people need to be ideologically driven if society is to remain libertarian. Roderick Long has a similar analysis:
anarcho-capitalist theory can be seen as a form of constitutional design. In framing a constitution, it is not enough simply to decree that the government shall do this and shall not do that; one must specify a political structure (division of powers, checks and balances, etc.) that gives individual participants an incentive to act as the constitution specifies. ... Yet, the importance of structure is not a reason for refusing to articulate any general principles or guidelines; articulated principles and incentive structures supplement each other, jointly rendering the success of the system more probable than either could do in isolation. (Hence, for example, the U.S. Constitution contains both structural provisions and a Bill of Rights.) Rothbard can be seen as doing the same thing: he regards a competitive legal system as more likely to provide incentives to maintain freedom than would a monopolistic one, but he also seeks to supplement that incentive structure with a Libertarian Law Code. ("Benefits and Hazards of Dialectical Libertarianism" p. 435-436)
Hence Rothbard's and Friedman's versions of anarchism turn out to be fundamentally identical. Both agree that the institutional structure of market competition will create incentives for a libertarian society, but Rothbard goes further in calling for a supplemental ideological movement. Rothbard's objection that Friedmanite anarchism has no law thus turns out to be hyperbole rather than substantive disagreement.
Friedman and Stringham also exaggerate the differences between Rothbardian and Friedmanite anarchism. Friedman writes that Rothbardian anarchism has "a single, consensus legal system. In mine legal systems are competing". If we define "legal system" as a set of institutions that provides dispute resolution, then clearly Rothbardian anarchism also has competing legal systems. What Friedman means is that Rothbardian anarchism has a single universal legal code, whereas Friedmanite anarchism has different, competing legal codes. But as we've seen, both think market competition will produce libertarian laws; the only difference is that Rothbard calls for an ideological movement to ensure the laws actually are libertarian.
Stringham writes that "Friedman's vision differs from that of Rothbard because Friedman believes that anarchist laws need not be libertarian. Under a market for law people would be free to choose any rules they wish and the resulting outcome would be determined by net willingness to pay." Stringham here is confusing normative and de facto rights. First, Rothbard also believes that anarchist laws need not be libertarian: his whole discussion of outlaw protectors (FaNL p.291-295) is an analysis of courts passing unlibertarian laws. What Rothbard believes is that anarchist laws should be libertarian. Second, under Rothbardian anarchism it would also be possible for people to choose any rules they wish. Rothbard believes that market competition and ideological persuasion will lead people to choose libertarian rules.
Pete Leeson has also commented that Rothbardian anarchism "is not polycentric... it's a weird kind of anarchy." But again, Rothbardian anarchism is just as polycentric as Friedmanite anarchism: both accept the institutional structure of market competition. Rothbardian anarchism is different only in that it specifies an ideological movement.
Thus, the supposed differences suggested by Rothbard, Friedman, and Stringham rest for the most part on a confusion of normative and de facto rights. In the end, Rothbardian and Friedmanite anarchism are fundamentally compatible.
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism
Of course they are compatible. Friedman's anarcho-capitalism entertains the possibility of non-libertarian laws, whereas Rothbardian anarcho-capitalism is a system - completely bound by the NAP - his ideal.
There was a thread on this quite recently.
They are compatible if both are interpreted consistently, but unfortunately they have often not been. This inconsistency, if it goes unaddressed, becomes a chink in the armor of the AnCap case, which opponents use to attack the theory, and which also causes much unnecessary internal strife. The clues to both these phenomena can be found in threads on this forum on a daily basis.
The inconsistency leading to these phenomena can be framed as equivocating on the word advocate. The advocate in "I advocate having no monopoly on force" and "I advocate certain de facto rights for all in a given territory" cannot consistently be taken to mean the same thing. Once there is no monopoly on force, there is no mechanism for any one person or group to implement de facto rights on all people in a given geographical territory (except a very tiny one).
Hence when Long writes,
Roderick Long: Yet, the importance of structure is not a reason for refusing to articulate any general principles or guidelines; articulated principles and incentive structures supplement each other, jointly rendering the success of the system more probable than either could do in isolation.
One wonders how such a "Constitution" would be promulgated, and what meaning it would have for it to be articulated. In a free market in law, there will be a whole lotta articulating going on by a whole lot of people. No articulator is in a very special position viz a viz anyone else. If they are an opinion leader for a certain group of people, they may have an impact on what law people in that group choose to purchase and support, but that is all.
The implications of this simple idea are not only that there are two distinct types of libertarian advocacy: 1. no monopoly on force, and 2. normative advocacy. But also that the anti-monopoly aspect being achieved cuts the significance of the normative advocacy down to mere expression of moral opinion or legal advice. Meaning: The goal of eliminating the monopoly on force renders essentially irrelevant all arguments over norms, rights, morals, ethics, etc. such as we see daily on these forums, and which comprise the main difficulty in getting people to agree with these ideas. (Note however that using a person's norms to convince them that the state should be eliminated [i.e., reasoning from one value to another] still makes sense.)
So we see that to advocate for more than eliminating monopoly on force is to not only waste energy, but also to create a tremendous amount of needless friction. The tent of anti-monopolism is a big one. It is something I think even many left libertarians could agree to. Although Austrians may realize that anarchy is not going to lead to anarcho-communism, why not leave them to that fantasy? Why bother arguing? There is no need to. All who would support the elimination of monopolies on force can be allies. Allies with vastly different expectations about how things will work out, but allies all the same.
Why anarchy fails
Angurse:Of course they are compatible. Friedman's anarcho-capitalism entertains the possibility of non-libertarian laws, whereas Rothbardian anarcho-capitalism is a system - completely bound by the NAP - his ideal.
I think this is still confusing normative and de facto rights. Of course any society faces the possibility of non-libertarian laws. Libertarian laws are not somehow magically self-enforcing. Normative rights can only become de facto rights through the use of means, e.g. an institutional structure or an ideological movement. And these means don't provide an absolute guarantee that de facto rights will be libertarian, only a strong tendency.
So it's not that Friedman's anarchism faces the possibility of non-libertarian laws, whereas Rothbard's doesn't. They both face the possibility. But where Friedman relies solely on institutional structure (market competition) to ensure that laws are libertarian, Rothbard goes further in calling for an ideological movement (i.e. converting people to libertarianism) in addition to that institutional structure.
AJ:They are compatible if both are interpreted consistently, but unfortunately they have often not been. This inconsistency, if it goes unaddressed, becomes a chink in the armor of the AnCap case, which opponents use to attack the theory, and which also causes much unnecessary internal strife.
In other words: Using false arguments is a bad thing.
AJ:The inconsistency leading to these phenomena can be framed as equivocating on the word advocate. The advocate in "I advocate having no monopoly on force" and "I advocate certain de facto rights for all in a given territory" cannot consistently be taken to mean the same thing.
Right. The former is advocating anarchism (an institutional structure), whereas the latter is advocating libertarianism (a theory of justice).
AJ:Once there is no monopoly on force, there is no mechanism for any one person or group to implement de facto rights on all people in a given geographical territory (except a very tiny one).
Sure there is. A private court could force everyone to follow libertarian laws (i.e. force them to follow the NAP). Or a group could convert everyone to libertarianism (i.e. persuade them to follow the NAP).
AJ:But also that the anti-monopoly aspect being achieved cuts the significance of the normative advocacy down to mere expression of moral opinion or legal advice. Meaning: The goal of eliminating the monopoly on force renders essentially irrelevant all arguments over norms, rights, morals, ethics, etc.
Perhaps this is true for a moral subjectivist, but it's certainly false for a moral objectivist.
AJ:Although Austrians may realize that anarchy is not going to lead to anarcho-communism, why not leave them to that fantasy? Why bother arguing? There is no need to. All who would support the elimination of monopolies on force can be allies. Allies with vastly different expectations about how things will work out, but allies all the same.
Well, what anarchy leads to is not independent of how people act. Sure, if people follow their self-interest, anarchy will lead to libertarianism. But people are not homo economicus; they are affected by ideology. If everyone wants anarcho-communism, then anarchy will not lead to libertarianism.
Why bother arguing? Because I want anarchy to be libertarian. I'm not content to rely solely on incentives; there are other unlibertarian ideologies out there, and if we want a libertarian society, these ideologies need to be combated. Hence we need our own ideological movement to ensure that society is in fact libertarian.
Sage:In the end, Rothbardian and Friedmanite anarchism are fundamentally compatible.
They are not, and I don't see how you managed to address the differences. You start out discussing a political program, but Friedmanite anarchism is apolitical or rather has no particular political bias, whereas Rothbard clearly has a political bias, to the point of suggesting that all competing ideas should be outlawed. You seem to redefine them into similarity.
There is nothing polycentic about natural rights libertarianism, because the presumption that natural rights are valid eliminates all sorts of NAP compatible (in action) alternatives. Indeed ask any theist natural rights theoretician, and he will not admit that there is more than one conception of rights because his rights are divinely inspired from a monotheistic source. Such a natural rights proponent may be tolerant of those who do not agree with his conception of rights, but he will never admit that their system is as valid as his. He cannot, without rejecting his fundamental belief in a single source.
Friedmanite anarchism is market anarchism. Rothbardian anarchism is political anarchism. The latter is post-Objectivist absolutist moral stuff that is incompatible with voluntarism and market anarchy. Like socialism, yes we could have people be voluntarily Rothbardian in a market, but a market which is only Rothbardian, cannot tolerate other orders.
As far as the necessity of an ideological movement, I disagree on "we" in any sense related to movements. I would like to see radical decentralization, which I believe is coming as a result of our technological advances, and such decentralization will lead to all sorts of new orders, some that Rothbard (and us) cannot even imagine.
As an aside, I think David Friedman's conception of anarchy is more consistent with Mises' Praxeology. And I am first and foremost a Praxeologist before I am an ideologue.
What just bugs me is: How did Rothbard seek to make all defense agencies follow his laws?
Praetyre: What just bugs me is: How did Rothbard seek to make all defense agencies follow his laws?
I think that's what the ideological movement is for. To get everyone to think the same way about liberty.
ok, thought experiment time.
imagine anarchy. no regional monopolies on force. imagine that agencies distinguished by the characteristic that they employ the use of force begin to form. Force Institutions/Agencies of one stripe or another. lets say lots of them fully keep to the NAP, lets say many don't keep to the NAP( these violate the violate the NAP)
now, lets say we define a 'naming scheme'. we engage in the exercise of classification according to criteria. we will appeal to our normative judgements. OR we will appeal to whether they violate the NAP (regardless of whether we think the NAP has anything to do with morality or not). It matters not which we choose for this illustration, normative or descriptive.
just as we might describe one entrepreneur as an honest/good man or simply as one who respects the NAP(avoiding judging whether this makes him good or not), and correspondingly how another entrepreneur as a bad man/ crook. (or descriptively someone who routinely violates the NAP)..... we will similarly label institutions that utilise force AND observe the NAP as 'Libertarian Defence Agencies'. and we will label institutions that utilise force AND violate the NAP 'Non-Libertarian Rogue Mafia Protection Rackets'.
we will say that although 'Libertarian Defence Agencies'. and 'Non-Libertarian Rogue Mafia Protection Rackets' share the characteristic of the use of force, they are yet not entirely the same. they are different. normatively. and descriptively.
Therefore PDA's will be libertarian, and there will be criminal gangs that we will rely on the PDA's to keep us safe from, no less than independant 'crooks' they will keep us safe from, all the while that they assist us in adjudicating for us in our passing disputes.
haven't we found the common ground between Rothbard and Friedman thusly?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
nirgrahamUK:haven't we found the common ground between Rothbard and Friedman thusly?
I don't think so. I read your post 3 times and I still don't feel like I completely understand it.
Can you simplify it?
liberty student:You start out discussing a political program, but Friedmanite anarchism is apolitical or rather has no particular political bias, whereas Rothbard clearly has a political bias
Well, this is sort of what I argued in the OP. Friedman is arguing for an institutional structure, whereas Rothbard is arguing for an institutional structure plus an ideological movement. Since they argue for the same institutional structure (market competition), I conclude that their versions of anarchism are fundamentally compatible.
liberty student:There is nothing polycentic about natural rights libertarianism, because the presumption that natural rights are valid eliminates all sorts of NAP compatible (in action) alternatives.
Can you explain this? How can natural rights (i.e. the NAP) rule out actions that are compatible with the NAP?
Furthermore, how do you define polycentric? I understand it to be synonymous with anarchy, i.e. an institutional structure where no agency has a monopoly over the legal system (a set of institutions that provides dispute resolution). On this definition, natural rights libertarianism can be polycentric. Just because natural rights libertarians argue for a specific theory of normative rights doesn't entail that they support a monopoly legal system. On the contrary, I would argue that the best way to transform normative rights into de facto rights is through competition in legal systems.
OK, I'll try to be Socratic with you and see how well I do
Context: we are trying to interpret and then answer Praetyre's question: How did Rothbard seek to make all defense agencies follow his laws?
Question: What characteristic(s) identify Defence Agencies from all other Agencies that there may be in an anarchy? (we are searching for criteria)
Praetyre:What just bugs me is: How did Rothbard seek to make all defense agencies follow his laws?
As I argued in the OP, Rothbard called for two primary means to transform normative rights into de facto rights: First, the institutional structure of market competition. Second, an ideological movement to convert everyone to libertarianism.
Sage:As I argued in the OP, Rothbard called for two primary means to transform normative rights into de facto rights: First, the institutional structure of market competition. Second, an ideological movement to convert everyone to libertarianism.
yes, its important to ask how there might plausibly be substantial market competition without a broad base of libertarian 'ideologues'. we can underline this by asking how plausible it is to assume substantial market competition in a world where everyone was a socialist 'ideologue' . This shows that ideology is of practical significance (even if it is not the whole story). Men's actions are informed by their ideas and this too includes their idea-ologies as much as other ideas they have. They play a part in a persons understanding of their own self-interest, and so can't be avoided if we want to concern ourselves with the self-interested actions of the people we consider.
Sage:Well, this is sort of what I argued in the OP. Friedman is arguing for an institutional structure, whereas Rothbard is arguing for an institutional structure plus an ideological movement. Since they argue for the same institutional structure (market competition), I conclude that their versions of anarchism are fundamentally compatible.
They don't argue for the same ideology. Friedman is proposing panarchy and competition between ideologies. Rothbard is proposing that competition be bypassed and go straight to the NAP, where I presume he thought there would be no further competition as the NAP is an end point for ethics.
Sage:Can you explain this? How can natural rights (i.e. the NAP) rule out actions that are compatible with the NAP
The NAP is an idea which does not have to be based on natural rights. I am a subjective ethicist who observes and encourages the NAP as an effective (consequentialist/utilitarian) means of organization. I don't care if Yahweh, Buddha, or Jesus say that non-aggression is moral, I care that organizing along these lines yields the most efficient economy (based on my values) that I can imagine at this time. I reserve the right to change my mind as I gain more information and my values change.
The issue isn't that the NAP doesn't tolerate the NAP, it is that the NAP as ideology presumes an objective and universal ethic. This is post-Objectivism and has little to do with Praxeology.
Sage:Furthermore, how do you define polycentric?
A system which does not resist the creation of any other system(s).
Sage:On this definition, natural rights libertarianism can be polycentric. Just because natural rights libertarians argue for a specific theory of normative rights doesn't entail that they support a monopoly legal system.
All you have here is competition in legal providers, not competition in laws.
Sage:On the contrary, I would argue that the best way to transform normative rights into de facto rights is through competition in legal systems.
Alchemy. So many attempts to turn ought into is.
nirgrahamUK:OK, I'll try to be Socratic with you and see how well I do
I will help you.
nirgrahamUK:What characteristic(s) identify Defence Agencies from all other Agencies that there may be in an anarchy? (we are searching for criteria)
I don't think there are specific criteria until we define defense. And to define defense, we have to define rights. And to define rights, we are back to square one.
(How was that?)
Sage:As I argued in the OP, Rothbard called for two primary means to transform normative rights into de facto rights: ...
Yes, if we believe it, it must be true. This is not logic.
liberty student:I don't think there are specific criteria until we define defense. And to define defense, we have to define rights. And to define rights, we are back to square one.
but you understand defence, you have actually thought about square one, unlike other people. you are a libertarian.
nirgrahamUK:but you understand defence, you have actually thought about square one, unlike other people. you are a libertarian.
This seems circular still. Yes, you and I can discuss rights (even though we may not agree about their origin or scope) but these are not systems only for libertarians, or only for Nir and his buddy LS.
Rothbard is making a universal statement with the NAP. One must accept this because, 1, 2 and 3. Hoppe has tried to bolster this (obviously shaky assertion) with Argumentation Ethics. Even Bob Murphy somewhat indicated in a recent LRC article (that bummed me out for a week) that at the end of the day, he's got God on his side, basically yielding that natural rights are arbitrary.
I'm ok with arbitrary, which is why I am ok with Friedman. His system is compatible with Praxeology and Marginalism. At least it seems that way to me.
I wanted to write more about that Murphy article but it was so depressing to me, that this is what at least one of the theist Austro-Libertarians falls back on. Either we rely on tricks of argumentation or we rely on divine fiat. Either way it seems, we can't just admit that values are subjective, including the values we use to define our ethics.
well, does Praetrye understand defence? as we do? the NAP as we do? if so how can he ask the question he asked. are we putting down his confusion just to his lack of knowledge of the NAP, I doubt it.....
the issue at hand is not subjective values, its not whether the NAP is 'good' or 'a standard for good' or not. its whether we can say that Agencies of Force that uphold the NAP are PDA's and Agencies of Force that violate it are not
nirgrahamUK:well, does Praetrye understand defence? as we do? the NAP as we do? if so how can he ask the question he asked. are we putting down his confusion just to his lack of knowledge of the NAP, I doubt it.....
I don't think anyone needs any particular understanding in order to ask a question. To make an assertion on the other hand...
nirgrahamUK:the issue at hand is not subjective values, its not whether the NAP is 'good' or 'a standard for good' or not.
It has everything to do with values. It seems to me that you are pre-supposing that we can value something without having our own values. What are we valuing "good" against? What standard for good?
nirgrahamUK:its whether we can say that Agencies of Force that uphold the NAP are PDA's and Agencies of Force that violate it are not
I am sorry but I do not understand this. I don't even know where to start guessing about what you are saying.
liberty student: nirgrahamUK:its whether we can say that Agencies of Force that uphold the NAP are PDA's and Agencies of Force that violate it are notI am sorry but I do not understand this. I don't even know where to start guessing about what you are saying.
liberty student:It that has everything to do with values. It seems to me that you are pre-supposing that we can value something without having our own values. What are we valuing "good" against? What standard for good?
liberty student:I don't think anyone needs any particular understanding in order to ask a question. To make an assertion on the other hand.. How can Rurray Von Mothbard say that automobile producers would all create products that are capable of transport? answer:producers of objects that are always incapable of providing transport services are all never auto-manufacturers.
liberty student:I don't think anyone needs any particular understanding in order to ask a question. To make an assertion on the other hand..
Nir, I have a headache, so maybe I just can't understand because my brain is fuzzy but I am somewhat certain you have not addressed any of my criticisms.
Praetyre's question seemed simple enough. How did Rothbard propose establishing this standard of good? I think my answer was sufficient.
nirgrahamUK: How can Rurray Von Mothbard say that automobile producers would all create products that are capable of transport? answer:producers of objects that are always incapable of providing transport services are all never auto-manufacturers.
I don't know if you are making a joke or being sarcastic, but this reads like nonsense to me. Maybe it is the headache.
liberty student:All you have here is competition in legal providers, not competition in laws.
Well, laws are the product of legal systems, so competition in legal systems entails indirectly competition in laws.
It's true Rothbard called for a single legal code. But he didn't advocate monopoly as a means to achieving this goal. Rather, his means were market competition and converting others to libertarianism.
liberty student:A system which does not resist the creation of any other system(s).
So would a polycentric society resist the creation of Nazi societies?
liberty student:This is post-Objectivism and has little to do with Praxeology.
Long's project is explicitly praxeological: The Praxeological Foundations of Libertarian Ethics.
liberty student:I am a subjective ethicist who observes and encourages the NAP as an effective (consequentialist/utilitarian) means of organization.
Yes, this does seem to be the root issue. So if we accept the premise that objective ethics is correct, do you still have any disagreements with my analysis in the OP?
Sage: A political program has two tasks: Developing a theory of normative rights. That is, determining the content of justice. Creating an institutional structure to ensure that society fulfills the requirements of normative rights. In other words, structuring society so that people act in a manner consistent with justice. The distinction between normative, legal, and de facto rights is helpful in understanding these tasks: Normative rights: the claims that ought to be respected and protected. Legal rights: the claims that a given legal institution officially announces it will respect and protect. De facto rights: the claims that actually receive respect and protection in a given society. Step (1) remains the same. We can understand Step (2) as the task of transforming normative rights into legal rights, and legal rights into de facto rights. Put differently, Step (1) is the end, and Step (2) is the means. Now, libertarianism is a theory of justice holding that all human relationships should be voluntary (corresponding to Step [1]). The task facing the libertarian, then, is Step (2): How can a libertarian society be achieved? One method is converting everyone to libertarianism; moral convictions will lead people to act in accordance with the principles of justice. But in its extreme form this is equivalent to assuming a New Libertarian Man, i.e. an unrealistic change in human nature. A more promising method is creating an institutional structure that will give people incentives to act justly. Libertarian anarchists hold that anarchism (the absence of a monopoly legal system) is the best institutional structure for bringing about and maintaining a libertarian society. (Incidentally, minarchists almost always fail to fully address Step (2). They propose a theory of normative rights, and hold that writing these into a paper document will transform them into legal rights. But they provide no account of how legal rights become de facto rights. Merely writing them down isn't enough; what is needed is an institutional structure that gives people incentives to act justly. After all, the Soviet Constitution guaranteed all sorts of nice-sounding rights for its citizens, but since it was enforced by a totalitarian state, it turned out to be completely worthless. My own view is that minarchists cannot accomplish this task: given the nature of government as a monopolistic legal system, there cannot be any institutional constraints on its power. All the minarchist can rely on to keep government limited is ideology and public vigilance.) It is important to recognize that anarchism and libertarianism are not the same thing. Anarchism is an institutional structure, whereas libertarianism is a theory of justice. The former is purely descriptive, whereas the latter is normative. Moreover, there is no necessary reason why anarchism must be libertarian. An anarchist society could conceivably be a Hobbesian jungle where private crime runs rampant and libertarian rights are constantly violated. On the other hand, I would argue that libertarianism must be anarchist, because only anarchism is consistent with libertarian rights. With these remarks in mind, I want to investigate the compatibility of Murray Rothbard's and David Friedman's versions of anarchism. Both thinkers viewed their brand of anarchism as very different from the other's. For example, Rothbard wrote that he was opposed to a kind of David Friedmanite anarchism, where there is no law, only people engaging in exchange and buying people out. If you have a group that wants to kill redheads, the redheads will have to buy them off if they value their hair. I think this is monstrous, the kind of anarchism would indeed be chaos. Just because there is a demand for something doesn't mean it should be fulfilled. And as Friedman commented about his Machinery of Freedom: As my friend Jeff Hummel pointed out, my model of anarchy was very different from the pre-existing competing model of anarcho-capitalism [i.e. Rothbard's], in which there was a single, consensus legal system. In mine legal systems are competing ... so you have a sort of market pressure toward generating optimal legal rules. (Although, Friedman has also said that he's "not sure we ever did clash on ... how the legal code of an anarcho-capitalist society gets produced.") Ed Stringham has also distinguished between Rothbardian and Friedmanite anarchism. In the Introduction to his Anarchy and the Law, he writes: Where Rothbard argues for anarchism based on rights, Friedman argues for anarchism based on efficiency. Friedman's vision differs from that of Rothbard because Friedman believes that anarchist laws need not be libertarian. Under a market for law people would be free to choose any rules they wish and the resulting outcome would be determined by net willingness to pay. (p.3) Now, I of course agree that Rothbard was a natural rights theorist, whereas Friedman is a consequentialist. But I think Rothbard, Friedman, and Stringham are overstating the differences between Rothbardian and Friedmanite anarchism. To begin with, Rothbard objects to an anarchism "where there is no law, only people engaging in exchange and buying people out." Presumably by "law" Rothbard is referring to rights; but is he talking about normative, legal, or de facto rights? Not normative rights, since these exist regardless of how society is organized. Rothbard's worry seems to be that Friedman is not adequately addressing Step 2, i.e. ensuring that normative rights are also legal and de facto rights. So Rothbard's problem is that Friedman's anarchism might not be libertarian. Friedman, however, has explicitly acknowledged this point: I have described how a private system of courts and police might function, but not the laws it would produce and enforce; I have discussed institutions, not results. ... Whether these institutions will produce a libertarian society—a society in which each person is free to do as he likes with himself and his property as long as he does not use either to initiate force against others—remains to be proven. (Machinery of Freedom, p.172) As discussed above, libertarianism is a theory of justice. But normative rights cannot become de facto rights on their own. A libertarian society can be achieved primarily by two methods: creating an ideological movement (i.e. converting everyone to libertarianism), or creating an institutional structure that will give people incentives to be libertarian. Friedman is explicitly using this second method, and he concludes that "the laws of an anarcho-capitalist society should be heavily biased toward freedom." (p.173) Rothbard, however, is not content to rely only on an institutional structure to achieve libertarianism. He also calls for an ideological movement, in the form of a Libertarian Law Code: a legal code which would be generally accepted, and which the courts would pledge themselves to follow. The legal code, simply, would insist on the libertarian principle of no aggression against person or property, define property rights in accordance with libertarian principle, set up rules of evidence (such as currently apply) in deciding who are the wrongdoers in any dispute, and set up a code of maximum punishment for any particular crime. (For a New Liberty, p.282) Rothbard wants libertarianism to be widely accepted as an ideology. Although he accepts that the institutional structure of market competition will keep outlaw (unlibertarian) courts in check (p.291-93), Rothbard believes that people need to be ideologically driven if society is to remain libertarian. Roderick Long has a similar analysis: anarcho-capitalist theory can be seen as a form of constitutional design. In framing a constitution, it is not enough simply to decree that the government shall do this and shall not do that; one must specify a political structure (division of powers, checks and balances, etc.) that gives individual participants an incentive to act as the constitution specifies. ... Yet, the importance of structure is not a reason for refusing to articulate any general principles or guidelines; articulated principles and incentive structures supplement each other, jointly rendering the success of the system more probable than either could do in isolation. (Hence, for example, the U.S. Constitution contains both structural provisions and a Bill of Rights.) Rothbard can be seen as doing the same thing: he regards a competitive legal system as more likely to provide incentives to maintain freedom than would a monopolistic one, but he also seeks to supplement that incentive structure with a Libertarian Law Code. ("Benefits and Hazards of Dialectical Libertarianism" p. 435-436) Hence Rothbard's and Friedman's versions of anarchism turn out to be fundamentally identical. Both agree that the institutional structure of market competition will create incentives for a libertarian society, but Rothbard goes further in calling for a supplemental ideological movement. Rothbard's objection that Friedmanite anarchism has no law thus turns out to be hyperbole rather than substantive disagreement. Friedman and Stringham also exaggerate the differences between Rothbardian and Friedmanite anarchism. Friedman writes that Rothbardian anarchism has "a single, consensus legal system. In mine legal systems are competing". If we define "legal system" as a set of institutions that provides dispute resolution, then clearly Rothbardian anarchism also has competing legal systems. What Friedman means is that Rothbardian anarchism has a single universal legal code, whereas Friedmanite anarchism has different, competing legal codes. But as we've seen, both think market competition will produce libertarian laws; the only difference is that Rothbard calls for an ideological movement to ensure the laws actually are libertarian. Stringham writes that "Friedman's vision differs from that of Rothbard because Friedman believes that anarchist laws need not be libertarian. Under a market for law people would be free to choose any rules they wish and the resulting outcome would be determined by net willingness to pay." Stringham here is confusing normative and de facto rights. First, Rothbard also believes that anarchist laws need not be libertarian: his whole discussion of outlaw protectors (FaNL p.291-295) is an analysis of courts passing unlibertarian laws. What Rothbard believes is that anarchist laws should be libertarian. Second, under Rothbardian anarchism it would also be possible for people to choose any rules they wish. Rothbard believes that market competition and ideological persuasion will lead people to choose libertarian rules. Pete Leeson has also commented that Rothbardian anarchism "is not polycentric... it's a weird kind of anarchy." But again, Rothbardian anarchism is just as polycentric as Friedmanite anarchism: both accept the institutional structure of market competition. Rothbardian anarchism is different only in that it specifies an ideological movement. Thus, the supposed differences suggested by Rothbard, Friedman, and Stringham rest for the most part on a confusion of normative and de facto rights. In the end, Rothbardian and Friedmanite anarchism are fundamentally compatible.
Great post! I have an article I'm working on that sort of "harmonizes" the Rothbardian and Friedmanite approaches to law. I will publish it here as soon as I get it to first-draft level.
Clayton -
Sage:It's true Rothbard called for a single legal code. But he didn't advocate monopoly as a means to achieving this goal. Rather, his means were market competition and converting others to libertarianism.
Right. A single legal code. Which means the end of competition. Rothbard presumed that once we got to his vision of what was just law, law no longer needed to evolve. That's my issue. It's basically Objectivism.
Sage:So would a polycentric society resist the creation of Nazi societies?
If it is polycentric, a Nazi society could emerge, and alternatives to that Nazi society could emerge as well. Then they would compete.
Sage:Long's project is explicitly praxeological: The Praxeological Foundations of Libertarian Ethics.
I don't care for Long or his ideas. If he has a relevant point, post it.
Sage:So if we accept the premise that objective ethics is correct, do you still have any disagreements with my analysis in the OP?
I think that follows. The issue is, I don't believe objective ethics are correct, and afaik, no one has proven otherwise. Plenty of assertion though!
Sage: liberty student:I am a subjective ethicist who observes and encourages the NAP as an effective (consequentialist/utilitarian) means of organization. Yes, this does seem to be the root issue.
Yes, this does seem to be the root issue.
I'm pretty sure Misesians are not invited to utopia.
liberty student:Praetyre's question seemed simple enough. How did Rothbard propose establishing this standard of good? I think my answer was sufficient.
Praetyre:How did Rothbard seek to make all defense agencies follow his laws?
liberty student:Maybe it is the headache.
nirgrahamUK: liberty student:Maybe it is the headache. awww. now you made me feel responsible for your headache.
No. Offline issue.
liberty student:Right. A single legal code. Which means the end of competition. Rothbard presumed that once we got to his vision of what was just law, law no longer needed to evolve.
Rothbard states what he advocates would only happen within the free market. Name another law code other than one based on property rights.
Angurse:There was a thread on this quite recently.
good. somebody linked it
Sage: liberty student:All you have here is competition in legal providers, not competition in laws. Well, laws are the product of legal systems, so competition in legal systems entails indirectly competition in laws. It's true Rothbard called for a single legal code.
It's true Rothbard called for a single legal code.
He called for a basic legal code (NAP). Completely different.
Someone please back up their claims and quote him precisely calling for a "single legal code" thanks. I want to see those words exactly, not your or anyone elses interpretation of what you think he means, because then you're not quoting him.
"Furthermore, law and the State are both conceptually and historically separable, and law would develop in an anarchistic market society without any form of State. Specifically, the concrete form of anarchist legal institutions- judges, arbitrators, procedural methods for resolving disputes, etc.-would indeed grow by a market invisible-hand process, while the basic Law Code (requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property) would have to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies, just as all the competing judges once agreed to apply and extend the basic principles of the customary or common law.13 But the latter, again, would imply no unified legal system or dominant protective agency. Any agencies that transgressed the basic libertarian code would be open outlaws and aggressors, and Nozick himself concedes that, lacking legitimacy, such outlaw agencies would probably not do very well in an anarchist society.14" - MNR
For those that want to deny the NAP, I am interested to know when would the initiation of physical aggression be justifiable?
Conza88:For those that want to deny the NAP, I am interested to know when would the initiation of physical aggression be justifiable?
I don't believe anyone claimed to deny the NAP. I said that I don't buy into natural rights. I'm quite content with the NAP as a foundation for an ethical system. For now.
If someone says "I advocate having no monopoly on force in this territory," then aren't they by implication "advocating" for all people in the territory the de facto right to set up a competing force-using-agency?
liberty student: Sage:Furthermore, how do you define polycentric? A system which does not resist the creation of any other system(s).
Would a polycentric legal system resist the creation of a non-polycentric legal system?
liberty student:Friedmanite anarchism is market anarchism. Rothbardian anarchism is political anarchism. The latter is post-Objectivist absolutist moral stuff that is incompatible with voluntarism and market anarchy. Like socialism, yes we could have people be voluntarily Rothbardian in a market, but a market which is only Rothbardian, cannot tolerate other orders.
Do you mean that, say, a voluntary hippie commune is incompatible with the "Rothbardian system"? Because I don't think that Rothbard's anarchism is opposed to people voluntarily adopting any legal rules that they choose (vis-à-vis each other). However, such voluntarily-interacting individuals cannot (without contradiction) voluntarily adopt any legal rules contrary to the overarching notion that "all voluntary interaction is moral," unless they claim that the moral force of their own legal rules derives from something other than the fact that they were voluntarily adopted (which would also entail the existence of universally-applicable legal rules).
Now, as far as institutions versus ideology is concerned: As Long points out,
Roderick Long:As for the desideratum of an "established, settled, known law," markets seem likelier than government to converge on a relatively uniform set of laws for the same reason that they tend to converge on a single currency: consumer demand. Consider: why are there no triangular credit cards? Government regulation is not the reason; rather, if someone started offering cards that wouldn't fit in the standard machines, nobody would accept them (unless forced to do so by law). Similar reasons explain why the market no longer carries both VHS and Betamax video cartridges, but only VHS; the market creates uniformity when customers need it, and diversity when they need that instead. Diversity in movie titles available is a benefit to consumers; diversity in shape and size of video cassettes is not. Hence the market tends to provide the former and suppress the latter.
competing DROs will have a tendency to converge on a single legal standard for all people to the extent that they interact with each other, since any dispute that cannot be resolved legally will have to be resolved violently, which is, all else being equal, costlier for both parties. However, that does not mean that they will converge on libertarian norms - it's entirely possible that some non-libertarian norm could become so entrenched that any individual dissenting DRO at the margin is faced with huge costs. For example, if you live in a 99% Klingon-speaking village, then it's a lot easier (and cheaper) to learn Klingon than to convince everyone else to learn a language that's easier on the throat. Similarly, if most of the DROs accept trial-by-ordeal as a valid method of deciding cases, then any DROs that don't will find themselves dealing with costly, irresolvable conflicts with the other DROs. Without ideological advocacy, the common legal standard becomes up for grabs; an at least non-fringe acceptance of libertarianism is necessary to be at all confident that the anarchy will be libertarian, as opposed to something else.
Zavoi: liberty student:Friedmanite anarchism is market anarchism. Rothbardian anarchism is political anarchism. The latter is post-Objectivist absolutist moral stuff that is incompatible with voluntarism and market anarchy. Like socialism, yes we could have people be voluntarily Rothbardian in a market, but a market which is only Rothbardian, cannot tolerate other orders. Do you mean that, say, a voluntary hippie commune is incompatible with the "Rothbardian system"? Because I don't think that Rothbard's anarchism is opposed to people voluntarily adopting any legal rules that they choose (vis-à-vis each other). However, such voluntarily-interacting individuals cannot (without contradiction) voluntarily adopt any legal rules contrary to the overarching notion that "all voluntary interaction is moral," unless they claim that the moral force of their own legal rules derives from something other than the fact that they were voluntarily adopted (which would also entail the existence of universally-applicable legal rules).
Rothbardian anarchism contains axiomatic-deductive objective ethics in terms of political philosophy and Austrianism as economics.
"Under total privatization [..] With every locale and neighborhood owned by private firms, corporations, or contractual communities, true diversity would reign, in accordance with the preferences of each community. Some neighborhoods would be ethnically or economically diverse, while others would be ethnically or economically homogeneous. Some localities would permit pornography or prostitution or drugs or abortions, others would prohibit any or all of them. The prohibitions would not be state imposed, but would simply be requirements for residence or use of some person’s or community’s land area. While statists who have the itch to impose their values on everyone else would be disappointed, every group or interest would at least have the satisfaction of living in neighborhoods of people who share its values and preferences. While neighborhood ownership would not provide Utopia or a panacea for all conflicts, it would at least provide a “second best” solution that most people might be willing to live with."M. N. ROTHBARD, Nations by Consent: Decomposing the Nation State, in <<Journal of Libertarian Studies>>, vol. 11, n.1, Fall 1994, p. 7
Sage: AJ:Once there is no monopoly on force, there is no mechanism for any one person or group to implement de facto rights on all people in a given geographical territory (except a very tiny one). Sure there is. A private court could force everyone to follow libertarian laws (i.e. force them to follow the NAP).
Sure there is. A private court could force everyone to follow libertarian laws (i.e. force them to follow the NAP).
*A* private court could only do that if it had a monopoly in that territory.
Sage:Or a group could convert everyone to libertarianism (i.e. persuade them to follow the NAP).
That's the other way around the mountain, but convincing people not to support a monopoly on force seems far easier and more expedient.
Sage: AJ:But also that the anti-monopoly aspect being achieved cuts the significance of the normative advocacy down to mere expression of moral opinion or legal advice. Meaning: The goal of eliminating the monopoly on force renders essentially irrelevant all arguments over norms, rights, morals, ethics, etc. Perhaps this is true for a moral subjectivist, but it's certainly false for a moral objectivist.
Still just expression of moral opinion or legal advice. That's not to say that will have no role (that's why I said "essentially"), but to point out that this isn't minarchy we're talking about: there is no mechanism other than persuasion and the market processes for advancing moral ideas once there are no more monopolies on force.
Sage: AJ:Although Austrians may realize that anarchy is not going to lead to anarcho-communism, why not leave them to that fantasy? Why bother arguing? There is no need to. All who would support the elimination of monopolies on force can be allies. Allies with vastly different expectations about how things will work out, but allies all the same. Well, what anarchy leads to is not independent of how people act. Sure, if people follow their self-interest, anarchy will lead to libertarianism. But people are not homo economicus; they are affected by ideology. If everyone wants anarcho-communism, then anarchy will not lead to libertarianism. Why bother arguing? Because I want anarchy to be libertarian. I'm not content to rely solely on incentives; there are other unlibertarian ideologies out there, and if we want a libertarian society, these ideologies need to be combated. Hence we need our own ideological movement to ensure that society is in fact libertarian.
Well, for what value of X would you choose B over A?
A. No monopolies on force ever again
B. X% of the world's population shares your ethical positions
5%? 10%? 20%?
Zavoi: AJ:The inconsistency leading to these phenomena can be framed as equivocating on the word advocate. The advocate in "I advocate having no monopoly on force" and "I advocate certain de facto rights for all in a given territory" cannot consistently be taken to mean the same thing. If someone says "I advocate having no monopoly on force in this territory," then aren't they by implication "advocating" for all people in the territory the de facto right to set up a competing force-using-agency?
To advocate for the elimination of the current monopolies on force doesn't entail advocacy of any de facto rights. However, once there are no monopolies on force, then to advocate that no monopolies should ever be allowed to form again is to advocate for a de facto right, yes, but then it would of course be nothing more than opinion or recommendation.
liberty student: The NAP is an idea which does not have to be based on natural rights. I am a subjective ethicist who observes and encourages the NAP as an effective (consequentialist/utilitarian) means of organization. I don't care if Yahweh, Buddha, or Jesus say that non-aggression is moral, I care that organizing along these lines yields the most efficient economy (based on my values) that I can imagine at this time. I reserve the right to change my mind as I gain more information and my values change.
Hadn't you styled yourself a 'Rockwellian' last year? Changed your mind since, or?
liberty student: Sage:It's true Rothbard called for a single legal code. But he didn't advocate monopoly as a means to achieving this goal. Rather, his means were market competition and converting others to libertarianism. Right. A single legal code. Which means the end of competition. Rothbard presumed that once we got to his vision of what was just law, law no longer needed to evolve. That's my issue. It's basically Objectivism. Sage:So would a polycentric society resist the creation of Nazi societies? If it is polycentric, a Nazi society could emerge, and alternatives to that Nazi society could emerge as well. Then they would compete.
Sounds like the current situation all over the world. The state is nothing but a NAP-ignoring firm that competes with other firms.
faber est suae quisque fortunae
indeed. this is why i think governments are simply rogue PDA's or what have you. They raid the current free market which is the only market that exists. The degree of violence coerced into the market can be also an explanation of the kinds of economic systems being applied, which most are centrally applied currently.
North Korea, heavy coercion upon the market. Iran with their gold-backed, non-fiat money (?) reserves thereby a little lighter impact on the market. Black markets are still impacted by governments currently but maybe only by fear, an increased fear differing from an unsophisticated, common criminal. Maybe Somalia has as near a market uncoerced by governments as it currently gets, though governments, including the U.S., are presently there applying their physical aggression.
liberty student: Praetyre: What just bugs me is: How did Rothbard seek to make all defense agencies follow his laws? I think that's what the ideological movement is for. To get everyone to think the same way about liberty.
I think Rothbard somewhat confuses substantive and procedural justice. Procedural justice, which defines the exact bounds and norms for dispute arbitration and actually carries them into effect, is not something that can be rationally defined beyond a few general principles (presumption of innocence, property, etc.) and these principles we find in almost any body of customary law.
I am not a Rothbardian in a normative sense, largely because I think the bounds of aggression and particular legal institutions are largely procedural features that can no more be rationally 'laid down' than can the procedures for producing shoes. This is a matter for entrepreneurs and concerned individuals to work out in the actual practice of contract, agreement and custom; for an economist or philosopher to attempt to define procedural elements as an actual 'justice for everyone', as though there even needs to be 'universal law', is a fundamental mistake. I believe in natural law in the same sense that I believe in natural economies and polycentric order; while there are side-constraints as to what is the bare minimum for civilized life and human respect there 'law' is produced in the same way as any other goods and will be as diverse as the circumstances it is developed for and the needs it aims to serve.
I would recommend reading Lon L. Fuller.
“Laws: We know what they are, and what they are worth! They are spider webs for the rich and mighty, steel chains for the poor and weak, fishing nets in the hands of the government.” - Proudhon
AJ:To advocate for the elimination of the current monopolies on force doesn't entail advocacy of any de facto rights. However, once there are no monopolies on force, then to advocate that no monopolies should ever be allowed to form again is to advocate for a de facto right, yes, but then it would of course be nothing more than opinion or recommendation.
What is "the elimination of the current monopolies on force," if not the bringing about of a state of affairs where people are able to compete without hindrance? And isn't this ability just what we mean by a "de facto right to compete"?