J. Grayson Lilburne:The labels I was rejected were "amoralist" and "moral nihilist", because, to me, those terms seem to indicate people, not entirely unlike Bloom, who profess to reject personal conscience-based morality, who profess to look only to further their own material well-being, and who say that it is only external threats of retaliation that keep them from rape, plunder and pillage. That in no way describes me. I consider my conscience to be a hugely important guide to my action and my judgment of the actions of others.
Suppose that all your life you were taught that X was immoral, such that it became ingrained in your conscience, and actually doing X would impose on you psychological torment that would outweigh any benefit to yourself, even if nobody else knew about it and there was no external retaliation. Then suppose that I offered to give you psychological counseling and therapy so that you would become able to do X (when it would benefit you) with a clear conscience. Would you take the offer? (Let X be first "question religious dogma" and then "murder".)
I. Ryan:The reason why I am asking this is that I do not know whether, by "there exists a way to judge the world free of personal biases", you meant that "there exists a [correct!] way [via "natural law theory"!] to judge the world free of personal biases" or not.
Yes. Natural law is a prism through which one can determine the morality or immorality of any action independent of his biases. (Not that it does not take nearly superhuman amount of effort in certain cases.)
yuberries:I know it's a matter of semantics, but am I right to say that... these "objectivists" shouldn't be using the word "objectivist", because that is NOT what an objective moralist normally is or says, in my opinion. A moral objetivist in my experience will infer that you ought to adopt his moral code based on some observational condition. Most "objectivists" here don't seem to be doing anything of the sort.
No, it is objective. Saying that whether an action is moral or immoral can be determined in a objective manner is saying that there exists an objective truth in regard to this that can be discovered.The rest is a technicality that is rarely stated because it is de facto redundant, but I do not know that it is not acknowledged by all moral absolutists. Imagine trying to convince someone that common sense exists, when that someone is a madman who religiously denies its existence. How can you convince him? By using common-sensical arguments? No. He will reject those, stand on his head and bark at the moon. It is impossible.This same way it is impossible for anybody to convince someone who abhors what is moral to convince him that he should embrace, instead of reject, morality. What are you going to do? Appeal to their morality??It just happens that this is unthinkable in humans because we hold that what is immoral is self-evidentely abhorent. Even our languages equate moral with "good" and with "right" and immoral with "bad" and with "wrong". But imagine a creature, a devil, for whom it is immoral that is admirable and desirable. Imagine he comes over and goes to the movies, what would he say about his experience? He would stutter in rage that he has had it with all these movies where the decent people always lose!So no, natural law can not convince him of the value of being moral rather than immoral. But it is still, even for him, the only fail-proof way of telling him when someone is being moral and when someone is being immoral.So if an actor professes to value a moral course of action, then yes he would do well to adopt the natural law approach in order to diminish the amount of danger that exists that his personal biases will lead him astray into committing what seems moral to him, but is not so in truth. (We would also claim that the devil should likewise adopt the natural rights approach so he will always know what is the immoral course of action to take, but we will rather not. It is better from out point of view if the devil screws up and unknowingly does something moral thinking it was immoral slightly more often.)This is the only significance the actuall adoption of the objective code by an individual has. To help inform his own choices. It does not make him "better" by the virtue of adopting it or "worse" by not adopting it. Only the actions with consequences for others can do that. There is nothing problematic about a "righteous heathen".
Zavoi: 1: What do you mean by "ought"? And 2: given that definition, how can you separate "ought" from morality? It's all well and good to have a complete and consistent criterion by which to evaluate actions (e.g., all actions that move matter away from the Earth are "foo", and everything else is "nonfoo"), but there must be something more to this criterion (beyond completeness and consistency) if it is to be a "moral system", rather than just a free-floating set of statements.
1: What do you mean by "ought"? And 2: given that definition, how can you separate "ought" from morality? It's all well and good to have a complete and consistent criterion by which to evaluate actions (e.g., all actions that move matter away from the Earth are "foo", and everything else is "nonfoo"), but there must be something more to this criterion (beyond completeness and consistency) if it is to be a "moral system", rather than just a free-floating set of statements.
Imagine you have before you a Thomas Jeffereson. The guy values morality somewhat, but he does not value morality so highly that he would want to release his slaves in order to placate it.
Does now the natural law have anything to say why he ought to value morality more highly? No. The natural rights theory can only explain that he ought to release the slaves and pay compensation because it is objectively unjust not to. That is it. It can not tell him why he ought to value justice more than comfort if Jefferson is willing to live with his objectively determined wickedness.
Hi Justin
I don't know whether you had time to read O'Neil's article:
http://mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf
The analogy with physical science isn't accurate, because the laws of physical science are explicitly "If - Then" in form.
Something like: "If you put your hand in the fire, then your hand will burn." "If you hold your hand far from the fire, then your hand will not be warmed."
Physical laws are then utilized according to the goals of the individual utilizing such laws.
Objective ethics theories as a rule try to avoid an explicit "If - Then" form such as:
"If you do X (contrary to the objective ethical code), then Y will happen to you."
This form sets up a moral "law" (provides information on a constant relationship between entities) which then "allows" the individual to utilize this law according to his individual goals:
"The moral law tells me that the "price" for doing X, is Y. Actually, I don't mind paying price Y, so I will do X."
This is the form that moral law would take, were it of the same type as physical law. It is in some sense neutral with respect to individual ends, and tells the actor what the result or consequence of his intended action will be....
The goal of objective ethics theorizing is not to arrive at such a law, but rather to overcome or supersede this very format. This "if - then" law format "allows" individuals to utilize the law (utilitarianism) for the attainment of their ends, or to prevent specific ends (events) from materializing.
To the extent information is provided by moral theory about a constant relationship between entities (doing X leads to or is co-present with consequence Y), then a situation is set up whereby a person gains cause-and-effect knowledge about the costs of his actions and is thus better able to judge whether the ends are worth the price he must pay according to the moral law.
Natural law or objective ethics theorizing is searching for an additional prohibitionary principle, above and beyond the costs a person would have to bear according to a strictly formulated "if - then" cause-and-effect moral law.
This kind of theory is looking for a principle that is "supra moral law"----a principle that doesn't collapses or reduce to the if-then form (which again, "allows" individuals to utilize laws in service of their ends).
The main point is that the analogy with physical science is not accurate, because physical science is involved in trying to discover laws of constant relations that man can utilize towards his ends. Natural law and objective ethics theory is searching for a principle that is somehow outside the cause and effect nexus or that somehow supersedes this nexus.
The Ayn Rand school of ethics attempts to overcome this situation by referring to the idea that A = A.
The challenge of this approach this approach is generally the following:
The idea that there is something wrong with a supposed act (something immoral about it), seems to require expression in an "A - B" form.
We don't say simply: robbery is robbery, or, wrong is wrong. We want to say: robbery is wrong.
This, strictly speaking, is not A = A, but rather A = B.
But now we are heading towards establishing a constant relationship between entities. We are saying that whenever robbery happens, that wrongness must also happen. The price to pay for robbery is wrongness. To avoid experiencing wrongness, or to avoid being wrong, abstain from robbery.
Now we are back to utilitarianism. We can take this information from moral theory instructing us that every appearance of A brings with it a B, and utilize this information for our own individual well-being (utilitarianism).
This is the situation that natural law and objective ethics is trying to surmount and overcome.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Adam Knott: Maybe the group you and Kinsella have in mind consists in those who are philosophically and temperamentally comfortable with objective ethics, but who nonetheless perceive that human values, including moral and ethical values, are relative to the purpose(s) of the individual(s) concerned ?
Maybe the group you and Kinsella have in mind consists in those who are philosophically and temperamentally comfortable with objective ethics, but who nonetheless perceive that human values, including moral and ethical values, are relative to the purpose(s) of the individual(s) concerned ?
Yes! That's what I meant. But as you said, this reconciliation it's kind of missing the point entirely, since as far morals go, this group would be practically as amoralist as the nihilist next door.
On a small note, I feel this would be the most compatible with libertarian thought, since ideas can be a free market themselves, and people are free to choose which morals most serve their ends.
Justin Spahr-Summers:Well, I do think it's possible to love someone "who [does] you more harm than good," but precisely because you love them for their virtues. It may be that they continually frustrate you romantically, or are inconsiderate in some ways, etc. (without getting into too much empirical analysis), but I'd still say that the person is loved because of their value to the actor—they aren't valued because they are loved.
If I love someone for their kindness and the irrepressible twinkle in their eye, doesn't that eventually take us back to the base human sensations of pain and pleasure? I don't see that our imputation of virtue (real or imagined) to a loved one need be anything more than justification of the feelings we are already feeling.
Justin Spahr-Summers: AJ: I guess the obvious question is, what if someone wants to commit suicide? How can we call that "evil," and if the answer is that the act works against life, isn't this merely tantamount to defining evil as that which works against life? Yes, it precisely is.
AJ: I guess the obvious question is, what if someone wants to commit suicide? How can we call that "evil," and if the answer is that the act works against life, isn't this merely tantamount to defining evil as that which works against life?
I guess the obvious question is, what if someone wants to commit suicide? How can we call that "evil," and if the answer is that the act works against life, isn't this merely tantamount to defining evil as that which works against life?
Yes, it precisely is.
If "evil" just means "working against life," then it seems the fundamental idea you're talking about is not an ethical system but more precisely a way of classifying which actions extend life or aid in "flourishing" and which subtract from it.
Justin Spahr-Summers:I try to avoid quoting Rand in debates, but I really like this: "The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do."
No problem quoting Rand, as I think her insights are important. It's the exact significance of them and their precise scope that I would like to address. I propose that an idea can be extremely helpful but still not quite perfectly conceived. It might be missing a little something, or it might have a little something extra that slightly (or substantially) undermines its usefulness. In fact, I can hardly think of a theory that lacks such a shortcoming.
I therefore suggest that the "moral" or "morally objective" connotations in Rand's theory are extraneous, and that the core of the value in Rand's insight - the reason that obviously highly intelligent people like yourself have found them so useful and elucidating - is as a heuristic for determining what is most likely to yield the most happiness and the least unhappiness.
I have myself used a similar (and perhaps ultimately identical) heuristic I might call the "health heuristic." Like the universalized concept of "life" the universalized concept of "health" is vague, but somehow it has been very clarifying as a rule or thumb applied over a vast range of my decision-making processes - from relationships to how to spend my free time, and from online discussion to job selection. Somehow looking at things through the lens of "health" is highly enlightening and invariably seems to lead to happier outcomes, and I think this is related to Rand's insights. In fact I have not yet discovered an instance where this heuristic has been certifiably unhelpful, but then I have never tried to apply it every last thing.
However, when a heuristic is so incredibly useful as to illuminate - often with magnificent results - every matter to which it is applied, it is tempting to elevate it to the status of objective or ethically normative ("ought to" be adhered to, as more than just a recommendation for how to achieve happiness*). Yet this seems to me a confusion - unnecessary at best, and obfuscating at worst.
More worrisome still is the labeling of something that goes against this objectivity as "evil." I simply call such things "unhealthy" and leave it at that. I think the additional component of meaning conveyed by the word evil is superfluous. I don't see that it's a clarifying word, but in fact the opposite. I know just as well to steer clear of something unhealthy as I would to avoid something that is evil, but with evil there is additional connotative baggage.
*Rand's quote makes perfect sense if interpreted as such a recommendation, but the ethical connotations seem to me gratuitous.
Justin Spahr-Summers:I think Adam Knott's very impressive contribution to this thread highlights the disconnect we have here. "All human values are moral values," and "every human choice is a moral choice involving moral values."
Indeed, Adam's post resonated superbly with my own thinking and I think it deserves wide readership. As above, I don't see that the moral aspect isn't extraneous, and that the real most fundamental concept isn't happiness vs. unhappiness, or pain vs. pleasure.
Justin Spahr-Summers:The immediate issue that I find with such individualized ethics, though, is that it's similar to a Nietzschean "transvaluation of all values." Yet even Nietzsche ultimately found "life" (rather more vaguely defined) to be the highest value—and then just kind of stopped and said that all other values are subjective. If we accept such a premise, though, what makes life a value at all?
It may be similar (not familiar enough with Nietzsche to say), but I don't agree with Nietzsche that "life" is the "highest value" (although this may indeed have great elucidating power as a concept employed for decision-making).
Justin Spahr-Summers:If we assume a society where everyone believes that ethics is subjective, it's possible that the sociopathic members of such a society could end up outnumbering the sane ones. Does this mean that murder will and should be condoned?
In that unlikely scenario, it may be that murder will be condoned, but I contend that the matter of whether it should be only has meaning as a question for each individual. From the sociopath's point of view, yes, it may be condoned, but not from my point of view. Anyway, even if such a scenario were to arise, I maintain that the subjective frame is the most useful for determining one's course of action, and that objective frames - although they might (debatable) produce no detriment in this case - do not provide any benefit for the outnumbered non-sociopaths either. The ideas that win for the non-sociopaths in this scenario are the ones that convince the sociopaths not to murder and not to condone it, as well as for the non-sociopaths to rise up and oppose the sociopaths. For those purposes I don't think subjective ethics is any less able than any other theory (that is to say, they would all have a usefulness of zero if none of the other theories existed; subjective ethics only being useful as a refutation of objective ethics).
Justin Spahr-Summers:If all the members of such a society adhered to self-destructive values, does that mean that self-destruction of oneself, of society, etc. is an end that we cannot pronounce judgment upon? I, for one, disagree.
We cannot really talk about society's self-destruction collectively without specifying exactly what that means: (a) individuals destroying their own selves, or (b) everyone destroying each other. If (a), I might judge their actions but I would not advocate any coercive action to stop them. If (b), I would judge their actions and I would advocate coercive action to stop them and/or take such defensive action myself.
Justin Spahr-Summers:It is our existence as an end in itself that provides us the standard by which to determine other ends and determine morality—or those actions which are proper to a living being.
If you mean it's a standard guiding your own judgment then I agree with the decision-making heuristic this suggests, although not precisely with the theory behind it. Anyway, to reiterate, I don't think anything beyond the heuristic is helpful.
Justin Spahr-Summers:Sorry, I was trying to refer to cultural norms, in the sense of Western cultural norms, Middle Eastern cultural norms, Far East cultural norms, and so on. I guess they are "ethical norms" in the sense that the adherents view them as part of their morality, but my point is that the number of adherents doesn't determine whether such an ethical/cultural norm is actually right.
Right, it comes down to the definition of ethical right and wrong. If we define them as just people's subjective opinions, then such cultural norms would be right for those adherents - by definition. If we define them as that which is conducive to (/destructive of) life or health or flourishing, then - in my view - "ethics" collapses down to simply a heuristic for determining what actions will make the actor happy and what actions by that same actor are deemed by that actor to be most likely to make other people happy (insofar as these other people are similar to the actor).
Why anarchy fails
nirgrahamUK: Adam Knott:This will also mean a critique of Misesian praxeology (as the search for exact laws of human action)---though not necessarily a critique of the Rothbardian conception of praxeology (conceived merely as a form of supposition/counter-supposition reasoninig). I'm interested to know how to understand this? and what backs it up? Do other scholars have their own praxeology?
Adam Knott:This will also mean a critique of Misesian praxeology (as the search for exact laws of human action)---though not necessarily a critique of the Rothbardian conception of praxeology (conceived merely as a form of supposition/counter-supposition reasoninig).
I'm interested to know how to understand this? and what backs it up? Do other scholars have their own praxeology?
?
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
Marko:It just happens that this is unthinkable in humans because we hold that what is immoral is self-evidentely abhorent.
Yet what is self-evidently abhorrent differs from culture to culture, if not from person to person. Sure, all cultures and individuals may find out-and-out murder of an innocent self-evidently abhorrent, but what determines innocence? Adultery is self-evidently a capital offense in some people's eyes.
Marriage is a contract. Adultery is braking of the marriage contract. The penalty for braking a contract is stated in the contract itself. As long as both parties agree to the pact and enter into it voluntarily with full knowledge of what it entails the penalty for braking it can be virtually anything.
If the people who see adultery as deserving of stoning discriminate based on the exact marriage contract made, you'd be correct.
This a pretty long thread, I've read a few (random) pages from it, so forgive me if I'm repeating a formerly stated position.
The whole stated position of an objective anything is ridiculous, because even by the act of observation, the observed is subject to our perception of it, every thought is subject to our thinking process. If the objective exists, it is impossible to fully understand it, no matter how much thinking you do about it!
Of course, you may be satisfied to accept the majority's concept of reality, but just because in a blind taste test, people prefer Pepsi to Coca-Cola 2 to 1, doesn't mean it's true that Pepsi tastes better.
The best you can do is enter the realm of interaction without presuppositions of objective morality, and let the market determine what the best path should be.
Jackson LaRose:The whole stated position of an objective anything is ridiculous, because even by the act of observation, the observed is subject to our perception of it, every thought is subject to our thinking process. If the objective exists, it is impossible to fully understand it, no matter how much thinking you do about it!
Engineering requires objective precision. Regardless of how we perceive such precision, it is an objective necessity.
Just based on what you said, there's no reason why ethics can't be similarly objective.
P.S. (to others), I've been reworking my theory of objective ethics, because I realized I was missing a lot of ground and having to concede a lot of points (which is why I ultimately ducked out of the thread). I'll hopefully have something to show for it in the near future; get your criticism cannons ready.
Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.—Ludwig von Mises
Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.
Justin Spahr-Summers:Engineering requires objective precision. Regardless of how we perceive such precision, it is an objective necessity.
It is in relation to an "if-then" that it is a requirement. There must be a desired (subjective) end for that statement to make sense.
Jackson LaRose: Justin Spahr-Summers:Engineering requires objective precision. Regardless of how we perceive such precision, it is an objective necessity. It is in relation to an "if-then" that it is a requirement. There must be a desired (subjective) end for that statement to make sense.
Okay, which is something I plan to address with the forthcoming thoughts I mentioned in my last post. For now, it'll hopefully suffice to say that you didn't include that in your criticism of objectivity.
Yeah man, Mises took care of it already.
Jackson LaRose:Yeah man, Mises took care of it already.
I think this is the same line of thinking that led to Rand's vehement opposition to subjective value theory.
People do value different things (subjective value theory), yes, but this has no bearing on whether they actually should morally value XYZ (objective ethics).
Stated differently: individuals hold different ends, but this says nothing about their validity one way or the other. Just because individuals have different ends does not mean that we can't analyze those ends. Mises would say otherwise, but that's the whole root of the disagreement between objective and subjective ethicists.
We DO live in a society of subjective ethics, and the sociopathic members already outnumber the sane members, at least in terms of firepower. People condone murder every day. We already live in your hypothetical society where everyone holds their own subjective code of ethics.
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But it is impossible, barring omniscience, to consider all things instantly, which would result in a perfect logic.
This would be required to make perfect judgements, which would be necessary to claim anything will be always right or wrong given any set of circumstances, from the perspective of anything involved.
Jackson LaRose:But it is impossible, barring omniscience, to consider all things instantly, which would result in a perfect logic. This would be required to make perfect judgements, which would be necessary to claim anything will be always right or wrong given any set of circumstances, from the perspective of anything involved.
Ethics deals with defining moral principles, which are objective and universal in nature. When we have to apply those principles to a real-world scenario, perfect judgments are not required. Because man is fallible, he has to choose the course that he finds to be right, as justified by his moral code and his reason.
Justin Spahr-Summers:Because man is fallible, he has to choose the course that he finds to be right, as justified by his moral code and his reason.
Exactly. This is subject to the individuals perception of the "real". How can that be universal?
Jackson LaRose: Justin Spahr-Summers:Because man is fallible, he has to choose the course that he finds to be right, as justified by his moral code and his reason. Exactly. This is subject to the individuals perception of the "real". How can that be universal?
Because the principles are universal, grounded in concrete reality. Each actor has to assess the circumstances and choose according to the limits of his knowledge and cognitive ability.
I don't think that's relevant Mr. Larose. I mean, moral objectivists have no objection (objectivist objections, ha... ha.) that a thief may have a different perception of what constitutes theft, and it still doesn't nullify their natural or universal moral code...
A blind man would be no less guilty of pulling the trigger and killing someone, or a sleep-walking man, uh... shooting people... I can only think of lame examples at the moment
Forgive me if I'm wrong Mr. Summers
Edit: Aw what the hell, I type so slow that you've answered yourself while I was typing.
How do you determine this objective morality?
Jackson LaRose:How do you determine this objective morality?
Well, that's the question, isn't it?
An answer to this would require a full elucidation of a theory of objective ethics, so it'll have to be deferred for now.
Could you do an easy one first? Like "murder is wrong"?