wilderness: Bert:I'm not sure how you can come to the conclusion Mises was a moralist. His theories are "value-free" in that area, and praxeology doesn't deal with what's right or wrong in the moral sense. the problem seems to be that Mises was also a Liberal, and writes about 'proving moral justification' and how is immoral to go to war, and moral to tend to welfare of society; and calls for the protection of life, liberty, health, and private property.
Bert:I'm not sure how you can come to the conclusion Mises was a moralist. His theories are "value-free" in that area, and praxeology doesn't deal with what's right or wrong in the moral sense.
the problem seems to be that Mises was also a Liberal, and writes about 'proving moral justification' and how is immoral to go to war, and moral to tend to welfare of society; and calls for the protection of life, liberty, health, and private property.
Going to war is destructive economically, and for people and property. In his usage of morality it makes sense. Expand on tending to the "welfare of society". Protection of life, liberty, health, and private property is protection against aggression. It's not necessarily a morality issue on how you see it.
Bert: wilderness: Bert:I'm not sure how you can come to the conclusion Mises was a moralist. His theories are "value-free" in that area, and praxeology doesn't deal with what's right or wrong in the moral sense. the problem seems to be that Mises was also a Liberal, and writes about 'proving moral justification' and how is immoral to go to war, and moral to tend to welfare of society; and calls for the protection of life, liberty, health, and private property. Going to war is destructive economically, and for people and property. In his usage of morality it makes sense. Expand on tending to the "welfare of society". Protection of life, liberty, health, and private property is protection against aggression. It's not necessarily a morality issue on how you see it.
and how exactly do I see it?
when I read 'proving moral justification', etc... how am I seeing it?
here's the quotes:
"As the liberal sees it, the task of the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks. Everything that goes beyond this is an evil." - Mises
"we are at the same time providing proof of the moral justification for private property and for the capitalist social order based upon it.
Morality consists in" - Mises
wilderness: Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:So say something that I disagree with. What's wrong with saying something you agree with? Let me ask you this: Do you think there is an external reality outside of your mind?
Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:So say something that I disagree with. What's wrong with saying something you agree with?
wilderness:So say something that I disagree with.
What's wrong with saying something you agree with?
Let me ask you this: Do you think there is an external reality outside of your mind?
Yes.
Grayson Lilburne: wilderness: Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:Mises says by the protection of natural rights which are of the natural law of human nature So now, Mises is for normative science, natural law, and natural rights. Awesome. Thanks for obscuring the intellectual legacy of one of the most important thinkers in history. "As the liberal sees it, the task of the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks. Everything that goes beyond this is an evil." - Mises It's in black and white. I'm sorry you disagree with Mises. Argue with him. Not me. Again, "an evil", is meant not in the sense of wicked (contrary to an universal/metaphysical end), but in the sense of something destructive (contrary to the ends of those involved)...
wilderness: Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:Mises says by the protection of natural rights which are of the natural law of human nature So now, Mises is for normative science, natural law, and natural rights. Awesome. Thanks for obscuring the intellectual legacy of one of the most important thinkers in history. "As the liberal sees it, the task of the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks. Everything that goes beyond this is an evil." - Mises It's in black and white. I'm sorry you disagree with Mises. Argue with him. Not me.
Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:Mises says by the protection of natural rights which are of the natural law of human nature So now, Mises is for normative science, natural law, and natural rights. Awesome. Thanks for obscuring the intellectual legacy of one of the most important thinkers in history.
wilderness:Mises says by the protection of natural rights which are of the natural law of human nature
So now, Mises is for normative science, natural law, and natural rights. Awesome. Thanks for obscuring the intellectual legacy of one of the most important thinkers in history.
It's in black and white. I'm sorry you disagree with Mises. Argue with him. Not me.
Again, "an evil", is meant not in the sense of wicked (contrary to an universal/metaphysical end), but in the sense of something destructive (contrary to the ends of those involved)...
Grayson Lilburne:yes.
then what are you disagreeing with? why are you arguing against Mises being a Liberal? What's wrong with Mises mentioned that life, liberty, health, and private property need to be protected? What's wrong with the fact that life, liberty, health, and private property are natural rights? I don't even need to label them as natural rights, but they are, and that doesn't change the meaning of those concepts.
wilderness: why are you arguing against Mises being a Liberal.
why are you arguing against Mises being a Liberal.
I'm not.
sorry i edited.
Bert: Grayson Lilburne: wilderness: Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:Mises says by the protection of natural rights which are of the natural law of human nature So now, Mises is for normative science, natural law, and natural rights. Awesome. Thanks for obscuring the intellectual legacy of one of the most important thinkers in history. "As the liberal sees it, the task of the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks. Everything that goes beyond this is an evil." - Mises It's in black and white. I'm sorry you disagree with Mises. Argue with him. Not me. Again, "an evil", is meant not in the sense of wicked (contrary to an universal/metaphysical end), but in the sense of something destructive (contrary to the ends of those involved)...
I don't see how that changes anything.
wilderness:then what are you disagreeing with? why are you arguing against Mises being a Liberal? What's wrong with Mises mentioned that life, liberty, health, and private property need to be protected? What's wrong with the fact that life, liberty, health, and private property are natural rights? I don't even need to label them as natural rights, but they are, and that doesn't change the meaning of those concepts.
Whatever your opinions may be on the necessary connections of concepts, and whatever your syncretic tendencies are, it is entirely misleading to say Mises was a natural rights proponent.
Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:then what are you disagreeing with? why are you arguing against Mises being a Liberal? What's wrong with Mises mentioned that life, liberty, health, and private property need to be protected? What's wrong with the fact that life, liberty, health, and private property are natural rights? I don't even need to label them as natural rights, but they are, and that doesn't change the meaning of those concepts. Whatever your opinions may be on the necessary connections of concepts, and whatever your syncretic tendencies are, it is entirely misleading to say Mises was a natural rights proponent.
Well, beyond that. Beyond what Mises thought, because I'm already convinced he didn't intellectually apprehend what natural law/rights were. That definition he provided is Hobbes and maybe Spinoza which from those very days the natural law tradition has abhorred as they changed the very meanings of "nature" and "natural" away from a tradition conceptualization that had been on-going for over a thousand years before and hundreds of years since. That is incidentally a side point. Yet within the natural law tradition those concepts "nature" and "natural" have retained their meaning. They mean logical, intellectual, and reasoned of reality.
Given that Mises made an error in his semantics that doesn't change anything.
I'm asking you.
What is wrong with life, liberty, health, and private property being concepts of natural rights? As I stated. Take away the label natural rights and those concepts do not change in meaning one iota. So what is wrong with life, liberty, health, and private property being protected?
wilderness:I'm already convinced he didn't intellectually apprehend what natural law/rights were.
If you don't think Mises even understood natural law/rights doctrine, then I'm assuming you now agree that he didn't promote it. I'm glad we've at least found that much common ground.
wilderness:So what is wrong with life, liberty, health, and private property being protected?
According to my value judgment, nothing.
I've changed my rating of this thread from 1 star to 5, because I think we've covered important ground here.
Grayson Lilburne: nirgrahamUK: Does this directly touch on the quote from epistimological problems where the translation word we are given as ethics, and that is a normative science? similarly does Geisteswissenschaft show up in the original text of Liberalism in the 'private property and ethics' chapter quoted? This looks like a job for..... Original Mises Circle Alum, Ralph Raico Man! Able to translate German treatises that are, in leather, bound! Maybe the Mises Faculty Spotlight peeps can ask him if they ever interview him. If I ever have the honor of meeting him, I will be sure to.
nirgrahamUK: Does this directly touch on the quote from epistimological problems where the translation word we are given as ethics, and that is a normative science? similarly does Geisteswissenschaft show up in the original text of Liberalism in the 'private property and ethics' chapter quoted?
Does this directly touch on the quote from epistimological problems where the translation word we are given as ethics, and that is a normative science?
similarly does Geisteswissenschaft show up in the original text of Liberalism in the 'private property and ethics' chapter quoted?
This looks like a job for..... Original Mises Circle Alum, Ralph Raico Man! Able to translate German treatises that are, in leather, bound!
Maybe the Mises Faculty Spotlight peeps can ask him if they ever interview him. If I ever have the honor of meeting him, I will be sure to.
Perhaps.
To paraphrase Marc Faber: We're all doomed, but that doesn't mean that we can't make money in the process. Rabbi Lapin: "Let's make bricks!" Stephan Kinsella: "Say you and I both want to make a German chocolate cake."
Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:I'm already convinced he didn't intellectually apprehend what natural law/rights were. If you don't think Mises even understood natural law/rights doctrine, then I'm assuming you now agree that he didn't promote it. I'm glad we've at least found that much common ground.
Right. He didn't promote the natural law he was defining. And who would! Except Hobbesists.
I am pointing out that Mises unknowingly supported natural law in accord with it's traditional usage. It's the way logic is. To logically deduce that the protection of life, liberty, health, and private property is good is an exercise in natural law of human nature because all that means is to intellectually apprehend reality based on science. Logically it is sound to protect those 'things'. (I say this hoping by now that you know that I know what Mises means and have that's why I don't know why you think otherwise when it comes to ethics). Look back on Bert's post. You for awhile would say those kinds of thing: 'not in the way I mean it'. How am I supposed to answer that? How does he or you know how I mean it? It would make it easier to point out something I wrote that misrepresents.
Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:So what is wrong with life, liberty, health, and private property being protected? According to my value judgment, nothing.
And that's all it ever is. A value judgment. Nobody has ever disagreed with that. It's axiomatic. It's human action. It's how we are. That's why it has logically been comprehended that only individuals reason and have free-will. By free-will what I mean is only individuals choose to either do what meets their goal of prosperity and peace or to choose the incorrect means to attain such ends. Politics and law go a bit further because it would be horrible in not protecting life, liberty, health, and private property. Thereby institutions are established to protect those 'rights' or 'things that are'. Some people choose not to. Protection becomes necessary for those people willing to protect them. It's all value-judgments. It's always based on the individual.
Do you see why I feel and Conza and others feel that there has been a lot of misconceptions and misrepresentations going on? I wasn't trying to misrepresent Mises. I only quoted him. Where did I suggest anything that differed from your understanding? I only quoted him and then you said I am misrepresenting him. How can I be doing that when I only quoted him? In hindsight, as I was getting to, maybe you now know how it feels to be misrepresented and conceptualized for months. Think this was only one thread for one night and day. I feel like you and others have been conceptualizing what natural law is for months on end. Why do you think we keep saying over and over again that what you are saying is wrong about natural law and that's not what natural law is, etc...? I mean we are not simply saying that for kicks. We even point out line by line referring to the misconceptions and showing why it is wrong. The mushroom topic of Adam's. I mean, nowhere was Rothbard saying that that is a poltical-legal issue. He was simply pointing out an example of an ethical situation, like Mises saying to do good for the whole of society. I mean if I walked up to somebody that was about to eat a poison mushroom and said nothing. I mean I knew for a fact that that mushroom would kill that person, but didn't say a word. I couldn't go to jail or there would be no legal repercussions, but would it conflict with my conscience? Would I feel perturb to have not help him? Yes I would have thought about it long afterwards on how wrong and immoral that was of me, personally me, because I'm not that kind of guy. I would feel horrible the rest of my life knowing that I could have saved that person's life and I said nothing.
Whether somebody wants to call those things natural rights or not. It doesn't change the fact of what they are. It doesn't change their nature, ie. definition. Life, liberty, health, and private property are what they are. I don't need to define them you know what they mean.
wilderness:Do you see why I feel and Conza and others feel that there has been a lot of misconceptions and misrepresentations going on?
I know this might be not kosher to comment on my own post but I want to infer an answer from this. The reason why I try to maintain natural rights is because my maintaining of them is my protecting of life, liberty, and property. I hope to only ever have to do that for the most part of my life philosophically and never have to get to the point of having to protect life, liberty, and property with physical self-defense. That's the, maybe, only reason I philosophically maintain that position because for me to maintain is to protect. I am only trying to protect life, liberty, and property.
More at the topic Wertfreiheit.
Grayson Lilburne: I hope this makes Mises' position even more crystal clear: "There is no such thing as a normative science, a science of what ought to be." Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History, Chapter 3
I hope this makes Mises' position even more crystal clear:
"There is no such thing as a normative science, a science of what ought to be."
Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History, Chapter 3
Strictly speaking, this is true. However, I think part of Putnam's point would be that science inherently presupposes what might be called epistemological normatives (most fundamentally, the value of truth). So we could say that the other side of the coin is that there really is no such thing as a fully value-free science in terms of human beings being the people investigating, already within the assumptions of certain norms, since there really is no such thing as stepping outside of the realm of human experience and value-laden perspective. The enterprise of science already is bound up in norms. Scientific methods are epistemic-normative formulas for obtaining truth-value, and scientists are not value-free observers.
Also, even if we grant that the *object* of science cannot be the discovery of oughts, I would disagree with the scientistic assumption that ethics has to be a scientific enterprise to contain truth-value in the first place. That is, even if we aknowledge that ethics is "philosophical but not scientific", I don't think that would make ethics any less valid of an enterprise because I don't think that positive science has a monopoly on truth-value. I find the tendency to completely dismiss things because they "aren't scientific" to be a bit superficial. Certainly not a sound understanding of the nature and scope of science, since science is not totalistic in nature and completely independant of philosophy.
Brainpolice: Grayson Lilburne: I hope this makes Mises' position even more crystal clear: "There is no such thing as a normative science, a science of what ought to be." Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History, Chapter 3 Strictly speaking, this is true. However, I think part of Putnam's point would be that science inherently presupposes what might be called epistemological normatives (most fundamentally, the value of truth). So we could say that the other side of the coin is that there really is no such thing as a fully value-free science in terms of human beings being the people investigating, already within the assumptions of certain norms, since there really is no such thing as stepping outside of the realm of human experience and value-laden perspective. The enterprise of science already is bound up in norms. Scientific methods are epistemic-normative formulas for obtaining truth-value, and scientists are not value-free observers.
Indeed, all actions presuppose values, including attempting a deduction or embarking upon research; there is no such thing as a value-free action. Misesian wertfrreiheit says nothing about some impossible value-free man who conducts science. That would be a contradiction in terms which Mises never put forth. The fact that a scientist's motives cannot be value free does not imply that his method cannot be.
It would be a shame if Putnam's "point" (whoever's misconceptions it addresses) provided cover for those so eager to insert values into science to say, "Well the scientist as a man has values anyway, so we may as well derive oughts from is-es to our heart's delight!"
Indeed, all actions presuppose values, including attempting a deduction or embarking upon research; there is no such thing as a value-free action. Misesian wertfrreiheit says nothing about some impossible value-free man who conducts science. That would be a contradiction in terms which Mises never put forth. The fact that a scientist's motives cannot be value free does not imply that his method cannot be. It would be a shame if Putnam's "point" (whoever's misconceptions it addresses) provided cover for those so eager to insert values into science to say, "Well the scientist as a man has values anyway, so we may as well derive oughts from is-es to our heart's delight!"
To be clear, my own intent goes in two directions. On one hand, I strongly disagree with those who would attempt to claim that they can derive ethics directly from science, that they have a strictly "scientific ethics". On the other hand, I strongly disagree with those who would to attempt to use this gulf between science and ethics as a basis for diminishing or nullifying ethics.
What I would say is that the fact/value dichotomy isn't absolute. They aren't completely disconnected. There definitely are philosophical complications in the attempt to directly derive a value from a fact, but I would also say that there are philosophical complications in the attempt to portray "the facts" as completely disconnected from values. In fact, that oddly seems to imply a "view from nowhere" or a claim of transcendance that itself is not "scientific".
The way that the fact/value dichotomy is often used, primacy is assumed on the behalf of "the facts". I believe this heirarchical binary doesn't necessarily hold and that a strict is-ought bridge isn't necessary to validate ethics. I don't think a big problem arises if we don't stick to the possible options given to us by the dominant western metaphysical tradition, a tradition that tends to create unecessary problems or dillemas that we are forced to pick sides in by the terms set.
Brainpolice:The way that the fact/value dichotomy is often used, primacy is assumed on the behalf of "the facts".
How so?
Grayson Lilburne: Brainpolice:The way that the fact/value dichotomy is often used, primacy is assumed on the behalf of "the facts". How so?
Well, it tends to be used to argue that values are non-cognitive or unfalsifiable if they cannot be directly derived from facts. Isn't that essentially how the is-ought problem manifests itself? And this, in turn, assumes the primacy of fact, fact that is supposed to already be "uncontaminated" by values, of an "is" or metaphysic that has the upperhand of prior certitude independant of value. One way to implode the dichotomy is to rigorously demonstrate that in many ways what we call the facts inherently are "contaminated" by values. And another way would be to show that what we call values cannot possibly have any origin outside of at least some degree of relation to facts, no matter how indirect or far-removed that may be.
Brainpolice:Well, it tends to be used to argue that values are non-cognitive or unfalsifiable if they cannot be directly derived from facts. Isn't that essentially how the is-ought problem manifests itself? And this, in turn, assumes the primacy of fact
...primacy of fact with regard to questions of fact, sure. Of course that doesn't mean it has primacy in all regards. All our actions, after all, are driven by values. Hume promoted the is/ought divide, but he also said that reason (which deals with the "is") is slave to the passions (the source of values).
Brainpolice:fact that is supposed to already be "uncontaminated" by values. One way to implode the dichotomy is to rigorously demonstrate that in many ways what we call the facts inherently are "contaminated" by values.
What do you mean by contamination?
I'm suggesting that there is no "pure" realm of "questions of fact" that is independant of value, that the absoluteness of the dichotomy rests on assuming some realm of "fact in itself" and that if the metaphysic collapses into human experience then "fact" and "value" both inhabit the same space and are inseparably mixed together. If we are working within the realm of human experience, there is no pure "question of fact" that is completely isolated from and subordinates our own presence and goals.
Bound up in, in a mixed relation with.
Brainpolice: What do you mean by contamination? Bound up in, in a mixed relation with.
I know the definition of the word. I'm asking for how specifically fact can be "contaminated" with value in a way in which meaningful, concrete conclusions can be inferred from that state of affairs.
Brainpolice: What reason do you have for believing that factual propositions must be normative? Epistemology generally concerns norms of thought, but it does not follow that it is of necessity prescriptive. Occam's Razor is a good example, as it is often used as a normative assumption 'you should believe x rather than y'.
However, Occam's Razor (and all supposedly 'normative' epistemological positions) is not necessarily prescriptive. I use epistemology to describe the way I think. There is no justified universal prescriptivist epistemological positions. When I get into epistemology, I am signaling my priors, NOT arguing for any apodictic truth, and any rational epistemologist should agree (see the qualifier, this is not contradictory).
What is my recourse if I reject normativity in epistemology as in ethics? The same recourse we all use when dealing with solipsists: I ignore them. However, I think the vast majority of people share the same priors and cannot change the way we think. Assuming intellectual honesty (a 1 to 1 mapping of professed beliefs and actually held beliefs), non-prescriptivist epistemology should not be a problem.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
zefreak: Brainpolice: What reason do you have for believing that factual propositions must be normative? Epistemology generally concerns norms of thought, but it does not follow that it is of necessity prescriptive. Occam's Razor is a good example, as it is often used as a normative assumption 'you should believe x rather than y'. However, Occam's Razor (and all supposedly 'normative' epistemological positions) is not necessarily prescriptive. I use epistemology to describe the way I think. There is no justified universal prescriptivist epistemological positions. When I get into epistemology, I am signaling my priors, NOT arguing for any apodictic truth, and any rational epistemologist should agree (see the qualifier, this is not contradictory). What is my recourse if I reject normativity in epistemology as in ethics? The same recourse we all use when dealing with solipsists: I ignore them. However, I think the vast majority of people share the same priors and cannot change the way we think. Assuming intellectual honesty (a 1 to 1 mapping of professed beliefs and actually held beliefs), non-prescriptivist epistemology should not be a problem.
I'm essentially questioning the notion of epistemology as a foundation or something that comes before ethics and aesthetics, similarly to how metaphysics came to be displaced by epistemology as "1st philosophy". This isn't to say that I'm taking the step of concieving of ethics and aesthetics as "1st philosophy", but proposing that the foundational order that we tend to assume obscures what is more accurately a complex web of interrelations between fields/disciplines in which.
Epistemology and positive science are not separable from ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, etc., when one views the whole. The facts, the epistemes, cannot be isolated from what are essentially the cultural (value-laden, ideological, instrumental, political, etc.) influences and motivations that at least partially determine them. The modern enterprise of science is not outside of the scope of this. It is not over and above or unaffected by the cultural and philosophical landscape that it inhabits. What it affirms is not constituted by a special class of facts that is especially "pure" and contrastable with a lower class of propositions that have a "human face".
This is the sense in which I say that factual propositions aren't a fully distinct type. The temptation to absolutely demarkate this in favor of particular disciplines and proclaim everything beyond its set margins to be outside the scope of truth and/or meaning, to establish a philosophically constructed absolute mantle of science that separates it from and subordinates everything else in order to permanently classify what can and cannot be said with any degree of certitude according to a set critieria matching a particular type within a particular discipline, is just positivism all over again.
Brainpolice: The facts, the epistemes, cannot be isolated from what are essentially the cultural (value-laden, ideological, instrumental, political, etc.) influences and motivations that at least partially determine them.
Brainpolice:This is the sense in which I say that factual propositions aren't a fully distinct type.
Thinking is an action, and all actions are impelled by values. So, yes values motivate thoughts, but that doesn't mean the motive of the thought and the object of the thought are indistinct. Causal relation does not imply indistinct characteristics.
Grayson Lilburne: Brainpolice: The facts, the epistemes, cannot be isolated from what are essentially the cultural (value-laden, ideological, instrumental, political, etc.) influences and motivations that at least partially determine them. Brainpolice:This is the sense in which I say that factual propositions aren't a fully distinct type. Thinking is an action, and all actions are impelled by values. So, yes values motivate thoughts, but that doesn't mean the motive of the thought and the object of the thought are indistinct. Causal relation does not imply indistinct characteristics.
I'm saying that values aren't absolutely separable from the episteme in that both of them are dependant on each other, and that there is no such thing as a workable criteria for determining what counts as a "pure" object of thought in order to dismiss explicit propositions of value as absolutely separate from "fact".
Such a dualism and the point at which you draw its borders is an arbitrary philosophical construction that places absolute borders between categories where none really exist. It functions to serve the purposes of those that wish to denigrate the enterprise of things like ethics on the grounds of a mantle of science that is fully autonamous in its scope - essentially predetermining what is and isn't allowed to be cognitive according to a particular subset of knowledge and its methods.
Brainpolice:I'm saying that values aren't absolutely separable from the episteme in that both of them are dependant on each other
Sure, but how does....
Brainpolice:and that there is no such thing as a workable criteria for determining what counts as a "pure" object of thought in order to dismiss explicit propositions of value as absolutely separate from "fact".
... necessarily follow from that?
Brainpolice:Such a dualism and the point at which you draw its borders is an arbitrary philosophical construction that places absolute borders between categories where none really exist.
It's not arbitrary, but neither is it a philosophical construct. It just so happens to be the logical structure of our minds. Inferences involving existential propositions simply make sense to the human mind, as do verifications and falsifications of existential propositions. But the human mind simply cannot make sense of "is/ought" hybrid syllogisms or the notion that such value statements as "Cheese is delicious" or "Filesharing is evil" can be verified or falsified (which doesn't mean people don't try).
Brainpolice: What problem do you see with epistemology as I use the term, which is non-normative but merely descriptive of why I believe? Can you try and use clear language with examples; I am not new to philosophical terminology and am relatively well-read in the literature, I can understand Quine's Philosophy of Logic and have read Hume, Carnap and Ayer to name but a few, and yet I find your posts practically indecipherable. I think I understand what you are saying, although if I do I am not convinced that you are saving moral realism or normativity from arbitrariness and Occam's Razor.
Brainpolice:I'm saying that values aren't absolutely separable from the episteme in that both of them are dependant on each other, and that there is no such thing as a workable criteria for determining what counts as a "pure" object of thought in order to dismiss explicit propositions of value as absolutely separate from "fact".
is/ought is purely arbitrary. In this possible world it is a fact that when somebody tries to murder somebody it is a fact that the victim is trying to stop the potential murderer. It is a fact that there is a conflict over property, ie. person. It is a fact that it is being resolved between the two. It is a fact that logic in accord with empirical evidence is on the side of the victim. It is a fact that the victim or the murderer will overpower one or the other. It is a fact that after it is all over logic is still on the side of the victim in the minds of others and the murderer was special pleading. It is a fact this possible world was dealing with an ethical situation. It is a fact that ethics this wasn't a purely personal ethical situation. There were factually more than one person involved. It is a fact that each individual sustained or attacked using their personal moral agent.
wilderness:It is a fact that logic in accord with empirical evidence is on the side of the victim.
You are making no sense here.
wilderness: Liberalism is not a dogma but applies science. That's why I say liberalism is a science.
Liberalism is not a dogma but applies science. That's why I say liberalism is a science.
Engineering is an application of science.
Wibee: wilderness: Liberalism is not a dogma but applies science. That's why I say liberalism is a science. Engineering is an application of science.
great for engineering