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Wertfreiheit

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wilderness Posted: Fri, Mar 19 2010 9:18 PM

Knowing that human action is self-evident, and presumptions laid aside that this is all underlined by individuality, etc...   I have a question.

Does wertfreiheit simply mean objective?

By objective, I mean independent of the agent's biases, prejudices, and beliefs.

"Do not put out the fire of the spirit." 1The 5:19
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thelion replied on Fri, Mar 19 2010 10:50 PM

No; whether objective or subjective is a question of the material propositions (i.e. subjective preferences and subjective expectations or objective technological proportions or objective ideas).

What werfreiheit means is that the agent who combines these material propositions in a formal way does not reject any particular outcomes provided by logical inference because he dislikes them; rather, he is only concerned with whether they are true or not.

 

Truth cannot either be called objective or subjective, because material propositions can be both, and both types of material propositions (else their contraries) can be true. I borrow J.J. Toohey's definition of true from his 1939 paper: "we may define a truth as (a piece of) information about a specified object, and a falsity as misinformation about a specified object" (504). Truth means full or partial identity with an object (or also a subject in the case of economic theory).

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When Mises talks about value-freedom (wertfreiheit), he is referring to this:

(from "Economics and Judgments of Value" in Human Action)

"An economist investigates whether a measure a can bring about the result p for the attainment of which it is recommended, and finds that a does not result in p but in g. an effect which even the supporters of the measure a consider undesirable. If this economist states the outcome of his investigation by saying that a is a bad measure, he does not pronounce a judgment of value. He merely says that from the point of view of those aiming at the goal p, the measure a is inappropriate. In this sense the free-trade economists attacked protection. They demonstrated that protection does not, as its champions believe, increase but, on the contrary, decreases the total amount of products, and is therefore bad from the point of view of those who prefer an ampler supply of products to a smaller. It is in this sense that economists criticize policies from the point of view of the ends aimed at. If an economist calls minimum wage rates a bad policy, what he means is that its effects are contrary to the purpose of those who recommend their application.

....

In this sense we may say that economics is apolitical or nonpolitical, [p. 885] although it is the foundation of politics and of every kind of political action. We may furthermore say that it is perfectly neutral with regard to all judgments of value, as it refers always to means and never to the choice of ultimate ends."

 

"the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of society, which require mutual abstinence from property" -David Hume
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I actually just had this same Mises quote up from Block on Reinach and Rothbard:

Mises thought he had found a way around this difficulty, but ultimately he did not. In his view, it was reasonable to deduce what the law ought to be from purely economic considerations, provided only that we take as a given the utility of the normal or average man, who is in this case the typical advocate of government intervention, as the lodestar of our analysis.He stated:

An economist investigates whether a measure a can bring about the result p for the attainment of which it is recommended, and finds that a does not result in p but in g, an effect which even the supporters of the measure a consider undesirable. If the economist states the outcome of his investigation by saying that a is a bad measure, he does not pronounce a judgment of value. He merely says that from the point of view of those aiming at the goal p, the measure a is inappropriate. (Mises 1998, p. 879)

But Rothbard offers a devastating refutation of this entire notion, after rejecting on praxeological grounds that the economist can know what is in the mind of the advocate of interventionism insofar as they are not demonstrated (Rothbard 1977b) by economic action:

Thus, Mises, qua economist, may show that price control (to use his example) will lead to unforseen shortages of a good to the consumers. But how does Mises know that some advocates of price control do not want shortages? They may, for example, be socialists, anxious to use the controls as a step toward full collectivism. Some may be egalitarians who prefer shortages because the rich will not be able to use their money to buy more of the product than poorer people. (Rothbard 1998, p. 208)

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wilderness replied on Fri, Mar 19 2010 11:35 PM

thelion:
No; whether objective or subjective is a question of the material propositions (i.e. subjective preferences and subjective expectations or objective technological proportions or objective ideas).

What werfreiheit means is that the agent who combines these material propositions in a formal way does not reject any particular outcomes provided by logical inference because he dislikes them; rather, he is only concerned with whether they are true or not.

Truth cannot either be called objective or subjective, because material propositions can be both, and both types of material propositions (else their contraries) can be true. I borrow J.J. Toohey's definition of true from his 1939 paper: "we may define a truth as (a piece of) information about a specified object, and a falsity as misinformation about a specified object" (504). Truth means full or partial identity with an object (or also a subject in the case of economic theory).

When I say objective (the definition I gave), I meant from the point of view of the scientist.  Would that still fit?  It seems to, but maybe not let me know, because if the scientist isn't injecting their bias into what is, ie. ontic, and instead is theorizing on the ontic without trying to skew or distort what is with their own preconceptions, then what is includes (as I had already stated in the OP that this all presupposes human action and individuality) subjectivity in preferences, thoughts, feelings, atoms, chairs, single-celled organisms, etc....

Here's another way of putting it maybe, but it doesn't use the word "objective" the way I thought it would mean as I tried to provide a definition, but here's the other explanation of what I thought meant being objective, because I am using the term 'objective' in the ontological sense which therefore entails truth or not.

Maki:
Ontological realism about X is primarily an account of what it is for X to exist (if it
does). To this, one may add the weaker claim that X might exist, or the stronger claim
that X does exist. Likewise with truth. Realism about truth is primarily an account of
what it is for a truth bearer T to be true. One may then add the weaker claim that T might
be true, or the stronger claim that T indeed is true. Naturally each such claim requires
different sorts of supportive argument.
source

What do you think?

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Well, back to the original question about human action. The method here is axiomatic-deductive. The logical proof A->B is there for anyone wishing to do the experiment to see (to paraphrase Rothbard). So, it is wertfrei. The concern with personal bias and such comes when we play the role of historian or in making predictions.

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But the first conjunction, e.g., “Austrian law” does present difficulties, at 

least at the outset. After all, if “Austrian” means anything in common academic 

parlance, it refers not to law, nor yet to a nation in Europe, but to economics.2 

And this subject matter constitutes of course a value free, (Rothbard 1973b, pp. 

35–39 and Block 1975, pp. 38–41) or positive science. Law, in sharp contrast, is 

anything but positive3; rather, it is very much of a normative enterprise. We 

have it on good authority,4that never the twain shall meet: specifically, that 

from positive premises no normative conclusions at all can be drawn; or, alter- 

natively, that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” Since economics per- 

tains to the realm of the “is,” and law to the “ought,” this translates into the 

denial that from economics one can derive legal principles. If so, then there 

can be nothing which can be described by “Austrian law”; any such termi- 

nology must refer not merely to a null set, but to an actual contradiction in 

terms. 

Mises thought he had found a way around this difficulty, but ultimately he 

did not. In his view, it was reasonable to deduce what the law ought to be from 

purely economic considerations, provided only that we take as a given the 

utility of the normal or average man, who is in this case the typical advocate 

of government intervention, as the lodestar of our analysis.  

He stated: 

"An economist investigates whether a measure acan bring about the result 

pfor the attainment of which it is recommended, and finds that adoes not 

result in pbut in g, an effect which even the supporters of the measure a 

consider undesirable. If the economist states the outcome of his investi- 

gation by saying that ais a bad measure, he does not pronounce a judg- 

ment of value. He merely says that from the point of view of those aiming 

at the goal p, the measure ais inappropriate. (Mises 1998, p. 879)"

 

Mises did not try to find "a way around" the "difficulty" of the is/ought divide.  He did not think of it as a "difficulty" in the first place; he fully embraced it as necessary for clear thinking.

Also Block is conflating two different things: Mises' conception of liberalism and Mise's conception of praxeology.

What Block describes when he writes, "In his view, it was reasonable to deduce what the law ought to be from purely economic considerations, provided only that we take as a given the utility of the normal or average man, who is in this case the typical advocate of government intervention, as the lodestar of our analysis," is Mises' conception of liberalism, which, as Mises clearly states, is a political doctrine, and not a scientific theory.  Thus, Misesian liberalism cannot be correctly viewed as an attempt to discover "oughts" with pure science, because liberalism is not science.

Conversely, the passage from Human Action which Block quotes does not discuss liberalism, but rather economic science.  This can be seen by the fact that the quote is not from the part of Human Action which discusses liberalism, but is from the part which discusses praxeology and value judgments in general; but mostly it can be seen in the fact that the goals in the description are variables; there are no "common man" concrete valuations involved, as you would have in a description of the political doctrine of liberalism.

Walter Block:
But Rothbard offers a devastating refutation of this entire notion, after rejecting on praxeological grounds that the economist can know what is in the mind of the advocate of interventionism insofar as they are not demonstrated (Rothbard 1977b) by economic action:

Thus, Mises, qua economist, may show that price control (to use his example) will lead to unforseen shortages of a good to the consumers. But how does Mises know that some advocates of price control do not want shortages? They may, for example, be socialists, anxious to use the controls as a step toward full collectivism. Some may be egalitarians who prefer shortages because the rich will not be able to use their money to buy more of the product than poorer people.

Again this can only refer to the political doctrine of liberalism.  And, contrary to Block's and Rothbard's depiction, advocates of liberalism, according to Mises, do not presume to know "what is in the mind of the advocate of interventionism".  Mises states this clearly:

"The champions of liberal doctrines are fully aware of the fact that their teachings are valid only for people who are committed to these valuational principles."

"the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of society, which require mutual abstinence from property" -David Hume
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Lilburne, I was about to head to bed so I will have to give you a proper response tomorrow. I just happened to be looking at the same quote as I went to reread that paper on Rothbard & Reinach. I have been also rereading Human Action, slowly and thoroughly. Let me just ask you this for now, what is Block basing this on?:

In his view, it was reasonable to deduce what the law ought to be from purely economic considerations, provided only that we take as a given the utility of the normal or average man, who is in this case the typical advocate of government intervention, as the lodestar of our analysis. 

It seems like Rothbard then is looking at the broader scope of praxeology, in 1977 prior to Hoppe's argumentation ethics. Now, I really don't want to drive this thread too far afield, but consider this passage from Hoppe:

Osterfeld's fourth objection to my article states that my argument is an instance of ethical naturalism, but that I then seem to fall afoul of the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an "ought" from an "is." 1 am willing to accept the first part of this proposition but not the second. What I offer is an entirely value-free system of ethics. I remain exclusively in the realm of is-statements and nowhere try to drive an "ought" from an "is." The structure of my argument is this: (a) justification is propositional or argumentative (a priori true is-statement); (b) argumentation presupposes the recognition of the private property ethic (a priori true is-statement); (c)  no deviation from a private property ethic can be justified argumentatively (a priori true isstatement). Thus, my refutation of all socialist ethics is a purely cognitive one.

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E. R. Olovetto:
Lilburne, I was about to head to bed so I will have to give you a proper response tomorrow.

No worries.

E. R. Olovetto:
In his view, it was reasonable to deduce what the law ought to be from purely economic considerations, provided only that we take as a given the utility of the normal or average man, who is in this case the typical advocate of government intervention, as the lodestar of our analysis. 

Like I said, he's describing Mises' conception of the political doctrine of liberalism.

"the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of society, which require mutual abstinence from property" -David Hume
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scineram replied on Sat, Mar 20 2010 8:11 AM

Hoppe:
The structure of my argument is this: (a) justification is propositional or argumentative (a priori true is-statement); (b) argumentation presupposes the recognition of the private property ethic (a priori true is-statement); (c)  no deviation from a private property ethic can be justified argumentatively (a priori true isstatement). Thus, my refutation of all socialist ethics is a purely cognitive one.

Well, (b) and (c) are false.

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thelion replied on Sat, Mar 20 2010 9:33 AM

scineram:

Hoppe:
The structure of my argument is this: (a) justification is propositional or argumentative (a priori true is-statement); (b) argumentation presupposes the recognition of the private property ethic (a priori true is-statement); (c)  no deviation from a private property ethic can be justified argumentatively (a priori true isstatement). Thus, my refutation of all socialist ethics is a purely cognitive one.

Well, (b) and (c) are false.

I would argue (b) and (c) are true. Its similar in form to Destutt de Tracy's (also true argument) that all people have property because self-property is presupposed in the idea of 'I'. Hoppe's position is different (its in his 1995 collection of three essays), but its also a prior synthetic; based around the concept of argument = action.

 

 

Anyway; "value-free" means that whatever logical outcome appears is what is accepted. The economist must not say that one logical outcome "should be different because X or Y or I prefer it to be different." A logical outcome is neither "good" or "bad"; merely "true" or false." "Good or "bad" are the subjective material propositions, not ways of judging the outcome.

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I really am not prepared still to comment on the points Lilburne raised, but I am not just passing them over (nice day/ family visiting Big Smile ). I need to find a few sections within HA, but Mises isn't the central focus of the paper I linked anyhow. Also, in regards to what thelion just said, I agree. I think that we can coherently use words like "good" and "evil", but prior to this, I am thinking about symmetry & asymmetry, intersection & disjunction.

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bloomj31 replied on Sat, Mar 20 2010 10:11 AM

Lilburne, I have a question, but first let me explain how I came to ask it:

I read what you posted about Mises saying economics simply tries to determine what is the best way to get from point A to point B.  

Do you think he came to what he called "liberalism" as a result of the conclusions he came to in economics of how to get from point A to point B?

I guess this is a sort of chicken or the egg question, but I'm genuinely curious about the direction of his thought process.  Was it from political to economic or from economic to political?

I hope this question makes sense.

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Mises was a socialist before he began his studies into economics

Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid

Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring

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bloomj31 replied on Sat, Mar 20 2010 10:30 AM

nirgrahamUK:

Mises was a socialist before he began his studies into economics

What kind of socialist?  

Someone should make a thread on the relationship between politics and economics.

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Last Knight of Liberalism:

The Grunberg seminar had reinforced for Mises the world-view of his adolescence, a vision of a glorified government as the prime mover in the enlightened management of the economy and of society. Mises grew up in an atmosphere of almost unlimited confidence in the state's ability to make human soci-ety safe for its constant improvement. This faith in the state went along with a distrust of private individuals and associations to match the good deeds of government. He later recalled:

By 1900 practically everyone in the German-speak-ing countries was either a statist (interventionist) or a state socialist. Capitalism was seen as a bad episode which fortunately had ended forever. The future belonged to the "State." All enterprises suitable for expropriation were to be taken over by the state. All others were to be regulated in a way that would pre-vent businessmen from exploiting workers and con-sumers. . . . When I entered the university, I, too, was a thorough statist.31

 31Mises, Erinnerungen, pp. 10f.; Notes and Recollections, pp. 13, 16. Mises adds that only in one respect were his views not quite as wrong as those of his fellow students: he was "consciously anti-Marxian."

 Most objections to this statist view were moral objections, defending the individual's rights against bureaucratic encroach-ments. These arguments fell on deaf ears. They could not with-stand the appeal of the utilitarian case for government inter-vention—especially since so many nineteenth-century liberals had themselves promoted utilitarianism as the basis for social policy. Surely, the improvement of the vast majority could not be sacrificed to selfish interests. Thus, when he started his legal studies, Mises was a champion of interventionist statism. He believed that government was able to fix a wide variety of social problems, and he was eager to engage in the scientific discovery of the dangerous consequences of unhampered capitalism.

Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid

Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring

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bloomj31 replied on Sat, Mar 20 2010 11:02 AM

Wow that's amazing.  

Interesting because my movement from left to right was mostly based on political reasoning (what I wanted to see society look like.)  I tried to find an economics school that I could use to back up what I wanted to see done politically.  

Btw, even if you don't agree with the terms "left" and "right" as I've used them here, I think you probably still get what I'm saying.  Just preempting.

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What I offer is an entirely value-free system of ethics.

There is no such thing. Ethics is precisely about questions of value. It is value-laden.

I remain exclusively in the realm of is-statements

Then, once again, it isn't (normative) ethics.

(a) justification is propositional or argumentative (a priori true is-statement)

Justification isn't purely analytic.

(b) argumentation presupposes the recognition of the private property ethic (a priori true is-statement); (c)  no deviation from a private property ethic can be justified argumentatively (a priori true isstatement).

This is absolutely false for reasons that have been explained ad nauseum. Hoppe is engaging in simple sophistry.

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thelion:
Anyway; "value-free" means that whatever logical outcome appears is what is accepted. The economist must not say that one logical outcome "should be different because X or Y or I prefer it to be different." A logical outcome is neither "good" or "bad"; merely "true" or false." "Good or "bad" are the subjective material propositions, not ways of judging the outcome.

Trying to stick to the OP, but it's fine that people are bringing up some interesting points, but I would like to go back in this post to what I was trying to figure out.

When you say, thelion, above is what I would consider being objective.

For example, since this seemed to be something that may have initially had yourself state "no":

John is angry.

I know John is angry.

I know John is angry, not because I inject my own bias or prejudice into the state of emotions thereby it is only my opinion that John is angry when he might not actually be angry.  Rather John is angry no matter what I think about John's state of emotions.  John is really angry.  It is a fact that John is angry.  That's being objective ontologically, or being a realist.  Isn't that being 'value-free', in other words, wertfreiheit?  I say yes.

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Brainpolice:

What I offer is an entirely value-free system of ethics.

There is no such thing. Ethics is precisely about questions of value. It is value-laden.

The value of the physical attacker is different from the value of the physical maintainer.  A scientific ethic studies both sides, but that isn't necessarily the ethical scientist view but rather the facts as to what an attacker does and what a maintainer does.  And which one is logical and which one isn't.  Hoppe can logically come to the conclusions of this conflict, but that doesn't mean Hoppe personally follows the logic of the attacker or the maintainer.  He has described the logic of both and shown where instances of the attacker or maintained are logically false.  What Hoppe does in his spare time isn't necessarily brought up.

Brainpolice:

(a) justification is propositional or argumentative (a priori true is-statement)

Justification isn't purely analytic.

As thelion pointed out Hoppe isn't talking about "purely analytic", but rather synthetic aprior.

Brainpolice:

(b) argumentation presupposes the recognition of the private property ethic (a priori true is-statement); (c)  no deviation from a private property ethic can be justified argumentatively (a priori true isstatement).

This is absolutely false for reasons that have been explained ad nauseum. Hoppe is engaging in simple sophistry.

No it is not false.  If you're bringing back up Brainpolice's property theory, then that's a conflation into Hoppe's property theory.  In the natural law tradition property includes property in ones person.

 

Edit:  With Hoppe as well, I don't want to exclude this, with his argumentation ethics he is basing that off of human action (which action goes back to Aristotle as well as what follows); and argumentation in Aristotelian acknowledges Aristotle's works that make explicit a philosophic attack (epicheirein) and defend (hupechein) also known as 'maintain'.  These are the argumentative roles discussed in his Prior Analytics, Topics, and Posterior Analytics (maybe others I'm not sure).

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E. R. Olovetto:
Well, back to the original question about human action. The method here is axiomatic-deductive. The logical proof A->B is there for anyone wishing to do the experiment to see (to paraphrase Rothbard). So, it is wertfrei. The concern with personal bias and such comes when we play the role of historian or in making predictions.

In how I defined 'objective', then it is no different as a concept than wertfreiheit, correct?

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wilderness:

E. R. Olovetto:
Well, back to the original question about human action. The method here is axiomatic-deductive. The logical proof A->B is there for anyone wishing to do the experiment to see (to paraphrase Rothbard). So, it is wertfrei. The concern with personal bias and such comes when we play the role of historian or in making predictions.

In how I defined 'objective', then it is no different as a concept than wertfreiheit, correct?

wilderness:

Knowing that human action is self-evident, and presumptions laid aside that this is all underlined by individuality, etc...   I have a question.

Does wertfreiheit simply mean objective?

By objective, I mean independent of the agent's biases, prejudices, and beliefs.

I think the way you defined it is pretty close, but I can weasel my way to make some problems with it if I want to. Maybe I don't understand the full range of how people try to use these words, subjective and objective, but I know that there is disagreement. I think the 2nd part of thelion's post here is more accurate.

No; whether objective or subjective is a question of the material propositions (i.e. subjective preferences and subjective expectations or objective technological proportions or objective ideas).

What werfreiheit means is that the agent who combines these material propositions in a formal way does not reject any particular outcomes provided by logical inference because he dislikes them; rather, he is only concerned with whether they are true or not.

Unless I am missing some point to it, why not change "agent" to "person" or "social scientist"? People act according to scales of values.

Mises:
Praxeology is not concerned with the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and categorial structure.

It would be nice is Rothbard's Individualism and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences was online, because I don't feel like transcribing it now.

Rothbard:
As a result, the critics of Wertfreiheit, having dismissed the possibility of rational ethics as a separate discipline, have taken to smuggling in arbitrary, ad hoc ethical judgments through the back door of each particular science of man. The current fashion is to preserve a facade of Wertfreiheit, while casually adopting value judgements, not as the scientist's own decision, but as the consensus values of others.

...

In short, to set forth one's own values is now considered biased and "nonobjective," while to adopt uncritically the slogans of other people is the height of "objectivity."

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wilderness replied on Sat, Mar 20 2010 10:49 PM

E. R. Olovetto:
wilderness:

Knowing that human action is self-evident, and presumptions laid aside that this is all underlined by individuality, etc...   I have a question.

Does wertfreiheit simply mean objective?

By objective, I mean independent of the agent's biases, prejudices, and beliefs.

I think the way you defined it is pretty close, but I can weasel my way to make some problems with it if I want to. Maybe I don't understand the full range of how people try to use these words, subjective and objective, but I know that there is disagreement. I think the 2nd part of thelion's post here is more accurate.

thelion:

No; whether objective or subjective is a question of the material propositions (i.e. subjective preferences and subjective expectations or objective technological proportions or objective ideas).

What werfreiheit means is that the agent who combines these material propositions in a formal way does not reject any particular outcomes provided by logical inference because he dislikes them; rather, he is only concerned with whether they are true or not.

I agreed with thelion, which is why I tried to elaborate more with my second post directed to him specifically seeing that my OP was brief.  Thus being in agreement with what he is saying, and seeing no argumentative conflict with my OP, then I wanted to elaborate on why I found his "no" to be unnecessary.

E. R. Olovetto:
Unless I am missing some point to it, why not change "agent" to "person" or "social scientist"? People act according to scales of values.

Yes they do and the objectivity is that there is a real world that is, meaning, thelion's "does not reject any particular outcomes... because he dislikes them" is a reductive-explanation of 'does not reject any particular outcomes... because of his bias and prejudicies, etc...'  Meaning, I said what he said but in different words. 

Further, if the person is not rejecting due to not injecting his biases to skew the results, then "he is only concerned with whether they are true or not", in other words, if it is real, ie. ontologically objective.

E. R. Olovetto:
...

The reason I began my OP with...

"Knowing that human action is self-evident, and presumptions laid aside that this is all underlined by individuality, etc..."

...is because being objective, in the sense I mean it, doesn't rid biasness or prejudices, in other words, personality.  Why? - because it is self-evident that any singular individual makes a choice and will act a certain way that as observers I can only deduce such acts were deliberate.  If an individual partakes in the market in a voluntary exchange I can only deduce by such an act that the person has put voluntary exchange at the top of their value scale and prefer doing that than anything else.  If an individual steals, then by that act I can only deduce that the act was deliberate and the individual preferred that value above all others.  It's human action.  It's not necessary to run down all the possibilities, eg. was there extortion involved, etc.... Because everything I noted here is understood as what really happened.  How an individual came to know that this is what really happened is of course supported by substantive argumentation.  Meaning if this is not what really happened, then it wouldn't have been what happened.  But since this explanation is what happened in this possible world, then this is what really happened.

Also, I don't think the question of ethics is what I was trying to get at in the OP in the sense that the OP was a question of definition since I don't speak or read the language that wertfreiheit is.  Basically I was trying to translate it, and thought I had done so and wanted to see if my translation was correct.  I wasn't necessarily looking for an example of wertfreiheit in action.  My OP was semantic in nature.

thanks

"Do not put out the fire of the spirit." 1The 5:19
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thelion replied on Sun, Mar 21 2010 11:34 AM

Ok, I see; Wilderness' definition of objective is correct in this sense. Logic itself is always objective, that's true.

 

What I meant by 'No', was really another related question; to consider the below example:

In Blanshard's theory of ideas, ideas are always objective.

In Economic theory, preferences are always subjective and technology is objective.

But suppose I prefer a certain good? The combination is two objective premises and a subjective premise?

The predicate is subjective, because the demand is the major premise. The predicate is also synthetic, because its true of the real world, and a priori, because the predicate was not contained entirely by definition in any one of the three separate premises.

To accept a subjective predicate as true is a subjective decision (since the premise depends on and changes with the subject), but it may be value-free because the laws of logic are objective. That is to say, another person will have a different premise in place of you own, and you have no idea what it is, only that you do not introduce your own preferences in viewing them.

What I meant was that the predicate can still be subjective, even though the rules of logic are objective.

So, generally,

Person 1: A = not B

Person 2: B = not A

Object: C = D

If value-free then AC = AD and BC = BD, however from 2's perspective AC = (AD)B = contradiction, else 1's perspective BC = (BD)A = contradiction.

If not value-free then 1's perspective AC = AD and BC = AD, else 2's perspective BC = BD and AC = BD, so from 2's perspective AC = ((A=B)D)B = BD, else 1's perspective BC = ((B=A)D)A = AD.

Not-value-free logic is a contradiction, because the premise A = B is implied even though such a premise was never given in our three premises.

 

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wilderness replied on Sun, Mar 21 2010 12:45 PM

thelion:
Ok, I see; Wilderness' definition of objective is correct in this sense. Logic itself is always objective, that's true.

thank you!  wertfreiheit is being objective.  I know it's best to go with what I think is logically true, but this was mainly a translation, semantic issue I had due to I don't know the language of whatever wertfreiheit is from.  Also getting back to me to confirm this is nice.  Some people (generalizing logically) may find the gumption to argue a point they disagree with, but to point out where there is agreement is virtuous and nothing short of being kind if not anything else.  Thank you. 

With the current research I'm doing this definitely helped to get some feedback because I don't want to confuse the term.  I'm very happy you replied back on this.  This helped me a lot!  And I think this is excellent to help establish the truth in this thread so as not to philosophically confuse what is being discussed here which may make some posts appear to be falsities being argued back and forth when in reality some posters are actually underlined in agreement.  This helps the root of the discussion bear fruit out of our attempts/posts including our thought processes behind what we posted in this thread in any other endeavors any one of the posters are currently involved in outside of this thread and forum in general.

thelion:

What I meant by 'No', was really another related question; to consider the below example:

In Blanshard's theory of ideas, ideas are always objective.

In Economic theory, preferences are always subjective and technology is objective.

But suppose I prefer a certain good? The combination is two objective premises and a subjective premise?

The predicate is subjective, because the demand is the major premise. The predicate is also synthetic, because its true of the real world, and a priori, because the predicate was not contained entirely by definition in any one of the three separate premises.

To accept a subjective predicate as true is a subjective decision (since the premise depends on and changes with the subject), but it may be value-free because the laws of logic are objective. That is to say, another person will have a different premise in place of you own, and you have no idea what it is, only that you do not introduce your own preferences in viewing them.

What I meant was that the predicate can still be subjective, even though the rules of logic are objective.

So, generally,

Person 1: A = not B

Person 2: B = not A

Object: C = D

If value-free then AC = AD and BC = BD, however from 2's perspective AC = (AD)B = contradiction, else 1's perspective BC = (BD)A = contradiction.

If not value-free then 1's perspective AC = AD and BC = AD, else 2's perspective BC = BD and AC = BD, so from 2's perspective AC = ((A=B)D)B = BD, else 1's perspective BC = ((B=A)D)A = AD.

Not-value-free logic is a contradiction, because the premise A = B is implied even though such a premise was never given in our three premises.

I think I follow what you're saying here.  Right, A=B would be a contradiction due to the A= not B; B= not A; and the object C=D finishes up the premises being deducted.

"Do not put out the fire of the spirit." 1The 5:19
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Conza88 replied on Sun, Mar 21 2010 9:48 PM

E. R. Olovetto:
It would be nice is Rothbard's Individualism and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences was online

Yes it would. Got a scanner? Stick out tongue

Ron Paul is for self-government when compared to the Constitution. He's an anarcho-capitalist. Proof.
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I thought it would be useful to point out what wertfreiheit does NOT mean: it does not mean "not dealing with values", as Mises explains in his discussion of wertfrei historical studies in Theory and History (emphasis added):

"The subject of history is action and the judgments of value directing action toward definite ends. History deals with values, but it itself does not value. It looks upon events with the eyes of an unaffected observer. This is, of course, the characteristic mark of objective thought and of the scientific search for truth. Truth refers to what is or was, not to a state of affairs that is not or was not but that would suit the wishes of the truth-seeker better.

There is no need to add anything to what has been said in the first part of this essay about the futility of the search for absolute and eternal values."

"the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of society, which require mutual abstinence from property" -David Hume
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wilderness replied on Mon, Mar 22 2010 10:30 PM

right.  And what you bolded also sounds like a Mises argument against the Historical School, ie. those thinking history itself is some kind of creature unhinged from human action.

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