So, like always, as my introduction to this post, I just want to say that these views are quite tentative, ambiguous, and poorly expressed. So, again, I hope that you will bear with me or something.
The position concerning what 'political organization' is best, of the proponents of "anarcho-capitalism", is that we should dismantle, get rid of, any sort of 'political organization', we should reduce the 'states', that is, the compulsory, territorial monopolies of provision of law and order, into what many of the people here call "private defense agencies", that is, into businesses each providing law, order, or both, 'freely competing' with each other, and seeking the voluntary contributions of people. Now I am sure that most of us are familiar with the fact that Mises did not conceive of such an arrangement. Despite what people like Poptech want you to believe, he never even engaged any form of it at all; in fact, when he talked of "anarchy", he was using that word to refer to the absence of any sort of police force, which is clearly not what "anarcho-capitalism" is about:
Ludwig von Mises: Of course, there will always be individuals and groups of individuals whose intellect is so narrow that they cannot grasp the benefits which social cooperation brings them. There are others whose moral strength and will power are so weak that they cannot resist the temptation to strive for an ephemeral advantage by actions detrimental to the smooth functioning of the social system. For the adjustment of the individual to the requirements of social cooperation demands sacrifices. These are, it is true, only temporary and apparent sacrifices as they are more than compensated for by the incomparably greater advantages which living within society provides. However, at the instant, in the very act of renouncing an expected enjoyment, they are painful, and it is not for everybody to realize their later benefits and to behave accordingly. Anarchism believes that education could make all people comprehend what their own interests require them to do; rightly instructed they would of their own accord always comply with the rules of conduct indispensable for the preservation of society. The anarchists contend that a social order in which nobody enjoys privileges at the expense of his fellow-citizens could exist without any compulsion and coercion for the prevention of action detrimental to society. Such an ideal society could do without state and government, i.e., without a police force, the social apparatus of coercion and compulsion.
Of course, there will always be individuals and groups of individuals whose intellect is so narrow that they cannot grasp the benefits which social cooperation brings them. There are others whose moral strength and will power are so weak that they cannot resist the temptation to strive for an ephemeral advantage by actions detrimental to the smooth functioning of the social system. For the adjustment of the individual to the requirements of social cooperation demands sacrifices. These are, it is true, only temporary and apparent sacrifices as they are more than compensated for by the incomparably greater advantages which living within society provides. However, at the instant, in the very act of renouncing an expected enjoyment, they are painful, and it is not for everybody to realize their later benefits and to behave accordingly. Anarchism believes that education could make all people comprehend what their own interests require them to do; rightly instructed they would of their own accord always comply with the rules of conduct indispensable for the preservation of society. The anarchists contend that a social order in which nobody enjoys privileges at the expense of his fellow-citizens could exist without any compulsion and coercion for the prevention of action detrimental to society. Such an ideal society could do without state and government, i.e., without a police force, the social apparatus of coercion and compulsion.
He is saying, in that quotation, that "[t]he anarchists contend that[...] a[...] society could do without[...] a police force". Now, as I already said, that is clearly not what the "anarcho-capitalists" believe; all of them express that, in a 'free society', police forces would exist; the only difference would be that they would be provided by the 'market', instead of by a monopoly. If someone disagrees that Mises ever engaged "anarcho-captalism", I want to see the proof; but, for now, I have yet to see any. He came very close to thorough 'voluntism'; but he never seemed to give it any thought that these voluntary governments could ever be non-territorial; he always assumed that, whether they were voluntary or not, they would, because of "technical problems" never elaborated on by him, have to be territorial.
The "anarcho-capitalists" contend that Mises hypostatized states, that he removed the analysis of states out of the rest of his work, that, although he knew of the fact that monopolies do not have the incentive to serve consumers, he did not subject his view of states to that. Why are monopolies of provision of food bad from the point of view of consumers but those of provision of law and order not? Why should the market produce every good besides law and order? What is so special about law and order? The following quotation outlines the most general, most basic form of this argument:
Roderick Long: Think about it this way. What's wrong with a shoe monopoly? Suppose that I and my gang are the only ones that are legally allowed to manufacture and sell shoes, my gang and anyone else that I authorize, but nobody else. What's wrong with it?[...] [F]rom a pragmatic, consequentialist standpoint: well, first of all, what is the likely result of my and my gang having a monopoly on shoes? Well, first of all, there are incentive problems. If I'm the only person who has the right to make and sell shoes, you're probably not going to get the shoes from me very cheaply. I can charge as much as I want, as long as I don't charge so much that you just can't afford them at all or you decide you're happier just not having the shoes. But as long as you're willing and able, I'll charge the highest price that I can get out of you, because you've got no competition, nowhere else to go. You also probably shouldn't expect the shoes to be of particularly high quality, because, after all, as long as they're barely serviceable, and you still prefer them to going barefoot, then you have to buy them from me. In addition to the likelihood that the shoes are going to be expensive and not very good, there's also the fact that my ability to be the only person who makes and sells shoes gives me a certain leverage over you. Suppose that I don't like you. Suppose you've offended me in some way. Well, maybe you just don't get shoes for a while. So, there's also abuse-of-power issues. But, it's just not the incentive problem, because, after all, suppose that I'm a perfect saint and I will make the best shoes I possibly can for you, and I'll charge the lowest price I possibly can charge, and I won't abuse my power at all. Suppose I'm utterly trustworthy. I'm a prince among men (not in Machiavelli's sense). There is still a problem, which is: how do I know exactly that I'm doing the best job I can with these shoes? After all, there's no competition. I guess I could poll people to try to find out what kind of shoes they seem to want. But there are lots of different ways I could make shoes. Some of them are more expensive ways of making them, and some are less expensive. How do I know, given that there's no market, and there's really not much I can do in the way of profit and loss accounting? I just have to make guesses. So even if I'm doing my best, the quantity I make, the quality I make may not be best suited to satisfy people's preferences, and I have a hard time finding these things out. [...] So those are all reasons not to have a monopoly on the making and selling of shoes. Now, prima facie at least, it seems as though those are all good reasons for anyone not to have a monopoly in the provision of services of adjudicating disputes, and protecting rights, and all the things that are involved in what you might broadly call the enterprise of law.[...] Once again, it's a monopoly. It seems likely that with a captive customer base they're going to charge higher prices than they otherwise would and offer lower quality. There might even be the occasional abuse of power. And then, even if you manage to avoid all those problems, and you get all the saintly types into the government, there's still the problem of how do they know that the particular way that they're providing legal services, the particular mix of legal services they're offering, the particular ways they do it are really the best ones? They just try to figure out what will work. Since there's no competition, they don't have much way of knowing whether what they're doing is the most successful thing they could be doing.
Think about it this way. What's wrong with a shoe monopoly? Suppose that I and my gang are the only ones that are legally allowed to manufacture and sell shoes, my gang and anyone else that I authorize, but nobody else. What's wrong with it?[...]
[F]rom a pragmatic, consequentialist standpoint: well, first of all, what is the likely result of my and my gang having a monopoly on shoes? Well, first of all, there are incentive problems. If I'm the only person who has the right to make and sell shoes, you're probably not going to get the shoes from me very cheaply. I can charge as much as I want, as long as I don't charge so much that you just can't afford them at all or you decide you're happier just not having the shoes. But as long as you're willing and able, I'll charge the highest price that I can get out of you, because you've got no competition, nowhere else to go. You also probably shouldn't expect the shoes to be of particularly high quality, because, after all, as long as they're barely serviceable, and you still prefer them to going barefoot, then you have to buy them from me.
In addition to the likelihood that the shoes are going to be expensive and not very good, there's also the fact that my ability to be the only person who makes and sells shoes gives me a certain leverage over you. Suppose that I don't like you. Suppose you've offended me in some way. Well, maybe you just don't get shoes for a while. So, there's also abuse-of-power issues.
But, it's just not the incentive problem, because, after all, suppose that I'm a perfect saint and I will make the best shoes I possibly can for you, and I'll charge the lowest price I possibly can charge, and I won't abuse my power at all. Suppose I'm utterly trustworthy. I'm a prince among men (not in Machiavelli's sense). There is still a problem, which is: how do I know exactly that I'm doing the best job I can with these shoes? After all, there's no competition. I guess I could poll people to try to find out what kind of shoes they seem to want. But there are lots of different ways I could make shoes. Some of them are more expensive ways of making them, and some are less expensive. How do I know, given that there's no market, and there's really not much I can do in the way of profit and loss accounting? I just have to make guesses. So even if I'm doing my best, the quantity I make, the quality I make may not be best suited to satisfy people's preferences, and I have a hard time finding these things out.
[...]
So those are all reasons not to have a monopoly on the making and selling of shoes. Now, prima facie at least, it seems as though those are all good reasons for anyone not to have a monopoly in the provision of services of adjudicating disputes, and protecting rights, and all the things that are involved in what you might broadly call the enterprise of law.[...] Once again, it's a monopoly. It seems likely that with a captive customer base they're going to charge higher prices than they otherwise would and offer lower quality. There might even be the occasional abuse of power. And then, even if you manage to avoid all those problems, and you get all the saintly types into the government, there's still the problem of how do they know that the particular way that they're providing legal services, the particular mix of legal services they're offering, the particular ways they do it are really the best ones? They just try to figure out what will work. Since there's no competition, they don't have much way of knowing whether what they're doing is the most successful thing they could be doing.
Now:
Ludwig von Mises: In the market economy the realization of technological innovations does not require anything more than the cognizance of their reasonableness by one or a few enlightened spirits. No dullness and clumsiness on the part of the masses can stop the pioneers of improvement. There is no need for them to win the approval of inert people beforehand. They are free to embark upon their projects even if everyone else laughs at them. Later, when the new, better and cheaper products appear on the market, these scoffers will scramble for them. However dull a man may be, he knows how to tell the difference between a cheaper shoe and a more expensive one, and to appreciate the usefulness of new products. But it is different in the field of social organization and economic policies. Here the best theories are useless if not supported by public opinion. They cannot work if not accepted by a majority of the people. Whatever the system of government may be, there cannot be any question of ruling a nation lastingly on the ground of doctrines at variance with public opinion. In the end the philosophy of the majority prevails. In the long run there cannot be any such thing as an unpopular system of government. The difference between democracy and despotism does not affect the final outcome. It refers only to the method by which the adjustment of the system of government to the ideology held by public opinion is brought about. Unpopular autocrats can only be dethroned by revolutionary upheavals, while unpopular democratic rulers are peacefully ousted in the next election.
In the market economy the realization of technological innovations does not require anything more than the cognizance of their reasonableness by one or a few enlightened spirits. No dullness and clumsiness on the part of the masses can stop the pioneers of improvement. There is no need for them to win the approval of inert people beforehand. They are free to embark upon their projects even if everyone else laughs at them. Later, when the new, better and cheaper products appear on the market, these scoffers will scramble for them. However dull a man may be, he knows how to tell the difference between a cheaper shoe and a more expensive one, and to appreciate the usefulness of new products.
But it is different in the field of social organization and economic policies. Here the best theories are useless if not supported by public opinion. They cannot work if not accepted by a majority of the people. Whatever the system of government may be, there cannot be any question of ruling a nation lastingly on the ground of doctrines at variance with public opinion. In the end the philosophy of the majority prevails. In the long run there cannot be any such thing as an unpopular system of government. The difference between democracy and despotism does not affect the final outcome. It refers only to the method by which the adjustment of the system of government to the ideology held by public opinion is brought about. Unpopular autocrats can only be dethroned by revolutionary upheavals, while unpopular democratic rulers are peacefully ousted in the next election.
Now, because "the best theories [...] cannot work if not accepted by a majority of the people", his later assertion that "[e]conomics must not[...] be left to esoteric circles" makes sense. He believed that he and other people had to convince the masses to accept the philosophy and economics of "liberalism" to see that "liberalism" triumph. But, as Mises has written, the masses are just a bunch of "simple routinists" and "dullards". So what sort of chance did he really expect us to have? How are we supposed to convince masses of dullards to embrace our theories, many of which are not very emotionally comfortable to hold and many of which go straight against our intuitions? The masses are not interested in learning this stuff.
But I am not so convinced that the explicit theories of the masses really matter. I am not so convinced that it really matters whether or not the hordes of "simple routinists" and "dullards" embrace "liberalism", "libertarianism", "anarcho-capitalism", or whatever you want to call it. But, far from thinking that his insistence of this point was a blunder, I think that it was a systematic error caused by the fact that he failed to conceive of law and order provided by a market. He is saying that "[i]n the market economy the realization of technological innovations does not require anything more than the cognizance of their reasonableness by one or a few enlightened spirits" but then that "it is different in the field of social organization and economic policies". Now, in reading that, what people like us should immediately realize is that we do in fact conceive of law and order provided by the market; so why should his assertion that "[i]n the market economy the realization of technological innovations does not require anything more than the cognizance of their reasonableness by one or a few enlightened spirits" not apply also to the movement toward the dismantling of statism? And why should it not apply to the choice of 'policies' once we do reach these 'stateless societies'? If we assume that what will bring the dismantling of statism will be a market process, why should we care about convincing the masses?
I am not sure where I read this; but I remember reading an article where the person was talking about how the progression toward the dismantling of statism will probably happen through the market, not through convincing the masses. The way that he thought that it would happen is that companies would actually make it more difficult to subjugate us. The most extreme example of this is a company saying "ok, the state takes 20% of your income per year; if you sign up with us, we will require only 10% per year and will defend you from the state". After a while, when other companies competing with them keep lowering it, we will finally be left with such a powerless state that we will need something other than the state to provide protection from petty criminals; and those companies would probably morph into general defense agencies. The closer that they get to cutting off all of the funds to the state, the less the state will be able to provide any sort of protection; and the closer that they get to that, the less profits that they will be getting. So it is probable that, in destroying the state, they would morph into "private defense agencies". Now I am not sure what the gradual steps between that will be.
Now, on that point, expressed in the words of Mises, "[h]owever dull a man may be, he knows how to tell the difference between [paying 20% of his income] and [paying 10% of his income]". So, in conclusion, if we assume that the dismantling of statism will be a market process, we no longer have to think of trying to always convince the masses; and I think that this is a much better prospect, anyway. The masses of people are so dull and thoughtless that, if we truly had to convince them to embrace our doctrines, we would, in my opinion, be screwed.
Now this does not go against what the Mises institute is doing. What they are doing is reaching out to people who want to learn this stuff, the people who will be a part of the 'market process' toward the dismantling of statism. They are teaching this stuff to people who could otherwise have never been exposed to any of this. They are speaking to the masses only to find out who the thinking people are.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
Fascinating post.
I. Ryan:a company saying "ok, the state takes 20% of your income per year; if you sign up with us, we will require only 10% per year and will defend you from the state".
Why do such companies not already exist? Because the State would use its superior power to put it down. Such a company would face the same problems as a secessionist community defense agency. Essentially you are saying a non-territorial secessionist community is more likely to be created and sustained than a territorial one.
How could such a company succeed? Either 1) the defense-against-the-state (DAS) company has superior firepower (unlikely) or 2) the State does not engage with the company. For the latter to happen, there would need to be widespread support among the dullards for the secessionists and the DAS company. Right now, the dullards would be on the side of the State; the secessionists would be denounced as unpatriotic tax evaders, and the DAS company would be called terrorist.
The likelihood of a DAS company being created depends on the profit margins involved and the risk of State aggression. So as taxes are increased, the likelihood increases, because the company will have bigger potential profits. It could promise to only 'tax' 70% of income, for example, rather than the State's 80%.
There already exist some individuals who refuse to pay taxes. These people presumably have some sort of mutual support network for 'how to get away with it' and 'what to do if the State goes after you'. The development you are describing would be an evolution of this network to the point where it is done openly and where dullards join without fear that they will be punished by the State.
Government Explained 2: The Special Piece of Paper
Law without Government
"the best theories [...] cannot work if not accepted by a majority of the people"
More and more I avoid talking to statists about politics, but I will usually say something like, "If I am walking past you on the street and one of us punches the other in the face, that is wrong right?". They typically agree unquestionably with this, even though they will probably fall victim to some sort of fallacy of "conventional wisdom" later. This is just an example of the non-aggression principle though.
Most people accept it. They just fail to realize that taxation is theft because that it's not theft has been beaten into them so badly this euphemism developed. Most people don't care to know how a TV works as long as it does what they want.
I could say more, but don't feel like it now. There is some good article I have somewhere about "why there is no market anarchist movement". Maybe someone knows it.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
Tues. 10/04/27 16:52 EDT.post #85 E. R. Olovetto:They just fail to realize that taxation is theft...I disagree. Inflation is theft; taxation is extortion and robbery (let's just call it "taxtortion").
E. R. Olovetto:They just fail to realize that taxation is theft...
trulib: Why do such companies not already exist? Because the State would use its superior power to put it down. Such a company would face the same problems as a secessionist community defense agency. Essentially you are saying a non-territorial secessionist community is more likely to be created and sustained than a territorial one. How could such a company succeed? Either 1) the defense-against-the-state (DAS) company has superior firepower (unlikely) or 2) the State does not engage with the company. For the latter to happen, there would need to be widespread support among the dullards for the secessionists and the DAS company. Right now, the dullards would be on the side of the State; the secessionists would be denounced as unpatriotic tax evaders, and the DAS company would be called terrorist. The likelihood of a DAS company being created depends on the profit margins involved and the risk of State aggression. So as taxes are increased, the likelihood increases, because the company will have bigger potential profits. It could promise to only 'tax' 70% of income, for example, rather than the State's 80%. There already exist some individuals who refuse to pay taxes. These people presumably have some sort of mutual support network for 'how to get away with it' and 'what to do if the State goes after you'. The development you are describing would be an evolution of this network to the point where it is done openly and where dullards join without fear that they will be punished by the State.
We might also see less extreme steps first. For example, the internet is making people harder to govern, right? The internet is especially messing up and defying things like copyrights, which are of the state. (Sorry that I could not give a better reply.)
Why do such companies not already exist? Because the State would use its superior power to put it down.
False. Firstly, It is not illegal to provide judicial or protection services. The coercion is against those involved in disputes, the compulsion to attend state courts. Secondly, if by power we mean armed might then it would logically follow that all states are total dictatorships; the executive could issue any instruction and army would simply put down anyone who disagrees with the executives. The real reason that it has not and would not succeed is because nobody other than the rebels would find it unseemly for the army to slaughter people for abstaining from attendance of state court.
I. Ryan:Now, in reading that, what people like us should immediately realize is that we do in fact conceive of law and order provided by the market; so why should his assertion that "[i]n the market economy the realization of technological innovations does not require anything more than the cognizance of their reasonableness by one or a few enlightened spirits" not apply also to the movement toward the dismantling of statism? And why should it not apply to the choice of 'policies' once we do reach these 'stateless societies'? If we assume that what will bring the dismantling of statism will be a market process, why should we care about convincing the masses?
I think the answer is that in the cheaper shoe example, Mises is assuming a functioning legal framework, i.e. a social organization that depends on the support of public opinion. Even though technological innovations require only the insight of a few people, this can only take place within an institutional framework that has the support of the masses. So I think Mises's original point stands: since market anarchism aims at changing the institutional framework, we must obtain the support of public opinion.
I. Ryan:So, in conclusion, if we assume that the dismantling of statism will be a market process, we no longer have to think of trying to always convince the masses; and I think that this is a much better prospect, anyway. The masses of people are so dull and thoughtless that, if we truly had to convince them to embrace our doctrines, we would, in my opinion, be screwed.
I don't think the masses need to "embrace our doctrines" in the sense of engaging in a thorough study of libertarianism. Rather, they just need to be not biased towards statism and generally nonviolent. As Stringham and Hummel put it:
Ultimately, a system depends on the relative intensities of pro and anti-market people and their willingness to act on these beliefs. In a world where 99.9 percent of the population is apolitical and not significantly violent, a libertarian society could come about with less than 0.1 percent of society even being aware of libertarian writings. But if the non-libertarians are biased against libertarianism, then a greater number of people will need to be persuaded to prefer libertarian ideals.
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism