Marko: I appreciate your intellectual curiosity in knowing what my theory is instead of making ad hoc assumptions as some other posters are doing. But then the phrase 'natural rights' does have a certain established meaning so when you name it that way is it really that unreasonable to assume things about it?
I appreciate your intellectual curiosity in knowing what my theory is instead of making ad hoc assumptions as some other posters are doing.
Natural rights theorists don't really agree on what they mean, I have no problem with him having his own pet theory.
The state is always "against you."
Tell that to Obama.
Your interests directly conflict the interests of the state, whether you know this or not. This is why the state requires a monopoly on force.
This is just false. The concept of the State (and the 'political' in its modern conception generally) is one of sovereignty, which is to say 'the right to decide exceptions'. Since the state decides exceptions, including exceptions between itself and others, it has a general tendency toward totalitarianism. But none of this involves a 'monopoly on force', which never has existed and has no been claimed by any real government I'm familiar with.
Read Carl Schmitt's "The Concept of the Political".
“Socialism is a fraud, a comedy, a phantom, a blackmail.” - Benito Mussolini"Toute nation a le gouvernemente qu'il mérite." - Joseph de Maistre
Prove it. Or in other words, prove that my brain isn't working based on chemistry and mechanics which is to say, on different principles than the earthquake and tsunami.
I'm a material determinist, but this doesn't rule out purposive action. Purposive action involves not supernatural 'spirits' or what have you, it involves a machine involving pattern-coherency and physiological stimulation. People do deliberate and take decisions, but there was of course no other possible conclusion they could have come to, no action other than those they actually did.
Austrian economics reflects this perfectly: given a person's ideas and values, what he does is necessary and inevitable. Carl Menger and Ludwig von Mises were both adamant proponents of this sort of 'causality' (though, strictly speaking, causality and determinism are not the same thing). Mises just argued that there was no coherent way to conceive of human action along the lines of the physical sciences. This is because human consciousness is a complex system, and can only be described with reference to the contingent circumstances of other parts of the system. This is not to say that it is anything, ultimately, other than particles and forces (or whichever physical theory you prefer).
Marko:But then the phrase 'natural rights' does have a certain established meaning so when you name it that way is it really that unreasonable to assume things about it?
Doing any science is to always check the assumptions. Science is built on this. Philosophy is the same thing. It is developed on the assumption of truth-finding as it has once been said a philosopher is a 'lover of wisdom'. So the assumption of discovering the truth in what any one person says is to be intellectually curious, respectful, and what at essence is philosophy.
There is a reason that there are natural law theorists - plural. There is a reason that in any given philosophical and scientific field there will end up being competiting, conflictive, and similar theories. Thomas Kuhn's book on "Scientific Revolutions" comes to mind. Theorists will use a theory as long as it is fruitful. And as Kuhn as so elegantly pointed out based on evidence, the more debate, and competition of ideas within any one general theory, then the more healthy and fruitful such a theory is. Since natural law is, as I understand it, only thinking for ones own self, then I find it difficult to believe that thinking for oneself will go away. Even the gov't official is thinking for him or her self. It's praxeologic.
- thanks
This is disorganized. Try to bear with me.
Andrew Cain: And why should people care about your ultimate ends without somehow adding in a sense of universal justice?
And why should people care about your ultimate ends without somehow adding in a sense of universal justice?
Assuming that, by "why should people care about your ultimate ends", you mean "why should people care about" whether they achieve "your ultimate ends", my answer is this, because they may either (a) hold the same ultimate ends that I do or (b) present the same manifestations that I do, of their ultimate ends, that is, hold the same ends less than ultimate that I do. We may, based on what ends that each of us hold, discover a thing or a process which, if initiated, strengthened, and then preserved, would be a means not only to the ends of one of us but also to those of the other of us, whether those ends are the same or not; which would allow us to establish a situation in which, in helping the other person employ those means to their ends, we help ourselves employ them to our ends, too, and vice versa. We make, on one hand, their gain our gain, making us want them to succeed, and, on the other hand, their loss our loss, making us not want them to fail. We call the common means of which I am talking "society", "the social order", "civilization", or whatever; and we call the guidelines or rules evolved to push us to act to preserve society "morality", "the moral code", or whatever.
Of course, if such a situation were to not exist, people would have no incentive to enact society, and its corollaries, such as morality, compassion, et cetera; so they would not exist. (For an explanation of that, see especially this post.)
For support of all of my points here, see the following quotations, especially the boldfaced lines of it:
Ludwig von Mises: Human effort exerted under the principle of the division of labor in social cooperation achieves, other things remaining equal, a greater output per unit of input than the isolated efforts of solitary individuals. Man's reason is capable of recognizing this fact and of adapting his conduct accordingly. Thus social cooperation becomes for almost every man the great means for the attainment of all ends. An eminently human common interest, the preservation and intensification of social bonds, is substituted for pitiless biological competition, the significant mark of animal and plant life. Man becomes a social being. He is no longer forced by the inevitable laws of nature to look upon all other specimens of his animal species as deadly foes. Other people become his fellows. For animals the generation of every new member of the species means the appearance of a new rival in the struggle for life. For man, until the optimum size of population is reached, it means rather an improvement than a deterioration in his quest for material well-being. [...] As social cooperation is for acting man a means and not an end, no unanimity with regard to value judgments is required to make it work. It is a fact that almost all men agree in aiming at certain ends, at those pleasures which ivory-tower moralists disdain as base and shabby. But it is no less a fact that even the most sublime ends cannot be sought by people who have not first satisfied the wants of their animal body. The loftiest exploits of philosophy, art, and literature would never have been performed by men living outside of society.
Human effort exerted under the principle of the division of labor in social cooperation achieves, other things remaining equal, a greater output per unit of input than the isolated efforts of solitary individuals. Man's reason is capable of recognizing this fact and of adapting his conduct accordingly. Thus social cooperation becomes for almost every man the great means for the attainment of all ends. An eminently human common interest, the preservation and intensification of social bonds, is substituted for pitiless biological competition, the significant mark of animal and plant life. Man becomes a social being. He is no longer forced by the inevitable laws of nature to look upon all other specimens of his animal species as deadly foes. Other people become his fellows. For animals the generation of every new member of the species means the appearance of a new rival in the struggle for life. For man, until the optimum size of population is reached, it means rather an improvement than a deterioration in his quest for material well-being.
[...]
As social cooperation is for acting man a means and not an end, no unanimity with regard to value judgments is required to make it work. It is a fact that almost all men agree in aiming at certain ends, at those pleasures which ivory-tower moralists disdain as base and shabby. But it is no less a fact that even the most sublime ends cannot be sought by people who have not first satisfied the wants of their animal body. The loftiest exploits of philosophy, art, and literature would never have been performed by men living outside of society.
Ludwig von Mises: Society is the outcome of conscious and purposeful behavior. This does not mean that individuals have concluded contracts by virtue of which they have founded human society. The actions which have brought about social cooperation and daily bring it about anew do not aim at anything else than cooperation and coadjuvancy with others for the attainment of definite singular ends[, which, between people, may be different or not]. The total complex of the mutual relations created by such concerted actions is called society. It substitutes collaboration for the--at least conceivable--isolated life of individuals. Society is division of labor and combination of labor. In his capacity as an acting animal man becomes a social animal.
Society is the outcome of conscious and purposeful behavior. This does not mean that individuals have concluded contracts by virtue of which they have founded human society. The actions which have brought about social cooperation and daily bring it about anew do not aim at anything else than cooperation and coadjuvancy with others for the attainment of definite singular ends[, which, between people, may be different or not]. The total complex of the mutual relations created by such concerted actions is called society. It substitutes collaboration for the--at least conceivable--isolated life of individuals. Society is division of labor and combination of labor. In his capacity as an acting animal man becomes a social animal.
Ludwig von Mises: Within the frame of social cooperation there can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friendship and a sense of belonging together. These feelings are the source of man's most delightful and most sublime experiences. They are the most precious adornment of life; they lift the animal species man to the heights of a really human existence. However, they are not, as some have asserted, the agents that have brought about social relationships. They are fruits of social cooperation, they thrive only within its frame; they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring. The fundamental facts that brought about cooperation, society, and civilization and transformed the animal man into a human being are the facts that work performed under the division of labor is more productive than isolated work and that man's reason is capable of recognizing this truth. But for these facts men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another, irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.
Within the frame of social cooperation there can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friendship and a sense of belonging together. These feelings are the source of man's most delightful and most sublime experiences. They are the most precious adornment of life; they lift the animal species man to the heights of a really human existence. However, they are not, as some have asserted, the agents that have brought about social relationships. They are fruits of social cooperation, they thrive only within its frame; they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring.
The fundamental facts that brought about cooperation, society, and civilization and transformed the animal man into a human being are the facts that work performed under the division of labor is more productive than isolated work and that man's reason is capable of recognizing this truth. But for these facts men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another, irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.
So, whether each of us holds the same ends or not, the common means to those ends, whatever they are, is originating, strengthening, and then preserving society. What we now need to analyze are the few people whose ends not only threaten to disintegrate those means, that is, society, but whose ends also depend on it somehow, that is, people living in society but still threatening to mess it up. Usually, we call these people "criminals". I showed how we manage to get along and care about each other without any reference to any sort of "objective" or "absolute" morality or justice. But what is left are the people whose ends are not only not served by society but also threaten to impair it. How do we get past this? Don't we need to bring in a sort of "objective" morality here to show that we are "correct" but the people trying to destroy society, like murderers, thieves, rapists, or whatever are "incorrect"? How else would be feel justified in killing these people? Why are our ends more important than theirs? Why is the end of a person A, that is, to raise a family, more important than the end of a person B, to kill people, including people like person A? We feel so passionate about our hatred toward people like B; so, surely, there is a reason why the ends of the person A are more important than those of the person B!
Before we try to answer that question, we should distinguish between two interrelated, but nevertheless separate, senses of the term "morality", (a) the one referring to our 'moral sentiments', that is, what we 'feel' about specific interactions between people, and (b) the one referring to our 'moral thoughts', that is, what we 'think' about such interactions. We not only experience feelings, such as compassion, sadness, or whatever, regarding the fate of other people, even of strangers, pushing us to act in ways to better the situation. But we also think about those situations; for example, we might decide, based on economic theory, which is conscious thought, to fight to halt the massive, impersonal packages of foreign aid given by governments, to 'third world' countries, not because we are too 'selfish' to give up that money, but because we think that, contrary to the moral sentiments of most people unmolested by thought, and, in fact, even contrary to the moral thoughts of some people, including those of some economists, doing so is hurting those people, whether the people of those countries know it or not.
Our moral sentiments are shorthands; they are the advisements of our subconsciousness, regarding how we should treat other people to serve our own interests, that is, those of what replicators underlie us. But that is not special, odd, or anything; we experience many sorts of advisements from our subconsciousness; for example, our tastes of things advise us to either continue eating or not what we are tasting, through 'good' tastes and 'bad' tastes, and our fears, or lack of them, in situations, advises us to remain or not in the situation in which we are. (In fact, the categorization of our sentiments is based on (a) what the sentiment advises us to do and (b) what the 'severity' or 'urgentness' of that advisement is.)
But our moral thoughts are the opposite, they are longhands; they are the conclusions of our consciousness, what we directly control, regarding how to treat other people to serve our own interests, whether, in colloquial speech, we call them 'selfish' or not. With our moral thoughts, we make all of the calculations, whether they are the naive, unsystematic thought of a dullard or are the informed, systematic thought of an economist.
Most of us use both of those processes to decide what to do. We weigh the conclusions of our moral thoughts with the advisements of our moral sentiments. What marks psychopaths, in the formal sense of the term, is that they do not experience moral sentiments. They have to rely only on conscious thought to decide how to treat other people. What they do, whether they commit crimes, lie, or not, or whether they are normal, nice, productive citizens, is up only to their moral thought; they are not able to rely on their sentiments to tell them what to do.
Now what do you consider to be objective, universal, or whatever? The first one regards choosing what to do based on what our ends are and what we believe are means to those ends, that is, it regard the nexus of means and ends; and the second one regards what our subconscious advises us to do, also basing its advice on the nexus of means and ends. Why else would either of them evolve? Again, for more information, see especially this post.
Andrew Cain: Because you are failing to see that if ethics is just a matter of personal preference then implicitly there is no right/wrong ethical system.
Because you are failing to see that if ethics is just a matter of personal preference then implicitly there is no right/wrong ethical system.
But one does exist. What is different from what you are thinking of, though, is that it depends on the perspectives of the people in question. To quote Liberte, although I probably could easily find a quotation of Mises saying the same thing, "[t]here is no 'right' or 'wrong' except with regards to actual perceived means to actually felt desires of specific individuals". What you are saying, which is just a restatement of your position, is that, "if ethics is just a matter of personal preference", "no [objective] right/wrong ethical system" exists, that is, "no right/wrong ethical system" divorced from the nexus of means and ends, unrelated to the perspectives of the people of which you are talking, exists. But, when it is put that way, it is not 'scary' anymore; it is pretty commonsensical. Either way, I will try to substantiate why is makes no sense to talk of 'right' or 'wrong' outside of the nexus of means and ends, mostly just by quoting one of my other posts:
I. Ryan: From where does truth originate? Well, if you were to walk into a room where a person were drawing a bunch of stuff on a chalkboard that looked like he were trying to solve a problem in physics and you were to notice that he made a "mistake", you decide to try to explain that to him, but then he says that he is just drawing aimlessly to pass the time, he would, at once, silence your "criticism". For your point that his work is "incorrect" depended entirely on the assumption that he was desiring to conform his markings to a certain system. Also, in the same way, it makes no sense to say that the orbit of a planet is "incorrect". For the planet has no desires at all. What it does is just what it does, nothing more. Therefore, the foundation of truth is desire, intention, or whatever you want to call it. (So in that sense, of course, truth is subjective. But that does not have any sorts of radical implications for science. For what unites the members of a certain science as scientists in that science is that they define certain terms in certain ways and desire to make their use of those terms conform to the real world. If one of them did not desire that, they would be a "counterfeit" or a liar in that science, nothing more. [By the way, I think that this is the only way to even account for the fact that it is possible to lie to each other.]) Now to build a system of praxeology, we need to assume that people have desires. But from where do these desires originate? When we try to explain the desires of a person, we generally invoke their other desires. For example, we might say that a person wants X because he believes that X produces Y and he wants Y. But if that were the only thing that we were to do, we would encounter an infinite regression. For if we were to want to explain every desire in that way, we would need an infinitely long chain. So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever. Now to call these ultimate desires either correct or incorrect from the perspective of the person having the desire, we have to point to a more fundamental desire. But because of the fact that we defined that desire as an ultimate desire, that more fundamental one does not exist. So it makes no sense to say that, from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, it is either "correct" or "incorrect". So in conclusion, ultimate desires, "judgements of value" are neither "correct" nor "incorrect", they are just given. Our only other option is to drop the notion of desire and see "actors" as a compilation of interrelated parts entirely dependent on each other. But I am sure that no person here who understands what I mean when I say that will want to do that. For that would go against the Austrian School by trying to reduce people to simultaneous equations like those found in physics. (See Robert Murphy in his talk "Austrian vs. Neoclassical Analytics" for some talk about how Milton Friedman conceived economics in that way.)
From where does truth originate? Well, if you were to walk into a room where a person were drawing a bunch of stuff on a chalkboard that looked like he were trying to solve a problem in physics and you were to notice that he made a "mistake", you decide to try to explain that to him, but then he says that he is just drawing aimlessly to pass the time, he would, at once, silence your "criticism". For your point that his work is "incorrect" depended entirely on the assumption that he was desiring to conform his markings to a certain system. Also, in the same way, it makes no sense to say that the orbit of a planet is "incorrect". For the planet has no desires at all. What it does is just what it does, nothing more. Therefore, the foundation of truth is desire, intention, or whatever you want to call it.
(So in that sense, of course, truth is subjective. But that does not have any sorts of radical implications for science. For what unites the members of a certain science as scientists in that science is that they define certain terms in certain ways and desire to make their use of those terms conform to the real world. If one of them did not desire that, they would be a "counterfeit" or a liar in that science, nothing more. [By the way, I think that this is the only way to even account for the fact that it is possible to lie to each other.])
Now to build a system of praxeology, we need to assume that people have desires. But from where do these desires originate? When we try to explain the desires of a person, we generally invoke their other desires. For example, we might say that a person wants X because he believes that X produces Y and he wants Y. But if that were the only thing that we were to do, we would encounter an infinite regression. For if we were to want to explain every desire in that way, we would need an infinitely long chain. So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever.
Now to call these ultimate desires either correct or incorrect from the perspective of the person having the desire, we have to point to a more fundamental desire. But because of the fact that we defined that desire as an ultimate desire, that more fundamental one does not exist. So it makes no sense to say that, from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, it is either "correct" or "incorrect".
So in conclusion, ultimate desires, "judgements of value" are neither "correct" nor "incorrect", they are just given. Our only other option is to drop the notion of desire and see "actors" as a compilation of interrelated parts entirely dependent on each other. But I am sure that no person here who understands what I mean when I say that will want to do that. For that would go against the Austrian School by trying to reduce people to simultaneous equations like those found in physics. (See Robert Murphy in his talk "Austrian vs. Neoclassical Analytics" for some talk about how Milton Friedman conceived economics in that way.)
(See also my clarification of that post.)
But, despite all of that, I think that you are talking of something else. I think that you are talking about this, in which I answer "no" to all of those questions in my fourth paragraph:
I. Ryan: Now considering that "correctness" depends on the perspectives of individuals, not a natural, external, "objective" thing, if we encounter two perspectives which each have ultimate desires conflicting with the other, ultimate desires that, if one were satisfied, would preclude that the other were satisfied, is it possible to say whose perspective is more "correct"? Of course not. For I already established that ultimate desires are neither true nor false, they are just given. So this implies that people whose ultimate desires respect life, like most of us here, are not any more "correct" than people whose ultimate desires do not do so, like some psychopaths; they are just different. We are able to justify jailing them or killing them only by reference to our own self-interest. Incidentally, the only reason that society is able to exist is that most people are like us and therefore have the power to selfishly vanquish the people with conflicting desires.
Now considering that "correctness" depends on the perspectives of individuals, not a natural, external, "objective" thing, if we encounter two perspectives which each have ultimate desires conflicting with the other, ultimate desires that, if one were satisfied, would preclude that the other were satisfied, is it possible to say whose perspective is more "correct"? Of course not. For I already established that ultimate desires are neither true nor false, they are just given. So this implies that people whose ultimate desires respect life, like most of us here, are not any more "correct" than people whose ultimate desires do not do so, like some psychopaths; they are just different. We are able to justify jailing them or killing them only by reference to our own self-interest. Incidentally, the only reason that society is able to exist is that most people are like us and therefore have the power to selfishly vanquish the people with conflicting desires.
I. Ryan: I will now turn to a lengthy quotation of a discussion that happened a few months ago[, that is, this one, which I already linked to,] and that engages your very criticism and substantiates my skepticism of the possibility of what you called "an ethics that is at the same time both universal and eternal, holding true for all times and in all places". It does not end well, though. It implies that we do not occupy a higher ground than those people who we consider to be the scum of the earth, the murderers, bandits, rapists, and whatever. It implies merely that, as the majority, we beat such characters into submission. It could not, though, unless we are prepared to acquiesce to the poverty of the "lower" animals, unless we are prepared to forgo the "advantages" of the division of labor, the very institution, after all, that explains the origination of morality, benevolence, and the values of your religion, be any other way!
I will now turn to a lengthy quotation of a discussion that happened a few months ago[, that is, this one, which I already linked to,] and that engages your very criticism and substantiates my skepticism of the possibility of what you called "an ethics that is at the same time both universal and eternal, holding true for all times and in all places". It does not end well, though. It implies that we do not occupy a higher ground than those people who we consider to be the scum of the earth, the murderers, bandits, rapists, and whatever. It implies merely that, as the majority, we beat such characters into submission. It could not, though, unless we are prepared to acquiesce to the poverty of the "lower" animals, unless we are prepared to forgo the "advantages" of the division of labor, the very institution, after all, that explains the origination of morality, benevolence, and the values of your religion, be any other way!
Far from failing to see that, I wrote it out explicitly. Just because something is uncomfortable, though, does not make it false.
Andrew Cain: It becomes normative, in the sense that all is equal.
It becomes normative, in the sense that all is equal.
No, I am claiming that, outside the nexus of means and ends, no magnitudes of rightness or wrongness exist; and, if two things are equal, their magnitudes are equal. It makes no sense to say that, because a quality does not exist, that quality applies equally to two different things. Instead, it just does not apply at all.
Andrew Cain: Let us say you happen upon a thief. He prefers to steal your wallet, you prefer to keep it. You cannot lay claim that his preference are wrong. How could you praxeologically resist his actions without establish a normative statement of values which center around a universal sense of justice in which you are no longer being praxeological?
Let us say you happen upon a thief. He prefers to steal your wallet, you prefer to keep it. You cannot lay claim that his preference are wrong. How could you praxeologically resist his actions without establish a normative statement of values which center around a universal sense of justice in which you are no longer being praxeological?
I do not want to get robbed. So I try to avoid things like that. You are begging the question by asking what my objective, universal "justification" is. I am arguing that no such thing exists.
Andrew Cain: I'm not saying there is such a thing as 'perfect justice.'
I'm not saying there is such a thing as 'perfect justice.'
I never said that you did; you are trying to extend my analogy past its relevance.
Andrew Cain: It has a goalpoint which would indicate positives like property property, non-violence, voluntarism.
It has a goalpoint which would indicate positives like property property, non-violence, voluntarism.
Which individuals drive; which does not contradict what I am saying. Are you saying that markets move independently to the means and ends of individuals?
Andrew Cain: I'm not expecting justice to catch every criminal or right every wrong but there is a sense of what justice should always be irrespective of what it is now.
I'm not expecting justice to catch every criminal or right every wrong but there is a sense of what justice should always be irrespective of what it is now.
I am not sure what the last part of that means; but I was not saying that you were expecting that.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
So, whether each of us holds the same ends or not, the common means to those ends, whatever they are, is originating, strengthening, and then preserving society.
Nonsense. What if I hate people more than I care for the products of their labour?
Liberte: Nonsense. What if I hate people more than I care for the products of their labour?
Read my whole post. I addressed that.
Well I guess I'm a 'psychopath', because none of that made any sense/difference to me. I have never experienced a 'moral quandry' in my life. I do what pleases me, and don't bother about 'fairness' or 'goodness' of the action; what is good is what is good for me.
The 'moral sentiments' are (in fact) signaling and other sociobiological factors, and have no cognitive content; only rationalizations.
Liberte:Nonsense. What if I hate people more than I care for the products of their labour?
You say "nonsense", but then ask a question. Wouldn't that mean you have no sense of what he said because you go on to ask a question; so thereby all you did here was make a baseless assertion. Usually it would be appropiate to firm up a comment with something. This possibly thereby might mean that this is simply another post of yours that you are using to drag down what necessarily need not be dragged down. Put some meat on some of these posts, or at least ask the question before making a conclusion.
just sayin'
Who cares if you don't value human life and social cooperation? It doesn't matter until you steal or murder, for instance. Then you can't coherently object to symmetric action in response to your crime. Easy-peasy.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
Liberte: Well I guess I'm a 'psychopath', because none of that made any sense/difference to me. I have never experienced a 'moral quandry' in my life. I do what pleases me, and don't bother about 'fairness' or 'goodness' of the action; what is good is what is good for me.
Sure, I do not hate you for that, either. Just accept that most people do have moral sentiments.
Liberte: The 'moral sentiments' are (in fact) [derivatives of] sociobiological factors[...]
The 'moral sentiments' are (in fact) [derivatives of] sociobiological factors[...]
Sure, I agreed with that a few times.
You say "nonsense", but then ask a question. Wouldn't that mean you have no sense of what he said because you go on to ask a question; so thereby all you did here was make a baseless assertion.
No, because the logical problems of normatives are not thereby rendered coherent. Compare it to the senses: if someone claims he can see in a spectrum I can not, perhaps he can. If someone claims he can see god, he is talking nonsense. Morality is either a value judgment (and therefor arbitrary and beyond dispute or proof) or it is not a value judgment and therefor can not be relevant for action except as a hypothetical imperative which can not, for these reasons, imply universality or general modes action.
Usually it would be appropiate to firm up a comment with something. This possibly thereby might mean that this is simply another post of yours that you are using to drag down what necessarily need not be dragged down. Put some meat on some of these posts, or at least ask the question before making a conclusion.
Except that I have no regard for natural rights crankery, and if I feel compelled to delve into the realm of moralistic gibberish I can find far more competent exponents than Mises Forumites. As I have said, if I leave you out it is because I am not talking to you. The very fact that I even acknowledge your posts demonstrates a lack of sufficient judgment on my part.
Then you can't coherently object to symmetric action in response to your crime.
I recognize no right and I demand no right (except as it may suit be to exploit the delusions and emotional states of others).
E. R. Olovetto: It doesn't matter until you steal or murder, for instance. Then you can't coherently object to symmetric action in response to your crime.
It doesn't matter until you steal or murder, for instance. Then you can't coherently object to symmetric action in response to your crime.
What does objection mean? Who says that the murderer cares about arguing with you?
Liberte: No, because the logical problems of normatives are not thereby rendered coherent. Compare it to the senses: if someone claims he can see in a spectrum I can not, perhaps he can. If someone claims he can see god, he is talking nonsense. Morality is either a value judgment (and therefor arbitrary and beyond dispute or proof) or it is not a value judgment and therefor can not be relevant for action except as a hypothetical imperative which can not, for these reasons, imply universality or general modes action.
I am not sure whether you are disagreeing with me, here. But, for the record, I am not appealing to my moral sentiments; that would require me to regard them as infallible. But they are not. For an example of a sentiment that is a complete failure in the modern world, see taste.
I have never denied that people have a complex of signaling, emotional and associational cues that they are apt to give the name 'morality'. What I do deny is that these have any philosophical significance, since they have no cognitive content. How and whether one's moral sentiments are adjusted or affected by actual knowledge of the sciences is totally beside the point, like whether one's feelings about banks are affected by knowledge of economics.
Morality is, to its core, nothing more than a game of self-advancement and manipulating the psycho-emotional states of others through complex rationalizations and signals. Whatever that's worth, it is certainly not philosophy any more than seduction is.
I recognize no right and I demand no right
So if you kill and are captured, you will happily lay your head on the chopping block. Sounds good. (I don't understand the point of the parentheses part, but yeah I agree with your sentiment regarding being a psychopath.)
What is so hard about the word "objection"? You are legally estopped from suggesting a course of action incongruous with your own. Who says what the murderer cares about matters?
Liberte: I have never denied that people have a complex of signaling, emotional and associational cues that they are apt to give the name 'morality'. What I do deny is that these have any philosophical significance, since they have no cognitive content. How and whether one's moral sentiments are adjusted or affected by actual knowledge of the sciences is totally beside the point, like whether one's feelings about banks are affected by knowledge of economics. Morality is, to its core, nothing more than a game of self-advancement and manipulating the psycho-emotional states of others through complex rationalizations and signals. Whatever that's worth, it is certainly not philosophy any more than seduction is.
Sure, but many people, including Mises and I, consider the conclusions of the moral thoughts also to be a part of morality:
Ludwig von Mises: All nonutilitarian systems of ethics look upon the moral law as something outside the nexus of means and ends.
All nonutilitarian systems of ethics look upon the moral law as something outside the nexus of means and ends.
We probably have no disagreement in this subject besides about definitions, by the way.
E. R. Olovetto: What is so hard about the word "objection"?
What is so hard about the word "objection"?
Try to be respectful. Is fighting back objecting? Or is just arguing objecting?
E. R. Olovetto: You are legally estopped from suggesting a course of action incongruous with your own.
You are legally estopped from suggesting a course of action incongruous with your own.
Why?
E. R. Olovetto: Who says what the murderer cares about matters?
Who says what the murderer cares about matters?
Because I was just asking you to clarify your position, it is pretty odd to throw questions like that back at me. To be productive, just explain why my question did not apply.
I'm a material determinist, but this doesn't rule out purposive action. Purposive action involves not supernatural 'spirits' or what have you, it involves a machine involving pattern-coherency and physiological stimulation.
Agreed, but that's not the way he was using purpose. He thought that my actions were separate from nature, and somehow the mystical "me" was the basis of purpose. I was attempting to respond to that, thus my qualifications of my "prove it".
That 'free will' stuff is a bunch of crazy talk. I got banned from Freedomain radio for arguing with Stephan Molyneux about it.
Liberte: That 'free will' stuff is a bunch of crazy talk. I got banned from Freedomain radio for arguing with Stephan Molyneux about it.
"Look at me, I'm quoting another user to show how wrong I think they are, out of arrogance of my own position. Wait, this is my own quote, oh shi-" ~ Nitroadict
Liberte wrote "
Morality is, to its core, nothing more than a game of self-advancement and manipulating the psycho-emotional states of others through complex rationalizations and signals. Whatever that's worth, it is certainly not philosophy any more than seduction is."
(the quote function is not working properly)
Liberte - have you read Ayer's views on ethics, aesthetics and theology? They seem to mirror your views exactly, with which I agree wholeheartedly. You may also be interested in a previous post of mine which roughly illustrates my thoughts of moral realism being based on a confusion of language:
http://mises.org/Community/forums/p/13643/294929.aspx#294929
You may also be interested in the following conversation between lilburne and myself regarding the psychology of moral sentiment (lilburne's responses are quoted):
http://mises.org/Community/forums/p/13643/294405.aspx#294405
http://mises.org/Community/forums/p/13643/294470.aspx#294470
Let me know what you think
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
I am mainly familiar with Ayer for his work on logical positivism, some of which was good but none of which I agree with wholeheartedly.
Which books of his does he talk about his views on ethics, etc?
In essense, you're saying that some part of your decision-making process behaves above the law of cause and effect. Which basically means you believe that some part of your body behaves outside the laws of the physical world.
No, I'm saying that the totality of my actions are not directly determined by chemical reactions. Again, the materialists never make their case, or provide any solid/concrete evidence. We have to accept their position on faith. I have to just agree that chemicals are causing me to type this right now.
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
Liberte -
Chapter 6 of Language Truth and Logic
http://www.archive.org/stream/AlfredAyer/LanguageTruthAndLogic#page/n103/mode/2up
I think that much of logical positivism was a failure, such as the attempt to reduce all language to that of sense-content. Much of it is salvageable, however. Ayer's 'weak verification criteria' is essentially a non-formalized version of Bayesian and Solomonoff Induction. The positivist criterion for meaning has never been adequately formalized, as seemingly every member of the Vienna Circle disagreed on its tenets. However, I believe the approach is generally correct. I think Ayer said it best when he admitted late in life that the strengths of logical positivism were almost entirely negative. The movement was important in what it cut away from philosophy.
Liberte: I'm a material determinist[.]
I'm a material determinist[.]
Which probably is just metaphysical speculation.
wilderness:I appreciate your intellectual curiosity in knowing what my theory is instead of making ad hoc assumptions as some other posters are doing. And I am very curious as to what your theory is, so, this is moving along in a very thoughful manner in order for me to discover what your theory is.
You used the phrase "my theory" to refer to two different things in your post. Above you are saying you don't know what my theory is, implying you and I might not have the same theory. And yet:
wilderness: trulib:You and I, at least, share the same basic theory when it comes to what is ethical/unethical; invasions of property rights are unethical. That is my theory, yes.
trulib:You and I, at least, share the same basic theory when it comes to what is ethical/unethical; invasions of property rights are unethical.
That is my theory, yes.
So we need to be clear on what theory we are referring to. Theory about what? Our theories on the content of ethical statements are the same: don't invade property rights. I have been asking you about your theory on the nature of ethical statements - namely, are they objective or subjective. Now, in your response to me and to others, you've said some things that make me think you are an objective ethicist and some things that make me think you are subjective ethicist.
wilderness: I. Ryan:He is just expressing his subjective preferences and calling it his "natural law". Thank you I. Ryan. It is amazing how some posters who preach subjective preferences do not actually apply or see them in others. It is afterall my theory as praxeologically I can only speak of my knowledge. I am happy you understand what I am saying.
I. Ryan:He is just expressing his subjective preferences and calling it his "natural law".
Thank you I. Ryan. It is amazing how some posters who preach subjective preferences do not actually apply or see them in others. It is afterall my theory as praxeologically I can only speak of my knowledge. I am happy you understand what I am saying.
If I. Ryan's statement about you is correct, you are a subjective ethicist. When you say 'natural law' you really just mean libertarianism. You are expressing a preference with regards to the content of ethical statements. To me, a natural law theorist is something much more than a libertarian, it is someone who believes that ethics is an objective discipline and that libertarian ethical statements are correct. Clearly, many people have very different interpretations of the term 'natural law'. Using this term is surely only adding confusion. Heck: you might even get lumped in with Hobbes!
wilderness:I like moral realism and use objective ethics because they are my subjective preferences and are my subjective ethics.
This is a strange statement. You "use" objective ethics but you regard ethics as a preference. It's confusing. As far as I can tell, you are here saying you are actually an objective ethicist, but your choice to be an objective ethicist is a subjective preference. In the field of physics, I make a subjective choice to be objective physicist. In the field of film criticism, I make a subjective choice to be a subjective film critic. But these are not difficult subjective choices, they are subjective only in the most trivial sense: I mean, physics is an objective subject, and film criticism is a subjective subject. It would be weird/impossible to be a subjective physicist or an objective film critic.
wilderness:In formulating my theory above in the previous posts I was incorporating both sides in the conflict. My theory involves the conflict and how the two parties are dealing with the conflict. That's why I included what Person-A possibly is thinking and what Person-B is possibly thinking. (I changed the names of the two people involved). Person-A has made a claim sometimes it is ok to steal. Person-B has made a claim that it is never ok to steal. Since A and B are making this claim what is the resolution?
I would avoid using the term conflict here, because a conflict usually refers to a property violation occuring. This is not that kind of conflict. It's a philosophical argument: an argument about which ethic is better.
It may not be possible to "resolve" this argument. It depends, again, on whether ethics is objective or subjective. The argument Flat-Earth v Round-Earth can be resolved objectively. The argument The Godfather v Jeepers Creepers can't be resolved objectively, although it could be resolved in the sense that the two people may be able to reach agreement, by one person convincing the other to change his subjective preference.
wilderness:Also, since it doesn't matter whether Person-A thinks of ethics as an objective or subjective discipline then the same goes Person-B. Do you find this last statement to be true or false according to your theory.
Now you seem to be asking about my theory about something else altogether: not the content, or the nature, of ethical statements, but rather how to convince someone else to adopt my ethic, what strategy to use. I'll leave this for now.
wilderness:Would you say that the question of, meaning, coming to the agreement of, not the agreement itself, but the process before finalizing the agreement as to whether "we ought to adopt 'maintain society' as a goal" relates to a deeper question as to if any one single human will always end up connecting or making a relation with another person therefore society. Is this a question of "Are humans social animals?" I am assuming you would say yes, but I don't want to go any further until I know for sure.
I don't know what you are asking me in your first sentence. As for humans being social animals, it depends on your definition of social, of course, but yes, being a social animal is one of the reasons we are such a successful species. I don't see where you're going with this though.
wilderness:Yet even knowing that I don't know if I can make the leap to whether "we ought to adopt 'maintain society'".
That's fine that you don't know because I don't know either. I don't know whether the is-ought gap can be bridged, has been already, or is really just an illusion. But this is the crux of what we're talking about. Is there any way that we can objectively derive from the ways things are, how they ought to be? If yes, you are an objective ethicist. If no, you are subjective ethicist.
A year ago, I would have described myself as objective ethicist, having just read Rothbard and Hoppe's arguments for ethics being an objective discipline. But about 6 months ago, when this subject was being discussed here frequently, I began to have my doubts about objective ethics, in no small part due to the arguments of AJ, Grayson, I. Ryan, et al. I now tentatively consider myself a subjective ethicist. In my arguments with statists these days, I do not think of my task as being convincing them that my ethic is correct and their ethic is incorrect. My task is to get them to re-assess their ethical preferences and hopefully change their preferences in light of new knowledge. I find it easier this way, because as an objectivist ethicist I was not only trying to get the statist to change his theory about the content of ethics, but also change his theory about the nature of ethics as a discipline (since statists generally consider ethics to be a subjective discipline, even to the point of mocking anyone claiming to have a "correct" theory of ethics).
Government Explained 2: The Special Piece of Paper
Law without Government
It is metaphysical, but I wouldn't consider it 'speculation'. I base it on Aristotle's elentic proof of non-contradiction, that if things were not either the case or not the case then the logical non-contradiction (p or not p) could not be possible. Since there is logic, there is ontological non-contradiction. That combined with Aristotle's materialism, that for a thing to exist is to have properties (if it had no properties it would not be the thing that it is, and therefore nothing at all, i.e., law of excluded middle).
wilderness:thank you for responding back. I really wasn't trying to cut you off from the discussion. I felt that you were giving some general notions that are a long way off from what I intended this thread to delve into. I think the thread is going somewhat well, but I'm trying to keep the target in focus. This post of yours here does just that. It is on target into getting into the underlying assumptions.
No offense taken. I myself might have come off a bit rough in my initial post; if that was so, I'd like to apologize.
Esuric:No, I'm saying that the totality of my actions are not directly determined by chemical reactions. Again, the materialists never make their case, or provide any solid/concrete evidence. We have to accept their position on faith. I have to just agree that chemicals are causing me to type this right now.
I'm sorry, but you are shifting the burden of proof, Sir. I'm arguing the default position, i.e. "The physical world behaves according to the law of cause and effect. Humans, being part of the physical world, are also subject to this law, as is the human will. There's no 'freedom of choice' for you, only the illusion of choice presented to you by the ultra-complex machine that is your brain." You're arguing "Not all of my will is the result of deterministic forces. I have some free will!" It is up to you to provide evidence for your statement; as it stands, you have declared an article of faith whereas the determinists have soundly applied a physical law to the human body.
I'm sorry, but you are shifting the burden of proof, Sir.
You seem quite confused. Armstrong wanted to know why/how people act purposefully, and how human action differs from the spatial trajectory of comets, for example, or the occurrence of earthquakes. I answered that question (others did as well). Next, I told him that he needs to actually support his materialistic position; put forth some kind of argument.
You, then, came along and told me that I denied causality. But that statement presupposes the validity of your argument, namely that only chemicals can cause human action. I haven't made a single argument. In fact, this is what I said:
The fact that people act purposefully is axiomatic; it is true by definition. Now whether purposeful action is caused by the soul, or because of complicated chemical stimuli and reactions, is another question entirely. If he wants to say that it's the latter, then he needs to make his case, and actually provide proof. Which chemical or set of chemicals is causing me to type this right now? How come the chemicals didn't cause me to type something else?
Your position, as it stands right now, requires pure faith, that is, it's no different then saying "Satan made me do it," where "me" would be the soul. In both cases, there is a cause.
I. Ryan:Is fighting back objecting? Or is just arguing objecting?
See your conversations. I'm confident I agree with however you would answer these questions.
Read this. I'd say it is pretty much required reading to discuss libertarianism.
I don't know how you read through your posts and then respond. I usually respond point by point without reading the whole post first. I suggest this time around, if you don't already, to read through first because I believe some of the early points you brought up I may not have answered in full. Yet further on in the post it appears I answer some of your earlier points in this post better.
trulib:You used the phrase "my theory" to refer to two different things in your post. Above you are saying you don't know what my theory is, implying you and I might not have the same theory. And yet:
I meant in my first usage that I would like to explore what you think/theory, but then later on in the post my theory agreed with your theory on that particular subject (invasion of private property is unethical). My first usage was in general theorizing, because there might be a point we potentially cross where we find disagreement. I was leaving it open-ended. The second was where were crossed paths and did find actual agreement. First included an emphasis of potential. Second actual.
I want to leave it open that we may possess knowledge that one or the other may not yet possess.
trulib:I have been asking you about your theory on the nature of ethical statements - namely, are they objective or subjective. Now, in your response to me and to others, you've said some things that make me think you are an objective ethicist and some things that make me think you are subjective ethicist.
Very perceptive. The objective/subjective is a false dichotomy. They are contraries, but contraries are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is when any particular person believes they are mutually exclusive that's when they may end up finding another person that also believes they are mutually exclusive yet each person holds the separate contrary from the other. This creates unnecessarily philosophical tension when in essence each person might actually be possessing in substance the same position as the other person because eventually it might be the case the word becomes more important than the underlying meaningful substance the the two sides share. Contraries can actually be not conflictive but complimentary. Of course it depends on the meaning of the terms in use because at essence the two possibly are disagreeing. I can use both terms without conflict because the way I define the terms is in a complimentary way.
I believe we had this conversation before and I tried to find our previous conversation on this because you had agreed with me. I can't find it though. Do you remember that conversation we had?
trulib:You are expressing a preference with regards to the content of ethical statements. To me, a natural law theorist is something much more than a libertarian, it is someone who believes that ethics is an objective discipline and that libertarian ethical statements are correct.
I believe my preference is correct. I assume both of those terms into my theory.
trulib:In the field of physics, I make a subjective choice to be objective physicist. In the field of film criticism, I make a subjective choice to be a subjective film critic.
This is the way I am using the terms.
trulib:But these are not difficult subjective choices, they are subjective only in the most trivial sense:
That is true. It does make, in my opinion, the conflict between subjective and objective trival. The terms are toned down a notch as they find complimentary, harmonuous qualities when used together. I am rather used to understanding it this way and for me this comes very natural.
trulib:(1)subjective physicist
When I read that all I see is a physicist who is using his own individual means to study physics. Subjective in this sense means individual.
trulib:(2)or an objective film critic.
When I read that all I see is a film critic who has made their knowledge about a film certain.
Though (1) and (2) are by no means mutually exclusive, the way I see this. Being objective is based on what a particular individual (the subjective factor) asserts as being real in this world.
Some philosophers have choosen to use terms to get around this subjective/objective haggling by using other terms such as: agent-relative, agent-neutral, and ontological realism.
trulib:It's a philosophical argument: an argument about which ethic is better.
Ok. That's what we are discussion. I was also assuming that Person-A and Person-B were already involved in the physical conflict. I am assuming that the philosophical argument is being demonstrated by their actions taking place. But I see what you mean and we can stick to that.
trulib:It may not be possible to "resolve" this argument.
I think a society that maintains private property and thus, human existence will resolve this argument by maintaining the law of such a society that prefers this kind of law to other types of laws (non-protection of private property). I think the philosophic argument is already a done deal by negative demonstration and special pleading.
But I also think philosophy is practiced in body and not only a mental exercise. When my actions and things in the world can be conceptualized and made into terms. Those terms are evidenced in the world and they also are a name that is abstractly made. So what the term evidences, that evidence is what the term refers to and the term is also a name and names are mental abstractions.
For instance, Some people live in New York
That is a proposition based on evidence and it is a mental abstraction. It is not Platonic because the evidence is grounded in there actually being factually some people that do in fact live in a place that is in fact New York. And on the other hand, it can be shifted into describing an abstraction because those are names that I mentally formulated since being human involves the capability is be an artist and name things. It's a shift of focus on what is being commented on in reference to the abstraction. The is based on the evidence and the other is based on this proposition being in my mind and now written here in this post. I say this because philosophy involves not only the mental abstraction being exercised but also involves knowing the evidence and when it comes to certain kinds of thoughts it involves living those thoughts. A society can not only dream about maintaining private property but a society also in bodily demonstration by some individuals in that society to carry forth the arguments into actual bodily demonstrations. I theorize a living philosophy.
trulib:I don't know what you are asking me in your first sentence. As for humans being social animals, it depends on your definition of social, of course, but yes, being a social animal is one of the reasons we are such a successful species. I don't see where you're going with this though.
I apologize. I didn't make that very clear. What I meant was in order for a society to be based on possessing a law that maintains economic action and private property (human existence) such a society of individuals are to be willing to maintain a society that has these attributes. A society is possible to not involve itself as a civilization but may become more tribal. Not that it would necessarily wrong to live that way but it is a matter of preference by the individuals in any one society as to how they want to live. Would you agree?
trulib:But this is the crux of what we're talking about. Is there any way that we can objectively derive from the ways things are, how they ought to be? If yes, you are an objective ethicist. If no, you are subjective ethicist.
Yes we can derive from the way things are how they ought to be. But "the way things are" still requires a starting point. For a tribal or socialist society the "way things are" can start very differently. For such a society, ie. tribal or socialist, the way things are may start from thinking that monetary transactions and living on housing plots on private land is minimized and not desirable so their starting point for a society originates with simply barter, exclusively hunting and gathering, and a village community. I don't think there is anything morally wrong with wanting to live that way. But that is their axiom or starting points. Whereas the civil society I am referring to the starting point or axiom is private property which originates in each person possessing ownership over their own actions and ceterbris parabris the law maintains this (the individuals in the society representing the law maintain this). Different starting points/axioms.
The last paragraph that you wrote isn't about subjective ethicists or objective ethicists. It is about how to persuade others. I don't focus on objectivist or subjectivist methodology in trying to persuade somebody because again I don't think these two are mutually exclusive, thereby, I undoubtedly use both methods. That doesn't mean that my ability to persuade is grand or anything. I know I'm lousy at times to demonstrate what I mean. That is a completely different topic though.
E. R. Olovetto: Who cares if you don't value human life and social cooperation? It doesn't matter until you steal or murder, for instance. Then you can't coherently object to symmetric action in response to your crime. Easy-peasy. What does "coherently object" mean?
wilderness:I believe my preference is correct.
A person's beliefs with regard to questions of fact which bring a person to form a preference can be correct or incorrect, but a preference itself can neither be correct nor incorrect.
What does "coherently object" mean?
Presumably he means something along the lines of "if you start by assuming an objective ethical principle (universalizability) you can't coherently object to objective ethics" which is true I suppose.
I agree, it's indicative of a lot of the bad philosophy that surrounds libertarianism.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
Are you saying that you believe objective ethics to be true because you prefer it to be true? If so, how is that not faith?
Or are you saying that you prefer objective ethics to other ways of conceiving ethics because you think it is the most accurate conception? If so, what are your criteria for that?
Lilburne:A person's beliefs with regard to questions of fact which bring a person to form a preference can be correct or incorrect, but a preference itself can neither be correct nor incorrect.
Great. Is this relevant to anything in particular? truism are awesome!
wilderness: wilderness:I believe my preference is correct. Lilburne:A person's beliefs with regard to questions of fact which bring a person to form a preference can be correct or incorrect, but a preference itself can neither be correct nor incorrect. Great. Is this relevant to anything in particular? truism are awesome!
First: What do you mean by objective and what do you think realism means? I answer your questions below, but without your assumption as to what these terms mean I will not know if we are on the same page when we exchange words.
Lilburne:Are you saying that you believe objective ethics to be true because you prefer it to be true? If so, how is that not faith?
I am saying that I believe objective ethics to be true because I as an individual know by evidence that they are true. It doesn't mean you will believe the evidence of what is demonstrated, but until you can show me what an axiom is without reverting to logical deductions I don't think I continue this discussion as it is a key term.
Lilburne:Or are you saying that you prefer objective ethics to other ways of conceiving ethics because you think it is the most accurate conception? If so, what are your criteria for that?
question 1: I do think it is the most accurate conception, but I think a subjective ethicist can make the same claim. The objective/subjective dichotomy is false. question 2: Depends on if the person knows what a negative demonstrations is.