Neoclassical: David Hume: When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. See that? He likes mathematics and experimental observations.[...]
David Hume: When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
See that? He likes mathematics and experimental observations.[...]
How does that support your case that "[I am] crazy", that "[I] can't be an empiricist like Hume and a rationalist like Mises", that '[I] ha[ve] to budge", that "[they] aren't compatible", and that "[he ...] was a proto-logical positivist"? Why don't you just read the thread that I was referring to?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan: "I don't think that you are using the word "sensation" how Neoclassical defined it, as experience of the public world.
In my signature, the first link is one to a thread in which I show that Mises and Hume, two of my favorite writers, weren't opposed to each other at all at least in epistemology, though most people would think that they were, because they would see the words that they used, such as "experience" and so on, and see that they used those words in superficially contradictory ways.
If you don't want to read it, I can give you a quick summary of what I was saying, and why it is relevant to what is going on here. Mises defined "experience" as that of the public world, and "reason" as that of the private world, yet Hume defined "experience" as that of either the private world or the public world. So people see Hume talk about experience like it is the only thing that matters to science, and see Mises talk about experience like it can't tell us anything about praxeology, and they think that they are saying entirely different things, and would be super opposed to each other. But they are missing what I already said, that they defined the terms in different ways.
I think that you are doing the same thing.
I asked Neoclassical whether he was using the word "sensation" to mean experience of the public world, and he said yes. But I think that you are switching it up to mean experience either of the private world or the public world. How Hume used the word "experience", yes, I think that experience is the only basis of science. But, how Mises used the word "experience", no, I don't think that experience is the only basis of science. So, in the same way, how you used the word "sensation", yes, I think that sensation is the only basis of science, but, how Neoclassical used the word "sensation", no, I don't think that sensatian is the only basis of science."
You have this exactly correct as far as my position, and that is very illuminating regarding Mises and Hume.
OK, words are very hard to parse at this level of analysis. The word "sensation" auto-equivocates between, for lack of better wording, "public" and "private" sensation. If Neoclassical means public, then his position makes sense. I mean private. Or rather, I reject the public/private distinction as anything other than an explanatory device of convenience. And I suppose that's the real core issue:
At this deep level of analysis, "reality" is just a term of convenience for that set of sensations that presents in more permanent and "high-detail" fashion, relatively consistently day after day, and where I can only control things by means of this physical body; unlike, say, "the fantasy world" or "dreams," where sensations are not as permanent or high-detail, and I may actually be able to control things just by thinking something different.
"I am an empiricist in the tradition of Hume, but a rationalist in the tradition of Mises. I think that the same thing probably applies to you. How that is possible is that people just got tripped up by the words that each of them used, and didn't get a good understanding of what they actually were saying, and they came up with terms to use to contrast them."
Indeed, I am probably the same, although I am a "first-person empiricist" w.r.t. myself, and I believe that's the only coherent position.
"How is it possible" for words to trip people up? Words just suck as explanatory devices, but they're all we have - for now. In fact, in most all arguments of this nature I don't think there would be any disagreement if the semantic issues were resolved. As your example of Mises and Hume shows.
Why anarchy fails
I did read it.
Hume never catered any of the ideas that define Misesean epistemology.
"I'm not a fan of Murray Rothbard." -- David D. Friedman
AJ:Indeed, I am probably the same, although I am a "first-person empiricist" w.r.t. myself, and I believe that's the only coherent position.
You don't believe in self-deception?
Neoclassical to I. Ryan: "How do you know what I "prefer"?"
It's not that he knows what you prefer, it's that (presumably) you do. Mises terms these concepts "self-evident," not "other-evident." Again, subjectivity: I don't think you have yet understood what Mises meant by it. (He does not mean it in the sense or context that Dennett apparently does in the article you linked.)
Neoclassical: "You don't believe in self-deception?"
Not my own deception of myself regarding my own subjective experience of sensations qua sensations, which are all I have to go on. In fact, self-deception in that arena wouldn't even be a coherent notion. It doesn't even make sense, in my own mind, to talk about my deceiving myself about a presently-sensed pain. And I presume the same is true for you, in terms of your own mind. Sure, looking at someone else we can say they are deceiving themselves (or appearing to) in contrast with what they report. But that is an entirely different matter.
If you mean, can my modeling of the "outside world" based on the sensations I experience make predictions about future sensations that ever differ from from the sensations I actually experience in the future? Then yes, I can indeed create models with poor predictive performance as far as the sensations I will experience in the future.
Neoclassical: Hume never catered any of the ideas that define Misesean epistemology.
I would argue that he did, but I don't know why that matters, unless I am misunderstanding what you mean. I was saying that they are compatible in the way that people often act like they are opposites, not that Hume came up with "any of the ideas that define Misesian epistemology". If I am misunderstanding you, tell me what you mean by "catered". What does it mean that Hume never "catered" any of those ideas?
AJ:It's not that he knows what you prefer, it's that (presumably) you do. Mises terms these concepts "self-evident," not "other-evident." Again, subjectivity: I don't think you have yet understood what Mises meant by it. (He does not mean it in the sense or context that Dennett apparently does in the article you linked.)
That I have "preferences" in some foggy mentalese sense is not at all "self-evident" to me.
Many people believe they "prefer" losing weight to gaining weight, but still eat cake rather than exercise.
For clarification, I am an eliminative materialist, and I contend "common sense mental notions do not pick out anything real "
Neoclassical: Many people believe they "prefer" losing weight to gaining weight, but still eat cake rather than exercise.
Either their beliefs of causal connections aren't correct from your point of view, they aren't giving you the whole story, or they prefer the pleasure that they think that they would get from eating cake to the pleasure that they think that they would get from losing weight.
I. Ryan:I would argue that he did, but I don't know why that matters, unless I am misunderstanding what you mean. I was saying that they are compatible in the way that people often act like they are opposites, not that Hume came up with "any of the ideas that define Misesian epistemology". If I am misunderstanding you, tell me what you mean by "catered". What does it mean that Hume never "catered" any of those ideas?
Hume differentiated "matters of fact" and "relations of ideas." Are you suggesting that Hume conceived of "relations of ideas" as Mises conceived of his praxeology?
Not mentalese or foggy, but simply that you indeed are aware that you don't want to be eaten by sharks right now, for example. I can imagine our conversation going like this:
Me: Do you want to be eaten by sharks now?
You: No.
Me: How do you know?
You: My sensory receptors are firing in such a way.
Me: I don't mean, by what mechanism did you come to you know, I mean, how can you be sure?
You: The word "want" doesn't make sense, it's just a folk term.
Me: Indeed, it's a term of convenience, but you seem to agree that "wanting" is just some sensory receptors firing. How can you be sure, without any scientific equipment, that your sensory receptors are really firing in such a way?
You: [Your answer here]
That's a separate issue: "want to do" vs. "want to have done." In Austrian terms, time preference. They want to eat cake, but they don't want to have eaten cake. This semantic ambiguity in the English language can't be a reason for my rejecting my subjective sensation I call "wanting" (or, you rejecting that subjective sensation you presumably experience).
Note that by calling a sensation "wanting" in the first place, I am simply sending you a signal in the hopes that you find a similar sensation in yourself and identify that sensation as what I am probably also experiencing and referring to by that word.
Words != concepts. Words are just communication devices.
AJ: That's a separate issue: "want to do" vs. "want to have done." In Austrian terms, time preference. They want to eat cake, but they don't want to have eaten cake. This semantic ambiguity in the English language can't be a reason for my rejecting my subjective sensation I call "wanting" (or, you rejecting that subjective sensation you presumably experience).
Holy shit, I hadn't ever thought of that. What an awesome point.
Neoclassical: Hume differentiated "matters of fact" and "relations of ideas." [Did] Hume conceive[...] of "relations of ideas" as Mises conceived of his praxeology?
Hume differentiated "matters of fact" and "relations of ideas." [Did] Hume conceive[...] of "relations of ideas" as Mises conceived of his praxeology?
I don't know. What do you think?
AJ:Me: Indeed, it's a term of convenience, but you seem to agree that "wanting" is just some sensory receptors firing. How can you be sure, without any scientific equipment, that your sensory receptors are really firing in such a way? You: [Your answer here]
I would rely on previous scientific research.
I. Ryan:I don't know. What do you think?
I think Hume considered "relations of ideas" exactly how the logical positivists did: analytic truths because they are tautologous. That is, "a triangle has three sides" is necessarily true, because it's a tautology. There is no knowledge per se being presented. I believe that is very dissimilar to how praxeologists conceive of their practice.
are there mathematical truths that are not tautological? is no mathematical knowledge per se ever being presented? you think everyone that goes to study math is wasting their time? (like you think praxeologists are wasting their time?)
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
nirgrahamUK:are there mathematical truths that are not tautological? is no mathematical knowledge per se ever being presented? you think everyone that goes to study math is wasting their time? (like you think praxeologists are wasting their time?)
I was not defending the logical positivists, but presenting their ideas, which reflect Hume's thinking. I consider Quine's criticism, contained in his essay, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," to be correct.
My view is reflected more accurately in this article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics#Empiricism. Quoting from the article, "Empiricism is a form of realism that denies that mathematics can be known a priori at all."
so now you deny that 'triangles are 3 sided' is an a-priori mathematical truth? rather you think that we need to go out into nature in search of things that have 3 sides and find out whether our hypothesis that '3 sided things are triangles' is true?
No, I am not claiming that at all.
you deny that mathematics can be known apriori, as you are an empiricist....
*sigh* what's the source of this confusion?
maybe you should draw me a picture.
You failed to either follow, read, or understand the links that I helpfully provided.
yes, you believe that we know triangles have 3 sides because of all the tests we did on them. and any individual if he is to come to know something about triangles must go out and find a large amount so that he has good statistical chances of drawing correct conclusions about how many sides they have.
No, that is an absolutely incorrect interpretation.
explain how knowledge of the properties of triangles are empirical yet do not require conducting experiments and making predictions and the like ?
Neoclassical: AJ:Me: Indeed, it's a term of convenience, but you seem to agree that "wanting" is just some sensory receptors firing. How can you be sure, without any scientific equipment, that your sensory receptors are really firing in such a way? You: [Your answer here] I would rely on previous scientific research.
No I mean how could you be sure your neurons were actually firing at that moment (not whether their firing in general causes such sensations)?
nirgrahamUK:explain how knowledge of the properties of triangles are empirical yet do not require conducting experiments and making predictions and the like ?
I'll be a good sport, even though I think you didn't read the supplemental material I linked.
You and I both will agree that a person can sit at a writing desk and discover mathematical truths, without even looking out the window! You allege this is a priori; I disagree.
I side with Quine; there is no such thing as a priori knowledge--rather, our knowledge is a seamless whole that originates, at the periphery, from observations.
OK, I read about Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism.
Although his (and others') observations about synonyms were completely silly:
Quine begins by making a distinction between two different classes of analytic statements. The first one is called logically true and has the form:
A sentence with that form is true independent of the interpretation of "man" and "married", so long as the logical particles "no", "un-", "is" and "and" have their ordinary English meaning.
The statements in the second class have the form:
A statement with this form can be turned into a statement with form (1) by changing synonyms with synonyms, in this case "bachelor" with "unmarried man". It is the second class of statements that lack characterization according to Quine. The notion of the second form of analyticity leans on the notion of synonymy, which Quine believes is in as much need of clarification as analyticity. Most of Quine's following arguments are focused on showing how explanations of synonymy end up being dependent on the notions of analyticity, necessity, or even synonymy itself.
How do we reduce sentences from the second class to a sentence of class (1)? Some might propose definitions. "No bachelor is married" can be turned into "No unmarried man is married" because "bachelor" is defined as "unmarried man". But, Quine asks: how do we find out that "bachelor" is defined as "unmarried man"? Clearly, a dictionary would not solve the problem, as a dictionary is a report of already known synonyms, and thus is dependent on the notion of synonymy, which Quine holds as unexplained.
(Statements are not truth-apt. Only interpretations of statements are, so this semantic-level analysis is completely irrelevant. This is a big fail, but he seems great on most other things. This also explains why he was confused that "logic could be revised," a position he thankfully later retracted. If you don't realize statements are just signals not concepts, you become quite vulnerable to all that "logic is not certain because of quantum physics, etc." confusion.)
Instead of reductionism, Quine proposes that it is the whole field of science and not single statements that are verified. All scientific statements are interconnected. Logical laws give the relation between different statements, while they also are statements of the system. This makes talk about the empirical content of a single statement misleading. It also becomes impossible to draw a line between synthetic statements, which depend on experience, and analytic statements, that hold come what may. Any statement can be held as necessarily true according to Quine, if the right changes are made somewhere else in the system
This I like. In other words, at a sufficiently deep level of analysis, the only thing we can meaningfully intend when we say "X is true" is "X follows from the premises." (Note what this does to Goedel's incompleteness thereom!)
AJ:No I mean how could you be sure your neurons were actually firing at that moment (not whether their firing in general causes such sensations)?
I'm not quite sure what you mean. Are you asking a question like, "How do you know the back of your head exists right now?"
AJ:OK, I read about Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Although his observations about synonyms were completely silly
Although his observations about synonyms were completely silly
Do you believe different persons will create different translations of a French novel? If so, then you agree with Quine. As Peter Godfrey-Smith stated, this "paper [is] sometimes regarded as the most important in all of twentieth-century philosophy"; calling it "silly" seems very arrogant, probably betraying ignorance of the content.
AJ: This also explains why he was confused that "logic could be revised," a position he thankfully later retracted.
Please provide evidence that he retracted that position; to my mind, he never did. And I, too, believe logic can be revised.
You're talking about the mechanism by which sensation happens physically. I'm asking about why you are sure you're actually experiencing sensation, absent the necessary equipment to detect your synapses firing.
And I suppose I'm imagining you'll answer by saying something about how you, well you know, actually appear to feel some sensation or whatnot. This seems like the obvious and only answer.
I simply mean how can you be sure you do not want to be eaten by sharks now (or would you remain unsure until you had the right equipment to examine your brain activity)?
I know I do not want to be eaten by sharks right now because my behavior indicates that to be the case: I am not seeking a pool of hungry sharks right now, am I?
I agree that translations will differ. Translations differ for the same obvious reason I've mentioned over and over: words are not thoughts/concepts/notions. They are communication devices. A translator interprets a source text into concepts (or "meaning" if you like), then finds corresponding words in the target language to express the same or sufficiently similar notions. This isn't mysterious.
Now the above quote may misrepresent Quine, but the content of the above is indeed completely silly. If you'd like to discuss this, please address my claim that propositions are not truth-apt.
By the way, your apparent reverence for other philosophers worries me; silly is silly no matter how many smart people believe it. I hope you wouldn't consider yourself arrogant if you disagreed with something others considered very important. Sure, it's evidence that you'd better tread carefully and be sure you're right, but it's nothing more than that.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duhem–Quine_thesis:
"Quine even believed that logic and mathematics can also be revised in light of experience, and presented quantum logic as evidence for this. Years later he retracted this position; in his book Philosophy of Logic, he said that to revise logic would be essentially "changing the subject". In classic logic, connectives are defined according to truth values. The connectives in a multi-valued logic, however, have a different meaning than those of classic logic. As for quantum logic, it is not even a logic based on truth values, so the logical connectives lose the original meaning of classic logic."
"I know I do not want to be eaten by sharks right now because my behavior indicates that to be the case: I am not seeking a pool of hungry sharks right now, am I?"
How do you know you're not seeking a pool of hungry sharks right now? (I'm not being cheeky, I genuinely am interested in how you know or "know" or whatever term you might use.)
From a more reliable Wikipedia article, In Philosophy of Logic (the chapter titled "Deviant Logics"), Quine rejects the idea case that classical logic should be revised in response to the paradoxes,being concerned with "a serious loss of simplicity", and "the handicap of having to think within a deviant logic". Quine, though, stood by his claim that logic is in principle not immune to revision.
His philosophy absolutely necessitates that logic be revisable.
AJ:"I know I do not want to be eaten by sharks right now because my behavior indicates that to be the case: I am not seeking a pool of hungry sharks right now, am I?" How do you know you're not seeking a pool of hungry sharks right now? (I'm not being cheeky, I genuinely am interested in how you know or "know" or whatever term you might use.)
Now that is an interesting question!
I can only tell you what I know based on the best theory I have from the observable data available. (I take "demonstrated preference" seriously.)
OK, so Quine does require that logic be revisable. If you can give me a very brief definition of what Quine means by logic and why he holds that position, I promise to treat it charitably. Does he mean anything like "logic is just a tool we developed to better navigate the sensory world"? By the definition of logic as I understand it, the notion of "revising" it at all would be incoherent. So he must mean something a little different.
On the shark thing, I know you must "get" what I mean about feeling a certain private sensation (fear, dread, or whatever) when you imagine being eaten by a shark. So I'm basically wondering in what exact fashion you're _____-ing that private sensation. In the blank might go "rejecting," "mistrusting," "seeing as incoherent," or something else.
Your "demonstrated preference"? How would you know that?
Philosophers; we've been babbling incessantly for over 5000years, but have we really said anything? I guess it depends on what you mean by "say." Or what I mean by "mean."
o.O
In States a fresh law is looked upon as a remedy for evil. Instead of themselves altering what is bad, people begin by demanding a law to alter it. ... In short, a law everywhere and for everything!
~Peter Kropotkin