Means and Ends

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AJ replied on Thu, Feb 3 2011 11:41 AM

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Adam Knott:

I can conceive that I experience the present while "aiming" for the future.  In this conception, I do not experience, or observe, or perceive the future.  But yet I or we do refer to it.  Thus, I refer to something I do not observe: the future.   The future is fundamentally unobservable in the conception of the future arising out of the phenomenon or conception of action.

I can interpret this meaningfully if I imagine that "the future" means two different things:

(1) the future in general, i.e., whatever is going to happen after now (I know not what)

(2) a specific state of affairs anticipated (a cat walks in front of your monitor, or a delicate aroma is experienced).

I can refer to (1) without experiencing anything more than whatever internally alerts me that I mean something that is going to happen (rather than something that has happened, etc.). I can also refer to (2) by seeing something specific, like imagining a cat walking in front of the monitor I am using, or imagining the aroma of chai ginger tea, and then writing words. I mean this only in the simple sense that if you didn't at some point imagine something like an image of a cat walking in front of a monitor, or if you didn't somehow imagine the chai tea or the smell of it, you couldn't have interpreted those words in any useful way for practical matters like dealing with cats or deciding what you are about to be served (do you agree? If we are stuck at this point then I will know where to focus and not waste time with other things.).

Now supposing you are with me on that, above you said, "I refer to something I do not observe: the future." By "future" I thought you meant (2), so the question is, do you really observe the cat or the chai tea when you imagine it just for a fleeting moment, or does it not count as observing unless you are experiencing the real thing? If it has to be "the real thing," that would - to my understanding - violate the methodological constraints of Mises's method as you mentioned in the quote below, as any talk to the effect that "observing an anticipated future of a cat walking in front of your monitor is not actually observing such a state of affairs" would posit a reality existing outside the first-person perspective and enter the naturalistic/physicalist view. 

Adam Knott:

the main point is to suggest a certain theoretical path that Mises was walking along; the path that tries to conceive all phenomena from the point of view of individual action.  This is the methodological individualism or methodological subjectivism at the center of Mises's praxeology.

In other words, I want to make sure we aren't accidentally inserting the idea of an objective reality by using the word observe. To be consistent it surely has to refer to something I actually experience, devoid of any connotations about "reality." Then that would make unobservables also, by definition, unexperienceables. (Right?)

By the way, does this have any relevance to what you were saying in the last posts? The claim I am suggesting there seems in a way to "conceive all phenomena from the point of view of individual action," although perhaps in a different way from how you meant there.

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Adam Knott replied on Thu, Feb 3 2011 2:19 PM

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Hi AJ:

"...so the question is, do you really observe the cat or the chai tea when you imagine it just for a fleeting moment, or does it not count as observing unless you are experiencing the real thing?"

By definition, 'observing' and 'imagining for a fleeting moment' will be considered different ways of saying the same thing.   We are defining/conceiving a basic unit/element of action/consciousness for purposes of analysis; what you refer to as a sensation and I call a perceptual presence.

"Exact science [praxeology], accordingly, does not examine the regularities  in the succession, etc., of real phenomena either.  It examines, rather, how more complicated phenomena develop from the simplest, in part even unempirical elements of the real world in their (likewise unempirical) isolation from all other influences..."  (Menger, Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences) (bold emphasis and bracketed added)

******

"...or does it not count as observing unless you are experiencing the real thing?"

To me, this question implies or entails a separate theory that defines or conceives a category of "real" things and a category of "unreal" things.   I think you agree that if one writes, for example, about the "real economy," then to be theoretically consistent, one should be prepared to provide an explanation or conception of the "unreal economy" which the former concept formally implies.  

Let's substitute "perceived thing" or "sensed thing" for "real thing."

Then your question becomes:

"...or does it not count as observing unless you are experiencing the perceived/sensed thing?"

Now we're getting close to a tautological definition. 

Hayek's definition of praxeology or the Pure Logic of Choice:

"...the system of tautologies--those series of propositions which are necessarily true because they are merely transformations of the assumptions from which we start..."   (essay, "Economics and Knowledge")

******

As I understand it, in a theory of action (a theory of goal-directed activity) the proper distinction is not that between the real and the unreal.  It is the distinction between the "had" and the "aimed for."   When we speak or conceive in terms of "real" and "unreal" we objectify both categories and imply that in nature there are real and unreal entities.   We take things out of the conceptual framework of individual action in which an actor has a state of affairs and aims for a different state of affairs.  We inadvertently put forth a theory of nature (a theory of real and unreal things, or at least theory of different kinds of things) rather than a theory of action (a theory of had and aimed for things).

"In an a prioristic science, we start with a general supposition--action is taken to substitute one state of affairs for another..."

(Mises, The Free Market and its Enemies)

The proper distinction in a theory of action is not between two states of affairs, state 1 and state 2, but rather between the state of affairs confronting the actor, and a future state which, as it is not yet actualized or attained, is not strictly speaking a "state."

The reason this is difficult to conceive is because the two categories in such a binary category system of thought (the category of the present state of affairs, and the category of the aimed for state of affairs) are fundamentally different in nature (the aimed for state of affairs can never be perceptually present), and yet both categories are represented in written or spoken theory by "present" things (written words, spoken words, etc.)

Thus there is an "asymmetry of category representation."  The category of perceived objects or sensed objects (present means) is represented by a perceptual symbol such as "perceptions" or "sensations."   But so is the category of (not yet present) ends represented by a perceptual symbol such as "ends" or "future goods," etc...

In the attempt to conceive the second category that stands in logical relation to the category of perceived or sensed objects (the category of not yet present ends, as opposed to the category of presently utilized means), we are forced into a situation where we try to delineate the essentially non-perceptible by means of perceptual presences (written words, spoken words, etc.). 

In short, we describe perceptions by perceptions, and non-perceptions by perceptions (hence an asymmetry).  This is a situation that likely cannot be "overcome," and therefore must be dealt with as a permanent feature of the theory, much like quantum indeterminism (in the Copenhagen interpretation).  I.e., this situation is not to be, and likely cannot be "overcome," but is rather to be incorporated as an essential part of the theory.

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AJ replied on Fri, Feb 4 2011 2:05 AM

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On the first two sections, I agree of course. I was just making doubly sure you weren't inadvertantly bringing in the real/unreal split. 

Where I disagree is in your last two paragraphs, where you explicitly reference non-perceptions even though you seem to be working under a methodological constraint that would make "non-perceptions" meaningless:

Adam Knott:

Again, whatever complications or epistemological problems may be entailed in extending this line of reasoning, the main point is to suggest a certain theoretical path that Mises was walking along; the path that tries to conceive all phenomena from the point of view of individual action.  This is the methodological individualism or methodological subjectivism at the center of Mises's praxeology.

It appears that the application of this constraint makes "non-perceptions"/"unobservables"/etc. meaningless. Now to answer this objection, it seems you could either say that (1) this constraint does not actually make them meaningless, or you could say that (2) the fact that a fundamental term in your conception is meaningless is an acceptable or unavoidable situation (or both). With your bringing up Heisenberg, I am guessing you are taking the latter position (2). But perhaps you are taking the former position (1), or both (1) and (2). I don't know, and I would like to know, because it is very hard to address anything without knowing. We would just talk past each other. So it would help to have a direct answer on that, even if it is to say that there is a third option. 

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Adam Knott replied on Fri, Feb 4 2011 4:24 PM

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AJ:

The short answer to your question is:  #2:

".. the fact that a fundamental term in your conception is meaningless is an acceptable or unavoidable situation (or both)."

However, with an important footnote.

Above you've introduced a standard (meaningless/meaningful) for appraising a proposed conception.  But as I understand it, the standard you are applying is totally arbitrary.  I mean this in the theoretical sense, not the derogatory sense.  You are not claiming that that the proposed concept doesn't accurately correspond to the phenomenon it is designed to correspond to, and you are not claiming that the proposed concept contradicts other concepts of the proposed theory (internal consistency).  You are simply introducing an arbitrary standard apparently taken from another theory in which things are conceived to be either 'meaningful' or 'meaningless.'

To understand my point, another theorist could just as easily claim that the conception under discussion is "not rational."  This would obviously imply that the claimant was working with a theory in which the ultimate standard to be applied to a theory or concept is whether such a theory or concept is "rational" or "irrational."   Yet another theorist could just as easily claim that the proposed concept was moral or immoral, right or wrong, good or bad, blessed or damned, objective or not objective, etc....    I think it is easy to see that all of these binary concept pairs, including meaningless/meaningful, are not terms that have an unambiguous and fixed definition, but are rather terms that are to be defined within a larger theory. 

The claim that concept X (which is part of theory 1 that does not contain the concept pair meaningful/meaningless) is meaningless, is essentially the same as the claim that concept X is not part of theory 2, or is inconsistent with theory 2.

I agree with this.  But I interpret you as trying to say something more, such as that concept X is 'defective' or something similar.  (which would introduce a new standard of appraisal, defective/not-defective, and imply a theory 3 in which things are categorized as either defective or not defective)

In short, I don't think we can consider the term 'meaningful' as some sort of objective standard unrelated to a theory in which the binary pair meaningful/meaningless are rigorously defined.

****

In support of what I'm arguing, I will substitute for the terms you have introduced, and which are part of a different theory, the appropriate term(s) taken from my theory.

Following Mises, I employ the binary concept pairs "satisfaction/dissatisfaction" or "happiness/unhappiness".   I consider the two pairs synonymous.

Substituting the concept from my theory in your expressed objection gives:

1.  "It appears that the application of this constraint makes "non-perceptions" / "unobservables" / etc. dissatisfactory."

and

2.  "The fact that a fundamental term in your conception is dissatisfactory is an acceptable or unavoidable situation (or both)."

(bold underlined is where I substituted terms)

When I substitute a term taken from my theory for the term you provided which is part of a different theory, the result is, I believe, less "dissatisfactory".

I generally agree with both #1 and #2 just above, when my own conception is used.   And that is because I'm trying to construct a theory which is, among other things, internally consistent.

If the categories of action or consciousness are conceived as satisfaction/dissatisfaction, then the theoretical choice that may confront us may be the choice between 1:  a theory of action in which the dissatisfaction in/of our action manifests as an inconsistency in the theory, and 2:  a theory of action that is accurate and internally consistent, but gains these qualities by intentionally "embedding" the phenomenon/category of dissatisfaction as an "attempt" of the actor during the act of trying to perceive/conceive the theory.

In other words, if we conceive the fundamental categories of action as satisfaction/dissatisfaction, we may not be able, for this very reason, to arrive at a totally satisfactory theory of action, and our choice may be where we choose to "place," theoretically, the dissatisfaction that is an unavoidable aspect of any action endeavor, theory being one of them.  The choice may be between a plainly inconsistent theory of action (dissatisfaction manifests as inconsistency) or a consistent theory of action with dissatisfaction intentionally designed as an experience of the actor occurring during the attempt to conceive/perceive the theory (dissatisfaction manifests as part of the theory).

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Lyle replied on Fri, Feb 4 2011 4:54 PM

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IMO, imaginary and intangible are not necessarily the same.  Therefore, ends need not necessarily be imaginary.

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AJ replied on Sat, Feb 5 2011 3:32 AM

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Adam,

I think this is progessing now, as I finally see just how to phrase what I want to say.

By (2), I do not offer any theory or standard. I am making a more basic point: I simply cannot figure out how to interpret "non-perceptibles" in the context you have used it. It is not that I don't find your theory satisfactory, it is that I don't find your theory at all. Let me rephrase (2) to get rid of the misleading term "meaningless":

"The fact that I cannot interpret a fundamental term in your conception is an acceptable or unavoidable situation."

This seemed to be what you were implying via Heisenberg, that the insistence on complete logical clarification would make science impossible.

If I may digress for a moment, I think you will agree with the following:

- You have ideas, and your aim in writing these posts is to get others to entertain the same ideas in order to accept or reject them.

- If someone has no idea how to interpret the words you are using, they cannot know what ideas you have, so they cannot evaluate them.

That is all I am saying with regard to "non-perceptibles." The word simply does not communicate anything to me in that context. I would say I am simply asking for clarification, but I anticipate you raising Heisenberg in response to the clarification request. Yet even assuming Heisenberg had a point, surely we can agree that there is a difference between a minor inconsistency or handwave somewhere, and a reader having no inkling of how to interpret a key term of the theory.

This is the case with "non-perceptibles"; the word is no clearer to me in that context than if you had instead written zxqwxzh6fyg. I am not critiquing anything about your theory, because I don't know what your theory is; I am asking for clarification on your terms in hopes of gaining even the first clue about what a certain part of your theory is intending - a part that seems fundamental to understand in order to evaluate it.

Hence if anything I have written is to be taken as a critique, it could only be, at most, a critique of your word choice. I trust that there is some thought you wish to convey by those words, but the words you have chosen for that purpose have not helped me to find any interpretation. 

---

That is my entire point, but now I would like to present an analogy to flesh out the very same point, and perhaps hint at where I suspect the discussion could lead (which is of course total conjecture at this point).

Imagine a man comes along with a theory that everything was actually shades of gray back in ancient Greek times. Really, everthing was gray, nothing had any hue. At one point he says, "So there was this one ancient Greek guy with a red hat." The natural response would be, "I thought everything was shades of gray, with no other colors." Then he says,

"It was, but this guy had a red hat."

"Isn't that contradictory?"

"It may be, but so what? You can't insist on complete logical clarification."

"Very well, but wouldn't it be clearer to say that everything was gray except for that guy's red hat?"

"No, his hat was gray, too. It was both completely gray and no other color...and at the same time completely red and no other color."

"I don't think you are getting through to me, because I cannot figure out how to entertain any idea that would correspond with those words."

"Isn't the word red clear enough? I mean, look at the sash across the LvMI coat of arms. That is red."

"It is clear in that context, but in the context of your theory, where as I understand it everything is always and only shades of grey, I cannot interpret the words there was this ancient Greek guy with a red hat. In particular the word red seems meaningless given the premise of the theory. Or rather, I cannot figure out how to interpret the word red in that context."

"Don't you remember what I said about complete logical clarification? You are holding me to too high a standard and finding my theory dissatisfying."

"No, it's not your theory I find dissatsifying, it's the fact that I don't even understand what you intend by the words you are using. Hence I don't know what your theory even is. That situation is what I find dissatisfying. At most you could say I find your use of terms unclear. Could you choose others?"

"All right. He wore a crimson hat. Or, he wore a scarlet hat."

"And those are still non-gray colors?"

"Yup."

"And yet there were no non-gray colors. That is to say, there were non-gray colors, but there were not any non-gray colors."

"Yeah, you got it."

"Actually I don't get it. I still cannot figure out how to interpret those words."

"Well you see, it's just like the particle-wave duality. It is contradictory and uninterpretable, but it works for science."

"How is the particle-wave duality contradictory or uninterpretable? I can interpret it to mean that photons share some characteristics with particles and some characteristics with waves. That doesn't necessitate any contradictions all by itself."

"Right, but there actually are contradictions: the photon exists both at one point - and only one point - and at the same time it exists distributed over here and over there."

"Well I agree, that is a contradiction, or better to say that I have no idea how to interpret those words. Because 'the photon exists only at one point' makes me think that the photon cannot exist at any more than one point, yet the words say it does. I cannot imagine such a situation."

"As Heisenberg said, we have to move beyond the idea that everything can be imagined. Science requires that we imagine unimaginables."

"No, you see, I cannot imagine such a situation, so how can I evaluate it? You yourself claim not to be able to imagine the situation, yet you speak about it. How is that communicating anything?"

"It is communicating something because it is language, and language communications things."

"Not always. What if you are just repeating words from your memory, with no thought behind them?"

"Words are thoughts. All thoughts are words, and all words are thoughts."

"OK, well that is where I cannot agree. But at least now I see that this is the fundamental point where we seem to differ" (with this imaginary historian at least).

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Adam Knott replied on Sat, Feb 5 2011 2:01 PM

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AJ:

Here is a passage from Human Action.  Speaking of natural scientists, Mises writes:

"Only in recent years have they begun to see the limits of their endeavors and, abandoning the excessive pretensions of older physicists, discovered the "uncertainty principle."  They realize today that there are unobservables whose unobservability is a matter of epistemological principle."

When I first read that passage, I understood its meaning immediately. 

The first reason is because I never interpreted the uncertainty principle as saying something about 'objective nature.'  I always interpreted the uncertainty principle as saying something about the limits of knowledge generally, or the epistemological limits of knowledge generally.   As I understand it, these limits apply not only to 'physical' knowledge, but will apply to praxeological knowledge as well.  Thus I expected that if the uncertainty principle is valid, something like the uncertainty principle will or must exist in praxeology as well as in physics.

Second, having been involved in praxeological theory, I can see how the nature of the phenomenon indicates or requires this approach.  If the two categories [means/ends, happiness/unhappiness, satisfaction/dissatisfaction, supply/value, etc., etc., ] we refer to in theory are conceived as fundamentally the same (i.e., both perceptible or perceptual in nature), this leads to an unavoidable inconsistency in the theory.  This inconsistency can only be eliminated, at least as far as I can see, by the assumption of a category of the fundamentally un-perceptible.

What I've been trying to explain is that this concept cannot be satisfactorily explained in perceptual terms (by referring to perceptions).  We can't say: the category of non-perceptibles is like "X", where X is some perceptual experience. 

I think at least some sense of the profound nature of the Heisenberg/Bohr principle is required to get a sense of the theoretical situation.

In Bohr's Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature, Bohr refers over and over again to the "fundamentally unvisualizable character of the problems concerned." (p.12)

He keeps mentioning the idea of "pictures" and "visualizability" and he says that quantum physics entails a fundamental renunciation of them. 

"all the concepts of previous theories rest on pictures which demand the possibility of continuous variation." (p.29)

"an essential failure of the pictures in space and time on which the description of natural phenomena has hitherto been based." (p.34)

"we meet, in the problem of the structure of atoms...a case where the...solution of the ...problem does not possess the ...properties which seem to be necessary for the mechanical picturing of the stationary states." (p.39)

In a chapter entitled "Insufficiency of Mechanical Pictures", Bohr continues to harp on this same theme:

"The analysis....has brought to light a number of features which could not be interpreted with mechanical pictures..." (p.42)

"which prevents a unique assignment of quantum indices on the basis of mechanical pictures." (43)

"it must be remembered, however, that the results do not allow of a unique association with mechanical pictures. (45)

"it stood in strange contradiction to the use of the mechanical pictures previously employed for an analysis of the stationary states." (47)

Bohr continues this theme throughout the book:

"fundamental difficulties involved in the construction of pictures of the interaction between atoms..." (50)

"To the physicists it will at first seem deplorable that in atomic problems we have apparently met with such a limitation of our usual means of visualization." (51)

"As we shall see, such a procedure necessitates a further departure from visualization in the usual sense." (62)

"On the whole, it would scarcely seem justifiable, in the case of the interaction problem, to demand a visualization by means of ordinary space-time pictures." (77)

"The renunciation regarding space-time pictures..." (84)

"a renunciation as to visualization in the ordinary sense." (90)

"In considering the resignation with regard to the desires for visualization.... to which we are compelled by the situation discussed above..." (98)

"quite incapable of being represented by visualizable pictures." (99)

"we may be concerned here with an unvisualizable relation of complementarity." (100)

"we can hardly escape the conviction that in the facts which are revealed to us by the quantum theory and lie outside the domain of our ordinary forms of perception...." (101)

"Quite apart from the fundamental question of whether we are justified in demanding visualizable pictures...." (102)

"Indeed, only by a conscious resignation of our usual demands for visualization...." (108)

In this passage, Bohr writes what I tried to explain above:

"On the whole, this point of view [quantum physics] offers a consistent way of ordering the experimental data, but the consistency is admittedly only achieved by the renunciation of all attempts to obtain a detailed description of the individual transition processes." (109)

I interpret this as meaning that the consistency of the theory is only achieved by fundamentally renouncing the demand for a visualizable account or account by means of mechanical pictures.  In other words, in order to achieve theoretical consistency (inconsistency is when dissatisfaction manifests as a contradiction in the theory), we are forced to "place" the category of dissatisfaction so that it manifests as a fundamentally non-perceptible aspect of/in the theory.  Again, since it seems we cannot eradicate or eliminate the category of dissatisfaction, assuming it is a category of action or consciousness, then our choice is one of "where" the dissatisfaction manifests.  Either our theory is inconsistent, in which case dissatisfaction manifests as theoretical contradiction, or, our theory is consistent, and this is achieved by arranging it so that the dissatisfaction results from a fundamental inability to perceive (to visualize) one component or aspect of the theory.  In no case is dissatisfaction eliminated.

Your reply seems to be: "Yes, but I'm dissatisfied in that I cannot interpret what you mean."

I don't know exactly how to reply to you.  It just seems to me as though you are demanding as your standard for meaningful interpretation, the very thing which I'm trying to say cannot be produced if theoretical consistency be maintained.  It is as if you were to ask Bohr for further clarification, not directly by asking him for visualizable pictures, but by continuing to ask him over and over for further clarification, implying indirectly that you wouldn't be satisfied until you received an answer couched in terms of visualizable pictures.  Meanwhile, what Bohr is trying to communicate by constantly repeating phrases such as "fundamental renunciation of our demands for visualization" is that  the answer you require to meet your standard of meaningfulness must necessarily render the theory inconsistent.  

As I understand it, your demand reduces to the preference for an inconsistent theory (dissatisfaction manifests as a theoretical contradiction) over a theory in which the category of dissatisfaction is embedded in the theory as an "unobservable whose unobservability is a matter of epistemological principle."

*****

Here is another way I can try to reply to your objections.  Consider this passage from Heisenberg:

"Therefore, the transition from the "possible" to the "actual" takes place during the act of observation.  If we want to describe what happens in an atomic event, we have to realize that the word "happens" can apply only to the observation, not to the state of affairs between two observations." (Physics and Philosophy, p.54)

According to your approach, it will be relatively easy to dissect and deconstruct Heisenberg's words and show that they are "meaningless."

Heisenberg says that the word "happens" can only apply to the observation, but not to "the state of affairs between two observations."

But we can ask Heisenberg for further clarification on exactly what he means by "the state of affairs between two observations."

He has referred to such a thing.  Then, how can such a thing "exist," but yet, the word "happens" doesn't apply to it ??

How can there be a "state of affairs" in which nothing "happens" ?    Doesn't a "state of affairs" necessarily have to be something that happens?

How can a state of affairs not happen ?

Heisenberg was aware of this situation.  He wrote:

"Therefore, in the process of penetration [into the remote parts of knowledge] we are bound sometimes to use our concepts in a way which is not justified and which carries no meaning.  Insistence on the postulate of complete logical clarification would make science impossible.  We are reminded here by modern physics of the old wisdom that the one who insists on never uttering an error must remain silent." (p.86)

Heisenberg wasn't consciously involved in praxeology, but I believe he arrived at essential praxeological insights indirectly via physics.

My argument is that if we begin from the assumption that the categories of action/consciousness are something like:  satisfaction/dissatisfaction, happiness/unhappiness, ease/unease, etc..., then the category of dissatisfaction may have to be incorporated in the theory of action at a more fundamental level than previously realized.

Again, this assumes that theoretical consistency is the goal. 

My point is that the demand that all categories of action be definable in terms of perceptions may be fulfilled, but doing so may require relinquishing theoretical consistency.   I.e., the idea that quantum complementarity is consistently conceived as an epistemological phenomenon (a phenomenon of action), not a "physical" phenomenon (not a phenomenon of nature).

Of course this could be wrong.  Then one simply has to produce a consistent theory of action in which all the aspects and categories of the theory are satisfactorily visualizable and/or perceptible.

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AJ replied on Sun, Feb 6 2011 4:41 AM

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Adam,

Thank you for the detailed reply, especially the many quotes from Bohr. I feel we are progressing to the heart of the matter. Whereas before I had no idea where you were coming from, now I think I see several clear points to focus discussion on.

Since I will be busy for the next day or so, I'll mention the general form of what I think my response will be:

I will raise some points that I think call into question the utility of the approach to science that Bohr and Heisenberg are suggesting, building on some of the points I started to touch on above regarding imaginability/visualizability/experiencability. Also - and here you may wish to say something in the meantime - I will ask you for clarification on this:

Adam Knott:

Second, having been involved in praxeological theory, I can see how the nature of the phenomenon indicates or requires this approach.  If the two categories [means/ends, happiness/unhappiness, satisfaction/dissatisfaction, supply/value, etc., etc., ] we refer to in theory are conceived as fundamentally the same (i.e., both perceptible or perceptual in nature), this leads to an unavoidable inconsistency in the theory.  This inconsistency can only be eliminated, at least as far as I can see, by the assumption of a category of the fundamentally un-perceptible.

In particular, I am wondering what your reasons are for thinking such an inconsistency is unavoidable in that case. (Since it seems a rather strong claim to say that there is no possible way of avoiding an inconsistency.)

And if possible, perhaps in that reply or in later ones, I would like to - if I come up with anything in the meantime - try to propose a way to "make it all perceptible," or at least point toward such a possibility, or how one might go about coming up with such a theory/elucidation. Finally, since I will be arguing that embracing contradictions is not an effective way to advance, I will - if I can come up with something - try to suggest or ask about some possible ways in which the apparent contradiction might be resolved.

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Adam Knott replied on Mon, Feb 7 2011 12:55 PM

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AJ:

Regarding this:

"If the two categories [means/ends, happiness/unhappiness, satisfaction/dissatisfaction, supply/value, etc., etc., ] we refer to in theory are conceived as fundamentally the same (i.e., both perceptible or perceptual in nature), this leads to an unavoidable inconsistency in the theory.  This inconsistency can only be eliminated, at least as far as I can see, by the assumption of a category of the fundamentally un-perceptible."

You asked:

"I am wondering what your reasons are for thinking such an inconsistency is unavoidable in that case."

*****

As I understand it, the reasons are the following.

We start with the goal, which is the determination of strict laws of phenomena:

"The aim of this orientation, which in the future we will call the exact one....is the determination of strict laws of phenomena, of regularities in the succession of phenomena which do not present themselves to us as absolute, but which in respect to the approaches to cognition by which we attain to them simply bear within themselves the guarantee of absoluteness.  It is the determination of laws of phenomena which....should be designated by the expression "exact laws." (Menger, Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences)

So this is praxeology, and the goal is exact laws; laws that must necessarily be "true" because, as Menger and Mises will assert, we cannot meaningfully think of the negation of what they assert.

It is this goal which guides or directs the endeavor, and ultimately this goal which determines the suitability of the conceptual means of attaining it.

In another post, JohnnyFive wrote the following:

The reason not all statements of the form 'If you do X, Y will result' cannot be praxeological is because they can refer to particulars rather than universals. Praxeological statements always refer to categories, not instantiations of a category.

So for example 'action' in Mises statement above is an umbrella under which an undenumerable number of actual actions take place, and the praxeological statemnent is a claim to a description of every single human action that has occured, past future and present.

Whereas the statement ' "If I try to change the text to black, wasting my time will be the result (since it already is black." is a particular instance, and that statement has no ability to describe any other instances.

(emphasis added)

JohnnyFive agrees with Mises that praxeology is formal and does not refer to particular content:

"Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a historical science.  Its scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and individual circumstances of the concrete acts.  Its cognition is purely formal and general without reference to the material content and the particular features of the actual case." (HA)

"Praxeology is not concerned wit the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and its categorial structure." (HA)

"The cognition of praxeology is conceptual cognition.  It refers to what is necessary in human action.  It is cognition of universals and categories." (HA)

We don't have to agree that praxeology is purely formal and only deals with categories just because Mises says it is.  It is the aim of determining exact laws of human action that in my view forces the theoretical structure to be constructed in terms of categories and not particulars.  As JohnnyFive explains:

So for example 'action' in Mises statement above is an umbrella under which an undenumerable number of actual actions take place, and the praxeological statemnent is a claim to a description of every single human action that has occured, past future and present.

Whereas the statement ' "If I try to change the text to black, wasting my time will be the result (since it already is black." is a particular instance, and that statement has no ability to describe any other instances.

My argument is that we refer to content as soon as we make distinctions between our various perceptions (e.g., "black text" versus "red text").

In order to avoid making distinctions between perceptions and thus referring to content, we can construct a category of perceptions or sensations "as such."   That is, a general category of perceptions or sensations.   Belonging to this category are all perceptions/sensations "as such,' which means without reference to any distinctions between the various perceptions/sensations  (imagined/real, sooner/later, direct/indirect, internal/external, vivid/dull, private/public, etc., etc.)

By constructing or conceiving a category of perceptions 'in general,' we can avoid making distinctions between perceptions, and thus avoid introducing content into our scheme, and thus preserve the universality of our statements.

We need at least two 'categories,' since the exact law has to assert a relationship between two non-identical phenomena, A and B.   The second category (let's call it the category of ends) cannot contain or be comprised of something by which it could be perceptually distinguished from the category of perceptible objects (let's call it the category of means).  Otherwise, we're back to contentual distinctions.  Thus, the second category cannot have any physical distinctions.  This accords with Hayek's conclusions at the time when he was making praxeological insights in the 30's and 40's:

"Are the human actions which we observe, and the objects of these actions, things of the same or different kind because they appear physically the same or different to us.....or for some other reason?"

"What I am arguing is that no physical properties can enter into the explicit definition of any of these classes [of the social sciences], because the elements of these classes need not possess common physical attributes."

"The common attributes which the elements of any of these classes possess are not physical attributes but must be something else."

(Hayek, "The Facts of the Social Sciences")

*******

"I would like to.... try to propose a way to "make it all perceptible," or at least point toward such a possibility, or how one might go about coming up with such a theory/elucidation."

When you eventually sketch this proposal for a theory of action/consciousness, I hope you will devote a new thread to it.

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AJ replied on Tue, Feb 8 2011 2:33 AM

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Adam Knott:

We need at least two 'categories,' since the exact law has to assert a relationship between two non-identical phenomena, A and B.   The second category (let's call it the category of ends) cannot contain or be comprised of something by which it could be perceptually distinguished from the category of perceptible objects (let's call it the category of means).  Otherwise, we're back to contentual distinctions. 

Wouldn't it be all right for the theory to reference two types of perceptions, just calling them A and B, without specifying anything about what distinguishes them, only that they are distinct for the actor? In other words, what you've explained here seems to prohibit the theory from saying, "These two categories are distinguished in this [such-and-such particular] way," but it does not seem to prohibit the theory from saying, "There are two categories distinguished in some way by the actor."

Also, I don't see how a statement can be entirely content-free. Even Mises's statement, "Action is an attempt to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory one," tacitly refers to an actor. Isn't that content? It seems to me that "purely formal" is a matter of degree (the word purely being misleading; probably should be extremely or something). I seem to recall you once saying that it is very hard for humans to grasp purely formal concepts; now that I consider it again it seems not just hard but impossible. In other words, I am noncognitive to the expression "purely formal"; I don't know how to interpret it.

To take a more concrete example, in The Logic of Happiness you write: 

With regard to the formal axiom “line,” what appears perceptually is never a line  strictly speaking, but always perceptual presences having width, depth, and presenting concretely and perceptually.  What is a formal line, or the axiom “line,” may be defined by referring to concrete “reference phenomena,” in each  of which the formal axiom “line” does not appear as it is defined.

Here you make it clear that one cannot fully get at the concept of a "formal line," and of course it follows that no one can ever experience a "formal line" - they will instead experience some sensory phenomena that we all agree is not a formal line. But there is an elephant in the room here: If no one has ever experienced a formal line, how could they possibly - merely by coining a word - have conveyed that non-experience to anyone else?

It seems we agree that the answer to [What goes here?] in the picture does not include any formal lines. The belief here is that one can create a new concept just by naming it, that "formal line" is being communicated even though it is not to be found in (1) and certainly not in (3), that somehow it is simply contained in the words themselves.

Why is there this tendency? We are used to thinking of communication as a process wherein one (1) has an idea, (2) speaks, and then (3) hopes the same idea will appear in another person's mind. As such, we are used to assuming that anyone sincerely trying to convey something to us through words has actually got that something in his or her mind. Hence we accept their words and try to interpret them. If we fail to, and yet the words are respected as legitimate, we tend to assume it is a shortcoming on our part. Or we hear reassuringly that it is impossible to interpret them anyway. But as soon as we hear that, we know the tail must be wagging the dog; the process of 1-2-3 has been turned on its head, and we can no longer assume that there is actually anything to communicate.

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AJ replied on Tue, Feb 8 2011 4:16 AM

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Adam Knott, bold and numbers by AJ:

As I understand it, your demand reduces to the preference for (1) an inconsistent theory (dissatisfaction manifests as a theoretical contradiction) over a theory in which the category of dissatisfaction is embedded in the theory as an (2) "unobservable whose unobservability is a matter of epistemological principle."

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AJ replied on Tue, Feb 8 2011 6:05 AM

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ETA: Actually it may well be a few days, so feel free to respond to my partial comments in the meantime if you'd like to.

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Adam Knott replied on Tue, Feb 8 2011 2:07 PM

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AJ:

"...my goal is simply to find some way to experience what you experienced that prompted you to write what you are writing"

I can provide an answer to this, but this won't solve the problem you are trying to solve.  Because you are trying to make the ideas I'm advocating square with your already formed ideas on consciousness and perceptions, i.e., your own theory of action or consciousness.  And your theory precludes the conception of unobservability which mine contains.

I can communicate what an unobservable is probably well enough to someone who may have reached the point where they are convinced that the solution to the problems concerned cannot be solved by standard, familiar, 'objective,' and/or common sense ideas.  But I may not be able to convince one who is advocating an alternate or competing theory.

By 'unobservables,' I mean "things" such as:

a.  the back of the basketball

b.  another person's thoughts, opinions, ends, purposes, intentions,etc.

c.  universals

d.  the future

I'm not making the argument that no other theory of these phenomena can be advanced.  I'm advancing a particular theory that conceives these things as "unobservables."

I'm arguing that the conception of a category of unobservability is required owing to certain theoretical presuppositions. 

When we theoretically presuppose or assume a category of 'satisfaction' [usefulness, success, attainment, happiness, etc.], which we do in a theory of action, this formally or logically implies a category of 'dissatisfaction' [not useful, failure, non attainment, unhappiness].  

Following up on what JohnnyFive wrote previously, the categories must be conceived or constructed such that each category is part of every action.  Also, I believe the categories must be nonidentical.

Also, remember that the aim is exact laws, and the phenomena to be explained are social phenomena such as socialism, coercion, etc...

*****

AJ, I think you are working with a different theory of who Heisenberg is.  I'm working with the Richard Feynman theory.    : - )

"Heisenberg noticed, when he discovered the laws of quantum mechanics, that the new laws of nature that he had discovered could only be consistent if there were some basic limitation to our experimental abilities that had not been previously recognized."

"Heisenberg proposed his uncertainty principle which, stated in terms of our own experiment, is the following....'It is impossible to design any apparatus whatsoever to determine through which hole the electron passes that will not at the same time disturb the electron enough to destroy the interference pattern.'  No one has found a way around this."

"Probability amplitudes are very strange, and the first thing you think is that the strange new ideas are clearly cock-eyed.  Yet everything that can be deduced from the ideas of the existence of quantum mechanical probability amplitudes, strange though they are, do work, throughout the long list of strange particles, one hundred percent."

(The Character of Physical Law, emphasis added)

As I understand it, not only was Heisenberg the one who formulated physical science's counterpart to Hume's is-ought gap, but his positive theory of the behavior of atomic particles ranks as one of the greatest scientific achievements of the twentieth century. 

What theory of Heisenberg are you working with ?

*****

"What one could imagine happened with Heisenberg and Bohr was that they came to something they could not explain, but instead of proposing a theory that would account for some of the data and not others, or a theory that would account for all of the data but was too general to yet be very useful, they instead chose a contradictory theory simply because it could be made to account for the most data the most "elegantly.""

I see.  Your theory of Heisenberg.

I'll suggest an alternate theory:

The ideal of classical physics is/was the description of an objective real world entirely separate from the realm of human purposes.  In other words, the goal of classical physics is a description of an objective nature that is absent the categories of human action and consciousness.  

But there is a problem with this goal in that, as Eddington writes:  "every item of physical knowledge, ....is an assertion of what has been or would be the result of carrying out a specified observational procedure."

The very method of physical science requires that the scientist perform a specific action, and then in a later action, observe what will be considered as the result of the previous action.  Out of this series of actions is supposed to come a result that is entirely absent any reference to the categories of action.

The attempt to carry through the program of classical physics to its logical conclusion, led to the unexpected result that, the observation that would be expected to result from the specified action could only be successfully attained, by positing a phenomenon or situation that must necessarily be considered dissatisfactory by the standards of classical physics (the ideal of a description of nature without any reference to the categories of action).

In introducing the notion of success (happiness), classical physics was inadvertently introducing the notion of unhappiness, while the goal of classical physics was supposed to be a description of objective nature totally separate from action categories (separate from human intentionality and purpose).

We might say this in some way such as the following:

The attempt to achieve success in observation (all terms referring to action or action categories), and at the same time avoid reference to the categories of action, not only proved impossible, but led to the further and unexpected result that the necessary utilization of some action categories in physical science (attempt, observe, succeed, etc.) necessarily introduces all action categories into physical science, one of which is the formally implied logical correlate of [success, achieve, attain, etc.], .....[failure, non achievement, non attainment, etc.].  In short, introduction of the basic concept of happiness into the conceptual scheme necessarily implies the correlate unhappiness.

The formal categories of quantum physics arrived at this conclusion "indirectly" in the sense that "happiness" (a successful observation) is conceived in logical correlation to "unhappiness" which is conceived as a fundamental unobservability. 

In other words, since physics contains action categories in its striving for successful observations, the systematization and formalization of physical concepts entails the systemization and formalization of praxeological concepts.  As the notion satisfaction (success, etc.) is already implied in the endeavor of physics, the formal extension and systematization of physics necessarily entails the eventual conception of the logical correlate of satisfaction/success, and this manifested in quantum physics as the idea of a fundamental unobservable.  In short, the physicists, through quantum mechanics, arrived indirectly and inadvertently at a formal definition of unhappiness.

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Adam Knott replied on Tue, Feb 8 2011 8:41 PM

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AJ:

"Wouldn't it be all right for the theory to reference two types of perceptions, just calling them A and B, without specifying anything about what distinguishes them, only that they are distinct for the actor? In other words, what you've explained here seems to prohibit the theory from saying, "These two categories are distinguished in this [such-and-such particular] way," but it does not seem to prohibit the theory from saying, "There are two categories distinguished in some way by the actor.""

I think this is the kind of question you would probably answer for yourself if you tried to construct a theory that seeks to explain social phenomena in terms of exact laws.

In social science and in social discourse we refer to things such as socialism versus capitalism, coerced action versus voluntary action, social interaction versus isolated action, etc...  The aim of praxeological social theory is to explain these social phenomena in terms of exact laws. (a priori propositions, necessary truths, etc.)      If you envision a theory along the lines of what you propose above that does explain social phenomena in terms of exact laws, I assume you would have to explain how your proposed categories relate to the social phenomena in question, and explain the sense in which your theory conceives laws of succession or co-presence as applying to the social phenomena in question.

****

"Here you make it clear that one cannot fully get at the concept of a "formal line," and of course it follows that no one can ever experience a "formal line" - they will instead experience some sensory phenomena that we all agree is not a formal line. But there is an elephant in the room here: If no one has ever experienced a formal line, how could they possibly - merely by coining a word - have conveyed that non-experience to anyone else?"

One answer is: I may "refer" to Y as opposed to "experiencing" Y perceptually.   I can ask: what does X "imply" [answer: X implies Y] as opposed to asking:  what does Y "look like" [answer: Y looks like Z].

We refer to concepts, universals, other minds, the future, etc...   What does it imply if we refer to them but never experience them as perceptions?

If we refer to X, and if we do not experience X as a perception, what does this imply?

Mises distinguishes between the action, and what is "inferred" from the action:

"We are wont to say that the need for A was more urgent than the need for B.  This is a mode of expression that, under certain circumstances, may be quite expedient.  But as an hypostatization of what was to be explained, it became a source of serious misunderstandings.  It was forgotten that we are able to infer the need only from the action.  Hence, the idea of an action not in conformity with needs is absurd."  (Epistemological Problems of Economics)(emphasis added)

In referring to something that does not appear to us perceptually, and in our inability to do otherwise (as one might argue), we find grounds for the notion of a category of fundamental unobservability.

Theoretically, I think this concept proves its usefulness.   Consider the notions of: gravity, strong force, weak force, other minds, concepts, universals, etc..

********

"Here you make it clear that one cannot fully get at the concept of a "formal line," and of course it follows that no one can ever experience a "formal line" - they will instead experience some sensory phenomena that we all agree is not a formal line. But there is an elephant in the room here: If no one has ever experienced a formal line, how could they possibly - merely by coining a word - have conveyed that non-experience to anyone else?"

I think that by phrasing the question the way you do, you miss the more important question.

You ask essentially:  If A has never experienced a formal line as a perception, how could he by words (by perceptions) convey that formal line to B?

You imply that in constructing a theory of social interaction or communication, one must answer positively whether what A experiences in/as his consciousness has or has not been experienced similarly in/for another person B's consciousness.  The way you have phrased the question does not conceive B as an element(s) of A's consciousness, but rather B here is conceived as a person "existing" in his own right, independent of the consciousness of A, and we are expected to assign a "yes" or "no" to the question of whether B experiences what A experiences after A attempts an act of communication.

We might say that your question is phrased in terms of "intersubjective objectivism."  We are not talking exclusively about the experiences of subject A.

You have implicitly introduced a realistic conceptual framework (objective realism or ontological or metaphysical realism).  You are saying in effect:  There are two people, A and B.  How can A or B know what is in the mind of the other ?    You ask the reader or theorist to consider how one person, A, can successfully transmit a thought to another person, B.    You are not conceiving B from the point of view of A, as an element(s) of A's consciousness.  You presuppose B's real existence.

We can re-phrase this question in terms of methodological individualism and theoretical subjectivism.  Something such as:

"If A experiences things only in terms of the categories of his consciousness, and one of those categories is/are perceptions, then to what category of A's consciousness can we assign another mind assuming that another mind does not appear perceptually to/for A?"

In phrasing the question this way, by methodological individualism/theoretical subjectivism, we do not posit the real existence or ontological reality of another person B.  Instead, we conceive that for person A, any other person or object must be comprised of categorical elements of A's consciousness.  If A's consciousness is comprised of 4 categories, q, r, s, and t, then an assumed person B, for A, must be constituted of elements belonging to categories q, r, s, and t, of A's consciousness.

Thus, the real existence or ontological reality of person B is not assumed.  (Nor is it denied)     Rather, person B is theoretically "constructed," as it were, out of the primary elements (i.e., categories) of A's action/consciousness.

"The nature of this exact orientation of theoretical research in the realm of ethical phenomena, however, consists in the fact that we reduce human phenomena to their most original and simplest constitutive factors.  We join to the latter the measure corresponding to their nature, and finally try to investigate the laws by which more complicated human phenomena are formed from those simplest elements, thought of in their isolation."

(Menger, Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences)(emphasis added)

Obviously in the social sciences as opposed to the physical sciences, the 'simplest constitutive factors' or 'simplest elements' that Menger is referring to will be categorial elements of action/consciousness (such as "value," "supply," "purpose," "satisfaction," etc.) and not physical elements such as "proton," "electron," etc...

If we follow the program Menger outlines, and keep with the procedure of view of methodological individualism, then we will "construct" any activity A may undertake using the categories of A's consciousness (the "simplest constitutive factors" of A's consciousness).   This includes such activities as communicating with B, coercing B, cooperating with B, etc...  There will be in this approach (methodological individualism, theoretical subjectivism) no concept of other people, or of society, or of the market, in the objective sense.    Every person or object, and every aspect of every person or object, will be conceived in terms of the categories of the mind of individual actor A, the actor who apprehends the person/object in question.

"It is important to remember that the...data, from which we set out in this sort of analysis [praxeology], are....all facts given to the person in question [person A], the things as they are known to (or believed by) him to exist, and not, strictly speaking, objective facts.  It is only because of this that the propositions we deduce [in praxeology] are necessarily a priori valid and that we preserve the consistency of the argument."

(Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge")(bracketed and emphasis added)

Again, "the data from which we set out in this sort of analysis are ALL facts given to the person in question [person A], not objective facts."

The goal of this approach then, paraphrasing Menger, is to:

try to investigate the laws by which more complicated human phenomena (such as other people, other minds, the market, society, etc.) are formed from those simplest elements (the categories of A's consciousness)....

This is essentially what Mises is referring to when he writes things such as:

"The scope of praxeology is the explication of the category of human action.....All the concepts and theorems of praxeology are implied in the category of human action.  The first task is to extract and to deduce them, to expound their implications...."  (HA)

"Praxeology---and consequently economics too---is a deductive system.  It draws its strength from the starting point of its deductions, from the category of action." (HA)

Explicating the category of action in this way is what Hayek is referring to when he writes:

"The claim to which I have referred follows directly from this character of the first part of our task as a branch of applied logic.  But it sounds startling enough at first.  It is that we can derive from the knowledge of our own mind in an "a priori" or "deductive" or "analytic" fashion, an (at least in principle) exhaustive classification of all the possible forms of intelligible behavior.....If we can understand only what is similar to our own mind, it necessarily follows that we must be able to find all that we can understand in our own mind." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

One of the primary reasons that this kind of praxeological study stalled in the 30's was the inability to figure out how "another mind" B could be conceived as a category or category-complex in/for the mind of person A.

The end of this kind of praxeological analysis was foreshadowed when Alfred Schutz, writing in his book The Phenomenology of the Social World, wrote:

"We must, then, leave unsolved the notoriously difficult problems which surround the constitution of the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience.....As important as these questions may be for epistemology and, therefore, for the social sciences, we may safely leave them aside in the present work.....The object we shall be studying, therefore, is the human being who is looking at the world from within the natural attitude.....The essence of his assumption about his fellow men may be put in this short formula:  The Thou (or other person) is conscious, and his stream of consciousness is temporal in character, exhibiting the same basic form as mine." (p.98)(emphasis added)

In other words, other people "exist," objectively.

Thus, as I have argued, in order for the program of praxeology to once again be a living program that studies all forms of human action, and not merely a historical discipline concerned mainly with banking and finance or market phenomena, a way must be found, as Schutz puts it, to "constitute the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience."   A way must be found to theoretically conceive things such as other minds, markets, coercion, and all other phenomena (e.g. "scarcity"), as subjective rather than objective phenomena. 

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AJ replied on Wed, Feb 9 2011 3:37 AM

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Adam Knott:

"...my goal is simply to find some way to experience what you experienced that prompted you to write what you are writing"

I can provide an answer to this, but this won't solve the problem you are trying to solve.  Because you are trying to make the ideas I'm advocating square with your already formed ideas on consciousness and perceptions, i.e., your own theory of action or consciousness.  And your theory precludes the conception of unobservability which mine contains.

You don't seem to take it seriously when I tell you I am simply trying to understand what you mean, as it is not obvious to me. This is a gesture of charity to your theory. If you insist that I take your words at face value, I would simply have to discard the theory as obviously contradictory. I know you are highly intelligent, so I hold out the possibility that you actually do have something coherent to propose, and maybe just the words are not reaching me. That could well be my fault, but whatever the case this is the process I must go through in order to have a chance at evaluating what you want to say.

Adam Knott:

I can communicate what an unobservable is probably well enough to someone who may have reached the point where they are convinced that the solution to the problems concerned cannot be solved by standard, familiar, 'objective,' and/or common sense ideas.  But I may not be able to convince one who is advocating an alternate or competing theory.

I am using no competing theory to evaluate yours. This is purely a practical matter of me not being able to interpret your wording in a charitable way, and asking for help. Now yes, I have high standards for rigor in communication, which is why I demand definitions for things like objective ethics. It is not because I have an ethical theory of my own, but because I just don't understand what the words even mean. In such situations, one can only await a coherent definition. Some often said to me, in effect, that they could communicate what "objective ethics" is well enough to one who isn't already a utilitatarian/legal-positivist or whatever they thought my theory was, so they couldn't understand why I didn't get what they meant by it. It never occurred to them that perhaps they were the ones wedded to a theory that was keeping them from being able to understand my basic practical point: that the words meant nothing to me.

Adam Knott:

By 'unobservables,' I mean "things" such as:

a.  the back of the basketball

b.  another person's thoughts, opinions, ends, purposes, intentions,etc.

c.  universals

d.  the future

I'm not making the argument that no other theory of these phenomena can be advanced.  I'm advancing a particular theory that conceives these things as "unobservables."

I'm arguing that the conception of a category of unobservability is required owing to certain theoretical presuppositions. 

When we theoretically presuppose or assume a category of 'satisfaction' [usefulness, success, attainment, happiness, etc.], which we do in a theory of action, this formally or logically implies a category of 'dissatisfaction' [not useful, failure, non attainment, unhappiness].  

Following up on what JohnnyFive wrote previously, the categories must be conceived or constructed such that each category is part of every action.  Also, I believe the categories must be nonidentical.

Also, remember that the aim is exact laws, and the phenomena to be explained are social phenomena such as socialism, coercion, etc...

Again, if the contraints you are placing on the theory render things contradictory, why prefer to embrace the contradictory instead of removing the constraints if you're sure there is no way to construct a non-contradictory theory with those constraints on? It is certainly not a given that Menger's strict program is necessarily workable. It could well be that the constraints of pure formalism will make such a theory impossible. It sometimes seems as though you are taking its workability as a starting assumption. Again, if something seems impossible to formulate under certain constraints, why go all the way to internal contradiction as a way to preserve the constraints themselves, as if the constraints were sacred? The most obvious thing to do at that point seems to be to abandon the constraints, as you note most others have done in AE. I am not saying they need to be abandoned at all, just that if I were as sure as you seem to be that a non-contradictory theory within those constraints is impossible, I would abandon them.

Adam Knott:

AJ, I think you are working with a different theory of who Heisenberg is.  I'm working with the Richard Feynman theory.    : - )

Maybe I am arrogant, but I don't care who anyone is. I care about arguments. Doesn't it seem odd to take things on authority when the goal is a theory about apodictic certainty? The only thing I am taking exception to (at least for now) is the idea that both Bohr and Heisenberg mentioned of eschewing the requirement for visualizability. To me it seems like an economist casting off adherence to subjective value, and even though it is nonsensical to assert objective value they claim their field has come so far with - and indeed because of - that little internal inconsistency/incoherence. They would say that insistence on the complete adherence to subjective value would make economics impossible, and caution that he who insists on never uttering an error must remain silent. I don't mean to come off as irreverent to any historical figures, nor do I mean to come off as reverent, nor guess their motives. When I said...

"What one could imagine happened with Heisenberg and Bohr was that they came to something they could not explain, but instead of proposing a theory that would account for some of the data and not others, or a theory that would account for all of the data but was too general to yet be very useful, they instead chose a contradictory theory simply because it could be made to account for the most data the most "elegantly.""

...this was not an attack on these individuals, it was a hint of what my argument would entail regarding their scientific approach so you could prepare a response or pre-emption to the substance of it, rather than to any perceived irreverence toward the individuals involved. 

Adam Knott:

"Heisenberg noticed, when he discovered the laws of quantum mechanics, that the new laws of nature that he had discovered could only be consistent if there were some basic limitation to our experimental abilities that had not been previously recognized."

"Heisenberg proposed his uncertainty principle which, stated in terms of our own experiment, is the following....'It is impossible to design any apparatus whatsoever to determine through which hole the electron passes that will not at the same time disturb the electron enough to destroy the interference pattern.'  No one has found a way around this."

"Probability amplitudes are very strange, and the first thing you think is that the strange new ideas are clearly cock-eyed.  Yet everything that can be deduced from the ideas of the existence of quantum mechanical probability amplitudes, strange though they are, do work, throughout the long list of strange particles, one hundred percent."

(The Character of Physical Law, emphasis added)

It is my claim that if such supposedly contradictory notions work it is because they are not actually contradictory, not interpreted in practice in a contradictory way, or the contradictory aspects of the theory were not employed in making the predictions. If such could be shown, then it would be clear that the contradiction had not helped, and more likely had hurt, if anything. It is not an authority that can make this argument, it is reasoning on why contradictory aspects of a theory are helpful. It is not rigorous to simply imitate the method of another field because in some eminent scientists' opinions it has been this approach that made for their successes, rather than this approach that has held them back from even greater successes. This is analogous to the argument that government regulation brought us out of the dark ages of the Industrial Revolution. As a non-economist, should I rely on Paul Krugman for the real scoop on that since he is so highly regarded in that field? Of course the answer is: only if he can make convincing arguments. Responding to logical points with appeals to authority, no matter how highly celebrated, is simply not persuasive.

Adam Knott:

The ideal of classical physics is/was the description of an objective real world entirely separate from the realm of human purposes.  In other words, the goal of classical physics is a description of an objective nature that is absent the categories of human action and consciousness.

My contention is, once again, that the rejection of the visualizable/experienceable is not an effective way to proceed. It doesn't necessarily entail anything more than this even if most classical physicists might have said more; in particular I never mentioned objective/subjective, so I have no comment on those parts.