In his book The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, Ludwig von Mises wrote:
"An honest man, perfectly familiar with all the achievements of contemporary natural science, would have to admit freely and unreservedly that the natural sciences do not know what the mind is and how it works and that their methods of research are not fit to deal with the problems dealt with by the sciences of human action." (The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p.56)
Mises Forum poster StrangeLoop generally takes issue with Mises’s assertion, writing, among other things:
Once again, these all are not-too-subtlepsychological terms, so Austrians are being quite hypocritical to claim they have divorced themselves from the natural sciences.
And:
the tadpole-like condition of neuroeconomics is already more advanced than praxeology.
I understand StrangeLoop to advocate the general position that the phenomena that aprioristic praxeology deals with are more satisfactorily dealt with by the natural sciences and/or empirical approaches utilizing an epistemology essentially the same as the natural sciences.
In what follows, I will argue that on epistemological grounds, natural science cannot provide a satisfactory, non-contradictory account of consciousness, and that therefore, an essentially non-naturalistic approach to the phenomena of consciousness is required.
In other words, I will argue that in principle, it is not possible for the natural sciences to solve the problems dealt with by praxeology. The epistemological framework of natural science precludes a satisfactory and non-contradictory account of the phenomena of consciousness.
SUPPOSITIONS OF THE PROBLEM
There are two primary suppositions which define the structure of the attempt to provide a natural-scientific account of consciousness. First, there is the supposition that there is such a thing as consciousness. Second, there is the supposition that consciousness can be explained in a satisfactory and non-contradictory way by the natural sciences.
For a general account of the phenomenon to be addressed (consciousness) and the assertion that consciousness can be explained satisfactorily and without contradictions by natural science, I will refer to John Searle’s fourteen page essay “Biological Naturalism” which can be found here:
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/articles.html
In his essay, Searle puts forth the two primary suppositions which frame the problem we will be discussing. First, Searle acknowledges that there is a subjective experience of consciousness. He writes:
“Consciousness, I say, consists of all of one’s states of awareness.” (p.1-2)
And
“Some things, such as pains and tickles and itches, only exist when experienced by a human or animal subject, and they have a subjective or first person ontology. Consciousness is ontologically subjective in the sense that it only exists when experienced by a human or animal subject.” (p.3)
Second, Searle asserts that consciousness can be explained by natural science:
“All conscious states are caused by lower level brain processes.” (p.5)
“…consciousness is part of the natural world along with other biological phenomena such as photosynthesis, digestion or mitosis, and the explanatory apparatus we need to explain it we need anyway to explain other parts of nature.” (p.7)
“Consciousness is entirely caused by neuronal behavior, but all the same we are unwilling to say that consciousness is nothing but neuronal behavior. Why not?” (p.11)
“In earlier writings, I said that the irreducibility of consciousness was a trivial consequence of our definitional practices……Grant me that consciousness exists as a first-person phenomenon in a world composed almost entirely of third-person phenomena and where, indeed, at the micro level the world is entirely constituted by third-person physical particles in fields of force. Then why is consciousness not reducible in the way that, for example, liquidity, solidity and color are reducible.” (p.12)
Thus, the two suppositions which frame the problem are, 1) that there is a subjective experience of consciousness and, 2) that this subjective experience of consciousness can be explained satisfactorily and without contradictions by natural science as particles or particle-structures interacting in fields of force.
Of course, non-acceptance of either of the two suppositions eliminates the problem. If consciousness is denied from the outset, or if it is denied that consciousness can be explained by natural science, the problem outlined below does not arise.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROBLEM
The problem under discussion arises due to the way objectivity is conceived and defined by natural science epistemology. A brief explanation of Pareto’s conception of objectivity as rendered by Talcott Parsons will serve as our typical conception:
“These considerations yield an interpretation of an important statement of Pareto, that the objective end must be “a real end, entering into the domain of observation and experience, and not an imaginary end, foreign to that domain which may, however, serve as a subjective end.” The objective end is always arrived at by a process of empirically valid prediction of the probable effects of certain operations in a situation. For such a prediction to be possible and to be verified by the outcome, it must lie “within the domain of observation.” (Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, Volume I, p. 189-190)
In other words, what is objective is that which appears in the domain of observation, taken to mean the domain of the publicly observable. This eventually means that objective phenomena, objects, or events, are those that in principle can be identified and publicly observed within a delimited spatial location.
For example, regarding a person’s reporting of his subjective conscious experiences, the reporting itself (his audible utterances, his bodily movements, etc.) will be considered objective, while the conscious experiences he refers to will be considered subjective.
Subjective conscious experiences, while constituting the object of the natural-scientific explanation, cannot comprise a part of the natural-scientific explanation. That is, the natural-scientific explanation will seek to explain subjective consciousness entirely in terms of the causal relationships (or perhaps a-temporal correlations) of several objective objects, processes, or events. Examples of the relationships between such objective events might be:
A.
Objective event 1: apply electrical impulse to X region of subject’s spine or brain
causes or correlates to
Objective event 2: movement of subject
B.
Objective event 1: place black and white picture in front of subject
Objective event 2: appearance of similar black and white figures on television monitor connected to subject’s spine or brain
The important point is that the epistemology of this procedure requires that two or more such publicly observable objective entities be related causally or correlatively.
If a subject, or if the scientific observer himself, utters: “I am now experiencing…,” or even “I am now doing …,” then what is considered an objective event, and allowed as objective science are the subject's or observer's physical sounds and movements, both conceived as publicly observable events occurring in a delimitable location. The “experiencing” and the “doing”—the “internal” subjective interpretation (C) that the person gives to his own activity—is not allowed as an objective natural-scientific element that causes or correlates to a given objective situation (X,Y,Z)), since these “internal” first-person interpretations (C) are considered subjective and not objective. As Pareto writes, that which is objective must lie within the domain of observation.
Due to the epistemological constraints of natural science with respect to what can be considered as objective, “a nasty perplexion arises.” If the methodology of natural science is strictly observed, and only objective entities are placed in casual or correlative relationships, this will entirely eliminate the causal or correlative relationship to the subjective conscious experiences of the given subject. That is, to the extent the natural scientific explanation is objective, the aimed for or intended causal connection between the objective explanation and the subjective conscious experience will be eliminated. It will be impossible to demonstrate causation or correlation between the objective-causal process or setup (X,Y,Z), and any particular subjective conscious experience (C).
On the other hand, to the extent that subjective elements are allowed as part of the natural-scientific explanation, natural-scientific objectivity is compromised, and the conclusions of such a procedure cannot be considered objective science by the standards of strict natural science.
The result is that on purely epistemological grounds, and based on the way that objectivity is conceived and defined in natural science, natural science cannot arrive at a satisfactory and non-contradictory account of consciousness in terms of physical, objective, publicly observable events and processes.
TWO EXAMPLES
1.
Setup:
A subject is looking at black and white picture on the wall in front of him. A television monitor is connected to the subject’s brain, and on the monitor, a figure is visible that matches the figure on the wall.
Implication:
Natural science is making progress in describing the causal processes involved in consciousness.
Problem:
“Looking” is not an objective scientific entity by natural-scientific epistemology. In this context, “looking” is a first-person description denoting what the subject believes he is doing, or what the observer believes the subject is doing. But neither of these subjective interpretations meets the criteria of a natural-scientific objective entity. In other words, “looking” is a conceptual complex, and the denotation of part of this complex refers to a person’s self-conscious “inner-interpretation” (C) that they are doing a specific thing (or it refers to the self-conscious “inner-interpretation” of an observer that the observed person is doing a specific thing). If this self-conscious interpretation enters the natural-scientific description, then the description is not entirely objective.
A strictly objective account would read something like this:
The subject’s eyelids are in the open position. The direction of the subject’s eyes is xyz. In front of the subject is black and white figure abc, and visible on the monitor connected to the subject’s brain is figure def. When we change the direction of the subject’s eyes slightly to qrs, the figure on the monitor changes to hij. Etc., etc.,
In this account of things, there is reference made to three objective entities: the figure on the wall, the location/direction of the subject’s eyes, and the figure visible on the monitor. Changes in one or more of these objects causes or correlates to changes in one or more of the others. But here there is no causal or correlative relation claimed with respect to the conscious experiences that we suppose the subject may be having. The description is objective by the standards of natural science, but no causal link to the subject’s consciousness has been thereby asserted.
Note that the scientific observer’s subjective belief that he is witnessing something important about the observed subject’s conscious experience is not itself an objective entity by natural science epistemology. The scientific observer’s subjective belief as such cannot enter the scientific description. The scientific observer’s bodily movements and audible utterances are publicly observable, but his “inner” convictions, beliefs, opinions, judgments, etc., are not.
When we remove the subjective “inner interpretation” from the scientific description (i.e., the subject is “looking” at the wall), and replace this with a purely objective description (the subject’s eyes are in xyz position), we achieve the required objectivity in the description while simultaneously relinquishing a causal description linking objective processes with subjective conscious experiences.
2.
In the future, once more knowledge has been acquired about physical brain processes, a subject is brought in for observation. John Searle is present as are several other natural scientists. The appropriate measuring devices are attached to the subject, and the processes occurring in the subject’s brain and related organs are measured. Upon reading the results displayed on the measuring device, John Searle turns to the scientists and says:
“This guy (the subject) is in pain, even though he does not feel it yet. The thalamocortical system definitely shows the presence of pain, though it is unfelt” (p.11)
Searle has already defined a conscious experience as something that only exists when experienced by a human or animal subject:
“Some things, such as pains and tickles and itches, only exist when experienced by a human or animal subject…..Consciousness is ontologically subjective in the sense that it only exists when experienced by a human or animal subject.”(p.3)(underlined emphasis added)
By his own terms, Searle has not provided a natural-scientific account of the conscious experience of the subject. According to Searle, a pain, as a conscious experience, only exists when experienced by a human or animal subject. When Searle observes the brain process occurring in the subject, he claims the subject is in pain though the subject does not feel it yet. However, Searle’s definition of pain as a conscious experience (page 3) specifically requires that it be felt or experienced by the subject.
Thus, the physical processes that Searle is measuring, by his own definition, do not constitute or comprise the subject’s conscious experience of pain.
I surmise that Searle envisions a temporal separation between the time the subject’s brain processes are measured and the time the subject experiences pain consciously, in order to establish independence between the natural-scientific demonstration of pain happening in the subject, from the subject’s subjective report of pain. Searle wants to establish that he has described the subject’s pain objectively entirely in terms of physical processes, independent of the subjective report of the subject himself. To this end, on page 11, Searle suggests that it will be possible to establish that a particular physical process happening in a subject now, will cause the subject to undergo a conscious experience of pain later. The problem is that Searle has specifically stated that the relationship between physical brain processes and the conscious experience is simultaneous and a-temporal:
"We have been taught by Hume that causation is always a relation between discrete events ordered in time and that every singular causal relation is always an instantiation of a universal causal regularity. Lots of causal relations are like that, but not all. Many causal forces are continuous through time. Gravity, for example. The causal explanation of why this table exerts pressure on the floor is the force of gravity, but gravity does not consist of a sequence of discrete events. And lots of causal relations are….. simultaneous with the effect. For example, the causal explanation of why this table supports objects is in terms of the behavior of the microparticles, but the causal explanation of why the table supports objects is not given by first specifying one event, the molecular movements, and then a later event, the support of the object. Rather the two are simultaneous. Similarly the causal explanation of why my brain is in its present state of consciousness is in terms of, let us suppose, massive rates of synchronized neuron firings at synapses. But this does not require that, first, the brain behave in a certain way and then, later, consciousness exists, rather the conscious states are realized simultaneously with the neuron firings." (p. 13)(emphasis added)
Here, Searle argues that the causality that he intends as applying between brain processes and conscious experiences is simultaneous causality. But then by his own standards, it is not possible to maintain that:
It seems clear that Searle is caught in a plain contradiction, and this contradiction is epistemological in nature. It is not a matter of the acquisition of more empirical knowledge. It is a matter of a discord between definition 1 of consciousness that Searle provides when he acknowledges consciousness as a phenomenon, and definition 2 of consciousness that he provides when he describes how consciousness might be explained by natural science. He is not able, “epistemologically,” to provide a non-contradictory account of how consciousness could possibly be described in natural-scientific terms while maintaining a strict standard of natural-scientific objectivity.
THE CHALLENGE
The naturalist will generally maintain that with the acquisition of more empirical knowledge about brain processes, eventually natural science will be able to explain consciousness the same way it describes photosynthesis, digestion, or mitosis. But the problem that naturalism faces is not primarily technical, but epistemological. It is the nature of the definition and conception of what constitutes natural-scientific objectivity that limits and circumscribes the nature of the information that can be meaningfully conveyed by natural science.
What those seeking to provide a natural-scientific account of consciousness need to provide is a simple descriptive account outlining how the phenomenon of subjective or first-person consciousness can be accounted for utilizing knowledge that is rigorously objective by natural-scientific standards.
The question is simply this: How, in principle, can a natural-scientific account of consciousness be constructed?
Until such an account is provided, those who pursue the logical-deductive approach to the phenomena of consciousness do so on reasonable grounds.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
That's one of your best posts Adam.