So far, the only thing you've been able to demonstrate is that people may act in ways that is not agreeable to you. That is, they do not do what you think they should do. But you refuse to acknowledge that your normative judgments are entirely subjective and arbitrary (unless you can show otherwise).
This is the sense that I get. What I'm waiting for is some kind of a theory of ethics or morality. A link or something might help.
When BP says something is bad, I generally agree with the statement. My issue is that he hasn't been explicitly clear about what his position is with respect to the topic.
Brainpolice:Yes, the non-drowning person did not *cause* the initial situation, but that is not what is ethically relevant here. What's relevant is the social context of the non-drowning person being added to the scenario - who knows exactly what is going on and is perfectly capable, without any particular risk, of saving the drowning person's life. Once such a context is established, the *decision* to help or not is the essential factor determining if they [will] live or die. You're focusing on necessity, I'm talking about decision-making. You're also shifting the focus to the issue of not doing anything at all, when my initial objection was brought up in relation to using the situation to try to make a power move. Those are two separate things.
The non-drowning person also doesn't *cause* the final situation if he refuses to help the drowning person. I also don't see how the decision in any way becomes "the essential factor determining of they [will] live or die".
What do you mean by "necessity"?
If I'm shifting the focus, I can assure you that it's not intentional. My point was simply to highlight how easy it can be to move this kind of situation from the realm of what you call "non-legal ethics" to the realm of what you call "legal ethics".
Brainpolice:The supposition is that knowingly allowing someone to die when one has the power to save their life makes you a relevant factor, no longer making the scenario a matter of necessity.
Ah, I think I see what you mean by "necessity" now. Do you mean that, since I've come upon the drowning person, he doesn't have to die (because I can, at least in theory, save him)?
But again, if I become a "relevant factor" in his death by knowingly allowing him to die (i.e. refusing to help him), how would you say that's different from saying that I caused his drowning?
Brainpolice:There is a certain overlap between the two. By "control others", I mean get them to do things for you. If someone is a guest in my house and I say "take your clothes off or leave", I'm using my ownership as leverage to control others.
My own sense of the word "control" implies that there is no choice involved. Hence I wouldn't call your hypothetical situation with the house guest to be an example of "controlling someone". The guest still has a choice whether to take his clothes off.
By your definition of "control", workers' "bargaining power" allows them to (attempt to) control their employers, doesn't it? Really, any statement of "Do X or I'll do Y" is then an attempt to control someone.
Brainpolice:Of course, it can be difficult, at best -- impossible, at worst -- to determine intangible advantages. In basic terms of survival, as well as physical and mental health, I don't think it's difficult at all.
Of course, it can be difficult, at best -- impossible, at worst -- to determine intangible advantages.
In basic terms of survival, as well as physical and mental health, I don't think it's difficult at all.
Ah, but how is "basic terms of survival" to be defined? What about "physical and mental health"?
Brainpolice:To grant the self-ownership concept for a moment, I mean to say that I have trouble seeing how the kind of land property rights that anarcho-capitalists generally favor doesn't come into conflict with self-ownership at some point because of how it manifests as territorialism.
Okay, I think I understand. Do you think that saying "Take your clothes off or leave" to a house guest violates his self-ownership rights in some way?
Brainpolice:I mean a basic sense of empathy or some notion of reciprocity. As for extreme hierachies, I mean social conditions with a fairly steep level of disparity in power that ends up forming classes with problematic double-standards between them.
Well, I'd say the vast majority of people are indeed born with at least a basic sense of empathy and some notion of reciprocity. And I find that your own idea of "egalitarian ethos" coincides with my own. Of course, I've called it something different, namely "moral egalitarianism". The idea is, like you say, to hold everyone equally accountable for their own actions, in moral/ethical terms. Does that make sense?
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
I'm not simply talking about me or people I know, a red herring you keep returning to.
What are you talking about? Where have I been continually distracting from the main issue by referring to you and people you know?
I'm talking about just about anyone in the history of social philosophy who identifies as an "egalitarian".
Who difference does it make whether they identify as "egalitarian" or not? Its ones views on equality that are important. Someone who believes that social equality is achievable through redistribution is an egalitarian (asset-based) are they not? However, off of the top of my head, Franz Boas was famous for believing in egalitarian principles and I'm fairly sure that G.A. Cohen even identified himself as an egalitarian - and several of Rothbards articles in EAARAN could be used as a direct critique of both. Plus, a very quick internet search immediately reveals a few groups (Federation of Egalitarian Communities, the Egalitarian Socialist Party) whose principles definitely fall within the books criticism.
say i own a paper company. i make and sell paper to companies that need it like say tropicana who uses it to make juice boxes. in this transaction i, the seller, and tropicana, the buyer, both benefit from the transaction. however, in the process of making the paper, my company releases various gases into the air that are not only unpleasent to locals living near the plant (they smell bad), but they may actually lead to more serious consequences (paper production releases ghgs into the atmosphere contributing to global warming). similarly, transporting the paper itself to complete the transaction has similar consequences (trucks emitting noise and harmgul ghgs).
Isn't this more of a legal issue than an economic one? But I do agree this is the more interesting topic when discussing mutual transaction.
To clarify: I think the economic issue (and much less interesting) example of mutual transaction would be something like: I bring to the market product A, consumer(s) B likes it which puts product X out of business as a consequence. This seems just like a basic market process.
All voluntary transactions are inherently mutual, but in a sense that may end up being superficial in some contexts. If the systematic context in which it takes places greatly limits people's options or if disparities of power are used as leverage to milk people, a voluntary transaction can manifest as simple submission. In this way I think that the concept of "voluntary-ness" can be ambiguous. I can "voluntarily" submit to power because I have no other choice besides death or extreme misery, not necessarily because my values are being genuinely represented. The power dynamics of the particular situation is what determines whether the "mutual benefit" is meaningful.
Please clarify: Are you trying to discuss a scientific economic issue (or maybe a philosophical or legal issue) by bringing up a dude's internal value and the desire he has to have better options open to him? Or are you simply trying to speak in as broad of an aesthetic language as you can hoping we understand your language?
Initial cause is irrelevant for my purposes, and the decision is the essential factor because it's literally the only thing making the difference between one or the other given the context.
You didn't cause it, you allowed it to happen when you had the power to stop it. In order to say you caused it, you'd have to have created the conditions that put them in that position to begin with. But I still think you're a relevant factor without such cause the moment you personally become part of the picture, or even do something that explicitly makes you part of the picture (such as my earlier example of demands).
If I put a gun to your head and say give me your money or be shot, you still technically have a "choice" there too (between giving money and being shot) - but I most certainly am controling you. The only significant difference between this scenario and the one I mentioned is that this one more explicitly invokes physical force - although my scenario can quickly degenerate into invoking physical force if one refuses to obey. In both cases, one has a "choice" between submitting to the power of someone else or facing negative consequences determined by the one in power, possibly injury or death.
At a certain level, yes, but the systematic power relations makes all the difference. When certain parties systematically have an advantage to dictate the terms, it can hardly be considered genuinely mutual. And even individually and circumstantially, the position that one is in relative to another can be used to control. In a sense, I'm thinking in terms of how control manifests, rather than taking issue with power-in-and-of-itself. I have context-sensitive boundary lines determining when something is "too much".
I'm refering to things that are basically universal - we all know these essential requirements of survival and health. We all know that certain factors contribute to our ability to survive and maintain ourselves physically and mentally. I don't think you'll find any sane person who doesn't think that starving, freezing, physical ailment, etc., is a disadvantage.
I think that the presumption of absolute authority on the part of the owner inherently comes into conflict with the "self-ownership" of anyone who happens to exist within the geographic space claimed as property. I certainly think the scenario in question risks infringing on the house guest's personal autonomy.
It makes a certain level of sense, yes, although I might be pushed egalitarianism a bit further as a concept.
From my POV, all of this boils down to a philosophical issue, even if it seems to hinge on little things. I find the line that an interaction is mutually beneficial because you chose to engage in it to be a simplisticly deceptive truism at best, which starts to run into problems if one digs into the details of particular situations and considers the broader context in which they take place.
It falls apart the moment you apply anyone's particular norms to it, the moment you consider the factor of time, the moment you consider the background conditions - basically, the moment you cease to treat it as a universally true generality without reference to any experience or particulars of any sort.
Brainpolice:Initial cause is irrelevant for my purposes, and the decision is the essential factor because it's literally the only thing making the difference between one or the other given the context.
Okay, maybe I'm barking up the wrong tree with the causality issue. You seem to be in agreement with me there. How about fault? If I choose not to rescue a drowning person (regardless of why I choose that), is it therefore my fault that he drowns?
Brainpolice:You didn't cause it, you allowed it to happen when you had the power to stop it. In order to say you caused it, you'd have to have created the conditions that put them in that position to begin with. But I still think you're a relevant factor without such cause the moment you personally become part of the picture, or even do something that explicitly makes you part of the picture (such as my earlier example of demands).
Would you say then that I have a responsibility to save the drowning person? How do you distinguish that from a responsibility to not steal from someone (for example)?
I presume that "becoming part of the picture" means, at the very least, somehow observing the victim's situation?
Brainpolice:If I put a gun to your head and say give me your money or be shot, you still technically have a "choice" there too (between giving money and being shot) - but I most certainly am controling you. The only significant difference between this scenario and the one I mentioned is that this one more explicitly invokes physical force - although my scenario can quickly degenerate into invoking physical force if one refuses to obey. In both cases, one has a "choice" between submitting to the power of someone else or facing negative consequences determined by the one in power, possibly injury or death.
I'm sorry but I don't find this to be an accurate comparison. Holding a gun to someone's head involves actively taking something away from the person. Demanding a drowning person's life savings in exchange for saving him takes nothing from him that he wouldn't have lost otherwise. That you didn't have to make such a demand is irrelevant to that.
On another note, my choices in the hold-up scenario aren't even limited to forking over my money and being shot. And actually, being shot isn't a choice that I make, since I wouldn't be the one doing the shooting. With that said, if I choose to refuse to hand over my money, how are you controlling me? You haven't gotten me to do what you want.
Finally, are you now equating letting a person die with using physical force against that person? If so, we're back to the issue of causality again.
Brainpolice:At a certain level, yes, but the systematic power relations makes all the difference. When certain parties systematically have an advantage to dictate the terms, it can hardly be considered genuinely mutual. And even individually and circumstantially, the position that one is in relative to another can be used to control. In a sense, I'm thinking in terms of how control manifests, rather than taking issue with power-in-and-of-itself. I have context-sensitive boundary lines determining when something is "too much".
Is it fair to say that by "systematic power relations" you mean power relations that have been institutionalized? If so, then any employer has a systematic power relation vis-a-vis his employees, doesn't he? But aren't advantages subjective?
What are your context-sensitive boundary lines? Do you see these as being objective (i.e. existing outside of your mind)? Otherwise, why would/should anyone else have the same ones as you do?
Brainpolice:I'm refering to things that are basically universal - we all know these essential requirements of survival and health. We all know that certain factors contribute to our ability to survive and maintain ourselves physically and mentally. I don't think you'll find any sane person who doesn't think that starving, freezing, physical ailment, etc., is a disadvantage.
Earlier you wrote, "In basic terms of survival, as well as physical and mental health, I don't think it's difficult at all [to determine intangible advantages]." Given what you say above, would you say that people without cancer have intangible advantages over people with cancer? How about people without schizophenia vis-a-vis people with schizophrenia? Or people with high self-confidence vis-a-vis people with low self-confidence?
Brainpolice:I think that the presumption of absolute authority on the part of the owner inherently comes into conflict with the "self-ownership" of anyone who happens to exist within the geographic space claimed as property. I certainly think the scenario in question risks infringing on the house guest's personal autonomy.
How are you defining "personal autonomy"?
If I were a guest at someone's house and he or she demanded that I take my clothes off or leave, I would most certainly be offended. In all probability, I would take the option to leave. But would I consider it ethically justified to somehow coerce him or her into letting me stay and remain clothed? Not at all. Does this make sense? And do you agree?
Brainpolice:Well, I'd say the vast majority of people are indeed born with at least a basic sense of empathy and some notion of reciprocity. And I find that your own idea of "egalitarian ethos" coincides with my own. Of course, I've called it something different, namely "moral egalitarianism". The idea is, like you say, to hold everyone equally accountable for their own actions, in moral/ethical terms. Does that make sense? It makes a certain level of sense, yes, although I might [push] egalitarianism a bit further as a concept.
It makes a certain level of sense, yes, although I might [push] egalitarianism a bit further as a concept.
In what way(s) does it not make sense to you?
What do you mean by "[pushing] egalitarianism a bit further as a concept"?
Still unanswered.
liberty student: Brainpolice:LS, "context" is the factors that may constitute whether your rules apply or if there is an exception. And those factors are what? Brainpolice:I don't understand what your first question has to do with anything or what it's trying to prove. You claim that feelings of fear and dependence are part of the context, yes? Who is responsible for creating/causing those feelings? Brainpolice:Your second question doesn't even make sense. Context isn't something people decide upon, it is the circumstances in which what's in question takes place. The purpose of the question, in either case, is obviously meant to imply the old canard of imposition. I asked you how the context arrived at? How have YOU determined the context of A and B in a drowning scenario? From A, B or by yourself?
Brainpolice:LS, "context" is the factors that may constitute whether your rules apply or if there is an exception.
And those factors are what?
Brainpolice:I don't understand what your first question has to do with anything or what it's trying to prove.
You claim that feelings of fear and dependence are part of the context, yes? Who is responsible for creating/causing those feelings?
Brainpolice:Your second question doesn't even make sense. Context isn't something people decide upon, it is the circumstances in which what's in question takes place. The purpose of the question, in either case, is obviously meant to imply the old canard of imposition.
I asked you how the context arrived at? How have YOU determined the context of A and B in a drowning scenario? From A, B or by yourself?
Here's an interesting quote from von Mises:
Thus the advocates of totalitarianism chose other tactics. They reversed the meaning of words.......They call the labor union methods of violence and coercion "industrial democracy....." They define liberty as the opportunity to do the "right" things, and, of course, they arrogate to themselves the determination of what is right and what is not.
This is quite the astute observation.
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
I see this as more of a practiced art legal point than a philosophical one. The philosophical point would seem to be asserting trying to discuss ethics, aesthetics, or describing something like a value statement (e.g. "I feel pain"); I do not think this is in the realm of philosophical discussion. The philosophical issue can not hold, due to it being incapable of even considering what an individual is, why we should concern ourselves with norms, etc; it is beyond the scope of language in philosophy
πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει - Heraclitus
I'm not thinking primarily in terms of responsibility, but virtue. But you could construe it as a non-legal "right thing to do".
At a minimum.
Physical force is irrelevant to the fundamental issue. I'm not equating the two, although when people refuse to submit to territorial demands physical force can come into it.
I'm sorry but I don't find this to be an accurate comparison. Holding a gun to someone's head involves actively taking something away from the person.
The comparison is based on the standard of having to submit to or face negative consequences, with physical violence possibly coming into play at some point. My comparison wasn't to the drowning scenario, but a land-owner demand scenario.
The objective vs. subjective morality thing strikes me as a set of choices that dissolves pragmatically.
I don't see the relevance of the question. My purpose was simply to argue that, even from an individual's perspective, that person will obviously consider basic things that negatively effect the survival or health not to be beneficial to them almost universally with everyone else. Hence, there is no need to put this in a 3rd person framework to construe the point.
The capacity to autonamously make decisions with respect to one's person, without coercive interference or any sort of territorial demarkation of its application.
But that's not the issue. For my purposes, the thrust of the question is if ownership grants the rigidity of authority that would ethically justify making such demands on people, I.E. if you as a "guest" (or even "tresspasser) have an obligation to obey the command and what the consequences of non-compliance ends up being.
Brainpolice:I'm not thinking primarily in terms of responsibility, but virtue. But you could construe it as a non-legal "right thing to do".
Okay. So you agree there should be no legal repurcussions for someone who's simply "acting like a dick"?
Brainpolice:I presume that "becoming part of the picture" means, at the very least, somehow observing the victim's situation? At a minimum.
Right, that's what I said. :P
Brainpolice:Physical force is irrelevant to the fundamental issue. I'm not equating the two, although when people refuse to submit to territorial demands physical force can come into it.
True, but the physical force comes into it when the landowner no longer considers the other person to be welcome on his land.
Brainpolice:The comparison is based on the standard of having to submit to or face negative consequences, with physical violence possibly coming into play at some point. My comparison wasn't to the drowning scenario, but a land-owner demand scenario.
Ah, my mistake then. On the other hand, does a person have a right to stay on someone else's land and keep their clothes on when the landowner is demanding otherwise? Leaving before one wanted to or planned on is a negative consequence to him, sure. But I don't see how it's possible to ensure that negative consequences (from the POVs of those experiencing them) never happen. Nor do I see how the possibility of negative consequences in general means that property rights in land should be restricted.
Brainpolice:The objective vs. subjective morality thing strikes me as a set of choices that dissolves pragmatically.
I'm sorry, but I don't consider appealing to "pragmatism" to be an answer to my question. Can you explain to me what your context-sensitive boundary lines are or not? If it helps, assume arguendo that I have no "common sense".
Brainpolice:I don't see the relevance of the question. My purpose was simply to argue that, even from an individual's perspective, that person will obviously consider basic things that negatively effect the survival or health not to be beneficial to them almost universally with everyone else. Hence, there is no need to put this in a 3rd person framework to construe the point.
Well, I'm looking for systematic answers from you. With all due respect, so far you seem to have been rather vague and hand-wavey about these things. You might as well just answer with "You know..." But no, I don't know. I'm trying to find out from you. Can you help me?
Brainpolice:How are you defining "personal autonomy"? The capacity to [autonomously] make decisions with respect to one's person, without coercive interference or any sort of territorial demarkation of its application.
The capacity to [autonomously] make decisions with respect to one's person, without coercive interference or any sort of territorial demarkation of its application.
Maybe it's just me, but I don't like your usage of "autonomously" in your definition for "personal autonomy", as "autonomously" is derived from "autonomy", which is part of the phrase I that I asked you to define. But that's a rather minor quibble. I think I understand your definition. The question I have no is how you're defining "with respect to one's person". For example, taking the expression literally, it seems I could claim that someone fending me off when I'm trying to strangle him is violating my personal autonomy (per your definition). My decision to strangle him is a decision I'm making with respect to my person -- I'm deciding to move my body in certain ways to facilitate the strangling. What do you think?
Brainpolice:If I were a guest at someone's house and he or she demanded that I take my clothes off or leave, I would most certainly be offended. In all probability, I would take the option to leave. But would I consider it ethically justified to somehow coerce him or her into letting me stay and remain clothed? Not at all. Does this make sense? And do you agree? But that's not the issue. For my purposes, the thrust of the question is if ownership grants the rigidity of authority that would ethically justify making such demands on people, I.E. if you as a "guest" (or even "tresspasser) have an obligation to obey the command and what the consequences of non-compliance ends up being.
"Ethically justify" in terms of your legal ethics, or in terms of your non-legal ethics?
I would say that no one is ever entitled prima facie to be welcome on anyone else's property. Furthermore, I'd say that, even if he comes to be welcome on someone else's property, that in no way implies that he must be always welcome from that point forward.
While one is not obligated to obey such a command from the person whose land he's on, the latter is within his rights to then consider the former to be a trespasser. Here I'm talking in terms of your legal ethics.
All that said, I don't understand why you put "guest" and "trespasser" in quotes. Do you find those terms to be somehow illegitimate?
I would agree with that, with the qualification that sometimes "acting like a dick" overlaps with "violating other people's freedom".
I'm basically saying that using the snap decision or whim of the landowner as a justification for physical force is very arbitrary.
On the other hand, does a person have a right to stay on someone else's land and keep their clothes on when the landowner is demanding otherwise?
They might not have a "right to be there" and the owner might have no inherent obligation to do what a guest wants or provide any goods and services, but I certainly think that a "guest" has a right to disobey and disagree. If they don't, I don't see how calling it "mutual" can make much sense in any normatively meaningful way.
Leaving before one wanted to or planned on is a negative consequence to him, sure. But I don't see how it's possible to ensure that negative consequences (from the POVs of those experiencing them) never happen.
The purpose is not to ensure that negative consequences never happen (a purely consequentialist ethical utopia), but that someone isn't basically institutionally coerced.
The main thing is that it constitutes a threat, one that can possibly end up rationalizing unecessary or excessive physical violence. The function of such a threat is basically enforcing a consequential dillema onto someone, whether it's bluffed or not. It can also function as a pretext to escalation.
In this specific thread of the convo, what I'm contending that it's not even a matter of debate as to certain basic things being unconductive to survival and health.
Maybe it's just me, but I don't like your usage of "autonomously" in your definition for "personal autonomy", as "autonomously" is derived from "autonomy", which is part of the phrase I that I asked you to define. But that's a rather minor quibble.
I realized that as I typed it. It's unecessary for the definition.
For example, taking the expression literally, it seems I could claim that someone fending me off when I'm trying to strangle him is violating my personal autonomy (per your definition). My decision to strangle him is a decision I'm making with respect to my person -- I'm deciding to move my body in certain ways to facilitate the strangling. What do you think?
I have the exclusion of invading someone else's personal space built into the concept. It's doesn't refer to being able to act in whatever way one wants, but to make decisions about what effects oneself without being coerced.
In various ways, both.
I would say that no one is ever entitled prima facie to be welcome on anyone else's property.
I would agree, but add that no one is ever entitled prima facie to obey whatever the owner of a given geographic space demands of them, and that there is a tension between personal freedom and territorial boundary lines functioning as unlimited spheres of authority.
Furthermore, I'd say that, even if he comes to be welcome on someone else's property, that in no way implies that he must be always welcome from that point forward.
From my point of view, it is problematic to focus just on this question of being welcome or not, when for my purposes the issue surrounds the character of relations between people within some physical space. We could maintain that no one must always be welcome, but that doesn't mean they must effectively lose their personal freedom whenever they happen to be within a space claimed as property by someone else, or that territorial boundaries represent domains in which physical violence is legitimized for certain people.
In the context of someone being a guest already, suddenly giving them the status of "trespasser" because they don't obey whatever arbitrary commands you happen to make seems to be shoddy endeavour by the very nature of the situation. When put in "legal" terms, at some level this is inherently going to involve arbitrary physical violence on "trespassers" and guests-suddenly-deemed-trespassers. What really fits into the category of "trespass" and the kind of response it merits is debatable.
I think some of the baggage that is sometimes implied by the category of "trespass" is loaded, and that overly broad standards for what constitutes "trespass" ends up rationalizing some rather problematic situations.
Brainpolice:Okay. So you agree there should be no legal repurcussions for someone who's simply "acting like a dick"? I would agree with that, with the qualification that sometimes "acting like a dick" overlaps with "violating other people's freedom".
Heh, fair point. I guess I was implicitly defining "acting like a dick" to mean doing anything that other people disapprove of that doesn't violate other people's freedom.
Brainpolice:I'm basically saying that using the snap decision or whim of the landowner as a justification for physical force is very arbitrary.
I agree that it can be arbitrary. For things like residence (i.e. renting from a landowner), I think there should be contracts that stipulate the circumstances under which the tenant can be evicted. Is that the kind of thing you're talking about?
However, not all situations are that formal, such as with houseguests.
Brainpolice:They might not have a "right to be there" and the owner might have no inherent obligation to do what a guest wants or provide any goods and services, but I certainly think that a "guest" has a right to disobey and disagree. If they don't, I don't see how calling it "mutual" can make much sense in any normatively meaningful way.
Ah... this is most interesting. I think I have a better understanding of your position here. Thank you very much for that.
First off, I don't see how a homeowner telling a guest "take off your clothes or leave" is a transaction. Of course, it depends on how "transaction" is being defined. Second, I also think a guest has a right to disobey and disagree. In the case of disobeying, though, he may be forced off of the landowner's property. To say that a guest is obligated to obey means he's not actually a guest -- he's a prisoner. If he has to obey, then he can't leave, can he?
Brainpolice:The purpose is not to ensure that negative consequences never happen (a purely consequentialist ethical utopia), but that someone isn't basically institutionally coerced.
I'm glad you also see that such a thing would be, as you put it, "a purely consequentialist ethical utopia". I figured you did see it that way, but I wasn't sure.
What about institutional coercion of people who have violated (i.e. have been found to have violated) other people's freedom? For example, do you think there should be institutional coercion of thieves to give back what they stole, when caught?
Brainpolice:The main thing is that it constitutes a threat, one that can possibly end up rationalizing unecessary or excessive physical violence. The function of such a threat is basically enforcing a consequential dillema onto someone, whether it's bluffed or not. It can also function as a pretext to escalation.
"Unnecessary or excessive physical violence" would be aggression, wouldn't it? The same thing probably goes for escalation. Or am I misunderstanding your point?
Brainpolice:In this specific thread of the convo, what I'm contending that it's not even a matter of debate as to certain basic things being unconductive to survival and health.
I guess what I'm getting at is that I'm not sure whether you're using the same meanings as I am for words like "basic", "survival", and "health".
Brainpolice:I have the exclusion of invading someone else's personal space built into the concept [of "personal autonomy"]. It's doesn't refer to being able to act in whatever way one wants, but to make decisions about what effects oneself without being coerced.
Okay, fair enough then. I agree that personal autonomy should not be violated, although I don't think all violations thereof fall under what you call legal ethics. We're probably in agreement here, though. :)
Brainpolice:"Ethically justify" in terms of your legal ethics, or in terms of your non-legal ethics? In various ways, both.
I consider ownership to be part of legal ethics, not non-legal ethics (your terms, again). If you're using a legal-ethics concept to deal with non-legal-ethics situations, I'd say you're confusing legal and non-legal ethics.
Brainpolice:I would say that no one is ever entitled prima facie to be welcome on anyone else's property. I would agree, but add that no one is ever entitled prima facie to obey whatever the owner of a given geographic space demands of them, and that there is a tension between personal freedom and territorial boundary lines functioning as unlimited spheres of authority.
Well, I do agree that no one is obligated prima facie to obey landowners, but I'd add that leaving isn't necessarily the same as obeying. If that makes sense.
The thing I'm afraid of is you advocating that landowners be forced to let people stay on their land that they don't consider welcome. If that's the case, then how can one say those landowners actually own their land?
Brainpolice:From my point of view, it is problematic to focus just on this question of being welcome or not, when for my purposes the issue surrounds the character of relations between people within some physical space. We could maintain that no one must always be welcome, but that doesn't mean they must effectively lose their personal freedom whenever they happen to be within a space claimed as property by someone else, or that territorial boundaries represent domains in which physical violence is legitimized for certain people.
How does one lose his personal freedom on someone else's land when he's still free to leave? No one is advocating that landowners be allowed to keep other people prisoner on their lands (at least not generally). On the other hand, it seems to me that you might be advocating that, if a landowner demands that a guest take his clothes off or leave, for example, the landowner should be forced to let the guest stay with his clothes on.
Brainpolice:In the context of someone being a guest already, suddenly giving them the status of "trespasser" because they don't obey whatever arbitrary commands you happen to make seems to be shoddy endeavour by the very nature of the situation. When put in "legal" terms, at some level this is inherently going to involve arbitrary physical violence on "trespassers" and guests-suddenly-deemed-trespassers. What really fits into the category of "trespass" and the kind of response it merits is debatable.
Of course it's debatable. But for you to say that people should not (be allowed to) change their minds on whether guests are still welcome seems ridiculous to me, quite honestly. On the other hand, I doubt that most people would want to remain the guests of those who wish to impose arbitrary commands on them. So their leaving will be quite voluntary.
Brainpolice:I think some of the baggage that is sometimes implied by the category of "trespass" is loaded, and that overly broad standards for what constitutes "trespass" ends up rationalizing some rather problematic situations.
What do you consider to be the "baggage" that's implied? What are the "rather problematic situations" that you're referring to?
Bump!
Are you still around, Brainpolice? Did you miss my last post?
The positive rights side of the argument tends to bail.