I observed...that the more public provisions were made for the poor, the less they provided for themselves... on the contrary, the less was done for them, the more they did for themselves... Benjamin Franklin
you are implying once again. You are implying property when you want to talk about it. What you should do is first to show that these apples are truly legitimately yours.
(english is not my native language, sorry for grammar.)
I stand corrected - Roderick Long, not Frederick.
Let me direct the discussion toward the idea that the 'homestead principle' may be a specific case (and rather rare), of a more general theory of property. Much as the marginal utility theory of value is a general theory, which encompasses labor theory, and can be used to show logically how prices form.
This 'general theory of property' may or may not have been already developed. Does anyone know of writings where someone has worked out such a general theory of property.
I'm confused as to what you are trying to ascertain. Are you asking how people actually homesteaded property through history or the theory behind it?
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Well, I am saying that the homestead principle is fine as far as it goes. But, it doesnt go very far. It covers the special case where land or other natural resources are unclaimed, someone comes along, and no conflicting claims arise. Its limitations have been discussed. What is the extent of unclaimed property that can be legitimately claimed by an individual? What about property that was originally stolen then sold? What about property that has no basis in natural resources (a computer program or a song)? Is there any case in history where property was actually allocated in this way?
I feel the need for a more general theory (a subjective theory of property?). This is rather fundamental. Private property is the basis of free exchange,. The NAP recognizes the right to defend ones property. Taxes are abhorred as a violation of property rights. One of the pillars of Marxism is the abolition of private property. Fractional reserve banking is a morass of confusion over property rights. Etc.
I would love to accept 'property rights' as a natural right. But, at this point, I must conclude that it is a legitmate function of govt to define and protect private property. In fact, I believe this is a principal impetus for individuals to organize and form governments in the first place. One of the many things that keeps me from going full Ancap.
MaikU:I'd say problem is not the monopoly per se, but illegitimate monopoly, or illegitimate ownership (which by definition is not ownership, but simply "use" when "might makes right", for example when somone steals your bike, the thief doesn't own the bike, he simply "has it" or "use it". To own it he must own legitimately. I don't know, maybe I am the only one here making the distinction here between legitimate ownership and other kind of "use") of the land or other things. I have monopoly on my own body but that is legitimate monopoly. However some may argue that "self-ownership" is not the "real" monopoly yada yada yada. Whatever.
I don't think I understand. I associate "monopoly" with government as being able to use force against people without being retaliated against. Property owners cannot do this.
Michael J Green:Well, having written that, I'm not sure I really addressed the original post. I think you're (unwittingly?) touching on game-theoretic explanations of the emergence and respect for property. That is, why would self-interested individuals respect one another's property claims? You might want to check out David Friedman's essay here.
This is actually very good - very close to what I am looking for.
Two people are living in a Hobbesian state of nature. Each can injure or steal from the other, at some cost, and each can spend resources on his own defense. Since conflict consumes resources, both could benefit by agreeing on what each owns and thereafter each respecting the other's property. The joint benefit might be divided in different ways, according to the particular set of property rights they agree on—what property belongs to whom, and whether either has a property right in tribute from the other. This is a special case of the game—bilateral monopoly—described above. Each player, of course, will threaten to refuse to make any such agreement unless he gets the division he wants. Each will disbelieve most of the other's threats. If their ability to coerce and defend is roughly equal, and if there is some natural division of contested property (such as a stream running between their farms), it is likely that they will find a Schelling point in the form of an agreement to accept that division, respect each other's rights, and pay no tribute. If one (being, perhaps, slightly more powerful) tries to insist on a small tribute, arguing that it will still leave the other better off than continued conflict, the other may believably refuse, arguing that once he concedes any tribute there is no natural limit to what the other can demand. Agreeing to tribute costs the victim not only the tribute but the only available Schelling point. The expected cost to him of such an agreement includes both the possible cost of paying higher tribute in the future and the risk of future conflicts if in the future he rejects demands for higher tribute. That cost may be high enough to make his insistence that he will choose continued conflict over the payment of even a small tribute believable. So far we have considered the Schelling point that generates an agreement. But the agreement itself, whether generated by a Schelling point or in some other way, is thereafter itself a Schelling point. It is a unique outcome of which both players are conscious. Once it has been made, a policy of "if you do not abide by the agreement I will revert to the use of force, even if the violation is small compared to the cost of conflict" is believable for precisely the same reason the refusal to pay tribute, or any insistence by a bargainer on a Schelling point, is believable. The signing of a contract establishes a new Schelling point and thereby alters the strategic situation. The contract enforces itself.
Two people are living in a Hobbesian state of nature. Each can injure or steal from the other, at some cost, and each can spend resources on his own defense. Since conflict consumes resources, both could benefit by agreeing on what each owns and thereafter each respecting the other's property. The joint benefit might be divided in different ways, according to the particular set of property rights they agree on—what property belongs to whom, and whether either has a property right in tribute from the other. This is a special case of the game—bilateral monopoly—described above.
Each player, of course, will threaten to refuse to make any such agreement unless he gets the division he wants. Each will disbelieve most of the other's threats. If their ability to coerce and defend is roughly equal, and if there is some natural division of contested property (such as a stream running between their farms), it is likely that they will find a Schelling point in the form of an agreement to accept that division, respect each other's rights, and pay no tribute.
If one (being, perhaps, slightly more powerful) tries to insist on a small tribute, arguing that it will still leave the other better off than continued conflict, the other may believably refuse, arguing that once he concedes any tribute there is no natural limit to what the other can demand. Agreeing to tribute costs the victim not only the tribute but the only available Schelling point. The expected cost to him of such an agreement includes both the possible cost of paying higher tribute in the future and the risk of future conflicts if in the future he rejects demands for higher tribute. That cost may be high enough to make his insistence that he will choose continued conflict over the payment of even a small tribute believable.
So far we have considered the Schelling point that generates an agreement. But the agreement itself, whether generated by a Schelling point or in some other way, is thereafter itself a Schelling point. It is a unique outcome of which both players are conscious. Once it has been made, a policy of "if you do not abide by the agreement I will revert to the use of force, even if the violation is small compared to the cost of conflict" is believable for precisely the same reason the refusal to pay tribute, or any insistence by a bargainer on a Schelling point, is believable. The signing of a contract establishes a new Schelling point and thereby alters the strategic situation. The contract enforces itself.
"What is the extent of unclaimed property that can be legitimately claimed by an individual? "
That is answered by the homestead theory itself.
"What about property that was originally stolen then sold?"
Rothbard covers this in Ethics of Liberty
"What about property that has no basis in natural resources (a computer program or a song)"
Kinsella covers this in Against Intellectual Property
"I would love to accept 'property rights' as a natural right. But, at this point, I must conclude that it is a legitmate function of govt to define and protect private property. In fact, I believe this is a principal impetus for individuals to organize and form governments in the first place. One of the many things that keeps me from going full Ancap. "
Well if individuals are incapable of defining private property then by what power do governments?
I think someone has it backwards. Society is a construct of private property rights. There is no society without property rights being assigned in one fashion or another.
Someone has ib backwards. Society is a construct of private property rights.
I believe that society is a construct of property rights.