Charles Anthony:Loving the state is not the only options when dealing with the reality. The other option is encouraging a market for law which. An anarchist market for law stands on its own without depending on any omniscience of what objectively happened in an alleged crime.
The other option is encouraging a market for law which. An anarchist market for law stands on its own without depending on any omniscience of what objectively happened in an alleged crime.
Sorry, "encouraging a market for law which..." what?
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
mikachusetts:Force might be a weird word, I'm just using it since it's sort of a traditional word choice in libertarian literature. At any rate, I'm using it synonymously with breach of property, where property is assumed to privately held and include one's self, as in the classical liberal and libertarian conception. So threatening force would mean threatening to violate property. Thats actually a much better way to get at what I've been trying to say.
Okay. And you agree that property can be breached without being damaged?
If you're defining "force" as "breach of property", that's fine. However, I typically define "force" as "violence", which I don't see as being the same thing as "breach of property". I'm not trying to say that my definitions are "right" and yours are "wrong" - they just seem to be different.
Anyways, maybe the real issue at hand is which kinds of threats actually breach property. For example, if you hold a gun to my head, I'd say you've breached my property without actually damaging it. If you call me up and say "I'll come over and kick your ass if you talk to my girlfriend again," I'm not sure whether you've even breached my property. Does that make sense?
mikachusetts:From the starting point of the NAP as formulated by Rothbard, his reasoning (and subsequent reasoning by his followers) are consistent. My issue was that I believed that the NAP was founded upon a more fundamental premise of absolute property rights (self ownership and homesteading), and I'm sure Rothbard thought so too, after all he was an ethical objectivist and natural rightster.
My understanding of Rothbard is that he did think so. I personally am not an ethical objectivist. While I do consider myself to be a "natural rightster", I probably have a different definition for that term from Rothbard's.
The problem with "absolute property rights" IMO centers around the word "absolute". Many people take it to have a physically reductionist meaning - i.e., if I own X, I therefore own all atoms/molecules of X. I don't agree with that notion. Like everything else in human affairs "property" is a concept. It may be inspired by certain facts or phenomena of the physical world, like scarcity, but it isn't bound to them. When faced with physical reductionism, "property" - like all other concepts - ultimately leaks.
mikachusetts:If we wish to treat the NAP as a rule developed on an arbitrary set of values held by certain people and nothing more (this is what I think you are suggesting), then we must recognize that any appeal to the NAP as an explanation or justification for this or that is no more meaningful than saying "cuz i feel like it." For you and I and anyone else who see's it this way, we simply admit that we value libertarian values and suggest other people value them for various reasons, not because of some rule.
I essentially agree. If that justification isn't for the NAP itself, then it's for whatever leads to the NAP, such as self-ownership. My bet, however, is that a concept like self-ownership is so intuitively obvious - that is, it meshes so well with our instincts - that it won't be opposed as a premise. Everything else then logically follows.
mikachusetts:But like I said, I find it hard to believe that anyone thinks that its an arbitrary rule and then constantly evokes it as justification for or against a given behavior. The people who I am posing my questions to, are those who believe that the NAP is a rule deduced from some other axiom, namely, property.
Whatever serves as a premise is necessarily arbitrary. Logic can't dictate premises - it can only work with them. Still, I see your point, I think: given the premise of property, does Rothbard's conception of NAP logically follow?
Threats are an imposition of risk. Imposition of risk is a unilateral movement of a property boundary - it is theft.
I understand why force itself is bad: it is a violation of property in someone's self or belongings, property is to be respected, therefore no force against another person is to be tolerated.
The key issue is that voluntary exchange entails both parties mutually agreeing to the redrawing of a property boundary. Before, the TV was mine and the boat was yours. Now, by mutual agreement, the boat is mine and the TV is yours. That is mutual, voluntary redrawing of property boundaries. But if you just walk in to my house and take my TV, you have redrawn a property boundary unilaterally. I did not agree to this. It is the first salvo in what could become a violent conflict.
But the threat of force or extortion is different. It isn't an actual violation but the threat of a violation, and threats on their own are ok.
Threats impose risk. Imposition of risk is redrawing property boundaries unilaterally.
I can threaten to withold love from my children if they don't eat their vegetable
You're equivocating on the word "threat." Your children have no property in your love. Since you could not do actual violence to their non-existent property right in your love you cannot possibly do hypothetical violence (threat) to it, either.
but I can't threaten to step on my neighbors garden if he doesn't paint his house blue.
Actually, I think that would be pretty tough for your neighbor to argue. You can't extend your foot over his property line and ape the motion of smashing his garden without actually doing it not only because he has property rights in the space above his land but also because you are actually putting his garden at increased risk of damage.
I can threaten to tell the neighborhood about Mrs. Smith's affair if she doesn't pay me off,
Again, Mrs. Smith has no property rights in your vocal cords, so it is impossible for your blackmail of her to be a threat in the sense under discussion.
but I can't threaten to vandalize her house if she doesn't repent.
I think it would be tough for Mrs. Smith to do anything about your threat if it was merely verbal. However, if you pointed a can of spray paint in the direction of her property, then she probably has a case against you.
So my question is: on what grounds does aggression and by relation the NAP come to include the threat of force?
I think that the person who is threatening force has to perform an action that puts some property at increased risk of damage, if nothing else through accident. For example, if I point a gun toward your head but do not pull the trigger, I could argue I have done no wrong by you. However, the mere fact that the gun could have gone off imposed a risk on you that you did not mutually agree to bear. No one will agree to bear unusual risks in exchange for nothing - consider a stunt actor or a soldier of fortune, for example. Hence, forcing someone to bear an unusual risk by unilaterally imposing that risk on them is a form of theft.
Why do people pay insurance premiums? To unload a risk onto someone else in exchange for a price. In my view, pointing a gun at someone's head and forcing an insurance company to pay out on a claim for which you did not pay the premiums are logically indistinguishable.
Clayton -
Clayton: Threats are an imposition of risk. Imposition of risk is a unilateral movement of a property boundary - it is theft. Hence, forcing someone to bear an unusual risk by unilaterally imposing that risk on them is a form of theft.
Hence, forcing someone to bear an unusual risk by unilaterally imposing that risk on them is a form of theft.
+1
Clayton:Threats are an imposition of risk. Imposition of risk is a unilateral movement of a property boundary - it is theft. Hence, forcing someone to bear an unusual risk by unilaterally imposing that risk on them is a form of theft.
I'd like to add another +1 to this. However, I think the issue of intent is essential here. Otherwise, you could argue that, however unwittingly, we're all constantly imposing risks on each other and therefore we're all constantly committing theft against each other.
Take driving, for example. The more cars there are on the road, ceteris paribus, the higher the likelihood of an accident. If I merge onto a highway, I'm thus unilaterally imposing higher risk of an accident onto the other drivers on the highway (at least in my vicinity).
Autolykos: If I merge onto a highway, I'm thus unilaterally imposing higher risk of an accident onto the other drivers on the highway (at least in my vicinity).
If I merge onto a highway, I'm thus unilaterally imposing higher risk of an accident onto the other drivers on the highway (at least in my vicinity).
If I exist, I'm thus unilaterally imposing higher risk of aggression onto others in the universe (at least in my vicinity).
z1235:If I exist, I'm thus unilaterally imposing higher risk of aggression onto others in the universe (at least in my vicinity).
Indeed! All the more reason to factor in intent.
@Autolykos
I'm not so sure the highway example is necessarily accurate. After all, if I drive on the highway, I know that other people will merge at certain points. Even though the highway is state owned property, I am consenting to follow the rules they impose on their property (of course, when I break those rules I do my best not to get caught :p). And if the highway were privately owned, then I really would have to consent to following the rules of the owner.
Since the highway is not privately owned, there is the problem of what state rules are just. But I think that just because it is a highway does not mean someone else driving on the highway is imposing risk on me that I have not consented to.
[Edited for clarity - well I hope it's more clear.]
Autokylos: Indeed! All the more reason to factor in intent.
The people involved may want cheap justice. If they chose to pay their security providers to omit convoluted investigations to factor in intent in how their disputes are resolved, intent will never be factored in.
Nobody can ever know the intent of an other person so factoring in intent is just a different type of guessing game of what happened.
gotlucky:I'm not so sure the highway example is necessarily accurate. After all, if I drive on the highway, I know that other people will merge at certain points. Even though the highway is state owned property, I am consenting to follow the rules they impose on their property (of course, when I break those rules I do my best not to get caught :p). And if the highway were privately owned, then I really would have to consent to following the rules of the owner. Since the highway is not privately owned, there is the problem of what state rules are just. But I think that just because it is a highway does not mean someone else driving on the highway is imposing risk on me that I have not consented to.
With all due respect, I don't see how this addresses my point. Just because there are merge points on highways doesn't mean a given driver 1) knows where the merge points are ahead of him, or 2) that he can foresee just how much the risk of an accident increases in proportion to the number of (additional) drivers on the highway.
In any case, my point was that drivers typically don't intend to put people at greater risk of harm. Otherwise, by my understanding of Clayton's reasoning, they should be prosecuted for theft every time they drive.
Charles Anthony:The people involved may want cheap justice. If they chose to pay their security providers to omit convoluted investigations to factor in intent in how their disputes are resolved, intent will never be factored in.
I don't think that will work - at least not in the long run. There's a reason intent has long been a part of common-law systems.
Charles Anthony:Nobody can ever know the intent of an other person so factoring in intent is just a different type of guessing game of what happened.
Would you call the scientific method just a different type of guessing game?
No, intent cannot factor into the definition of a tort, otherwise, torts become purely subjective and psychological. Intent matters during negotiation of a settlement... if the victim of the tort believes that the person who committed the tort was, in fact, not malicious, he is more likely to agree to lower terms of settlement. Otherwise, intent is irrelevant.
I used the phrase "unusual risk" to differentiate between those risks that must, as a matter of course, be borne in going about one's daily life and those risks which are created by the unusual actions of an individual, whether maliciously or negligently. Driving on unowned roads is an excellent example of this.
Autolykos: Take driving, for example. The more cars there are on the road, ceteris paribus, the higher the likelihood of an accident. If I merge onto a highway, I'm thus unilaterally imposing higher risk of an accident onto the other drivers on the highway (at least in my vicinity).
My point was that if you are merging onto a highway and are imposing risk upon other drivers, that they are driving on the highway means they have accepted the risk - whether or not they understand how great or little that risk doesn't matter. The highway is someone's property (the state's, but it could be private property), so you have to abide by the rules set by the property owner (wether or not state rules are just is a separate discussion). My point was that it is not unilaterally imposing risk on someone else because they have consented.
Because of this, I don't see why it would be considered theft or aggression against property. I hope that makes more sense.
AutoKylos: Charles Anthony:Nobody can ever know the intent of an other person so factoring in intent is just a different type of guessing game of what happened. Would you call the scientific method just a different type of guessing game?
Watch as much Star Trek as you want. There is no scientific method that can lead you to read the mind of your fellow man.
Clayton:No, intent cannot factor into the definition of a tort, otherwise, torts become purely subjective and psychological. Intent matters during negotiation of a settlement... if the victim of the tort believes that the person who committed the tort was, in fact, not malicious, he is more likely to agree to lower terms of settlement. Otherwise, intent is irrelevant.
Do you think a stateless society would ever make a legal distinction between murder and manslaughter? Why or why not?
Clayton:I used the phrase "unusual risk" to differentiate between those risks that must, as a matter of course, be borne in going about one's daily life and those risks which are created by the unusual actions of an individual, whether maliciously or negligently. Driving on unowned roads is an excellent example of this.
That's fair enough. And like GotLucky said, the imposition of risk by merging onto a highway isn't unilateral after all.
gotlucky:My point was that if you are merging onto a highway and are imposing risk upon other drivers, that they are driving on the highway means they have accepted the risk - whether or not they understand how great or little that risk [is] doesn't matter. The highway is someone's property (the state's, but it could be private property), so you have to abide by the rules set by the property owner (wether or not state rules are just is a separate discussion). My point was that it is not unilaterally imposing risk on someone else because they have consented. Because of this, I don't see why it would be considered theft or aggression against property. I hope that makes more sense.
It does, thanks. However, I'm not sure if you can really say that a person has accepted a risk if he doesn't understand the size of the risk. After all, if he doesn't understand the size of it, he doesn't really understand it at all, does he?
Charles Anthony:Stop making a mockery of libertarianism. Either you are deliberately being stupid or you are accidentally being stupid. Watch as much Star Trek as you want. There is no scientific method that can lead you to read the mind of your fellow man.
How exactly am I making a mockery of libertarianism? Please explain.
My question about the scientific method was not, in fact, a rhetorical one. So why don't you actually answer my question now?
Auto,
Come back when you have a scientific method to figure out intent. Only then will your question be worthy of a libertarian consideration.
I am not answering a silly question just like I am not going to answer why it is that pigs do not fly.
If you can not see that figuring out intent is the same as reading someone else's mind, then you are making a mockery of intelligent libertarians who would otherwise have a fruitful discussion.
Charles Anthony:Auto, Come back when you have a scientific method to figure out intent. Only then will your question be worthy of a libertarian consideration. I am not answering a silly question just like I am not going to answer why it is that pigs do not fly.
At this point, it seems obvious to me that we're using different definitions for the phrases "guessing game" and "figuring out intent". It also seems to me that you've been using "guessing game" with the implication that all guesses (and means of making them) are equally arbitrary. I don't see how that's the case. For example, the scientific method certainly has a better track record than augury, haruspicy, or the Oracle at Delphi.
Figuring out intent, in the literal sense of knowing a person's intent, is indeed impossible - until there's a way to literally read a person's mind. So of course that's not what I was referring to. Rather, I was talking about the established legal practice of establishing, "beyond a reasonable doubt", what a person's intent must have been.
Charles Anthony:If you can not see that figuring out intent is the same as reading someone else's mind, then you are making a mockery of intelligent libertarians who would otherwise have a fruitful discussion.
I certainly see that you've been taking "figuring out intent" to mean the same thing as "reading someone else's mind", and that's fine - but, as I indicated above, that's not what I was referring to.
Autokylos:Rather, I was talking about the established legal practice of establishing, "beyond a reasonable doubt", what a person's intent must have been.
The people involved may want cheap justice. If they chose to pay their security providers to omit convoluted investigations to factor in intent in how their disputes are resolved, intent will never be factored in."
The bottom line is that if people do not want to pay professional arguerers to waste their time trying to read eachother's minds then lawyers and judges will not waste their own time factoring in intent. The established legal practice is interesting but completely irrelevent in a libertarian discussion of the market for law.
Autokylos:I certainly see that you've been taking "figuring out intent" to mean the same thing as "reading someone else's mind", and that's fine - but, as I indicated above, that's not what I was referring to.
Autokylos:It also seems to me that you've been using "guessing game" with the implication that all guesses (and means of making them) are equally arbitrary.
Charles Anthony:Back to my point stated on July 8th up above: "An anarchist market for law does not require factoring in intent. The people involved may want cheap justice. If they chose to pay their security providers to omit convoluted investigations to factor in intent in how their disputes are resolved, intent will never be factored in." The bottom line is that if people do not want to pay professional arguerers to waste their time trying to read eachother's minds then lawyers and judges will not waste their own time factoring in intent. The established legal practice is interesting but completely irrelevent in a libertarian discussion of the market for law.
I don't consider it irrelevant, because I think it serves as a guidepoint for what people may actually look for in a free-market legal system. On the other hand, I didn't think the point of this thread was indeed to have a libertarian discussion of the market for law.
Charles Anthony:Irrelevent but interesting nonetheless. Go re-read what I wrote and what you quoted. Here is a hint: the bits before and after the "a different type of" part are pertinent.
Having re-read what you wrote and what I quoted, I fail to see how my latest response was irrelevant.
Charles Anthony:That is not what I wrote and it can not logically be derived from what I wrote. Regardless, they are all still just guessing games.
If you didn't mean that all guesses (and means of making them) are equally arbitrary, then I'm at a loss to understand what you did mean. Can you explain it to me in more detail?
I mean they are all arbitrary. Just not equally arbitrary.
The point is that there is no objective proof. There are convincing arguments but there is no proof. Your perceivably-less-arbitrary guidepoint may be more convincing but nobody will ever be able to prove events in an absolutist sense. That is ok. That is just the reality of the world in which we live.
Autokylos: I don't consider it irrelevant, because I think it serves as a guidepoint for what people may actually look for in a free-market legal system.
Come back when you have a way of proving what people want to pay for justice.
Autokylos: On the other hand, I didn't think the point of this thread was indeed to have a libertarian discussion of the market for law.
The NAP is just a type of law, the one and only law that defines authentic libertarianism, by the way.