Papirius: Employment is illegitimate because it includes alienation of labor, and labor, being a part of the self, falls under the inalienable right to selfownership.
Employment is illegitimate because it includes alienation of labor, and labor, being a part of the self, falls under the inalienable right to selfownership.
This is absolutely ludicrous. The products of labor are alienable. And the employee is being payed to alienate the products of his labor. The fact that people readily agree, voluntarily, to labor contracts doesn't give you pause while espousing this theory?
Anenome
The products of labor are alienable. And the employee is being payed to alienate the products of his labor.
Even if that were true, that would mean that employment of workers who do service jobs is still illegitimate. But it's not, workers never alienate products of their labor, always the labor, alienating products of labor is not called employment, it's called selling (products).
The fact that people readily agree, voluntarily, to labor contracts doesn't give you pause while espousing this theory?
People used to agree, voluntarily, to slave contacts, that doesn't make slavery legitimate.
Papirius: People used to agree, voluntarily, to slave contacts, that doesn't make slavery legitimate.
Pics or it didn't happen. Please provide a source for this claim.
@Papirius
Me: This doesn't have any bearing on discussions of property, as no one can use abstractions, and so no disputes about use of abstractions can arise. Papirius: It doesn't? Systems of slavery, feudalism and capitalism have all legaly allowed people to own (buy and sell) areas of land even if they are in the state of nature. Eg. someone owns 20 acres of unused fertile land, or 20 acres of forest, and can deny it's use to anyone else, and can sell it.
Me: This doesn't have any bearing on discussions of property, as no one can use abstractions, and so no disputes about use of abstractions can arise.
Papirius: It doesn't? Systems of slavery, feudalism and capitalism have all legaly allowed people to own (buy and sell) areas of land even if they are in the state of nature. Eg. someone owns 20 acres of unused fertile land, or 20 acres of forest, and can deny it's use to anyone else, and can sell it.
The labor theory of property (natural resources only become owned once someone has mixed his labor with them) is sufficient to eliminate the possibility of people owning, selling, or excluding others from the use of virgin resources. It is not the labor theory of property which I claimed has no bearing on discussions of property. What is irrelevant to discussions of property is this idea of abstract area. Abstractions cannot be used in the same sense that real, particular things can be used. And property is about determine rights to use things. Hence abstractions are alien to discussions of property. Saying you have a right to use an abstraction (e.g. area) is like saying you have a right to drink a color. It is literally nonsense.
The above mentioned would not be possible.
I take it "the above mentioned" is this:
people...own (buy and sell) areas of land even if they are in the state of nature
But, again, a strict labor theory of property is sufficient to prohibit this behavior. There is no need to bring abstract area into the discussion. The only conceivable reason to bring area into the discussion is to justify the land tax. That is, the necessity for the land tax does not follow from the principle of inalienable self-ownership and a labor theory of property. The land tax only follows if, in addition, you posit this bizarre area concept.
he ownes his labor, and and everything that is product of his labor is his property
It seems this could have two meanings:
(1) The product of one's labor is inalienable property. In this case, voluntary exchange itself is illegitimate.
(2) The product of one's labor is alienable property, but it cannot be alienated in advance. That is, Bob can produce a widget, and then sell the widget. But Bob cannot contract with an employer such that the widget becomes the employer's property automatically as soon as it is produced. I believe this is your view? What are implications of this? Debt is an alienation of the product of one's labor in advance: in other words, an alienation of one's future labor. Hence, by this view, debt itself is illegitimate.
Papirius: The products of labor are alienable. And the employee is being payed to alienate the products of his labor. Even if that were true, that would mean that employment of workers who do service jobs is still illegitimate. But it's not, workers never alienate products of their labor, always the labor, alienating products of labor is not called employment, it's called selling (products).
That's precisely what employment is, the selling of labor services. Employment is not some special arrangement unlike other kinds of transactions in the marketplace. It is instead a continuing purchase of labor services. Any other conception of it is nonsensical.
Papirius: The fact that people readily agree, voluntarily, to labor contracts doesn't give you pause while espousing this theory? People used to agree, voluntarily, to slave contacts, that doesn't make slavery legitimate.
People agreed to indentured servitude perhaps, I don't think anyone's ever agreed to be an outright slave, as slavery as a concept denotes aggression on the part of the slave owner.
gotlucky
Please provide a source for this claim.
"Slaves are either born so, their mothers being slaves themselves, or they become so; and this either by the law of nations, that is to say by capture in war, or by the civil law, as when a free man, over twenty years of age, collusively allows himself to be sold in order that he may share the purchase money." Corpus Iuris Civilis http://www.humanistictexts.org/justinian.htm Slavery by debt bondage: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debt_bondage
Minarchist
What is irrelevant to discussions of property is this idea of abstract area. Abstractions cannot be used in the same sense that real, particular things can be used.
Yet in capitalism areas can legally be property.
Saying you have a right to use an abstraction (e.g. area) is like saying you have a right to drink a color.
You're talking gibberish. I have the right to use any area because I have the right to freedom because of which I have the right to where ever I want.
But, again, a strict labor theory of property is sufficient to prohibit this behavior.
My talking about areas not being legitimate property is talking about labor theory of property.
That is, the necessity for the land tax does not follow from the principle of inalienable self-ownership and a labor theory of property.
From self-ownership and LTP follows that areas cannot be property, from which follows that my right to freedom is being impaired, because I'm denied access to something that is unowned (areas). And being that you can have property (ius in re) only over products of labor, you can only have exclusive use over land by using it. Now, in order not to have those state of nature situation where you remove your property for a few minutes and someone else comes and puts his property there and to mess with you, in exchange for the recompensation you owe the community community makes a social contract to give you ius ad rem over and area that you use continuously.
2) The product of one's labor is alienable property, but it cannot be alienated in advance.
It can be. I sell chairs, and you come and give me money for a chair, and I go and make a chair and give it to you at a later date on which we agreed, and there you go- I sold you my chair before I made it.
But Bob cannot contract with an employer such that the widget becomes the employer's property automatically as soon as it is produced.
That would make Bob the seller, and the guy who becomes the proprietor of the wigdet a buyer. If Bob becomes an employee he alienates his labor, he doesn't get payed for widgets, but for hours of labor, and, by alienation of labor, the employer becomes the exclusive user of his labor, whereas if someone were to come to self-employed Bob to buy widgets, there would be no alienation, with Bob remaining the only boss of his labor, determining how much to charge for widgets, how, when, at what pace, how many etc to make them. Bob remaining the only owner of his labor is the only legitimate option.
That's precisely what employment is, the selling of labor services.
Making employment illegitimate, because labor is a part of self, and thus inalienable.
as slavery as a concept denotes aggression on the part of the slave owner.
It doesn't, from Code of Hammurabi to Justinian's Corpus three types of slaves are recognized- born into slavery, war captives, and those who sold themselves into slavery (which includes those who became slaves by pledging themselves as collateral for a loan). The third kind doesn't denote aggression, but a voluntary contract.
Papirius: Anenome That's precisely what employment is, the selling of labor services. Making employment illegitimate, because labor is a part of self, and thus inalienable.
Let's say I agree with you for one second. Let's say labor is part of the self. Then the only moral way to deal with another person would be to trade with him for his labor, whatever price he's willing to accept for that labor, like, oh I don't know, a wage. Because a person owns his labor the only illegitimate thing to do would be to take it by force. It could never be illegitimate to freely trade someone for that which they own!
Papirius:Well, when you commit suicide, you cannot feel isolated, estranged, unsympathethic or hostile. al·ien·ate/ˈālēəˌnāt/ 1. Cause (someone) to feel isolated or estranged; Cause (someone) to become unsympathetic or hostile. If we use alienate in the meaning "transfer as property" in the sense of "transer ownership from oneself to someone else" then suidice is not self-alienation, because you haven't by suidide transfered ownership over your body to someone else (and you can't do that legitimately anyway). al·ien·ate/ˈālēəˌnāt/ 2. Convey or transfer (as property or a right) usually by a specific act rather than the due course of law
al·ien·ate/ˈālēəˌnāt/ 1. Cause (someone) to feel isolated or estranged; Cause (someone) to become unsympathetic or hostile.
If we use alienate in the meaning "transfer as property" in the sense of "transer ownership from oneself to someone else" then suidice is not self-alienation, because you haven't by suidide transfered ownership over your body to someone else (and you can't do that legitimately anyway).
al·ien·ate/ˈālēəˌnāt/ 2. Convey or transfer (as property or a right) usually by a specific act rather than the due course of law
With all due respect, I really hope you're not trying to insult my intelligence here.
I thought it was clear from the context that I was referring to "alienate" in the sense of "transfer, abandon, or destroy", which is the sense I used when I first talked about the kinds of right that Roman law considered to constitute ownership. So your usage of "alienate" above is inconsistent with my usage. That doesn't make it wrong, just different (and conflicting).
So let me ask you this: when a person commits suicide, does he destroy himself in any way?
Papirius:Tell it to the people who wrote Marriam Webster dictionary. To own something means to have something as property, to possess.
I couldn't care less what the Merriam-Webster dictionary says. There's no particular necessary meaning of the word "own". It's just a word. So the question is what definition do you attach to it.
Now I'll point out that "to have something as property, to possess" is an inconsistent definition. You've agreed that property and possession are two different things. Yet this definition of "own" treats them as if they're identical. Please make up your mind. You're not being consistent at all with your definitions.
Your statements about self-ownership make no sense to me, because I don't understand your definition of "self-ownership". And that's because I don't understand your definition of "ownership". So none of it makes sense to me yet. What I've been trying to do is make sense out of what you're saying, and at this point it seems as though you're being deliberately obtuse in order to obfuscate my efforts at attaining clarity. I don't know why you would do that, and if that's indeed what you're doing, I ask you to please stop.
Papirius:Therefore, to have property over something means to have the right to use or destroy it and to exclude everyone else from using or destroying it, and depending on the nature of the property (i.e. if it's alienable or inalienable) also the right to exchange it for something or give it as a gift or just abandon it.
Okay, this comes closer to making sense. Do you think mere possession of something entails the right to destroy it and/or the right to exclude everyone else from using or destroying it?
As far as I can tell, the Roman-law concept of jus abutendi ("the right to alienate") included transfer, abandonment, and destruction. Would you not agree that destroying something is a way of abandoning it - in the sense of giving up your rights over it?
Papirius:You can sell it, but not the area it is on. If you distroy that house and abandon that area, anyone is free to come and use that area, because it is unowned. You can't legitimately say- that area is my property and if you want to use it, you have to buy it from me.
What do you think constitutes abandonment in this context? For example, if I leave my house to go on vacation for two weeks, would you say that I abandoned my house?
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
I don't believe that's true. I have never heard anyone speak of owning an area. Can you provide a single example of a case where someone is claiming to own an abstract area: as distinct from the real, particular land which occupies it?
I have the right to use any area
You are talking about the area as if it is distinct from the contents. If it is not distinct, then your entire argument breaks down. You need to show/explain what it means to use an area, as distinct from using its contents. Of course, you already admitted it is not possible to use the area without using its contents. Hence this "right" to use area is a right to do something impossible: like a right to drink colors.
It is my opinion that advocates of this view you are espousing did not reason disinterestedly to the conclusion that there were wrongs which needed to be righted by the land tax. Rather, you all wanted the land tax from the start, and built up this system to justify it. This would account for the otherwise inexplicably bizarre talk of rights to use abstract areas.
Bump. I'd really like you respond to my last post, Papirius.
Self (which includes labor) is inalienable, that is- slavery, serfhood and employment are illegitimate irrespective of the consent of the slave/ serf/ employee.
Autolykos
Would you not agree that destroying something is a way of abandoning it - in the sense of giving up your rights over it?
I thought you were a mortal enemy of polysemy
In state of nature abandonment would be instant. In a society (social contract) people would agree upon what constitutes lack of continuous use.
I don't believe that's true. I have never heard anyone speak of owning an area.
It's called "land" in property law. Estate in land.
You are talking about the area as if it is distinct from the contents.
Because it is. If you till some land, you own the soil. When you leave and the soil returns in it's state of nature (it is not plowed), you don't own anything there, and anyone can come and start using it, whereas in capitalism it's considered "homesteaded", and even though it is unused land, if anyone wants to come and use it, you have the legal right to deny usage to him and everyone else, and to rent or sell it, etc. Which is to say that in capitalism, by the fact labor has been excerted, not only the products of labor are made property but also the abstact area.
Papirius:I thought you were a mortal enemy of polysemy
That doesn't answer my question. Please try again. Please also answer my other questions.
Papirius:In state of nature abandonment would be instant. In a society (social contract) people would agree upon what constitutes lack of continuous use.
Okay, fair enough. As an aside, how do you see societies/social contracts forming in the world you envision?
That doesn't answer my question.
Define what you mean with someone destroying oneself and what by someone abandoning oneself.
Please also answer my other questions.
What questions have not been answered?
As an aside, how do you see societies/social contracts forming in the world you envision?
By revolution or election. What other options are there?
Papirius: Anenome: Let's say I agree with you for one second. Let's say labor is part of the self. Then the only moral way to deal with another person would be to trade with him for his labor, whatever price he's willing to accept for that labor, like, oh I don't know, a wage. Because a person owns his labor the only illegitimate thing to do would be to take it by force. It could never be illegitimate to freely trade someone for that which they own! Self (which includes labor) is inalienable, that is- slavery, serfhood and employment are illegitimate irrespective of the consent of the slave/ serf/ employee.
Anenome: Let's say I agree with you for one second. Let's say labor is part of the self. Then the only moral way to deal with another person would be to trade with him for his labor, whatever price he's willing to accept for that labor, like, oh I don't know, a wage. Because a person owns his labor the only illegitimate thing to do would be to take it by force. It could never be illegitimate to freely trade someone for that which they own!
How can you claim the individual owns himself and yet does not have the legitimate right to do what he wants with his labor or the products of his labor, including selling them?
How can you equate slavery and serfhood with employment, the former two involving coercion and the latter being purely a product of free choice among two equals?
Upon what rubric is your judgment of legitimacy being made? If labor is inalienable how does that make employment illegitimate, what connects the two concepts. Since inalienability would imply that the laborer owns his labor and therefore should be able to legitimately do whatever he or she wants with it.
How can you claim a legitimate right to tell the laborer what he can and cannot do with his labor and its products if you also claim the laborer owns his labor?
Your position is confused and not well thought out philosophically.
I mentioned products of his labor? I said that the self is inalienable, and that the labor is a part of the self, and thus inalienable. Products of labor are alienable.
Neighter slavery nor serfhood involve coercion by themselves. People could (and somewhere still can) become slaves by selling themselves into slavery, likewise with serfhood.
If labor is inalienable how does that make employment illegitimate, what connects the two concepts.
The fundamnt of employment is alienation of the labor of the employee to his employer. You don't work for the money you got by doing a service to a customer or selling him a product you made, you work for a wage, and the mentioned earnings (which are products of your labor) go to your employer to which you have alienated your labor.
Since inalienability would imply that the laborer owns his labor and therefore should be able to legitimately do whatever he or she wants with it.
Inalienability would imply alienability? Bravo.
I do not claim it, I say it is not a right, it as a violaton of the right to liberty to tell other people what to do (unless they waive that right by violating the same right of some else). Also, you again confuse labor and products of labor- labor, as a part of self, is inalienable, the products of labor- the opposite.
Papirius:Define what you mean with someone destroying oneself and what by someone abandoning oneself.
By "destroy", I mean "damage beyond use or repair". By "abandon", I mean "give up all rights over".
Papirius:What questions have not been answered?
As I see it, three questions:
1. When a person commits suicide, do you think he destroys himself in any way?
2. Do you think mere possession of something entails the right to destroy it and/or the right to exclude everyone else from using or destroying it?
3. Do you think to own something means to have it as property, or do you think it means to simply possess it?
That last one was implicit in my earlier post.
Papirius:By revolution or election. What other options are there?
I guess I should've been more specific. I wasn't talking about how you see getting there from here. How do you see new societies/social contracts forming in a social mutualist world?
Yes.
Do you think mere possession of something entails the right to destroy it and/or the right to exclude everyone else from using or destroying it?
No.
I have explained my views of property (/ownership) and use (/possession).
How do you see new societies/social contracts forming in a social mutualist world?
Changing laws would be achieved by plebiscite on an area that those laws apply to.
Papirius:Yes [I think a person destroys himself in some way when he commits suicide].
Okay. Do you also think that, when a person destroys himself, he abandons himself (using the definitions of "destroy" and "abandon" that I provided)?
Papirius:No [I don't think mere possession of something entails the right to destroy it and/or the right to exclude everyone else from using or destroy it].
Okay. So clearly you can't consistently define the verb "own" as both "have something as property" and "possess", since you clearly don't think merely possessing something conveys the same rights as having something as property. I'd argue that, based on the evidence, you actually define the verb "own" as only "have something as property". Does that sound accurate to you?
Papirius:I have explained my views of property (/ownership) and use (/possession).
With all due respect, I don't think you've yet done so to my satisfaction. But I think I'm getting closer to understanding your views here.
Let's talk about land for a bit. You've made it clear that, when you use the term "land", you mean the same thing as "area". But area is an abstract concept, isn't it? For example, even if Earth was somehow destroyed, the area once occupied by its surface would still exist, wouldn't it? So you're right - area per se can't be destroyed or destroyed (at least not by humans). But is that the same thing as talking about e.g. "an area of fertile soil"? I would say it isn't the same thing.
Papirius:Changing laws would be achieved by plebiscite on an area that those laws apply to.
So you're presuming that there's no part of Earth's surface that's under what you'd call "the state of nature" in a social mutualist world? That is, there's nowhere for any group of people to move to and form a society/social contract ex nihilo?
Regardless of your answer there, how do you see such a plebiscite being conducted? In particular, who do you think would determine the area that it applies to?
Do you also think that, when a person destroys himself, he abandons himself (using the definitions of "destroy" and "abandon" that I provided)?
I don't see why is equating destroying my body with me giveing up all rights so important, I don't know if I think they are eqatible, tell me to what do you wish to apply that construction, and I'll tell you if it's equatable, I don't have the will to sit here and try to think of all the situation that this sort of equation would justify or imply.
I'd argue that, based on the evidence, you actually define the verb "own" as only "have something as property". Does that sound accurate to you?
But is that the same thing as talking about e.g. "an area of fertile soil"?
Why does it matter? I have given conrete examples. You owning the soil you till, but not the area that it is on means that once you stop tilling it and it returnst to it's untilled state of nature, that area is free to be used by anyone else; i.e. the homesteading of an area (which is allowed in capitalism, where the area is called "land") is illegitimate.
That is, there's nowhere for any group of people to move to and form a society/social contract ex nihilo?
There would be, but I guess that depends on the size of the human population.
In whatever way the people agree to. The people themselves would organize depending of their proximity, bioregion and language, and would next determine by themselfs the areas. That was from the perspective of mutualism, whereas I'm a "state mutualist", I envision it similarly, but with the existance of the state making it 'simpler'.
Papirius:I don't see why is equating destroying my body with me giveing up all rights so important, I don't know if I think they are eqatible, tell me to what do you wish to apply that construction, and I'll tell you if it's equatable, I don't have the will to sit here and try to think of all the situation that this sort of equation would justify or imply.
In this context, "abandon something" means to me "give up all rights over something". Furthermore, I'm treating "abandon" and "alienate" as synonyms in this context. So if a person kills himself, he's certainly given up all rights over himself. If he's dead, he can no longer exercise any rights that he may be purported to have. Hence suicide is a form of abandonment, and hence the self is alienable. That's my point.
Papirius:Yes [I actually define the verb "own" as only "have something as property"].
Thank you. Given what you earlier wrote about what you think it means to "have something as property", I believe I can break down your definition of the verb "own" even further: "have the right to use or destroy something and to exclude everyone else from using or destroying it, and depending on the nature of the thing owned (i.e. if it's alienable or inalienable) also the right to exchange it for something or give it as a gift or just abandon it". However, if you agree with my definition of "abandon", then destruction is a form of abandonment, as I've explained already - if something is destroyed, no purported rights can be exercised with/over it. Furthermore, if you agree to treat "alienate" as a synonym of "abandon", as I'm doing, then that makes destruction a form of alienation, and thus all things that can be owned are in some way alienable. Your definition of the verb "own" would then fall in line with the Roman law concept: "have the right to use, the right to enjoy the fruits of use, and the right to alienate".
Papirius:Why does it matter? I have given conrete examples. You owning the soil you till, but not the area that it is on means that once you stop tilling it and it returnst to it's untilled state of nature, that area is free to be used by anyone else; i.e. the homesteading of an area (which is allowed in capitalism, where the area is called "land") is illegitimate.
Okay, I think I have a better idea of what you're talking about in regards to land ownership. I'm glad you brought up the notion of "the state of nature", because I think it's an important one. I would actually agree with you that, if I plow an acre of land, but then leave it to return to the state of nature, then I've abandoned that land. Thus it would be illegitimate for me to subsequently claim the rights of ownership over that acre.
However, I think an important question here is what constitutes use. For example, if I buy a car, but just so I can put it in a garage and admire its beauty, do you think I'm using that car? If you do, then how is that different from me fencing off an area of land so I can admire its natural beauty?
Papirius:There would be, but I guess that depends on the size of the human population.
Okay, fair enough.
Papirius:In whatever way the people agree to. The people themselves would organize depending of their proximity, bioregion and language, and would next determine by themselfs the areas. That was from the perspective of mutualism, whereas I'm a "state mutualist", I envision it similarly, but with the existance of the state making it 'simpler'.
What is your definition of "state"?
Furthermore, if you agree to treat "alienate" as a synonym of "abandon", as I'm doing
I don't, because then I would contradict my previous use of the word alienate, eg. in that definition of property I gave.
However, I think an important question here is what constitutes use. For example, if I buy a car, but just so I can put it in a garage and admire its beauty, do you think I'm using that car?
You're starting to sound like a troll with this totally ludicrous connections you make between topics that are talked about and some notion about polysemy that retarded people don't have doubts about. It's like we're talking about whether should a pupil drop out of school, and you start asking about why should people remove pupils from their eyes if they are in a school. It's insane.
Papirius:I don't, because then I would contradict my previous use of the word alienate, eg. in that definition of property I gave.
Okay, that's fine. I won't use the term "the right to alienate" anymore then. Instead I'll use the term "the right to abandon", which is what I meant by the term "the right to alienate".
Papirius:You're starting to sound like a troll with this totally ludicrous connections you make between topics that are talked about and some notion about polysemy that retarded people don't have doubts about. It's like we're talking about whether should a pupil drop out of school, and you start asking about why should people remove pupils from their eyes if they are in a school. It's insane.
Perhaps you'd like to clarify your objection here, because so far, all I see is you trying to tell me to not say certain things. If that is indeed what you're doing, then I consider it to be a waste of time and effort on your part. Now I would like you to tell me what you think constitutes using something. Understand that I'll reject anything that amounts to "I know it when I see it".
Papirius just keeps making bald assertions w/o supporting rationale :\
Autolykos has the patience of a saint.
Now I would like you to tell me what you think constitutes using something.
No, an area is not being used if it's watched. I will not feed your trolling any more.
Papirius just keeps making bald assertions w/o supporting rationale
E.g.?
Or is just a troll.
Papirius:No, an area is not being used if it's watched. I will not feed your trolling any more.
You haven't been feeding my trolling, because I haven't been trolling. Semantics lies at the heart of debate and, indeed, all communication.
So you say that an area isn't being used of it's only being watched. Logically, then, you must consider a car that's not being driven, only being admired for its beauty while it's sitting in a garage, as not being used either. Now let me ask you: when would you say something is being used? Again, I won't accept anything like "I know it when I see it" as an answer.
Papirius:Or [Autolykos] is just a troll.
If you really think I'm a troll, then why don't you put your money where your mouth is, and report all of my posts as constituting trolling, and PMing one or more moderators/administrators asking them to perma-ban me since I'm apparently a troll? In other words, I'm calling your bluff here, sorry.
Malachi:Considering that usage is central to your concept of ownership, its very hard to understand why you are so reluctant to define usage.
It's not really hard to understand. His beliefs have at their root a very deep error that he cannot see or he would've corrected it long ago, and should he ever achieve clarity on that error he would be forced to change his entire world-view, meaning there's deep psychological reasons why he doesn't even want to achieve clarity, unless he's intellectually honest and ready to change of course, but it doesn't sound like he is.
F* you and your psychologist fallacy. Meaning of use? Area is used by existence of anything tangible on it, tangible things are used by exercising control over them (exerting effort [/labor] to change their natural state by physical contact). Watching a field is not using it.
Ah, yes, those silly paintings are not owned by anyone, unless of course we are using them as firewood.
Some things are made to be useless.
Let me ask this, do you own the "area" taken up by a sandwich as you eat it, or is it illegitimate to eat something because you can't own it, because it's taking up "area."
In short, why on earth would land be considered fundamentally different from any other thing that can be owned. It's the height of contradiction to accept that things can be owned except land. There is literally no point in thinking that. And I'd really like to know your ulterior motive for suggesting that concept, because it ain't in the slightest bit consistent.
Let me ask this, do you own the "area"
or is it illegitimate to eat something because you can't own it, because it's taking up "area."
These questions have nothing to do with what I've written here.
It's the height of contradiction to accept that things can be owned except land.
Things can be owned if they are products of labor. Land (in meaning of an area) isn't a product of labor, therefore- it cannot be legitimate property (whereas in capitalism it can).
Read before trolling, so that it doesn't turn out so obvious. Look up to Autolykos.
Papirius: Read before trolling, so that it doesn't turn out so obvious. Look up to Autolykos.
In case anyone missed the humor in this, that statement is from a guy who says this about art:
Papirius: Some things are made to be useless. LibertyHQ and its awesome forum. | Post Points: 5
Papirius: It's the height of contradiction to accept that things can be owned except land. Things can be owned if they are products of labor. Land (in meaning of an area) isn't a product of labor, therefore- it cannot be legitimate property (whereas in capitalism it can).
Alright, I'm about to blow your mind.
Let's say I bring a couple hundred thousand tons of dirt to the ocean and build my own island.
I have now created land as a product of labor. Do I own the island?
"The concept of 'voluntary slavery' is indeed a contradictory one, for so long as a laborer remains totally subservient to his master's will voluntarily, he is not yet a slave since his submission is voluntary; whereas, if he later changed his mind and the master enforced his slavery by violence, the slavery would not then be voluntary". - Rothbard
Ok, here is where I am getting a little stuck.
One the one hand, I get the argument that if the laborer remains totally subservient to his masters, he is not yet a slave. Once, he changes his mind, and the master enforces the slavery through violence, the slavery would then be 'involuntary'.
But, this does seem contradictory to me in another way.
If I, Jones, do decide to sell myself into "slavery", signing a contract with Smith claiming that I will forever be subservient to Smith, then I am bound by this contract to do so. If I change my mind later on then tough luck, right?
I mean, lets equate with something a little bit less emotionally charged. Lets say I sign up for a three year subscription for cell phone usage, as we commonly do. I sign a paper that says, "I, Jones, agree to pay for three years of cell phone service." Well, like the slave, maybe twr years into the contract, I decide that maybe this deal isn't as great as I thought it would be. The cell phone company is not aggressing against me when they come after the monthly fees just because I decided I don't like the contract I signed. If you can just repudiate contracts like this then what is the point of the contract. It is largely to lock in the deal, make sure no one cuts and runs before they agreed to. I see no reason why, if one were foolish enough to just sign their rights over to someone else, that they shouldn't be held liable for damages in repudiating their contract. They shouldn't have signed it in the first place.
You might say that this person is simply not a slave since he voluntarily signed over his right to someone else. A slave does not do this. But I don't think you can call it slavery if a master enforces his contract with the "laborer" or "slave" through violence if at some point the laborer signed a contract remitting property rights over his body to the master for an indefinite period of time.
I see how this may violate traditional contract law which necessitates a time frame. I also understand that you cannot truly sign over your will to someone else because you will always actually control it, but singing a contract to slavery involves a selling of your body. Because the will and the body cannot be divorced, this presents a problem. But, I think you could make the argument that in any contract you are selling off a portion of your will to the other party. You agree to control your will according to the conditions of the contract, but you are always physically free to break them. The question is of rights over enforcement. I don't see why a master cannot enforce these rights if he possesses such a contract from you.
"If men are not angels, then who shall run the state?"
Never mind, Rothbard's property rights and the theory of contracts cleared it all up for me. i was thinking of contracts purely in terms of promises and not property transfer...man, what a paradigm shift!
Right. To elaborate further:
"If I, Jones, do decide to sell myself into "slavery", signing a contract with Smith claiming that I will forever be subservient to Smith, then I am bound by this contract to do so. If I change my mind later on then tough luck, right?"
Rothbard clears this up by placing the proper emphasis on title rather than contract. It's title that is nonviolable, not contract. Holding title is always a moral proposition. But you can see that some contracts are invalid on their face, such as a slavery contract, because one cannot transfer title to their body to another, because they cannot separate their will from their body and cannot guarantee their future will won't want to change the arrangement. If that future self does want to change the arrangement then the contract would have to become slavery for it to go into effect, thus violating the man's rights and becoming an immoral and thus null contract.
I have now created land as a product of labor. Do I own the island
I exit the discussion, being that I have come to doubt whether the concept of (right to) property is justified at all.