AJ:Based on this definition, any subjective statement by Alice is insufficient for her goal of making a statement that is inconsistent with Bob's performance of Action L (since the only subjective statements she can make that she could possibly know to be true are about "Alice"; she can't know Bob's subjective feelings or opinions). This is <1> from above.
Right - a subjective statement about one's own feelings/opinions cannot possibly have this property of action-inconsistency (with regard to another person).
AJ:Now, an objective statement by Alice is either sufficient or insufficient. If all objective statements are insufficient, I don't see where you are headed with the argument. If any objective statements are sufficient, the argument seems circular (<2> holds).
This is the dilemma raised by the question I mentioned before: Do meaningful statements exist which are inconsistent with someone else's actions but which are not trivialities? There is no circularity because the answer to this question is not contained in the definition of "inconsistent": we could potentially answer "yes" or "no." However, we will see (assuming Argument G) that neither answer can coexist with a non-trivial statement that is inconsistent with libertarian actions.
Right, I think you might possibly be able to make Argument G, which would then prove that it is impossible to consistently make a non-trivial statement that is inconsistent with libertarian actions. But since this is in the context of your definition of inconsistent, it seems that all that would be gained would be to show that no objective (or at least, non-subjective) statements can consistently be made against libertarian actions. If you could do this, you would succeed where I believe Hoppe fails, but there would still be the "doesn't speak to anyone except those who accept objective ethics" issue. In other words, I believe Hoppe fails in two critical ways: 1. His proof is invalid. 2. Even if it were valid, it only speaks to those who accept objective ethics. I am saying that if you could give Argument G, you may have solved issue 1 (and that may be all you hoped to do), but it wouldn't take care of issue 2 (which maybe doesn't matter from your perspective - I don't know. Kinsella seems not to care about issue 2.).
Why anarchy fails
AJ:Right, I think you might possibly be able to make Argument G, which would then prove that it is impossible to consistently make a non-trivial statement that is inconsistent with libertarian actions. But since this is in the context of your definition of inconsistent, it seems that all that would be gained would be to show that no objective (or at least, non-subjective) statements can consistently be made against libertarian actions.
Isn't it also true that no (non-trivial) subjective statements can be made against libertarian actions either? If so, then wouldn't we have proven that all statements (whether subjective or non-subjective) are either trivial, self-contradictory, or capable of being "Yeah, so?"-ed by the libertarian?
AJ:If you could do this, you would succeed where I believe Hoppe fails, but there would still be the "doesn't speak to anyone except those who accept objective ethics" issue.
As for someone who doesn't accept objective ethics, at what point would they part ways with the argument I have presented here? (Or do you mean to say that Argument G won't "speak to" a non-objective-ethicist? Because it isn't intended to; it's only a part of the larger argument.)
Zavoi:Isn't it also true that no (non-trivial) subjective statements can be made against libertarian actions either?
If by "against" you mean "inconsistent with" as defined above, then I agree, but then the statement becomes trivial. But maybe I have a simpler way around this...
Zavoi:If so, then wouldn't we have proven that all statements (whether subjective or non-subjective) are either trivial, self-contradictory, or capable of being "Yeah, so?"-ed by the libertarian?
...well, can't every (normative* non-libertarian) statement be "Yeah, so?"-ed by the libertarian (every performer of Action L)? Because every normative statement can (and generally is) "Yeah so?"-ed by anyone who doesn't share the norms the statement refers to. See Lilburne's brief post on casuistry here http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/9871.aspx
Zavoi:As for someone who doesn't accept objective ethics, at what point would they part ways with the argument I have presented here?
Before I answer this, the whole concern may be circumvented by the above, which I may be quite late in noting because I think the "Yeah so" issue was brought up before, but I didn't see this way of resolving it at that time.
*Naturally, non-normative statements like, "Don't homestead that stick, it's a snake!" or other consequentialist statements or statements of fact wouldn't be "Yeah so"-ed
Perhaps I should have been more clear when inventing words. By "Yeah so-ing" I meant: accepting the other person's statement as true while not altering your behavior. A consequentialist or purely-factual statement is a prime example of a yeahsoable statement: when you tell me that the stick is really a snake, I could accept this fact but still decide to homestead it (because I don't care that it's a snake). A more obvious example is "Don't pick up that stick: two plus two is four!" The natural response is "Yeah [I accept that two plus two is four], so [why does that matter]?"
With that in mind:
AJ:...well, can't every (normative* non-libertarian) statement be "Yeah, so?"-ed by the libertarian (every performer of Action L)? Because every normative statement can (and generally is) "Yeah so?"-ed by anyone who doesn't share the norms the statement refers to. See Lilburne's brief post on casuistry here http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/9871.aspx
It seems that you're saying that someone can always reject a normative statement by rejecting its normative premise. But that's not what I meant by yeahsoing, which involves accepting the statement.
Aren't we then back to this:
AJ:If Alice's goal is to make a statement inconsistent with Bob's performance of Action L, and this notion of inconsistency is defined such that - by definition - <1> a subjective statement (by someone other than the acter [the performer of Action L in this case]) is insufficient and <2> an objective statement is sufficient, the argument would seem to be circular.
<1> a subjective statement (by someone other than the acter [the performer of Action L in this case]) is insufficient
and
<2> an objective statement is sufficient,
the argument would seem to be circular.
Where in the definition of "inconsistent" is <2> contained? Certainly, not all objective statements suffice to be "inconsistent" with an action, and neither is it obvious that any (non-trivial) objective statements do.
If the definitions are an issue, then let's just unpack the terminology to see what substantive claims are being made. The claim I'm defending is: All meaningful statements are either false, capable of being rendered false by a simple act of will on the part of Bob [the listener], or such that Bob can believe the statement while also doing Action L. (As always, Argument G(L) is assumed to have already been proven.)