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Thank you all for your encouragement. In response to comments by Jonathan Finegold http://www.economicthought.net/blog/?p=3180 I'm posting some additional context here. ****** To understand what Hayek writes in “The Facts of the Social Sciences” it is important to realize that he begins by arguing that social phenomena cannot be defined
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Andris: "My main question resulting from this quiz would be not analysis of any of the specific statements (whether they are indeed true or false), but rather a more general problem: why do we have any differences of opinon over them? Aren't they supposed to be really obvious? Why do we arrive at different answers? Is it because the statements
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Fephisto: Thank you for your reply and compliment. You wrote: 1-at n goods I do/attain X, Y, and Z 2-at n-1 goods I do/attain only X and Y (that this is so is because of all the pedantry involved in defining 'an economically distinguishable unit' that Mises/etc. go into pains describing) 3-Since action implies a positive preference, I prefer
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Hi Clayton I don't agree. Both Menger and Mises are talking about the difference between regularities in the relationship between A and B that are absolutely certain, versus regularities in the relationship between A and B that are not certain. The difference between my walking toward a location (action A) and my arriving at that location (result
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Quickly scanned... may have some quibbles. Hans Hoppe on Austrian method . Clayton - ****** Thank you. Yes, I'm fully aware of Hoppe's epistemology, ethics, and concept of action. Adam
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Empirical Laws, Exact Laws, and Human Action: A Short Essay on the Austrian Distinction between Exact and Empirical Regularities What we refer to as praxeology can be traced back to Carl Menger’s distinction between empirical laws and exact laws . As Menger explains: The types and typical relationships (the laws) of the world of phenomena are
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Fephisto wrote: A) the law of marginal utility is only talking about the nth v. n-1st goods. Action can determine a preference between two objects (nth v. n-1st). Thus a weak form of a subjective value theory (SVT) is all that's really needed. B) What I was originally thinking was the following. If marginal utility says that successive units of
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"Apparently there is some article somewhere about this, please point me to it if you know." http://mises.org/daily/3794/Freedom-and-Property-Where-They-Conflict
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Fephisto: Thank you for your contribution. Here is a correct version of your question: If I understand the Austrian treatment of indifference theory, it's, basically, that "Preferences are revealed only in action", and thus, indifference theory is illogical. However, at any given point in time, Austrians can claim to make a ordinal (not
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nirgrahamUK: "the praxeological result of A+B (where these are NAP violating acts/descriptions) seems always to be that the welfare analysis fails the pareto unanimity rule." The point that FlyingAxe raised was, what is the inhibition to the individual's act on an individual level? "So, why shouldn't I steal the book (while encouraging