I know forms are not the place for long works, yet, there is much talent here. Im hoping someone will have the time to offer some criticism.
No Compromise: A Rejoinder to Block and Whiteheads' Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approach to Resolving the Abortion Controversy.
Jeremiah Dyke *
Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to repair the misinterpretation of the private property rights approach to resolving the abortion controversy given by Dr. Block and Whitehead in their esteemed "Compromising the Uncompromisable" paper written for Appalachian Journal of Law. It is this author's premise that the title chosen is fallacious in that it purports a compromise where no compromise should exist. Indeed, the scenario that Block and Whitehead depict is a situation of symmetrical benefits, a quasi Nash Equilibrium between the opposing parties. Yet, in reality Block and Whitehead are settling for the notion of less force as opposed to more force instead of maintaining the libertarian doctrine's creed of no force versus less force (inherent within the nonaggression axiom).
Like many of the preceding libertarian giants, I owe a great intellectual debt to Dr. Walter Block[1], and therefore owe it to him to be forthright and uncompromising in the march toward liberty. It is my opinion that most libertarian thinkers labor under two misapprehensions which cloud their judgment on a multitude of topics. These misapprehensions include the acceptance of implied-in-fact contracting, otherwise known as the implicit contract, as well as the refusal to accept an individual's absolute right to his or her property[2]. It is because of this blight on our philosophy, and not due to lack of intellectual courage, that leads our two authors to accept a system of initial violence. Therefore, unlike Block's often-employed analogy of the taxi passenger whose morality tells him to "head north", but has instead chosen to compromise his principles by settling for west, these freedom hailers are unaware of their compromise. Dr. Block and Whitehead are unaware that they are headed west.
After a systematic presentation of the guiding cases that dominate the legalities of the abortion topic[3], Block and Whitehead begin to introduce their compromise in part IV of their paper Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approach to Resolving the Abortion Controversy. As a process of paying homage to the unborn children of abortion, Block and Whitehead make a weighty error by paralleling abortion to slavery and the Holocaust.
"If anything, the present day pro-life forces are in a worse position than their nineteenth century counterparts. For one thing, the fetus is far more helpless than was the black slave. The latter could 'run away' with the help of the Underground Railroad and other such institutions. No threeweek old fetus has the maturity to initiate or even remotely cooperate in any such venture" (page 14).
And again,
"It is for this reason we maintain that abortion is an abomination. It is a massive killer. More people die annually as a result of it (1,591,000) than perish from heart disease (720,058), cancer (505,322), stroke (144,088), or all accidents (91,983) Adding insult to injury, death occurs in these cases because of the purposeful action of other people" (page 15).
"In our view, what we do to very young human beings is far worse than what we do to either of these two other groups of people, and thus should not be equated with them. And this for two reasons: one, fetuses are more helpless than either Jews or blacks; two, far more of them have been murdered. Lynched blacks number 'only' in the thousands. There were 'only' six million Jews who perished in the holocaust. But, given that somewhat more than 1.5 million fetuses are killed every year in the U.S. alone, it takes only four short years to reach totals attained by the Nazis regarding the Jews" (page 15, footnote 130).
The error here is comparing potential utility/disutility with actual utility/disutility. The same confusion is often employed by utilitarians when they speak as to how some animal life is better than no life. The concept is empty because it is speaking about an entity prior to existence (by existence we mean a living organism of self-preservation). The fetus is a potential life, not a life. Even if we yield the fact that life begins at conception, it is an error to believe that conception is the qualifier from which we can define murder of life. Murder would be justified as theft (theft of life), and theft would imply ownership. Moreover, ownership would imply a conscience so as to assume value, yet, how would a parasitic entity like that of a developing fetus claim value? It is as if our two libertarian philosophers are waxing in Shakespeare, "is it better to have loved and lost than never to have loved?" to an inanimate object[4].
Finally, the statistics regarding abortion death rates outlined above are skewed, given that nature itself is the chief aborter via miscarriage. Therefore, even if we accept the statistics quoted above as properly contrasted, the statistics presented must be adjusted for the natural rate of miscarriage in order to format a true picture. According to a 2006 study titled Early Pregnancy Loss, "Early pregnancy loss is unfortunately the most common complication of human gestation, occurring in at least 75% of all women trying to conceive. Most of these losses are unrecognized and occur before or with the next expected menses. Of those that are recognized, 15-20% are spontaneous abortions (SABs) or ectopic pregnancies diagnosed after the pregnancy is clinically recognized. Approximately 5% of couples trying to conceive have 2 consecutive miscarriages, and approximately 1% of couples have 3 or more consecutive losses[5]". This of course is not to suggest that the quoted abortion statistics should be decreased by 75%, as the previous study might claim, but merely that they must be adjusted downward to capture a true representation.
Before we continue our endeavor with defining private property rights and abortion, let us first survey the question that babies are innocent, sinless entities (the author is not suggesting that Block and Whitehead subscribe to this notion, only that a large majority of the populace does). If we define our stance of morality as upheld by the most ardent defenders of pro-life, the religious Judeo-Christian rightwing, it may be asked how you defend a baby's death from the backdrop of its innocence. Being that heaven is defined as paradise and speculating that all dying babies go to heaven, then the question becomes, what have babies lost? In actuality, they received a one way trip to paradise without the possibility of, at some point in time, rejecting, or losing, their faith/salvation. In this case, abortion is an insurance policy paid in full. In fact, by this logic, we need more aborters; especially aborters of dissimilar faiths so that their babies may be propelled to heaven (via termination) before these babies are born and possibly educated into a different religion. With that aside, we continue our rejoinder.
Block and Whitehead outline how the process of abortion is not constituted as an act of invasion, but instead an act of abandonment or renunciation.
"The woman who refuses to carry her fetus to term is in exactly the same position as a person who refuses to rescue a drowning swimmer. Abortion is not, in and of itself, an act invasive of other people or their property rights, even when fetuses are considered persons" (page 17).
This writer is in complete agreement with the above statement. However, the two authors then commence to explain what specific obligations the mother has to her fetus that can only be described as a form implicit contracting that is somehow intrinsic to the birth process. Though it is true that Block and Whitehead acknowledge that such contracts between fetuses and mothers are negligible,
"In contrast, there can be no such contract in the case of pregnancy, at the very least because there is simply no child to have a contract with at the point of intercourse when the child is created. The fetus does not yet exist, and even when it does, it is impossible to have a contract (implicit or otherwise) with a one weekold baby" (page 20).
Simultaneously, they surrender to the notion that the mother has an obligation to follow specific practices if those practices lead to the safety of the fetus. Essentially, Block and Whitehead are making the argument that if the capability to evict the fetus (rather than abort) is available, then the mother is under obligation to conduct such practices[7].
"Suppose that under these circumstances a woman had an abortion - that is, she refused to notify anyone or used the 'Church steps' when she could as easily have saved the life of this fetus by engaging in this modern technology. Under these conditions, the individual would be guilty of an initiatory aggressive act that would certainly be contrary to all known principles of law. Under these assumptions, one would have to evict the fetus, not abort it" (page 20).
"The word 'abort' is used in different ways. It is absolutely crucial that a distinction be made between lulling and eviction. This future technology would allow the individual to do the one without the other. If and when it becomes possible, the individual would have an obligation" (page 21).
Regardless of the difference in implications between aborting and evicting, clearly it is a violation of self-liberty to oblige someone to engage in medical procedures by way of implicit contract with an undeveloped, potential-life owner. Clearly, as stated above, if Block and Whitehead accept that such contracting is impossible with a "week-old baby", then they must be operating under the assumption that a pregnant woman is contracted with some third-party entity of moral authority. Furthermore, not only does this supposed entity have authority to unilaterally contract with a harboring mother (to mean that they contract without her consent), it also has legal informed consent of a developing-aborted-embyro so as to represent the fetus within a courtroom. In other words, we are to believe that a third party representative of an underdeveloped entity not only has the ability to hold the mother accountable for her pregnancy termination, but it also has that entities desire to do so (yet why should we assume such desire?). It is this writer's belief that these types of errors in logic and liberty fall within the faulty reasoning of not accepting explicit contracting (contracting accounting for the immensity of variables) as the only means of legal title exchange. Furthermore, these types of errors would not exist within the realm of absolute rights to property as the only form of ownership.
Next, Block and Whitehead call to mind the analogy of Judith Thompson's violinist who magically becomes attached to another individual via no fault of either individual, but instead by way of third-party intruder. From here our authors deliniate what rights each member has to one another, and if one may "cut" off ties with the other, even if that severing causes death.
"What can you do with this person? Suppose he goes back to sleep and is thus totally helpless. Can you just slit his throat? That would be murder and must therefore be opposed. Killing him is aggressive; it constitutes initiatory violence. Even if you can get away with it on practical grounds, it should certainly not be allowed on the basis of legal principles" (page 19).
The fault lies within the acceptance that one's personal life has more precedence over another's personal property which, by itself, leads to logical inconsistencies[9]. Therefore, instead of viewing the scenario from the reference point of whose property each individual currently resides in, Block and Whitehead are instead viewing the scenario in terms of each individual's right to life. Given the scenario, can one imagine any more of an invasive action of one's personal property than that of attaching onesself to another human being? It may of course be attested that this attachment is not the fault of the violinist, but instead the fault of a third-party; however, it is irrelavant. The fact remains that an individual is found within the confines of your own property (assumed) by way of attachment. There should be no need for deliberation over blame, but instead let the property owner act in accordance to his or her will (which will undoubtedly be some act of defense which one may label agression). An arbitrator would then decide if such a lawsuit is under merit. Again, the problem is that of refusing to accept the owner's absolute property rights, i.e. the property owner may do as he or she pleases with his or her property as long as his or her property doesn't invade another's property. Under this rubric, there is no questioning what actions are allowed to be performed by the property owner, nor what actions are permitted to the trespasser (unless they are explicitly contracted) since action presupposes property from which to act[10]. If our property owner wishes to punish the trespasser by death, then so be it. It is the owner's right to property.
Now, one will undoubtedly argue that this is a violation of another's life by definition that one's rights end where another's begin. However, that would hold the right to life above the right to property, yet life itself is property (property of ones will). Therefore, if we hold that ownership is defined as the right to possess, use, and/or dispose of anything to which one has a moral claim (as quoted from the Market for Liberty), then there are only but a few choices where our property owner is forbidden the right to do with the intruder as they please.
Of course it can be noted that only one of these three choices is consistant with libertarian law code, the option of explicit contracting. Therefore, when Block and Whitehead make the argument that,
"If a parent abandons a newborn in the woods or shoves a five-year-old out into a blizzard, he is doing something akin to that of slitting the cord between you and the kidney victim who is attached to you. It is incumbent upon the individual to at least make a phone call to an orphanage, or put the child on the proverbial Church steps or be in touch with whatever organization functions in this capacity in any given society. It is only if no help is forthcoming from any such quarter that these actions can possibly not be interpreted as murder, (page 19).
they are essentially either arguing that our definition of ownership outlined above[11] is wrong or that the female is not the actual owner of her property (more on this below).
Therefore, we finally confront the compromise to which Block and Whitehead purport to both substantiate liberty while offering each opposition a win-win situation. The compromise is that of the eviction position, or thus, a mother has an obligation to evict an unwanted fetus, rather than abort it, in the gentlest manner possible if and when the technology becomes available. Though this author disagrees with this supposed compromise offered above (for reasons previously outlined), it can be said that while operating under the lenses through which Block and Whitehead view liberty, the above statement would be considered a compromise. However, the question that remains is; are Block's and Whitehead's views on liberty appropriate-are they consistent with a free society?
The foremost reason we call into question the ways in which Block and Whitehead perceive liberty is that of the libertarian objection to positive obligations. Libertarians hold that, under a free society, positive rights i.e. compulsory Good-Samaritanism, are inconsistent with liberty. Block and Whitehead tip their hat to this objection in section IX.
"Positive obligations: Another argument against the libertarian view is that it amounts to a demand for positive obligations. Before confronting this charge head on, let us place it in context. Our claim, here, is that if we are indeed guilty of making an exception to the general libertarian structure against positive obligations, it is a very narrow and limited one. All that is required is that the pregnant woman notify an evictionist that she wishes to rid herself of the fetus. In the case of the post birth child, the 'positive' requirement would be that the parent not simply hide the child in an attic or basement and refuse to feed it until it dies. Instead, the 'obligation' is to engage in a public notification (to the newspaper or radio or church or orphanage or evictionist) to the effect that the parent in question no longer wishes to support his child. It is only if no one else in the entire world desires to take charge of the baby that it may legitimately die of neglect, under the libertarian code (Page 36)."
Drawing attention to the underlined statement from the passage above, it cannot be objected that some form of compulsory positive obligation exists within Block and Whitehead's compromise. Yet, even though Block and Whitehead in a roundabout way concede this point[12], they view the use of force as "a very narrow and limited one", one that obviously is worth such a break from principle. Again, this author disagrees. To claim an obligation of such a small act as calling, locating, and visiting an eviction agency as trite, is beyond my comprehension. I can only compare this claim to obligating someone to take one step forward, an obviously small obligation, unless he or she are standing at the edge of a cliff, at which point our small intrusion becomes somewhat extensive. The potential embarrassment to which may be compelled upon a pregnant woman seems to be neglected by our two authors. Though one may not own their reputation or secrecy they do own the right to pursue it, of which the eviction compromise doesn't allow.
Block and Whitehead seem to find shelter from this positive obligation within the relationship between parents and children under a free society. The bulk of this shelter is from the lack of acceptance of life as property, a view that Murray N. Rothbard espoused in his classic work The Ethics of Liberty
"Let us pursue more deeply our argument that mere promises or expectations should not be enforceable. The basic reason is that the only valid transfer of title of ownership in the free society is the case where the property is, in fact and in the nature of man, alienable by man. All physical property owned by a person is alienable, i.e., in natural fact it can be given or transferred to the ownership and control of another party. I can give away or sell to another person my shoes, my house, my car, my money, etc. But there are certain vital things which, in natural fact and in the nature of man, are inalienable, i.e., they cannot in fact be alienated, even voluntarily. Specifically, a person cannot alienate his will, more particularly his control over his own mind and body. Each man has control over his own mind and body. Each man has control over his own will and person, and he is, if you wish, "stuck" with that inherent and inalienable ownership. Since his will and control over his own person are inalienable, then so also are his rights to control that person and will. That is the ground for the famous position of the Declaration of Independence that man's natural rights are inalienable; that is, they cannot be surrendered, even if the person wishes to do so (pages 119-27)."
Though this author agrees completely that "mere promises or expectations should not be enforceable", this concept is unrealized-it is unfinished. The question is not whether one may hold the promises/expectations of title transfer enforceable or even whether you believe that the title of life can be transferred, the question is in regards to absolute property rights. For example, it is yielded that an individual may engage in voluntary servitude to which he may sell himself into bondage under whatever conditions the two parties agree upon. Furthermore, it is yielded that the since an individual cannot truly contract his or her title of life away to another individual (since life cannot "alienate its own will" because it is inseparable from life), it is still declared by this author that two individuals may contract in a way in which one individual cannot yield his or her servitude without yielding his or her life. Thus, under the banner of absolute property rights, one may contract with a property owner to enter his property without the fear of the property owner calling upon his rights to defend his or her entrance. Yet, by this same token, the two parties may contract a way in which defense of absolute property rights may be employed if such a breech of contract surfaces[13].
Stepping back, Block and Whitehead comment on the issue of evictionism from the standpoint of sociobiology and the nature of aborting only female babies (with reference to China's policies on birth). Within the essay the question is addressed as whether to
"adopt a 'laissezfaire' attitude of 'so be it': if a group of people wishes to abort females and thus eventually vanish, let them get on with it; they have the right to make such choices, and if they result in the demise of their society, there would be no one but themselves to blame" (page 27).
To which our authors speculate on such implications,
"Yet another concerns the kind of society that will be in existence roughly twenty years after such decisions are made. It will be one with hundreds of males for every female: surely a recipe for disaster, at least from a social and psychological perspective. The result can only be massive homosexuality, or polyandry, or massive emigration, which will only start the problem off on another round elsewhere, if these mores are carried with them" (page 27).
It baffles me how the concept of relative costs becomes overlooked in such speculation. Such an extreme anti-female-baby society would only exist within a certain state of male to female ratios. Yet as a society pursues such policies the ratios will change. The costs of bearing female babies will decline until they eventually become, on net, a positive decision. Only under a condition of coercion would such policies persist (not under free exchange) and even under such compulsory force we would still have a healthy black market to fulfill such demand.
Continuing, Block and Whitehead consider the implications for their proposed "eviction compromise". Though the authors make an accurate judgment for the role charity would potentially play in fueling the demand for increased medical technology as well as playing the role of monetary sponsorship for those women who cannot afford such new technological breakthroughs, they again make an error in choice of language when they speak of potential health factors of evictionism versus abortion.
"Under libertarianism, there are no positive obligations. Thus, the mother is only to be forced to undergo an eviction procedure (on the assumption that she prefers aborting her child) when there is no increase in hazard to herself" (page 33).
How is "increase in hazard to herself" to be understood? Indeed, are we to assign probabilities to all acts of potential hazard that fall under the rubric of eviction-obligation? And how and who is to be the judge of such probabilities? Are we to consider both physical harm as well as mental harm? Proceeding forward, our authors continue in their advancement of arbitrariness as they speak of the implications of child abuse and suicide. Questions thus arise on what is considered child abuse? How do we prove it? How is it punished? Who punishes and pays for it? Etc. All of this vague language stems from the refusal to accept an individual's absolute rights to property[14]. For example, there would be no need to question when life begins (conception or birth)? When is there justification to end another's life? What constitutes potential harm or a potential threat or any other arbitrary definition as long as we accept one initial axiom: that an individual has true ownership to their property. Therefore, the question is transformed from pregnancy and life to property. Who owns the property where the baby is harbored? Who owns the property where the baby is given birth? To answer these questions is to justify whatever action comes next unless there is a previous contract that explicitly forfeits that action[15].
Therefore, if you were to make the legitimate claim that if you invite someone onto your property, at which point in time you change your mind and ask them to leave, you must, at minimum, give them enough time to leave. Indeed, someone may parallel the above statement with the birth process in that, by inviting the fertilized egg onto your property it is implicitly assumed that it will need nine months to depart. Yet, the above claim sidesteps the fact that no contract is explicitly derived. For example, under absolute rights to property, it should be accepted that if you invite someone onto your property without explicitly contracting their rights to be present there, you are under no obligation to forfeit your absolute rights to property. You may change your mind at any time and invoke any punish to the trespasser.
Therefore, the initial assault on such a theory as absolute rights to property is that no exchange would ever take place because no one possesses the omniscience to detail an explicit contract (there are just too many supposed variables). Though this is a quality objection it highly dubious given our nature as a social species and our desire to derive such contracts as to allow exchange. Therefore, though it may be true that a market for loopholes may exist, it is also true that precedence will serve to correct such loopholes. Thus, it is more likely that a market for such contracting will surface and that no one will socialize or exchange with anyone unless they can properly demonstrate that they are protected by such contracting agencies. To carry our previous example about the trespasser further, we can now imagine an individual inviting another individual onto his property, of which both parties are involved with a contracting organization that doesn't allow such absolute rights to property to be used without a large monetary penalty. Therefore, both parties have signaled to each other that they have previously contracted away such absolute rights to property (as murder) to an agency that will enforce such a contract. Hereafter, if these individuals were to break such contracts they would thus be responsible to the agencies demands[16].
In conclusion, we know that to murder is theft! It is theft of life, and life can only be rightly taken by its owner. Furthermore, we know that to abort something is to leave it, to cut off ties with its existence, to eradicate it from our contact. Thus, if the fetus is the owner of its life, and the mother is its harbor, where is the crime of abortion? Where is the crime when one life chooses not to associate with another life? Where is the crime when one life chooses to eliminate all physical and emotional contact from another's life? Where is the crime in eradicating a life from your property, to in fact use force when it is unwilling to remove itself? What is the crime? If one argues that it is murder because the eradication of this life leads to its death, then by this logic we must blame all ex-girlfriends and ex-wives who choose to eliminate their physical and emotional bonds from their boyfriends and husbands--leading to their suicide. Moreover, if one believes they are possessed by a demon, do they not believe they are taking the same recourse through exorcism as the mother is toward her fetus? Are they not both attempting to abort or evict that which is parasitic? Are they too murders?
If one owns his or her life then he or she may associate, bond or remove any other life from his or her own (or by definition, he or she does not own his or her life). It is not a matter of where your rights end and where another's begin. Another individual does not own the right to trespass on your property, and if he were invited, he does not own the right to stay when asked to leave. There is no argument for where rights end and begin because there is no murder, and there is no crime! Simply one life cutting ties from another's life.
If a fetus is not a human life, the same rules apply; one is simply discarding or cutting ties of an unwanted object. If the mother is the owner of the child's life (i.e. not in possession of like a contractual pregnancy), she may thus disown anything she owns. If she is in possession of another's life, she may relinquish the possession of it at any time. Indeed, in spite of the analysis offered by Block and Whitehead, she doesn't need to contact an eviction agency to see who would take the fetus, though she may be inclined if there were some monetary incentive, because it not their title. Block's statement about contacting the world before discarding the fetus has no merit except under the illusion of an implicit contract, whereas it is implicitly assumed that the mother and the fetus have some obligatory commitment to one another. It is only with the notion of this amoral animal, the implicit contract, that unwilling trespassers (like sperm and the outcome of its labor) gain rights to negotiate the trespassing of another's body.
*Jeremiah Dyke ([email protected]) http://jeremiahdyke.blogspot.com/ .
Cite this article as: Jeremiah Dyke, "No Compromise: A Rejoinder to Block and Whiteheads' Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approach to Resolving the Abortion Controversy" Libertarian Papers 1, __ (2009). Online at: libertarianpapers.org. This article is subject to a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (creativecommons.org/licenses).
[1] Labeling him my guru-mentor, Dr. Block once had within him the courtesy to respond to an e-mail of mine to which I asked blatantly if this 28-year old part-time writer and math teacher had a speck of talent. I will forever be grateful to those couple of sentences of inspiration that will forever have renewed my vigor for liberty. Thank you.
[2]. Many of these individuals argue that one's absolute right to his or her property should not violate another's absolute right to his or her life. Thus, it is argued by these life-apologetics that rights-to-property come second to rights-to-life. This too is a compromise. I will start with the obvious. If ownership is a claim, via initial homesteading or exchange, to a geometrical three-dimensional space (a specific longitude, latitude and altitude), then what other form of ownership is there aside from absolute? Even in the case of mutual ownership, the ownership is absolutely owned by the mutual parties. Furthermore, if we define ownership as "the right to possess, use, and/or dispose of anything to which one has a moral claim (as quoted from the Market for Liberty)," then we would need to defend the right of an individual to take action in any manner he or she wishes within the confines of his or her own property. Therefore, to accept that life is inherently above an individuals absolute right to his or her property while still holding that a life can own property is completely illogical. The argument becomes that of conditional ownership, yet conditional to whom?
[3] See pages 1-14 of Block, Walter, and Roy Whitehead, Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approach to Resolving the Abortion Controversy," Appalachian Law Review (2005) 4 (2) 1-45
[4] The objection set forth is in need of its own essay to fend from the usual assailing of analogies that surface. For example, babies too lack the faculties to acknowledge their existence; could it then be argued that they too cannot be murdered? In short, yes. They cannot be murdered (if we define murder as theft of one's own life) because they are indeed property of their caretaker (i.e. they do not own their life). They can be stolen from their caretaker at which point the criminal may be charged with destruction of property and punished. However, this punishment is subject to the valuation methods of their caretakers, not the valuation of the baby itself. The reader may substitute any number of analogies for the baby if they wish, but the result is the same.
[5] Petrozza, John C (August 29, 2006). "Early Pregnancy Loss". eMedicine. WebMD. http://www.emedicine.com/med/topic3241.htm. Retrieved 2009-11-06.
As a note to the reader, this author shares no interest in any supernatural beliefs under the umbrella of any religion (thus operates under the heading of an atheist). Therefore, this speculation serves only to highlight one possibility under one of the many denominational interpretations.
[7] We will sidestep the question of how Block and Whitehead propose to define the term "available". For example, are we to believe that "available" is determined by accessibility and cost? Are we therefore to wait for an over-the-counter eviction kit to become available, or are we obligated to engage in such activity as soon as the technology becomes obtainable (irregardless of cost)?
At first consideration, a concept like explicit contracting invokes a vague and somewhat absurd meaning. Readers may begin to call into question how all variables may be contracted when the endorsers of a contract are not, themselves, omniscient. Such an interpretation is incorrect. Instead the author implies that a market for contracting agencies would account for the bulk of such variables as well as operate as a trust mechanism between two parties. Therefore, individuals would contract with contracting agencies that would contract (and serve as arbitrator) for any exchanges. For more information about explicit contracting and possible objections please see http://jeremiahdyke.blogspot.com/2009/10/revised-implicit-contract-amoral-animal.html
[9] For example, by this same logic, rape (an extreme form of trespassing), if initiated by a third party, whereas no fault can be assigned to the victim or trespasser, would be condoned by Block and Whitehead. We may simply contemplate an individual who awakes from his or her sleep being sexually assaulted by an individual who is also a victim of third party intruder. Is this invasive enough to merit the "slitting of his throat", or should the property owner still seek the path of least retribution/aggression?
[10] It will undoubtedly be argued that action actually presupposes property since one must homestead (act) before he or she can be assigned ownership to property. However, we are not speaking from the a priori form of action. We are speaking of action from the backdrop of ownership, i.e. post-homesteading and assignment of property title. Indeed, the scenario may be analogous to that of freedom of speech (action) which presupposes property from which to speak from (be it owned, un-owned or granted permission).
[11] Reproduced here: ownership is defined as the right to possess, use, and/or dispose of anything to which one has a moral claim (as quoted from the Market for Liberty)
[12] Or at least that the possibility exists: "Our claim, here, is that if we are indeed guilty of making an exception to the general libertarian stricture against positive obligations (page 36)"
[13] Though potentially an inadequate analogy, let us imagine an explicit contract that exists between two parties that commits one of them into voluntary servitude with the other. Since the volunteer slave may cease servitude at any date in time (since the title-to-life cannot be contracted away), we can thus imagine that if such a breech in expectation occurs, the property owner may indeed proceed to defend his absolute right to property. More blatantly, we can imagine the property owner shooting the slave/trespasser since the conditions the slave/trespasser signed for the ability to enter the property of the slave master was breeched, and by breech of contract the volunteer slave hence becomes a trespasser punishable by death. This analogy gives some potential insight to what the author is proclaiming, but it is in need of its own essay.
[14] Indeed, it is this author's (possibly premature) notion that under theory of absolute rights to property and explicit contracting, the bulk of such vague definitions and arbitrary thought experiments that plague our definition of a free society would be answered. In fact, it is the author's unrealized assertion that the with the adoption of such policies our philosophy would only be plagued with the problems of defining continuums, i.e. ,where boundaries begin and end.
[15] In other wording, a mother may evict or abort their baby whenever they please if they are the owner of the property to which the abort or evict them to. Furthermore, an individual may shoot a trespasser whether they have a "no trespassing" sign or a "welcome" sign. They may do this because there is no justification to implicitly assume anything. There is only one property owner and they need not obey any arbitrary contract that attempt to preside over their own property.
[16] If they were to make the claim that the contract is invalid due to some contractual mistake, they must prove such an infraction to whatever third-party arbitration agency they chose. If they could indeed make such a legitimate claim that even this portion of the contract is invalid (or in other words they need not submit their case to any arbitration agency) then our contract agency is reared useless, but at least one's absolute right to property is still maintained. The fact is that even if such a loophole is inevitable, meaning it is beyond the capacity of our species to state explicitly within a contract that all objections will be determined by a third party arbitrator, there is still reason to believe that no one would invoke such a claim. We may simply imagine a blacklist for such a person (and their family) that carries with it unconditional costs. Costs much higher than anything rendered from an arbitration agency.
Read until you have something to write...Write until you have nothing to write...when you have nothing to write, read...read until you have something to write...Jeremiah
**Here was some great advice from the editor, but I'm not sure how or what to change. Let me pose this, since we all have our projects and time constraints. I will pay for constructive criticism (paypal--i assume) contact me if interested [email protected]
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From S. Kinsella:
Jeremiah,I like you and support your efforts. There were 2 main problems. The first was a combination of formatting idiosyncracies that would tkae me a long time to fix; you are suppose to turn it in ready to go, and compatible with normal styles. I can give examples later if you want. Some were not just mechanical; it was the way you introduced quotes in footnotes too, etc. It was just not the normal scholarly format. And the other half was your writing style--it would need to be re-written; too many sentences were purple; or too self-absorbed (who cares about your religion); or too wordy or strangely written. The second main problem was... substantively, you didn't seem to have a clear direction, it leaped all over the place, it did not resort to or justify fundamentals, and it took too many controversial adages for granted and relied on them. I love these kind of debates, so would like to see some coherent, forceful, fundamental libertarian nitty gritty on this. My problem is I am not sure if I"m equipped or have time to offer you detailed enough comments to allow you to fix it. Nor did other referees I consulted wiht.Now, I had one referee who thinks I should accept it, with changes. I may see if I can fine some fresh eyes to look at it, because I want to be fair and I don't want to turn away good matiral, esp. from a good guy like you. If I am able to get some more constructive comments from another referee or two directing you to as some changes that should be made substantively, would you be interested in revising hte paper per my more mechanical comments (which I can provide in detail lateR), and also substantively--knowing we can't guarantee publication until we see the revised one? If so, I'll try to send it through another pass, because this one was a close one for us.I don't mean any insult or personal at all--you asked for feedback. I think it's great you do this and want to encourage it. If we can make this work, I'd be very happy. Let me know your feelings on this.
Jeremy. In my opinion you were sort of petty.
I mean is it really worthwhile to get on Block's case for what is a totally peripheral point? You argue the abortion is not really comparable to the holocaust because nature itself is the biggest abortionist around?! Is that really a point that you need to be making and that is really vital to your point?
IMO, keep on the vital stuff, and throw out all this flavour stuff.
A few things...
Check the definitions of some of the words you are using. For example.
Jeremiah Dyke:It is this author's premise that the title chosen is fallacious in that it purports a compromise
Is it the author's 'premise' or is it the author's 'thesis'? Is the title chosen 'fallacious' or is it a 'misnomer'?
In general, I think you need to focus more on structure. Start off by deciding what your central thesis is. Start off with a brief introduction of the topic, its significance, history, ect. Next, make a case which supports your thesis in a logical step by step fashion. And finally draw your conclusion. As a rule, you should write in third person. You should be very conservative with regard to the assumptions you make about your audience's knowledge. You should go into sufficient detail so that your audience understands clearly. For example, most people don't know what Nash Equilibrium is. It may be appropriate to assume that your audience would know, if the topic of the paper was within the field of game theory, but not if it is in the field of legal theory. Also, you should avoid over explaining points. Try to stick to justifying your thesis and avoid going too far off on tangents.
There are plenty of resources available on the internet which give advice on formal writing. I suggest you look up a number of them, consider what would be most appropriate and give LP another shot.
Jeremiah,
I read it, and I think that it touches on very important arguments. But, I agree with Marko; you should focus on the main arguments. When I write, sometimes I tend to go off on tangents. More recently, I have begun to reign in these impulses to explain absolutely everything; it helps to create some type of skeleton of the piece, before writing it. I'm not sure if it could be claimed that you go off on tangents, as from what I read everything seems on topic; nevertheless, the advice to stick to your main points was excellent. It would definitely make your argument much better and much more direct.
Some more suggestions:
I was given very good advice by another forum members before, and it was to dissect my paragraphs and re-write them until I liked how they sounded. I wrote one piece which was too long and had a lot of redundant information and wording, so I completely re-wrote it and it came out much better (and was accepted).
I would wait for Kinsella to give you more feedback, but if you have no other option I would suggest writing some type of skeleton, where your argument is presented in a very basic form (for example:
1. Introduction (w/ thesis statement)
2. Argument A
3. Argument B
4. Argument C
5. Conclusion).
The above example is very rudimentary, but I just mean it as an example. The article should have structure, so that the flow is clear. Also, especially for longer articles, I am personally a fan of sub-titles. It makes the information much easier to read, as it gives it the illusion that it's not one giant wall of text. There are some stylistic considerations to make, but I am not the best person to give advice on writing and whatnot. The Economist offers excellent information on professional, journalistic writing: Style Guide.
Regardless, the paper was interesting, and I think that the main argument was a very good one (and one that I agree with). With some re-writting and copyediting, this could be a very powerful piece.
You seem to be on to something, but I agree with the refs that is has to be rewritten. This paper could use more precision and formality (I rarely give this advice, but in this case it is warranted). Without getting into specifics, I think you should read Michael Huemer's Writing Guide a few times and reorganize your paper. Don't give up.
"I cannot prove, but am prepared to affirm, that if you take care of clarity in reasoning, most good causes will take care of themselves, while some bad ones are taken care of as a matter of course." -Anthony de Jasay
Thank you to everyone who commented. I know such an investment of time is not easy to give away.
If i may return the favor, please contact me.