I say yes.
What do you mean by 'coercion'? What kind of actions count as coercive? If I pull my friend away from a driving car, did I coerce him? If I stop someone from killing himself whilst under the influence of pretty heavy drugs, did I coerce him? What if I save a sleep-walker; did I coerce him?
What do you mean by 'better of'? According to his own subjectivist preferences? According to his previously stated preferences? According to my own benefit? Or do you mean the 'better of' of the person coercing?
Who do you mean by 'people'? The coercer of the people who undergoes the coercion? Or even a third party? Or do you mean 'society at large'?
Do you mean by this question as a general institutional move, or in a concrete case under specific circumstances?
Can you give an abstract theory and apply it?
Just to make sure this isn't a troll topic.
The state is not the enemy. The idea of the state is.
I coerce you into giving me your money.
I am now better off.
"I say yes."
Prove it.
Do you think it's impossible?
From a praxeological perspective, I would argue that it's impossible to know this with apodictic certainy a priori, but it's not conceptually impossible to have it ex post. I'm thinking of cases where there it's (almost) impossible (due to time constraints or whatever) to 'ask' the person it question, like when there is a car about to hit someone, or when he's completely stoned or something.
You can also argue that this isn't 'coercion'; which I could grant, but I think that it's still conceptually possible.
Let me put it this way, is it possible for me to improve your welfare by your own standards by limiting your range of choice.
Loaded question... eh..
(english is not my native language, sorry for grammar.)
In strict utility terms no.
Since the OP doesn't distinguish between aggression and coercion....
EconomistInTraining: Let me put it this way, is it possible for me to improve your welfare by your own standards by limiting your range of choice.
Yup, most definitely. Because it's practically conceivable that someone has a certain preference but misses a causal relationship and by intervening I can make sure he does 'act' on it, e.g. when I push my friend out of the way of a oncoming car I have limited his choice - because he was chosing to walk in front of the car - but my estimate was that he didn't see the causal relation, i.e. he missed the presence of the car, so I made him better of in his own terms (he would rather not be on that spot and not being run over by a car).
But again; we can't know this apodictally certain a priori, only ex post.
I do believe that 'paternalism' is something conceivable; but I also agree with the Wittman and Rizzo criticisms - there paper is awesome - that libertarian paternalism as a policy is doomed to fail because of the rigid political process.
Of course.
If I want A, believe that X leads to A, must do either X or Y, but X actually leads to non-A, where Y leads to A, it would improve my welfare by my own standards to limit my range of choice to being only Y, instead of being both X and Y.
It could be that I want to go through a tunnel at a certain time, because I believe that going through the tunnel at that time will get me to work on time, but don't know that it would actually probably land me in a hospital, because it is about to collapse. And it could be that I believe that you are a moron and I wouldn't give any of your ideas any thought, so I wouldn't listen to you if you tried to tell me that I shouldn't go through the tunnel at that time. If there were those conditions, it would improve my welfare by my own standards to limit my range of choices to not being able to go through the tunnel at that time.
But how do you know that you are correct and they aren't? I explained me in that example as being wrong, dogmatic, and so on. But what if it is you who are those things? How do we know that you are right and I am wrong? Couldn't the situation just be the reverse, where you do the same thing, but it actually would have been a better idea for me to have went through the tunnel anyway?
And wouldn't it usually just be a better idea to give them the right information, if you think that you have it, instead of forcing them to do something? Wouldn't it be difficult to actually find people not willing to hear you out if you are telling them that they might be walking into a tunnel about to collapse? Wouldn't it just be easier in most situation to tell them that X doesn't lead to A, instead of just not even letting them do X?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
As Edward said if the coercer would not be better off then he would not be coercing.
scineram: As Edward said if the coercer would not be better off then he would not be coercing.
I think that he was asking whether A coercing B could make B better off, instead of whether A coercing B could make A better off. It wasn't specific in his words which he meant, but it would be much more charitable to assume that he meant the former.
Short Answer: Coercion can be beneficial to a given individual's preferences, but this would conflict with other individual's preferences as well. It is not always beneficial per unintended consequences, however. Long Answer: Well, that'll take of itself when the thread reaches about 4 pages... :P
"Look at me, I'm quoting another user to show how wrong I think they are, out of arrogance of my own position. Wait, this is my own quote, oh shi-" ~ Nitroadict
EconomistInTraining:Let me put it this way, is it possible for me to improve your welfare by your own standards by limiting your range of choice.
LOL, what a silly question. It's called bondage, and some people really think it improves their welfare...
Can leaving people better off be a bad thing?
Marko: Can leaving people better off be a bad thing? I say yes.
now I lol'd :DDDD