The claim was made in another thread that most of modern linguistics is invalid for the same reasons that most of modern economics is invalid, in that it doesn't follow a praxeological approach. I'd like to focus the discussion with a starting question:
What is a noun?
Why anarchy fails
the terminology used to express an existing entity.
In States a fresh law is looked upon as a remedy for evil. Instead of themselves altering what is bad, people begin by demanding a law to alter it. ... In short, a law everywhere and for everything!
~Peter Kropotkin
Really? Unicorn!
I don't think it's possible to give a priori definitions of linguistic categories. It depends on language. I don't know much about established linguistics either but I'll do the best I can:
A morpheme composition which corresponds to an arbitrary structure, as opposed to a verb which corresponds to an arbitrary transformation over structures.
"praxeology" is just slang for "my mind is made up, don't try to confuse me with facts"
I'm under the impression that linguistics is some lot of nothing that Noam Chomsky made up to get professional title and a paycheck.
Just off the top of my head: is it better to ask along more specific lines, "why/how do we have nouns", or "why/how do nouns work the way they do?". Perhaps I missed your point, or perhaps I asked the wrong questions; but what I am wondering is if the opening line of questioning should start with an even more limiting and "measurable" starting question to try to start a dialogue where people are not talking past each other.
Here is Steven Pinker's definition of a noun (which I don't find useful):
A noun, for example, is simply a word that does nouny things; it is the kind of word that comes after an article, that can have an 's stuck onto it, and so on.
Thoughts-- John Ess? I. Ryan?
Steven Pinker kicks ass and takes names. He is one of the greatest luminaries alive today.
Clayton -
Pinker's brain work is indeed awesome. His linguistic ideas are much closer to the mark than what preceded him but the main thrust is still quite wide of it: he understands that we don't think in words, which is HUGE, but his idea of "mentalese" turns out to be just another language, which is an equally huge disappointment.
Yes, unicorn. It doesn't physically exist, which is what you were thinking. But it exists within the context of what you said.
Apple, unicorn, freedom, toe.... existing entities, as opposed to actions, descriptions, prepositions, etc
AJ: What is a noun?
(I wrote the following post almost completely linearly. I barely went back and changed anything. Please forgive me for how bad the writing is, and for how rough a lot of the explanations are.)
Nouns are correlatives to adjectives, so I will have to explain both of them to explain one of them. Most people come up with ad hoc, disjointed, and unsystematic definitions of nouns and adjectives, such as saying that nouns refer to "time-stable" ideas and adjectives to "non-time-stable" ideas, but I think that those qualties are just the offshoots of a more fundamental distinction. (Also, a lot of people just say things like, look, nouns can have the possessive "s" put onto them, so that is what a noun is, something which can take the possessive "s"! But I don't think that is much of a definition. It is just an indicator that relies on having defined the other things in the language already.)
Nouns and adjectives are probably the easiest distinction to make, because they don't rely on any other distinctions besides those that you need to start out with the simplest language possible anyway. So I will start out with the simplest language possible, and then build nouns and adjectives into it, which will give you an idea of what the point of the distinction is, and then I will show you how the distinction is mostly pointless in English, because of its word order, but that it is necessary sometimes.
We need to start out with the distinction into objects and relations. I'm not talking about any distinction that exists only in languages, but a distinction that exists in every thought that we have. The distinction into objects and relations is a fundamental distinction of in our mind. We can't think without it. So the distinction is pretty obvious. When I think of the desk in my room that I am sitting at, I am thinking of a relation between two objects, the fact that my desk is related to my room by being in it. The desk is in my room. That is a relation between two objects. But what is less obvious is that objects like my desk are themselves just a compilation of objects and relations. The legs of my desk are below its surface. The left-hand side of its surface is to the left of the right-hand side. And so on.
We are now with that distinction ready to build the template of a very simple language, and then I will show you how to add the distinction between nouns and adjectives into it. I will use context-free grammar to build it, because that is one of the easiest and most familiar formal languages, but I could use a bunch of different ones, my own, or whatever.
So, where "C" is the start symbol, and the word order of the language that I am builditg with it is prefix notation, "R" is for "relation", and "O" is for "object", here are the formation rules for the language:
We can with those formation rules build any combination of relations of objects that we want. The "a", "b", "c", and so on are just random relations, and the "α", "ß", "Γ", and so on are just random objects. We haven't yet given any interpretations to anything besides that one group is a group of relations and the other is a group of objects. I will just give you a few examples of what we could do with that language. We start out with the start symbol and then just start substituting things for it based on the formation rules.
The first example:
The second example:
And the third example:
One thing about this is that it would probably be a lot easier to read if you put paratheses around the things that you could simplify. We can simplify any set of a relation and two objects into just an object, like the fact that we can simply the relation between the legs of my desk and the surface of my desk just into the desk. So I will give you an example that will be easier to understand by using the paratheses and substituting English words for the letters.
Remember the third example:
Here it is with paratheses:
Now here it is with English words:
So that would mean something like this: I shot somebody in Germany. If we had a word that just meant "somebody in Germany", I could replace "somebody in Germany" with it and be simplify a relation between two objects into just an object.
So far the only thing that I have done is introduced the distinction into objects and relations, which is one that we find in our own private world, which is one that is required for all of our thoughts, and just represented it in a set of formation rules. I am just creating a model of a very simple part of my private world. Now I will show you how to make the distinction between nouns and adjectives, and show you why it is just a convenience of our language, and not really anything fundamental about our thought process, but how it comes out of making an easier to use version of the model of that simple part of our mind. I will be following natural languages, but only because what I am trying to do is make a model of something that happens in natural languages. I am using information from natural languages only because what I am interested in right now is explaining something about natural languages. (That should sound very familiar, if you remember what Ludwig von Mises talked about in chapter two of Human Action.)
I need to add one more thing before I do this. I need to define what intersection is. Intersection is basically just comparing ideas in your mind and finding out what is common between both of them. A more exact definition of it in terms of extension and sets would be this:
Now I am ready.
The symbol for the operation of intersection in some phrases of English is "null", is invisible; for instance, in the phrase "faint likeness", it is clear that, though no symbol explicitly refers to it, the relationship between its parts, "faint" and "likeness" is one of intersection, that, in other words, in refers to things that are at the same time both faint and a likeness.
But here is the problem, and where the distinction into nouns and adjectives comes to rescue us. If I try to change the system that I already came up with to mirror that, if I try to make it so I can symbolize intersection between two objects with an invisible symbol, things get really ambiguous, because whether those symbols exist, and what the placement of them are, is impossible to know.
For example, where the ending "-o" symbols that the words are objects:
It isn't clear from that presentation which of the following interpretations apply: (1) that one invisible symbol exists before "tafo", and therefore take "tafo" and "djefto" as its arguments, leaving two disconnected objects, "tafo djefto" and "detfayso", (2) that one exists between "tafo" and "djefto", and therefore takes "djefto" and "ketfayso" as its arguments, leaving two disconnected objects, "tafo" and "djefto" "ketfayso", (3) that two invisible symbols exist, one before "tafo" and an other between "djefto" and "ketfayso", and therefore first takes "djefto" and "ketfayso" as its arguments, leaving two disconnected objects, "tafo" and "djefto ketfayso", and then second takes "tafo" and "djefto ketfayso" as its arguments, leaving only one object, "tafo djefto ketfayso", or, finally, (4) that they just aren't there, so all three of the objects remain untouched, leaving three disconnected objects, "tafo", "djefto", and "ketfayso".
That is, it could be any of these four interpretations, where the asterisk makes the intersection explicit.
In other words, it isn't clear what the grouping of the words are, (1) whether they are "tafo djefto" and "ketfayso", (2) whether they are "tafo" and "djefto ketfayso", (3) whether they are "tafo djefto ketfayso", or whether they are just "tafo", "djefto", and "ketfayso".
That is, it could be any of these four interpretations, where the paratheses make the groupings explicit.
So how do we fix this? How can we have intersection be referred to by an invisible symbol, but know where they are and whether they are even there? Well, if we distinguish between two functions of objects, which we will appropriately name "nouns" and "adjectives", and establish (1) that nouns begin "simple phrases", (2) that any number of adjectives may follow it in the phrase, and (3) that nouns and any adjectives succeeding it "blend" together to form an object composed of the intersection of them, the presentation becomes, at once, entirely precise and unambiguous.
In the following set of examples, the endings "-a" symbolize that the word to which it is attached is an object functioning as a noun and "-u" that it is one functioning as an adjective.
First, remember the problem:
That could mean any of these:
But now we can with those ending make them explicit but keep the asterisk invisible:
So the groupings are these:
But now that I have those endings saying whether the object is being used as a noun or an adjective, the paratheses are redundant, because the endings "-a" and "-u" serve the same purpose.
Now I think that that is the fundamental distinction into nouns and adjectives. I think that English, and most natural languages, didn't evolve an ending to distinguish them, but tended to have a ridiculously irregular system where just the word itself is either a noun or an adjective. Nothing about the word "stupid" makes it obvious that it is an adjective, and nothing about the word "idiot" makes it obvious that it is a noun; you just need to memorize those things when you learn English.
Now keep in mind that I was using prefix notation for my sample language, but English uses infix notation a lot of the time, so that means that the relation often separates the two objects, and you don't even need to know whether they are nouns or adjectives. For example, in the sentence "the red tree is in the green forest", it doesn't matter whether you know that "red" is an adjective, "tree" is a noun, and so on, because "is in" separates each side, acting like those parentheses that I talked about. But there are situtation where you need it, like when the relation takes three objects, like it "I needed to give someone stupid something important". We need to know that "someone" is a noun, "stupid" is an adjective, and so on, to know the groupings of those four words, and know that they are "someone stupid" and "something important" instead of for example something like "someone" and "stupid someone important". But, either way, English probably at some point in its history was either prefix or postfix, and therefore needed the distinction anyway. (Also note that people often don't heed the distinction and use nouns as adjectives or adjectives as nouns, because the distinction is usually useless, such as in the phrase "hand me a long", if they are working in a factory where they need to constantly distinguish between the long and short version of a tool or something.)
Now the ad hoc things that people say about nouns and adjectives, such as what I said at the beginning, saying that nouns refer to "time-stable" ideas and adjectives to "non-time-stable" ideas, is just an offshoot of that. Our language formed words and specified in an almost completely irregular fashion whether they are nouns or adjectives, so words that tended to be used as adjectives tended to just end up feeling like adjectives, and those usually used as nouns tended to just end up feeling like nouns. So, if you usually use a word by itself, it will be used as a noun, and will end up just being a noun. But, if you usually use a word with other words, it will often be used as an adjective, and will end up just being an adjective. Now, if something is usually used with other things, that means that it is usually a transient quality of something that is usually permanent. You should see where I am going with this, but it is pretty hard to explain.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
AJ: The claim was made in another thread that most of modern linguistics is invalid for the same reasons that most of modern economics is invalid, in that it doesn't follow a praxeological approach.
The claim was made in another thread that most of modern linguistics is invalid for the same reasons that most of modern economics is invalid, in that it doesn't follow a praxeological approach.
This post is relevant.
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun: Apple, unicorn, freedom, toe.... existing entities, as opposed to actions, descriptions, prepositions, etc
What about the words "destruction", "action", "description", and so on, which are "nouns"?
I. Ryan: Now keep in mind that I was using prefix notation for my sample language, but English uses infix notation a lot of the time, so that means that the relation often separates the two objects, and you don't even need to know whether they are nouns or adjectives. For example, in the sentence "the red tree is in the green forest", it doesn't matter whether you know that "red" is an adjective, "tree" is a noun, and so on, because "is in" separates each side, acting like those parentheses that I talked about. But there are situtation where you need it, like when the relation takes three objects, like it "I needed to give someone stupid something important". We need to know that "someone" is a noun, "stupid" is an adjective, and so on, to know the groupings of those four words, and know that they are "someone stupid" and "something important" instead of for example something like "someone" and "stupid someone important". But, either way, English probably at some point in its history was either prefix or postfix, and therefore needed the distinction anyway. (Also note that people often don't heed the distinction and use nouns as adjectives or adjectives as nouns, because the distinction is usually useless, such as in the phrase "hand me a long", if they are working in a factory where they need to constantly distinguish between the long and short version of a tool or something.)
I forgot about one of the most important uses for the distinction between nouns and adjectives in English. We make compound words by putting two nouns next to each other, like "forest person", "television movie", and so on. Putting two nouns next to each other means that they are in a relation which each other, and that is the only thing that it specifies. If you hadn't even heard the phrase "television movie" before, it would just mean that it is a movie somehow related to television, and you would have to figure out what that relation is by the context. But, over time, people use them in the same sort of relation so often that they basically get coined as their own word. Everybody know what "television movie" means, though the formation rules wouldn't tell you anything other than that it is a movie somehow related to television.
But, if we made "forest" in "forest man" an adjective, like in "forest-like man", the relation between them would go back to being specified as intersection, and would be saying referring to something that is both like a forest and a man.
So that is a bit weird to me, but I think that my definition that I gave in my other post takes care of that, because we just need to specify that two objects sitting next to each other in the place where a relation is looking for its argument, those two objects are related together by a generic relation, just any relation whatever, depending on the context. And I think that my definition makes that possible, because otherwise you wouldn't know whether a group of objects were related to each other by intersection, a generic relation, or nothing.
Destruction exists as a state of chaos, action exists as the manifestation of acting (the verb), description exists as the means by which we describe (the verb form) things, noun exists as the description of existing things.
It really is quite simple; if it exists it is noun, if it acts it is verb, if it describes it is adjective/adverb, etc etc. Theres a reason you learn it in first grade.
I will grant that pronouns are a little different, hence why they have their own category. But pronouns are just a shorthand way of describing nouns; instead of John acts, we say he acts, to simplify things.
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun: Destruction exists as a state of chaos, action exists as the manifestation of acting (the verb), description exists as the means by which we describe (the verb form) things, noun exists as the description of existing things. It really is quite simple; if it exists it is noun, if it acts it is verb, if it describes it is adjective/adverb, etc etc. Theres a reason you learn it in first grade. I will grant that pronouns are a little different, hence why they have their own category. But pronouns are just a shorthand way of describing nouns; instead of John acts, we say he acts, to simplify things.
What, I can't describe you by calling you an idiot?
An idiot exists as a being that is not knowledgeable about certain subjects. An ad hominem (in its noun state) exists as the state of attacking someone based on their character, not their argument.
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun: An idiot exists as a being that is not knowledgeable about certain subjects. An ad hominem (in its noun state) exists as the state of attacking someone based on their character, not their argument.
Heh, did you think that I was calling you an idiot? Well, I wasn't; it was just an example. Re-read it.
But, if you are saying "epicurus is an idiot." If you call me an idiot, you are not using an adjective, that would be 'the idiotic Epicurus."
An idiot is a noun.
idiotic is an adjective.
Dont overthink things.
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun: But, if you are saying "epicurus is an idiot." If you call me an idiot, you are not using an adjective, that would be 'the idiotic Epicurus." An idiot is a noun. idiotic is an adjective.
You said that a noun exists, but an adjective describes things. Well, I could describe you by calling you an idiot. So how is your definition useful at all?
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun: Dont overthink things.
Don't underthink things. (Do you now see how useless it is to say things like that?)
By the way, if you read my long post, you would know where your ad hoc, commonsense definitions are coming from.
fBecuase you are not so much describing me, as placing me in the state of that description, thereby it becomes a noun.
Idiot = noun. To describe me as idiotic is entirely different than to place me in the state of idiocy.
An apple is delicous, an apple is red = descriptive
An apple is a plant = placing it in a state, noun
It is based off the language itself, purple isnt an adjective becuase it is a descriptive term. It is only an adjective when used to describe something. Purple is awesome; purple is no longer an adjective there, it is a noun (the state of being purple)
words only exist in context. which is why I cant say "colorless green ideas sleep furiously" or "the bite dog man the" or "jump purple thirteen apple she pow"
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun: Becuase you are not so much describing me, as placing me in the state of that description, thereby it becomes a noun.
Becuase you are not so much describing me, as placing me in the state of that description, thereby it becomes a noun.
Uh, yeah, okay . . .
you're welcome :P
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun: you're welcome :P
It was sarcasm, if you didn't catch that.
yes, yes it was....
(as was mine, just in case you didnt catch that either)
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun: yes, yes it was....
Well, try reading my long post from earlier, and then get back to me.
I am sorry. These things have been described quite reasonably to first graders. If you think you have a new way of describing language that is fine. But until you get it published in the Journal of Linguistics, or some other enterprise.. you're really just some guy on the internet who thinks he knows better than an entire field of study.
No offense, cuz I did read it. But you really could just sum it up with;
noun = thing
adjective = description
a word can be either of these things depending on its context, tho usually, in the english language, we create ways to just change the word slightly to show its intent;
idiot = noun
idiocy = verb
idiotic = adjective
Epicurus Ibn Kalboun: I am sorry. These things have been described quite reasonably to first graders. If you think you have a new way of describing language that is fine. But until you get it published in the Journal of Linguistics, or some other enterprise.. you're really just some guy on the internet who thinks he knows better than an entire field of study.
What a joke. Don't expect me to take your posts seriously in the future.
Haha. I never did in the first place. Which says a lot really....
Ludwig von Mises said in Human Action that the method of praxeology is using imaginary constructions:
Ludwig von Mises in Human Action: The specific method of economics is the method of imaginary constructions. This method is the method of praxeology. That it has been carefully elaborated and perfected in the field of economic studies in the narrower sense is due to the fact that economics, at least until now, has been the best-developed part of praxeology. Everyone who wants to express an opinion about the problems commonly called economic takes recourse to this method. The employment of these imaginary constructions is, to be sure, not a procedure peculiar to the scientific analysis of these problems. The layman in dealing with them resorts to the same method. But while the layman’s constructions are more or less confused and muddled, economics is intent upon elaborating them with the utmost care, scrupulousness, and precision, and upon examining their conditions and assumptions critically. An imaginary construction is a conceptual image of a sequence of events logically evolved from the elements of action employed in its formation. It is a product of deduction, ultimately derived from the fundamental category of action, the act of preferring and setting aside. In designing such an imaginary construction the economist is not concerned with the question of whether or not it depicts the conditions of reality which he wants to analyze. Nor does he bother about the question of whether or not such a system as his imaginary construction posits could be conceived as really existent and in operation. Even imaginary constructions which are inconceivable, self-contradictory, or unrealizable can render useful, even indispensable services in the comprehension of reality, provided the economist knows how to use them properly. [...] The main formula for designing of imaginary constructions is to abstract from the operation of some conditions present in actual action. Then we are in a position to grasp the hypothetical consequences of the absence of these conditions and to conceive the effects of their existence. Thus we conceive the category of action by constructing the image of a state in which there is no action, either because the individual is fully contented and does not feel any uneasiness or because he does not know any procedure from which an improvement in his well-being (state of satisfaction) could be expected. Thus we conceive the notion of originary interest from an imaginary construction in which no distinction is made between satisfactions in periods of time equal in length but unequal with regard to their distance from the instant of action. The method of imaginary constructions is indispensable for praxeology; it is the only method of praxeological and economic inquiry. It is, to be sure, a method difficult to handle because it can easily result in fallacious syllogisms. It leads along a sharp edge; on both sides yawns the chasm of absurdity and nonsense. Only merciless self-criticism can prevent a man from falling headlong into these abysmal depths.
The specific method of economics is the method of imaginary constructions.
This method is the method of praxeology. That it has been carefully elaborated and perfected in the field of economic studies in the narrower sense is due to the fact that economics, at least until now, has been the best-developed part of praxeology. Everyone who wants to express an opinion about the problems commonly called economic takes recourse to this method. The employment of these imaginary constructions is, to be sure, not a procedure peculiar to the scientific analysis of these problems. The layman in dealing with them resorts to the same method. But while the layman’s constructions are more or less confused and muddled, economics is intent upon elaborating them with the utmost care, scrupulousness, and precision, and upon examining their conditions and assumptions critically.
An imaginary construction is a conceptual image of a sequence of events logically evolved from the elements of action employed in its formation. It is a product of deduction, ultimately derived from the fundamental category of action, the act of preferring and setting aside. In designing such an imaginary construction the economist is not concerned with the question of whether or not it depicts the conditions of reality which he wants to analyze. Nor does he bother about the question of whether or not such a system as his imaginary construction posits could be conceived as really existent and in operation. Even imaginary constructions which are inconceivable, self-contradictory, or unrealizable can render useful, even indispensable services in the comprehension of reality, provided the economist knows how to use them properly.
[...]
The main formula for designing of imaginary constructions is to abstract from the operation of some conditions present in actual action. Then we are in a position to grasp the hypothetical consequences of the absence of these conditions and to conceive the effects of their existence. Thus we conceive the category of action by constructing the image of a state in which there is no action, either because the individual is fully contented and does not feel any uneasiness or because he does not know any procedure from which an improvement in his well-being (state of satisfaction) could be expected. Thus we conceive the notion of originary interest from an imaginary construction in which no distinction is made between satisfactions in periods of time equal in length but unequal with regard to their distance from the instant of action.
The method of imaginary constructions is indispensable for praxeology; it is the only method of praxeological and economic inquiry. It is, to be sure, a method difficult to handle because it can easily result in fallacious syllogisms. It leads along a sharp edge; on both sides yawns the chasm of absurdity and nonsense. Only merciless self-criticism can prevent a man from falling headlong into these abysmal depths.
If I am correct that the method of studying markets should be the same as the method of studying language, and he is correct that the method of studying markets is using imaginary constructions, what is the method of studying language? Well, it apparently is imaginary constructions. So what are imaginary constructions that we should use in studying language? Did I use any in my division into nouns and adjectives? Yeah, I built the simplest language possible, which was just any combination of objects and relations, abstracted away from the specific objects and relations except for the one that I was talking about, which was intersection, and then showed how to make just one isolated change to that, adding the division into nouns and adjectives.
I thought after I wrote that post of the fact that Ludwig von Mises in Human Action said that the method of praxeology is using imaginary constructions, so I wanted to figure out what the imaginary constructions in studying language are. Well, I saw it right away in the post that I wrote for you in which I defined the division into nouns and adjectives. We need to build simplified languages isolating the things that we are talking about, and that way we can describe language. Just like the evenly rotating economy is an imaginary construction in studying markets, the simplified language that I used is an imaginary construction in studying language.
The method of studying natural languages at least in the praxeological tradition should be building simplified languages to isolate the distinctions that we find in natural languages.
I was hoping to start more simply (simple but deep). For example, if "seven" is a noun...
...is this a noun?
AJ: I was hoping for a simpler discussion (simple but deep).
I was hoping for a simpler discussion (simple but deep).
Sorry, brother. The definition was simple, but the groundwork took a bit of time.
AJ: For example, if "seven" is a noun... ...is this a noun?
For example, if "seven" is a noun...
Of course not. Didn't you read my post? The distinction is just a sort of syntactical convenience.
AJ: I was hoping to start more simply (simple but deep).
I was hoping to start more simply (simple but deep).
Good change. I was worried for a minute.
Aren't you trying to debunk modern linguistics? That means answering John Ess or someone else's expositions of Chomsky/Pinker/etc. Ess hasn't weighed in yet. This question and the one in the OP are mainly for him or another supporter of linguistics.
AJ: Aren't you trying to debunk modern linguistics? That means answering John Ess or someone else's expositions of Chomsky/Pinker/etc. Ess hasn't weighed in yet. This question and the one in the OP are mainly for him or another supporter of linguistics.
Well, isn't the positive theory also important? Aren't examples important?
(Maybe positive theory is important, but if all of what you're attacking* is really pure nonsense, a negative deconstruction might be all you need. Just like I don't think we need a positive theory of objective ethics, just an explanation for why it is meaningless.)
The questions aim to poke holes in mainstream linguistics, not in your conception.
*What elements of mainstream linguistics do you take the most exception to?
AJ: The questions aim to poke holes in mainstream linguistics, not in your conception.
Well, I showed in my long post that one of the most common definitions is just a fuzzy offshoot of the "praxeological" distinction that I made, which I think poked a pretty good hole in it.
Well I just feel like we don't have the mainstream position represented here. I don't know enough about it, so whatever Chomsky/Pinker quotes I dig up might be dismissed as out of context or not accepted by the mainstream anymore. I don't want to be accused of strawmanning. I need a real argument from a real linguist or someone who knows the material decently well. I have my own very detailed account of what language is and its relation to thought, but I haven't posted it here because I am awaiting something to disagree (or agree) with in the "official" mainstream.