Re: Understanding "The Sensory Order"

AnonLLF — Fri, 11 Dec 2009 01:56:03 GMT

Bank Run:

David Gordon claims Hayek takes the positivist approach in The Sensory Order.

Should it be O.K. to use the scientific method in scientific fields? Is psychology not considered a scientific field by Austrians?

I really don't see the value of the critique by Mr. Gordon. Perhaps I will gain more insight as I continue to study.

This article will answer your question.I too wondered this some time ago.

http://mises.org/daily/1351#_ftnref1

Psychology vs praxeology by robert murphy.

In which article is the gordon critique?

Re: Understanding "The Sensory Order"

Faustus — Sat, 05 Dec 2009 21:02:19 GMT

Bruce Caldwell has quite a good exposition and analysis of Hayek's theory in 'Hayek's Challenge'

I copied out the the expository and explanatory parts of the chapter on the sensory order for my own purposes. You may find it useful. The parts on the significance, consequences, implications ect. are not included.

The Physical Order and the Sensory Order

There are two different orders, a physical order, which is revealed to us through natural science, and a phenomenal or mental, or sensory order which we experience as individuals. Evidence that there are two order is demonstrated by our reaction to certain stimuli. Sometimes our sensory experience of (what natural science tells us) the same stimulus is very different. Everyday examples abound: when lemon juice is applied to the skin, or to the tongue, or to the eyes, the resulting sensations differ. The same needle when pressed against various parts of the arm causes different sensations. Alternatively, sometimes our sensory experience of (what natural science tells us are) different stimuli is the same. Most of us cannot tell by looking whether the white powdery substance sitting on the table is salt, cocaine, anthrax, or ground up aspirin. Scientific instruments reveal the existence of a much wider range of colours and pitches than we are able to perceive with our senses.

And gestalt psychology has established our tendency to group certain classes of stimuli together, even when they may be very different from each other: our ability to interpret vastly different perceptual signals as constituting our ability to interpret vastly different perceptual signals as constituting “faces” is a prime example.

Hayek notes that the examples provided by gestalt psychologists are anything but unique. Indeed, a great deal of our sensing is relational: we frequently categorise as similar objects and sensations that in the physical order have very little in common. Thus, we might say that a colour is warmer, or louder, or harsher that another or that a tone is thinner, or brighter, or richer. Furthermore, other humans seem to understand what we mean when we say such apparently absurd things. More generally, it seems that humans and in some cases, even other animals share a similar phenomenal reality.

That the phenomenal order that each of us experiences through our senses seems quite different from what natural science tells us about the physical order, yet similar to that experienced by others, raises some problems:

What we call “mind” is thus a particular order of a set of events taking place in some organism and in some manner related to but not identical with, the physical order of events in the environment. The problem which the existence of mental phenomena raises is therefore how in a part of the physical order (namely an organism) a sub-system can be formed which in some sense (yet to be more fully defined) may be said to reflect some features of the physical order as a whole, and which thereby enable the organism which contains such a partial reproduction of the environmental order to behave appropriately towards it surroundings. The problem arises as much from the fact that the order of this subsystem is in some respects similar to, as from the fact that it is in other respects different from the corresponding more comprehensive physical order.(Hayek [1952] 1967h, 16)

It is the task of theoretical psychology to explain how it came to be that the sensory or phenomenal order that each of us experiences differs from the physical order. Because it is the central nervous system that receives stimuli and transforms them into what we experience, it is there that any such investigation must begin. How the system works seems straightforward enough physiologically. An event external to the nervous system stimulates a receptor organ. This produces an impulse that is passed along a nerve fibre. These impulses are physically identical, so the elementary neural events are indistinguishable from one another. Yet they result in the sensory order that accounts for how we experience the world. The central question can, therefore, be put more precisely as follows: “how is it possible to construct from the known elements of the neural system a structure which would be capable of performing such discrimination in its responses to stimuli as we know our mind in fact to perform?” ([1952] 1967h, 47).

The Nervous System as a Classification System

Hayek's answer is that the central nervous system accomplishes its task by acting as a giant classification mechanism. He defines the key terms as follows.

By “classification” we shall mean a process in which on each occasion on which a certain recurring event happens it produces the same specific effect, and where the effect, and where the effects produced by any one kind of such events may be either the same or different from those which any other kind of event produces in a similar manner. All the different events which whenever they occur produce the same effect will be said to be events of the same class, and the fact that every one of them produces the same effect will be the sole criterion which makes them members of the same class. ([1952] 1967h, 48).

Hayek provides a few examples of analogous classifying or sorting devices: a machine that sorts balls of varying diameters into different receptacles; another composed of tubes or wires through which signals are sent; and an “actual instance” of certain statistical machines for sorting cards on which punched holes represent statistical data”([1952] 1967h, 48). He asks us next to imagine a system that is able to perform multiple acts of classification. An event might be treated as a member of more then one class, or it might produce different responses whenever it appears in combination with other groupings or classes on one level occurring in certain sequence trigger groupings on a different level, groupings that trigger further multiple groupings at still higher levels, and on and on. He then claims that the central nervous system performs just this sort of classification processor, more correctly, that the nervous system just is an instrument of classification. The sensory qualities that we experience are the result of combinations of various systems of connections. It is all laid out in a long Hayekian sentence:

The point on which the theory of determination of mental qualities....differs from the position taken by practically all current psychological theories is thus the contention that the sensory(or other mental) qualities are not in some manner originally attached to, or an original attribute of, the individual physiological impulses, but that the whole of these qualities is determined by the system of connections by which the impulses can be transmitted from neuron to neuron; that it is thus the position of the individual impulse or group of impulses in the whole system of such connection which gives it its distinctive quality; that this system of connections is acquired in the course of the development of the species and the individual by a kind of “experience” or “learning”; and that it reproduces therefore at every stage of its development certain relationships existing in the physical environment between the stimuli evoking the impulses.... The connection between the physiological elements are thus the primary phenomenon which creates the mental phenomena.([1952] 1967h, 53).

What we call the mind is, then really just a vast network of interconnected neurons. Some sets of neurons have many connections in common, others fewer. Receptor organs that are sensitive to similar stimuli tend to be excited at the the same time, sending a certain sequence of impulses through pathways in the dense network of connections. Some stimuli tend to occur in conjunction with other, others by themselves; some with great frequency, others with less. Some stimuli tend to occur either in regularly recurring cycles or when the organism is in a certain state. Each of these sorts of stimuli causes initial and then subsequent firings of impulses, and these form patterns among the levels of classification that constitute the neural network. And this is what produces our phenomenal experience.

This is all pretty abstract, but Feser (1999, 9) provides a clear example of Hayek's theory in action.

Consider the case of my looking at an orange. What gives this experience the quality it has, a quality which is similar in some respects but not others to that of the experience of looking at an orange car, is that the orange's stimulating my sensory organs initiates some stets of neural impulses which are also initiated when I look at an orange car and others which are not, but which are also initiated when I look, say, at a billiard ball(which is similar to an orange in shape); that those impulses initiate further sets of impulses that are related to those initiated when, say, I see other types of fruit(while failing to initiate impulses related, say, to my seeing rocks); and that it ultimately (through such intermediate impulses) initiates some dispositions to act (realised in further neurophysiology activity), rather than others, say a disposition to salivate and eat the object)which I also have when seeing a hamburger), rather than a disposition to take a drive which I might have when seeing an orange car.

So far, we have been describing impulses that are caused by external stimuli. But the impulses are themselves physical events, and they may also serve as stimuli, creating further impulses, or “followings” The “following impulses” have effects on still other networks of neurons. This leads to still higher orders of classifications and a huge increase in the complexity of the system:

In the higher centres there occur undoubtedly a great many impulses which do not uniquely correspond to particular stimulations of sensory receptors but which represent merely common qualities attributed to the primary impulses; these representatives of classes of primary impulses will in turn become the objects of further process of classification; the classes for which they stand will be further grouped into classes of classes; and this process can be repeated on many successive levels....The consequent differences in the influence which different impulses will exercise on the whole course of the nervous processes, varying from identity through various degrees of similarity to complete difference, would be adequate for building up an extremely complex system of relations among the millions of impulses. The word classification scarcely conveys an adequate idea of the almost infinity wealth of variety and gradation of the discriminations which can be performed by such an apparatus.([1952] 1967h, 70-71).

Hayek discusses these issues under the heading of classifications of relations between classes and indicates that such relations are the source of the “relational thinking” that he had earlier identified as characteristic of human thought. He emphasizes repeatedly the great complexity of the order that is thereby formed: “The complexity of the order which can be built up by means of this variety of relations is for all practical purposes unlimited. Given the number of separate neurons in the higher nervous centres and the number of possible connections between them, the problem is not one of the limitation of the number of possible differences between their respective positions in the whole system, but rather the inadequacy of our mind to follow out the full degree of complexity of the order which can thus be determined”.([1952] 1967h, 74).

Hayek's final step is to argue that the process of classification is universal in character. It accounts for the sorts of higher relational forms of perception, the “organisation of the field” identified by gestalt psychologists. It is even involved in higher forms of abstract or conceptual thought.

In treating the so called elementary sensations and the more complex sensory phenomena as instances of the same process, and therefore, as being capable of being explained by recourse to the same principle, we arrive (again in agreement with the views of the gestalt school) at the conclusion that there is no substantial difference between the acts of “sensation” and of “perception”: both appear as essentially similar and.. they constitute merely different stages in an even more comprehensive range of processes, formed by the central nervous system....The principle used to explain these phenomena applies also to the so called “higher” mental processes such as the formation of abstract concepts and conceptual thought.([1952] 1967h, 77-78).

The Origin and General Character of the Sensory Order

Hayek is agnostic on the question of how much of the mental order is hard wired into the species and how much is a result of the experiences of the individual. For simplicity, he initially assumes that the structure of the central nervous system is in place at the beginning of life but that specific impulse paths among neurons created in response to stimuli are formed only after-ward. As impulses pass through the pathways of the network, connections gradually form: “Since every occurrence of a combination of such impulses will contribute to the gradual formation of a network of connections of ever increasing density, every neuron will gradually acquire a more and more clearly defined space in the comprehensive system of such connections, and with it a distinct functional significance which in a great many ways will differ from that of other impulses” ([1952] 1967h, 103). He calls the pathways linkages. They begin to be formed prior to any sensory experience, for they will ultimately be the apparatus that later makes qualitative sensory distinctions possible. Yet, paradoxically, they are also formed, as it were, by experience, by certain pathways being “remembered” by the organism. Hayek first advanced this paradoxical hypothesis in his 1920 paper (see Hayek [1920] 1991a), and, in The Sensory Order, he quotes a passage from the earlier work: “We do not first have sensations which are then preserved by memory, but it is as a result of physiological memory that the physiological impulses are converted into sensations” ([1952] 1967h, 53)

The formation of the network is a continuous process. The mental order that results is an approximation of the order that exists in the external world among stimuli, which have themselves evoked impulses that “represent” them in the sensory order. Gradually, a “map” is formed that reproduces relations between classes of events that exist in the environment. Although errors are continually corrected by changing classifications that do not allow the organism to interact successfully with the environment, the map will for a number of reasons be an imperfect representation. The sensitivity of receptor organs to different stimuli is shaped by evolutionary forces and will vary among species The environment that an organism inhabits will affect the sorts of stimuli that it is most likely to encounter. The internal environment of the organism will also affect the networks that form. The capacity of the “higher centres” to form connections among neurons is not uniform. Finally, the sorts of additional higher level classifications that are formed by any individual organism will also be affected by all the factors previously mentioned. As a result, although the maps formed by any two individuals might be similar, they will never be identical: “The different maps which will thus be formed in different brains will be determined by factors which are sufficiently similar to make those maps also similar to each other. But they will not be identical. Complete identity of the maps would presuppose not only an identical history of the different individuals but also complete identity of their anatomical structure. The mere fact that for each individual the map will be subject to constant changes practically precludes the possibility that at any moment the maps of two individuals should be completely identical” ([1952] 1967h, 110)

Like snowflakes, no two people are alike. The maps that our minds create are subject to continuous gradual change. A map is formed by past impulses, but it is relatively permanent vis-a-vis the particular impulses that may be proceeding through it at at a given point in time. It provides the structure by which any new impulses are categorized and determines which subsequent classes of impulses are created. The sequences of impulses over time will affect the structure, but relative to the “constantly changing pattern of impulses it can be regarded as semi-permanent” ([1952] 1967h, 115)

At any given moment, the organism uses a portion of the existing map as well as the pattern of impulses already proceeding within the network to form a “model” of the existing situation. The relation of the “model” to the “map” is one of a “model within a model”: “The complete apparatus of orientation thus consists of a structure of which a certain part will be activated, or of a sort of model within a model which has significance only by its position within that model, and which adjusts the responses to any new stimulus not only to the general significance which stimuli of that sort will possess in any circumstances, but to the particular significance which they will possess in the situation existing at the moment”([1952] 1967h, 116)

Incoming impulses will be the starting point of what Hayek calls associative processes, further impulses that “represent events which in the past have become connected for the individual with those which are represented by the impulses which evoke them”([1952] 1967h, 118)

By way of these impulses, the individual's model of the environment tends to “run ahead of” the existing situation. The model will be constantly checked against, and revised in accordance with, any new impulses that come in. In like manner, the new impulses will be classified or evaluated against the background of the “expectations” set up by the model. This sort of “trying out of consequences” occurs at a number of levels:

The representation of the existing situation in fact cannot be separated from, and has no significance apart from, the representation of the consequences to which it is likely to lead. Even on a pre-conscious level the organism must live as much in a world of expectation as in a world of “fact”, via fairly complex processes of “trying out” on the model the effects to be expected from alternative courses of action. The reaction to a stimulus thus frequently implies an anticipation of the consequences to be expected from it.(121)

The central nervous system is a mechanism of sorts, but it differs from a mechanical process in a number of ways. One usually thinks of a machine as having a fixed structure that uniquely determines its actions, as always responding in the same manner to a given external stimulus, and as being unable “purposively” to adapt its operations to produce different results. The system that Hayek has described, however, has the opposite characteristics. Because stimuli always operate in conjunction with a pre-existing excitatory state, the response of the organism to a given combination of stimuli will seldom be the same. Furthermore, evidence for purposive behaviour exists at many levels. Initial examples of such behaviour may simply be actions taken that preserve the existence of the organism. But, as associative processes become developed, the seeking out of stimuli viewed as “desirable” by the organism(e.g., those that are associated with the satisfaction of “urges” like hunger) may occur. The formation of models that allow an organism to “try out” various possible outcomes in order to choose the preferred on ultimately becomes an essential aspect of purposiveness.([1952] 1967h, 122-26)

Re: Understanding "The Sensory Order"

Bank Run — Sat, 05 Dec 2009 12:59:55 GMT

David Gordon claims Hayek takes the positivist approach in The Sensory Order.

It may be that all supposed a priori knowledge is by necessity not applicable to all fields. The Gross error of the positivist approach. Should it be O.K. to use the scientific method in scientific fields? Is psychology not considered a scientific field by Austrians? I can see why psychoanalysis is sort of a field of prejudices. It seems in all their classifications, and groupings, they fail to see the individual. Their causal analysis is largely metaphysical(so it seems to me). I admire the physiological approach to psychiatry. I think the genealogical method serves a purpose but is misdirected. How many Doctors in the field of psychiatry can claim they've abated the mental ailments of a multitude. It seems the common prescribed cure is "There may be a 'treatment'(medicinal) for that". What today's head-shrinkers are doing is surely not better than a more radical and physiological approach to psychiatric medicine. I think Hayek's psychology is far more humane and compassionate to the individual, than the modern lobotomizing effects of popular treatments.

I am still trying to understand Hayek's work. I really don't see the value of the critique by Mr. Gordon. Perhaps I will gain more insight as I continue to study.

Understanding "The Sensory Order"

Bank Run — Mon, 26 Jan 2009 14:19:04 GMT

The Sensory Order by F.A. Hayek, is over my lay head. I would however appreciate any insights. Can anyone recommend any complimentary works. He uses many physiological terms I really don't grasp. My lay understanding is that over the course of time the mind builds connections, some strengthen and some become disjointed. Many of these connections can occur at the same time. Not all of these occur from external stimuli. Often times the connections made in the mind are not attributable to their original attributes. A persons physical body can act independent of mental direction, e.g. a person when walking doesn't need to consider the individual steps, and the muscles needed to make those steps, but to will themselves in order to walk.
Well it's a complex work, and I would be grateful to anyone who could help me get a better take on it, and the implications of his theory.

Thanks in advance, and good day.

Newbies

Re: Understanding "The Sensory Order"

Re: Understanding "The Sensory Order"

Re: Understanding "The Sensory Order"

Re: Understanding "The Sensory Order"

Understanding "The Sensory Order"