General

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

zefreak — Mon, 08 Mar 2010 22:13:58 GMT

Solid_Choke:

What do you think of A.J. Ayer? I think it is clear from his writings that he considered proof via empiricism to be qualitatively different from analytic proof. I think his notion of proof has more in common with Bayesian inference than logical necessity. Do you not find this a satisfactory explanation and justification for science?

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

Conza88 — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 15:25:07 GMT

Just thought I would add; Praxeology as the Method of the Social Sciences by Murray N. Rothbard

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

Solid_Choke — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 00:48:34 GMT

bloomj31:

Responding to the OP, are you saying that just because correlation is often confused with causation that any form of positivism (requiring proof of claim) is meaningless?

No, I am saying that if Logical Positivism is true than it is cognitively meaningless and that Critical Rationalists are against it because it does nothing to solve the problem of induction.

P = If Logical Positivism is true, then every cognitively meaningful statement is experimentally testable (in principle), or is an analytic truth.

P is not experimentally testable (in principle).

P is not an analytic truth.

Therefore, P is not a cognitively meaningful statement (assuming Logical Positivism is true).

If you accept that Logical Positivism is true, then you should conclude that it is cognitively meaningless. In other words, if you hold that Logical Positivism is true, you are engaging in metaphysics and not science. The whole point of being a Logical Positivist in the first place was to avoid doing metaphysics.

twistedbydsign99:

I believe he means to say that positivism is self contradictory. Requiring proof for everything means requiring proof of positivism, is there any?

Logical Positivism isn't self-contradictory (strictly speaking), but does undermine itself.

bloomj31:

Lol, you mean we need to prove that some things cause other things? Or I should say that some empirical phenomenon are linked to others? If there is no cause and effect, logic makes no sense. Logic depends on the ability of the logician to make chains of causes and effects right?

Logical Positivism does not have a monopoly on causation. Almost every epistemological theory accepts causation (although some do not in the way you are using it). Also, if causation is simply posited without being verifiable, then it is itself metaphysics (which is back to square one for Logical Positivism).

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

wilderness — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 19:57:30 GMT

I think twistedbydsign99 is talking about this. That's a link to a post that gives a good summary of the self-contradictory of positivism. That linked post was apart of a thread in which was a spin-off of this current thread here. Here's a link to the beginning of that genus thread.

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

bloomj31 — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 18:11:28 GMT

twistedbydsign99:

I believe he means to say that positivism is self contradictory. Requiring proof for everything means requiring proof of positivism, is there any?

Lol, you mean we need to prove that some things cause other things? Or I should say that some empirical phenomenon are linked to others? If there is no cause and effect, logic makes no sense. Logic depends on the ability of the logician to make chains of causes and effects right?

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

twistedbydsign99 — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 18:00:26 GMT

bloomj31:
Responding to the OP, are you saying that just because correlation is often confused with causation that any form of positivism (requiring proof of claim) is meaningless?

I believe he means to say that positivism is self contradictory. Requiring proof for everything means requiring proof of positivism, is there any?

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

bloomj31 — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 17:49:54 GMT

Responding to the OP, are you saying that just because correlation is often confused with causation that any form of positivism (requiring proof of claim) is meaningless?

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

twistedbydsign99 — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 17:46:17 GMT

Solid_Choke:

How do you witness a conditional proposition?

Perhaps you mean?:

1. O ⊃ (P ⊃ Q)

2. (P • Q)

∴ O

If theory O is true we witness p->q, theory O does not cause p -> q, it explains it. Theory O stands on no solid ground and is ready to be toppled as soon as what it predicts does not occur, or something occurs within its domain that it does not predict.

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

wilderness — Sat, 28 Nov 2009 21:47:21 GMT

I thought this was an excellent paper pertaining to the topic here.

What Empiricism Can't Tell Us, and Rationalism Can by Mark Crovelli

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

Solid_Choke — Thu, 26 Nov 2009 23:55:02 GMT

zefreak:

I'm am rereading that paper on Popper and Hume, and plan to expand my defense of Hume into a critique of the article. Not only does it oversimplify Hume's argument but I feel confident that I can show that his whole argument via the law of identity being contradictory to Hume's problem of induction is completely unwarranted and betrays a deep misunderstanding of Hume. I'll probably have it posted by tonight or tomorrow.

I await your defense.

nirgrahamUK:

This is the Misesian argument for why teleological (prexeological) analysis is appropriate in the realm of the social sciences, whereas the traditional causal analysis is appropriate in the real of the physical sciences...

Conza88:

Oh, so you are? lol. That's a real shame. If you read any of the below you'll realise trying to apply the methodology of the natural sciences to that of the social sciences, is bunk.

The Mantle of Science by Murray Rothbard

Praxeology: The methodology of the Austrian School by Murray Rothbard

What is the Proper Way to Study Man? by Murray Rothbard

In Defense of "Extreme Apriorism" by Murray Rothbard

Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics by Murray Rothbard

I won't be able to think about these until after Thanksgiving. I'll make a comment sometime after that.

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

zefreak — Thu, 26 Nov 2009 23:45:34 GMT

I'm am rereading that paper on Popper and Hume, and plan to expand my defense of Hume into a critique of the article. Not only does it oversimplify Hume's argument but I feel confident that I can show that his whole argument via the law of identity being contradictory to Hume's problem of induction is completely unwarranted and betrays a deep misunderstanding of Hume. I'll probably have it posted by tonight or tomorrow.

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

Conza88 — Thu, 26 Nov 2009 07:19:14 GMT

Nitroadict:
It's bunk because Rothbard sez so? What a surprise.

No, who said that? It's bunk because the arguments for it are...

I gave the best sources I know of that deal with this issue, and they all happen to be from Rothbard. Got a problem with that? Seems like it, as you took issue with it.

Care to point me in the direction of anything similar written by other austro-libertarians?

Nitroadict:
At least there's google for a larger variety of sources. This seems to be a nice initial find: http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/notebooks/social-science-methodology.html

Have you read any of those, or do you just feel like throwing out links you found on google? What a surprise.

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

Nitroadict — Thu, 26 Nov 2009 05:47:52 GMT

Conza88:

Solid_Choke:

Conza88:

Are you guys trying to use this methodology in the social sciences?

I don't think it makes sense to use different methodologies depending on if the science is physical or social. Perhaps the case can be made that different methodologies should be used for simple or complex phenomena, but even this seems rather ad hoc.

Oh, so you are? lol. That's a real shame. If you read any of the below you'll realise trying to apply the methodology of the natural sciences to that of the social sciences, is bunk.

The Mantle of Science by Murray Rothbard

Praxeology: The methodology of the Austrian School by Murray Rothbard

What is the Proper Way to Study Man? by Murray Rothbard

In Defense of "Extreme Apriorism" by Murray Rothbard

Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics by Murray Rothbard

It's bunk because Rothbard sez so? What a surprise.

At least there's google for a larger variety of sources. This seems to be a nice initial find: http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/notebooks/social-science-methodology.html

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

Conza88 — Thu, 26 Nov 2009 04:27:11 GMT

Solid_Choke:

Conza88:

Are you guys trying to use this methodology in the social sciences?

I don't think it makes sense to use different methodologies depending on if the science is physical or social. Perhaps the case can be made that different methodologies should be used for simple or complex phenomena, but even this seems rather ad hoc.

Oh, so you are? lol. That's a real shame. If you read any of the below you'll realise trying to apply the methodology of the natural sciences to that of the social sciences, is bunk.

The Mantle of Science by Murray Rothbard

Praxeology: The methodology of the Austrian School by Murray Rothbard

What is the Proper Way to Study Man? by Murray Rothbard

In Defense of "Extreme Apriorism" by Murray Rothbard

Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics by Murray Rothbard

Re: What is wrong with Critical Rationalism?

nirgrahamUK — Thu, 26 Nov 2009 02:51:20 GMT

This is the Misesian argument for why teleological (prexeological) analysis is appropriate in the realm of the social sciences, whereas the traditional causal analysis is appropriate in the real of the physical sciences...

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

There are for man only two principles available for a mental grasp of reality, namely, those of teleology and causality. What cannot be brought under either of these categories is absolutely hidden to the human mind. An event not open to an interpretation by one of these two principles is for man inconceivable and mysterious. Change can be conceived as the outcome either of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior; for the human mind there is no third way available [9]. It is true, as has already been mentioned, that teleology can be viewed as a variety of causality. But the establishment of this fact does not annul the essential differences between the two categories.

The panmechanistic world view is committed to a methodological monism; it acknowledges only mechanistic causality because it attributes to it alone any cognitive value or at least a higher cognitive value than teleology. This is a metaphysical superstition. Both principles of cognition--causality and teleology--are, owing to the limitations of human reason, imperfect and do not convey ultimate knowledge. Causality leads to a regressus in infinitum which reason can never exhaust. Teleology is found wanting as soon as the question is raised of what moves the prime mover. Either method stops short at an ultimate given which cannot be analyzed and interpreted. Reasoning and scientific inquiry can never bring full ease of mind, apodictic certainty, and perfect cognition of all things. He who seeks [p. 26] this must apply to faith and try to quiet his conscience by embracing a creed or a metaphysical doctrine.

If we do not transcend the realm of reason and experience, we cannot help acknowledging that our fellow men act. We are not free to disregard this fact for the sake of a fashionable prepossession and an arbitrary opinion. Daily experience proves not only that the sole suitable method for studying the conditions of our nonhuman environment is provided by the category of causality; it proves no less convincingly that our fellow men are acting beings as we ourselves are. For the comprehension of action there is but one scheme of interpretation and analysis available, namely, that provided by the cognition and analysis of our own purposeful behavior.

The problem of the study and analysis of other people's action is in no way connected with the problem of the existence of a soul or of an immortal soul. As far as the objections of empiricism, behaviorism, and positivism are directed against any variety of the soul-theory, they are of no avail for our problem. The question we have to deal with is whether it is possible to grasp human action intellectually if one refuses to comprehend it as meaningful and purposeful behavior aiming at the attainment of definite ends. Behaviorism and positivism want to apply the methods of the empirical natural sciences to the reality of human action. They interpret it as a response to stimuli. But these stimuli themselves are not open to description by the methods of the natural sciences. Every attempt to describe them must refer to the meaning which acting men attach to them. We may call the offering of a commodity for sale a "stimulus." But what is essential in such an offer and distinguishes it from other offers cannot be described without entering into the meaning which the acting parties attribute to the situation. No dialectical artifice can spirit away the fact that man is driven by the aim to attain certain ends. It is this purposeful behavior--viz., action--that is the subject matter of our science. We cannot approach our subject if we disregard the meaning which acting man attaches to the situation, i.e., the given state of affairs, and to his own behavior with regard to this situation.

It is not appropriate for the physicist to search for final causes because there is no indication that the events which are the subject matter of physics are to be interpreted as the outcome of actions of a being, aiming at ends in a human way. Nor is it appropriate for the praxeologist to disregard the operation of the acting being's volition and intention; they are undoubtedly given facts. If he were to disregard it, he would cease to study human action. Very often--but not always--the events concerned can be investigated both [p. 27] from the point of view of praxeology and from that of the natural sciences. But he who deals with the discharging of a firearm from the physical and chemical point of view is not a praxeologist. He neglects the very problems which the science of purposeful human behavior aims to clarify.