General

Re: So?

Graham Wright — Tue, 04 May 2010 00:04:35 GMT

wilderness:
trulib:
I have been asking you about your theory on the nature of ethical statements - namely, are they objective or subjective. Now, in your response to me and to others, you've said some things that make me think you are an objective ethicist and some things that make me think you are subjective ethicist.

Very perceptive. The objective/subjective is a false dichotomy... I can use both terms without conflict because the way I define the terms is in a complimentary way.

Well this is the heart of where we are misunderstanding each other then! Do you not recognise that there is a difference between the way you decide what flavor ice cream you like best, and the way you decide whether you think the Earth is round or flat? The former is a subjective subject, based on your preferences alone. The latter is an objective subject, based on your assessment of objective evidence. This is a real dichotomy.

wilderness:
trulib:
You are expressing a preference with regards to the content of ethical statements. To me, a natural law theorist is something much more than a libertarian, it is someone who believes that ethics is an objective discipline and that libertarian ethical statements are correct.

I believe my preference is correct.

Do you believe your preference for ice cream flavor is correct in the same sense? If yes, then the above is a trivial statement. If no, then you are implying that ethics is different to picking ice cream flavors, in a way that makes it possible to talk about correctness and incorrectness in ethics.

wilderness:
trulib:
(1)subjective physicist

When I read that all I see is a physicist who is using his own individual means to study physics. Subjective in this sense means individual.

No. A subjective physicist would argue (in a debate with a physicist who disagreed with him over the content of a physics claim) that we should all adapt his preferred physics theory, because it is "cool" or "fashionable", or will bring good consequences, or because it appeals to our inner-sense of what physics statements are preferable. "Support the Round Earth theory! All the cool kids are doing it! Don't be a square and go around saying the Earth is flat!"

Such a physicist would be laughed out of town, even though the content of what he is saying - that the Earth is round - is actually a good theory for us to adopt. He is supporting it - and arguing why we should support it - for all the wrong reasons. He has mistaken physics for a subjective subject, where there is no correct and incorrect, just preferences.

wilderness:
trulib:
(2)or an objective film critic.

When I read that all I see is a film critic who has made their knowledge about a film certain.

No. An objective film critic would claim that anyone who disagrees with his assessment of how good a given film is simply incorrect. He will claim to have an objective way of measuring the quality of a film, so that he can provide evidence or proof that one film is better than the other. Again, a film critic claiming to be objective would be laughed out of town. He would be mistaking film criticism for an objective subject.

A normal film critic could make objective statements like "this film has 500 special effects shots", "this film got 5 stars in Empire magazine", "this film is directed by an Oscar-winning director", but it is clear that these are just pushing the subjectivity back a step. They are saying if you like lots of special effects shots then this film may appeal to you. They are not bridging the is-ought gap and saying you ought to like films with lots of special effects shots.

This parallels subjective ethicist arguments, in that they say (merely) if you want a wealthy/peaceful society then you ought to adopt the libertarian ethic and oppose the State. Objective ethicists go further and say we ought to adopt the libertarian ethic because ethics is objective and the libertarian ethic is correct (and all other ethics are incorrect). Hoppe claims that his argumentation ethics is the proof of this.

wilderness:
Some philosophers have choosen to use terms to get around this subjective/objective haggling by using other terms such as: agent-relative, agent-neutral, and ontological realism.

If you are happier using these terms, then we can. You can replace all my previous utterances of subjective with 'agent-relative' and objective with 'agent-neutral'. To me, the pairs of terms are equivalent.

So the question is: Is ethics an agent-relative subject like picking ice cream flavors or an agent-neutral subject like the shape of the Earth?

I think we should focus on this one issue for now, so we are not talking past each other. My responses to your other paragraphs depend on us having a mutual understanding that a dichotomy exists here.

Re: So?

Vichy Army — Sun, 02 May 2010 03:02:54 GMT

Not metaphysical, empirical.

I would say that to associate any particular theory of the physical sciences with consciousness is empirical, though to call this 'speculation' seems as unfair as to call relativity 'speculation'; whatever inadequacies may exist with the theory it is not substantively comparable to idle proposition mongering of the sort one would associate with those who blame Hitler's anti-semitism on some experience of his childhood.

However, as to the proposition that human existence is necessarily material, and qua material necessarily deterministic, is no 'speculation' at all, though it be metaphysical indeed, it is a necessary consequence of 'existence' itself and to deny this is to not be speaking of 'reality' at all; and to have moved outside the boundaries of logic, proposition and thought altogether.

Re: So?

zefreak — Sun, 02 May 2010 01:56:10 GMT

Not metaphysical, empirical.

Re: So?

z1235 — Sun, 02 May 2010 00:54:56 GMT

Which probably is just metaphysical speculation, again.

There is empirical evidence (electrical shocks, drugs, brain surgery, etc.) that support a 'self as a pattern' hypothesis. Of course, it's far from proven but, to me, it's the best explanation I've seen.

To us (humans), an emergent phenomenon would be meta-(beyond-)physical, by definition; a whole that language and reason recognize as something more than a mere sum of its parts -- but physical/material nevertheless. We find it useful to acknowledge certain states of matter/energy existence and like to give them names: 'wave', when matter/energy moves a certain way (oscillates), and 'self' when chemical/physical patterns fire in our brains a certain way.

Re: So?

I. Ryan — Sun, 02 May 2010 00:27:39 GMT

z1235:

our 'self' emerges from the complex chemical/physical patterns in ours brains.

Which probably is just metaphysical speculation, again.

Re: So?

z1235 — Sun, 02 May 2010 00:24:09 GMT

I think that nirgraham's point is that the language we use in describing intentionality is still useful, even if 'free will' or mind/body dualism is false, in the same way that the symbol 'hand' is still useful even if 'hand/palm-fingers dualism' is false.

Yes, thanks. Upon reading nir's post again, it seems that this may indeed be his point. The emergent nature of these phenomena does not preclude language and reason (another two emergent phenomena, btw) from acknowledging their existence. A better analogy (than the hand) would be a wave: it's nothing but a complex physical pattern (oscillating matter/energy) which language and reason have found useful to acknowledge as a specific separate entity/phenomenon. A wave emerges from oscillating matter/energy, just like our 'self' emerges from the complex chemical/physical patterns in our brains. The wave disappears when the matter/energy stops oscillating, just like our 'self' disappears when the chemical/physical patterns go away (or veer outside the realm of 'self' patterns).

Re: So?

Vichy Army — Sat, 01 May 2010 21:55:36 GMT

Intentionality (at its most meaningful in jurisprudence) has to deal with proximate behavior and accountability norms of actors by definition. The question of free will or determinism is totally irrelevant; one may be accountable for an action one was not even near or aware of (your equipment dropping a box on someone walking by). The whole inane 'free will debate' and the obsession some libertarians have over it only arise because of the ridiculous and impossible attempt to associate moral responsibility with jurisprudence.

Re: So?

Sam Armstrong — Sat, 01 May 2010 19:39:23 GMT

I can agree that the language is useful, but I think using that language to justify a categorical difference between people and nature presumes free will or mind/body dualism e.g. It's wrong because you have purpose, but the earthquake didn't so it wasn't wrong. Saying those chemicals in his brain shouldn't have been in that pattern to shoot someone, is exactly like saying that earthquake shouldn't have happened. Or let's bring it up one higher. It's exactly like saying the chemicals in the wolf's brain shouldn't have been in that pattern to rip that guy's throat out.

Say what ever you will about not having proof of behaviorism, there is not even evidence to suggest that the difference between those two things is anything more than a difference of scale and complexity.

Re: So?

zefreak — Sat, 01 May 2010 18:25:39 GMT

I think that nirgraham's point is that the language we use in describing intentionality is still useful, even if 'free will' or mind/body dualism is false, in the same way that the symbol 'hand' is still useful even if 'hand/palm-fingers dualism' is false.

Re: So?

z1235 — Sat, 01 May 2010 18:01:59 GMT

do chemicals muse over issues, do they ponder and consider, and believe things, and go on to decide matters?

What else would you suggest does all that? Complex, interrelated physical/chemical processes in your brain produce emergent phenomena, one of which is your acting, pondering, reasoning, and deciding "self".

Re: So?

nirgrahamUK — Sat, 01 May 2010 11:53:54 GMT

Sam, what is going on here?

yes, we have minds because we have brains. we are 'selves' because we have brains. our actions occur within the universe and have not some mysterious divide from physics, chemistry, et all

yet for all that. living people have purposes, and are agents. tsunami's and earthquakes do not have purposes and are not agents. do you disagree?

>>>>All you stated is that drugs may effect our decisions but that doesn't necessarily mean our decisions are made by chemicals.

what does it mean for a decision to be caused by chemicals? do chemicals muse over issues, do they ponder and consider, and believe things, and go on to decide matters?

Re: So?

Esuric — Sat, 01 May 2010 09:53:53 GMT

1. Drugs (chemicals) affect our decision making abilities

2. Brains exist. Not just in us, but in much smaller animals who don't have the same complexity as we do, but do have the same or very similar structures.

3. Animals brains function similar to us. We have countless examples of animals learning very similarly to us. Pavlov's dog ring a bell. We even have chimps who have learned language, acted with purpose, and have even done things like apologize for past harms.

4. Human's aren't instantly granted the power of acting with purpose. A zygote doesn't have any more purpose or consciousness than an amoeba. They grow, their brains grow, and as we watch those brains grow and make more and more connections between neurons eventually surpassing the dog who played with them as a infant, and the chimps. We see that people who don't make those connections don't gain those abilities. So it's not a case of correlation != causation.

5. Artificial Intelligence. We see that the principles which our brains are founded on can be simulated on small scale's within computers. Neurological networks actually work at solving problems running on computers. Now they are admittedly smaller problems then the one's our brains can handle, but they are also orders of magnitude smaller scales.

6. Evolution explains why we have the desires most of us have. Which is to live and reproduce, and all those things which further our lives. The single most beneficial tool at achieving that is our brain. So of course our brain is ingrained with an urge to live and reproduce, and to do those things which help us do that. But evolution hasn't evolved us to perfection, and some of the tools that were beneficial earlier or are still beneficial in some ways but not others can lead to our own harm.

dealt with
Yeah, they do.
So what? Do animals act like us?
Way to ignore my last response
lol
So what?

If you chose to push your argument all the way to the necessary conclusions (that is, if you were logically consistent), you would get to behaviorism (though the movement isn't entirely homogeneous). Now go read the refutations of behaviorism.

Either way, you have yet to put forth a definitive or coherent argument supporting your position. I want proof, and an actual argument.

Re: So?

Sam Armstrong — Sat, 01 May 2010 08:53:21 GMT

Yeah. Mine are just layman's understandings of neuroscience, but I know enough to realize dualism is really just another god of the gaps.

Re: So?

zefreak — Sat, 01 May 2010 08:36:00 GMT

There is a wealth of evidence for materialism. Check out either 'The Ego Tunnel' or 'Being No One' by Metzinger. The great thing about his books is that he is knowledgeable of the newest breakthroughs in neuroscience, and provides countless, specific examples to support his position. Dualism is not even a tenable position. The problems with dualism make the rough edges and holes in our understanding of conscious seem like nothing.

Re: So?

Sam Armstrong — Sat, 01 May 2010 08:33:59 GMT

Lines of evidence which support that our brains run on chemicals, and that humans aren't some special case.

1. Drugs (chemicals) affect our decision making abilities

2. Brains exist. Not just in us, but in much smaller animals who don't have the same complexity as we do, but do have the same or very similar structures.

3. Animals brains function similar to us. We have countless examples of animals learning very similarly to us. Pavlov's dog ring a bell. We even have chimps who have learned language, acted with purpose, and have even done things like apologize for past harms.

4. Human's aren't instantly granted the power of acting with purpose. A zygote doesn't have any more purpose or consciousness than an amoeba. They grow, their brains grow, and as we watch those brains grow and make more and more connections between neurons eventually surpassing the dog who played with them as a infant, and the chimps. We see that people who don't make those connections don't gain those abilities. So it's not a case of correlation != causation.

5. Artificial Intelligence. We see that the principles which our brains are founded on can be simulated on small scale's within computers. Neurological networks actually work at solving problems running on computers. Now they are admittedly smaller problems then the one's our brains can handle, but they are also orders of magnitude smaller scales.

6. Evolution explains why we have the desires most of us have. Which is to live and reproduce, and all those things which further our lives. The single most beneficial tool at achieving that is our brain. So of course our brain is ingrained with an urge to live and reproduce, and to do those things which help us do that. But evolution hasn't evolved us to perfection, and some of the tools that were beneficial earlier or are still beneficial in some ways but not others can lead to our own harm.

Lines of evidence to suggest something other than physical interactions and chemical reactions.

.....