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Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

Zavoi — Tue, 08 Feb 2011 10:34:40 GMT

AJ:
Anyway, to your main point there, I guess I am still not sure how you are defining extensional thought and intensional thought. I haven't really felt like I understood what the distinction was trying to get at, as you have been using it.

OK, let's see how this goes... The extension is the thing referred to; the intension is the way you refer to it. The extension is the number, the intension is the formula.

I think where this was going was towards the question of What are thoughts/utterences/etc. actually about? If someone says "There's a bee on the flower," what do they "really mean" by that?

You're saying (correct me if I'm wrong) that such a statement is really just shorthand for "It follows from my premises that there's a bee on the flower," since the reasoning apparatus of a person's mind doesn't have any direct connection to the external world; all they know is what they perceive through their sensations. Therefore, we should interpret any statement made by a person P as saying "It follows from P's premises that..."

What I'm saying is that this is confusing two different levels of analysis. At the meta-level, it is indeed the case that P only thinks/utters X because P's premises (and sensations) entail X -- whether or not X is "actually true" has no direct effect on P's thoughts except as far as it's mediated through P's sensations. However, at the object-level, we can still ask "What is the statement X about?" Certainly, it's not about P or P's premises; it makes no reference whatsoever to them. At the object-level, the statements must be taken purely at face value.

An example might help. In Peano Arithmetic, there is a very clear distinction between the two statements:

"1+1=2", which is expressed in PA as the string "S(0)+S(0)=S(S(0))" (using Wikipedia's notation)
"'1+1=2' follows from the premises of PA", which is expressed in PA by a horrendously long and complicated string resembling "∃x:([x is the Gödel number of a valid proof that ends with S(S(S(S(S(S..........0)))))])"

Just because PA doesn't have direct access to the "platonic realm of numbers," doesn't mean that the two statements are equivalent.

Or, consider a calculator where you enter "1+1=" and you get "2". What did the calculator just say? Did it say that "1+1=2"? But, says the sophisticated thinker, "Ah, see, the calculator is just a machine; it outputs whatever its machinery dictates it will output -- the mere fact that the calculator output '2' doesn't tell us anything about anything other than what the calculator outputs when input with '1+1='". That's all true enough, but it isn't what the calculator is actually saying. To say otherwise is to confuse the object-level (extension) with the meta-level (intension).

Hopefully some of this is helpful...

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

AJ — Mon, 31 Jan 2011 14:11:29 GMT

Zavoi,

I can hardly remember where I was in my thinking last August when we were talking last, but I do remember this thread was very valuable for helping me to develop my, for lack of a better term, "first-person epistemology." I am not the frequent net-user I was back then (for lack of a computer as well as other reasons), so I may not reply quickly, but I welcome any thoughts.

What kinds of sensations that are associated with numbers is a pretty complex and personal thing. For instance, I might see a collection of color splotches for small numbers like 2 or 4, then rows and columns for numbers around the two-digit range, then just various intuitive notions for even larger numbers - like a million is enough dollars to buy a big house, and there is some physical sensation that goes with it as well. Of course it's usually hard to introspect on such things to notice everything.

Anyway, to your main point there, I guess I am still not sure how you are defining extensional thought and intensional thought. I haven't really felt like I understood what the distinction was trying to get at, as you have been using it. I have developed my thoughts on all this quite a lot in the meantime, and I think this intension/extension distinction (or the question of whether there really was such a distinction, or if it was a useful one) was closely related with the issue we were discussing finally, so I might now be able to offer better phrasing that would make my view make more sense.

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

AJ — Mon, 31 Jan 2011 13:49:55 GMT

Brainpolice:

I would add the bold parts to make this more useful (and I would disambiguate "the signified" to "the intent" and "the interpretation," as per the bold text).

the signifier — the "sound image" or string of letters on a page that one recognizes as a sign.

the signified — the concept or idea that a sign evokes. (means the thought/sensations in the speaker that prompted the utterance ("the intent") or the thought/sensations evoked in the listener by the sign ("the interpretation"))

the referent — the actual thing or set of things a sign refers to. (not meaningful at a deep level of analysis, where the physical world is not yet hypothesized, only sensations)

This is just begging for a post-structuralist to tear it apart. :)

What do you mean? The definitions are not useful?

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

Zavoi — Mon, 24 Jan 2011 03:17:45 GMT

It’s been so long, I have to refresh myself on what we were talking about…

AJ:
For this one, I would say that PA cannot believe, and set ZFC set theory cannot observe - only humans or other actors can. But maybe I missed the point or forgot something.

This is only supposed to be an analogy, not to be taken literally.

AJ:
If they are the same number, the sensation I experience when I think of that number would be the same. (But let me know if I'm misreading the context here.)

Can you clarify? (First of all, what kinds of sensations are associated with numbers?) But the main point is: once you’ve understood the two formulas, does it really take no thought at all to recognize that they both refer to the same number? If not, then we have demonstrated the difference between extensional and intensional thoughts: the first is the number itself, and the second is the process by which you calculate the number.

AJ:
(not meaningful at a deep level of analysis, where the physical world is not yet hypothesized, only sensations)

If I recall correctly, I think this is ultimately what we were debating about. But I won’t address it yet, not until the conversation is back in swing again.

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

Brainpolice — Sun, 23 Jan 2011 21:26:14 GMT

I would add the bold parts to make this more useful (and I would disambiguate "the signified" to "the intent" and "the interpretation," as per the bold text).

the signifier — the "sound image" or string of letters on a page that one recognizes as a sign.

the signified — the concept or idea that a sign evokes. (means the thought/sensations in the speaker that prompted the utterance ("the intent") or the thought/sensations evoked in the listener by the sign ("the interpretation"))

the referent — the actual thing or set of things a sign refers to. (not meaningful at a deep level of analysis, where the physical world is not yet hypothesized, only sensations)

This is just begging for a post-structuralist to tear it apart. :)

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

AJ — Sun, 23 Jan 2011 14:49:43 GMT

I would add the bold parts to make this more useful (and I would disambiguate "the signified" to "the intent" and "the interpretation," as per the bold text).

the signifier — the "sound image" or string of letters on a page that one recognizes as a sign.

the signified — the concept or idea that a sign evokes. (means the thought/sensations in the speaker that prompted the utterance ("the intent") or the thought/sensations evoked in the listener by the sign ("the interpretation"))

the referent — the actual thing or set of things a sign refers to. (not meaningful at a deep level of analysis, where the physical world is not yet hypothesized, only sensations)

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

AJ — Sun, 23 Jan 2011 14:45:33 GMT

Re: Intension vs. extension, you seem to have been using it in a way different from how Wikipedia defines it, so it may help to use a different distinction, from here:

the signifier — the "sound image" or string of letters on a page that one recognizes as a sign.

the signified — the concept or idea that a sign evokes.

the referent — the actual thing or set of things a sign refers to.

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

AJ — Sun, 23 Jan 2011 14:12:26 GMT

Sorry for the wait, computer broke (still broken, but I have been spending some quality time at net cafes recently).

Zavoi:
To continue with the PA analogy, you’re saying (right?) that a third party (say, ZFC set theory) observes that everything that PA believes, it believes because it is derived from PA’s axioms; whereas from PA’s internal perspective, all that is happening is that certain statements are derived, and these statements are believed by PA, but PA is not aware of this – PA does not believe that it is committed to believe everything it can derive from its axioms.

For this one, I would say that PA cannot believe, and set ZFC set theory cannot observe - only humans or other actors can. But maybe I missed the point or forgot something.

Zavoi:
The distinction also occurs in thought; it’s the difference between thinking of “the morning star” (as in the actual star) and thinking of “the idea of ‘the morning star’” (as in the process of looking to the east in the morning and seeing something).

I think the sensations I'd experience in both cases would be the same; if they weren't, then for example the "idea of 'the morning star'" is taken to have some extra connotation, such as "whatever star you see in the morning, even if it isn't the Morning Star."

Zavoi:
Or, if you prefer, the difference between and . If it were purely a matter of language, then it would take no thought at all to recognize that these refer to the same number.

If they are the same number, the sensation I experience when I think of that number would be the same. (But let me know if I'm misreading the context here.)

Zavoi:
AJ:
Also, even before considering what knowledge actually is, my getting (but perhaps not realizing that I get) a definite twinge of pleasure now for acting as if X now is not the same as my deeming that acting as if X at some later time t will result in pleasure (and/or less pain) being experienced at some time t+n.

How can a feeling of pleasure be “definite” without you realizing that you have it?

Because memory is limited. In the case of the above quote, I am saying that I definitely feel it when I feel it, but then I forget it. So I might be feeling it periodically many times a day, but I immediately forget it each time because it is such a mundane occurence that I immediately filter it out of short-term memory. However, if I can even notice (that is, retain in memory long enough to analyze) one of these periodic twinges of pleasure, it makes sense for me to posit that this could be happening periodicaly all the time as I take various actions.

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

Zavoi — Wed, 01 Sep 2010 18:55:11 GMT

AJ:
Zavoi, bold added:
Yes, it may be the case (as seen by a third party, or, as you say, “at the deep level”) that my beliefs are just what it is useful* for me to act as if

By the deep level I mean from an individualist-subjective perspective, where I assume nothing about any "reality" or "third parties." At the deep level, perhaps all that is happening is I get pleasure from certain actions, and by now I have long forgotten or pushed into the subconscious any awareness of this process. At a casual level - that of a third-party observing someone, for example - it might be said that "what she calls her beliefs just turn out to be her deemed useful-to-act-as-ifs; in other words, that is all she really means by belief."

OK, I think I had that mixed up. If we replace the bolded text with “as seen by a third party, or, as you say, ‘at the casual level,’” how does that sound?

To continue with the PA analogy, you’re saying (right?) that a third party (say, ZFC set theory) observes that everything that PA believes, it believes because it is derived from PA’s axioms; whereas from PA’s internal perspective, all that is happening is that certain statements are derived, and these statements are believed by PA, but PA is not aware of this – PA does not believe that it is committed to believe everything it can derive from its axioms.

AJ:
But like I said, intension and extension are matters of language, not of thought.

The distinction also occurs in thought; it’s the difference between thinking of “the morning star” (as in the actual star) and thinking of “the idea of ‘the morning star’” (as in the process of looking to the east in the morning and seeing something). Or, if you prefer, the difference between and . If it were purely a matter of language, then it would take no thought at all to recognize that these refer to the same number.

AJ:
Also, even before considering what knowledge actually is, my getting (but perhaps not realizing that I get) a definite twinge of pleasure now for acting as if X now is not the same as my deeming that acting as if X at some later time t will result in pleasure (and/or less pain) being experienced at some time t+n.

How can a feeling of pleasure be “definite” without you realizing that you have it? Should we think of this notion of pleasure as more like the healthiness of food than any direct sensation (like “red” or “pain”)?

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

AJ — Sun, 29 Aug 2010 10:55:36 GMT

Also, even before considering what knowledge actually is, my getting (but perhaps not realizing that I get) a definite twinge of pleasure now for acting as if X now is not the same as my deeming that acting as if X at some later time t will result in pleasure (and/or less pain) being experienced at some time t+n.

(Note: I should have said "operant conditioned" above, not "Pavlovian conditioned.")

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

AJ — Sat, 28 Aug 2010 08:54:16 GMT

Zavoi:

AJ:
Perhaps I don't "know" it is useful to act as if, I just get pleasure (some tiny twinge of satisfaction perhaps) from treating it that way.

But by telling me this, you are indicating that you do know that it is useful to act as if (assuming “pleasure” and “usefulness” are interchangeable). Which brings us to…

...

“It is useful, but I don’t know that it is.”

Not exactly: the very question of what it means to "know" hinges on the perspective one chooses, and that we are apparently taking different side of.

Zavoi, bold added:
Yes, it may be the case (as seen by a third party, or, as you say, “at the deep level”) that my beliefs are just what it is useful* for me to act as if

By the deep level I mean from an individualist-subjective perspective, where I assume nothing about any "reality" or "third parties." At the deep level, perhaps all that is happening is I get pleasure from certain actions, and by now I have long forgotten or pushed into the subconscious any awareness of this process. At a casual level - that of a third-party observing someone, for example - it might be said that "what she calls her beliefs just turn out to be her deemed useful-to-act-as-ifs; in other words, that is all she really means by belief."

But like I said, intension and extension are matters of language, not of thought. Whether I call it "the morning star" or "the evening star," in my own mind I am simply, for example, seeing an image of Venus. Even if I believe that the morning star and the evening star refer to two separate things (say, two distinct images in my mind), I am simply then referring to those respective images.

In other words, the whole issue of intension and extension is also part and parcel of the issues we've been discussing.

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

Zavoi — Fri, 27 Aug 2010 09:13:55 GMT

AJ:
Perhaps I don't "know" it is useful to act as if, I just get pleasure (some tiny twinge of satisfaction perhaps) from treating it that way.

But by telling me this, you are indicating that you do know that it is useful to act as if (assuming “pleasure” and “usefulness” are interchangeable). Which brings us to…

AJ:
So it is useful to me, but I don't make that statement at the deep level of analysis in terms of methodological individualism, just at the casual level as third party might as they are observing me and hearing my reports.

So perhaps that was the problem all along. I was (or should have been) making the final statement that "all beliefs are just useful-to-act-as-ifs" at the casual level, not at the deep subjective-individualist level. At the deep level, it may just be that it gives me a certain type of pleasure to act as if certain things, and I call those my beliefs.

“It is useful, but I don’t know that it is.”

I think this is more or less getting to the heart of the matter, and shows why it is important to distinguish extension from intension. Yes, it may be the case (as seen by a third party, or, as you say, “at the deep level”) that my beliefs are just what it is useful* for me to act as if – just as the “beliefs” of PA are just what is deduced from the Peano axioms. This is a purely extensional statement. It is then tempting to say casually “All my beliefs are just useful-to-act-as-ifs,” discreetly moving to an intensional statement (as if to say P⊢(P⊢S→S)). I think our whole disagreement can be resolved by recognizing this distinction.

*(Where this sense of “useful” is not necessarily something I am aware of; e.g., in the same way that the food I eat may be healthy or unhealthy for me without my knowing this.)

AJ:
pain and pleasure are ultimately the only real motivators.

This isn’t really relevant, but it’s something that’s been bugging me about praxeology for a while: Are we defining pain as “that which one is motivated to avoid” (and pleasure “to seek”)? If so, isn’t this an entirely uninformative statement? If, on the other hand, we are using the everyday definition of pain as “the sensation produced when my bodily tissues are damaged,” then the statement is by no means necessarily true (someone could be a masochist, suffering for the sake of truth, etc.).

AJ:
I think I see where my explanation was misleading. Does the above clear that up?

I think so. This debate seems close to over.

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

I. Ryan — Tue, 24 Aug 2010 14:55:29 GMT

AJ:

Could you pick some particular point? The paper raises so many issues and points that I agree with, disagree with, or find relevant/irrelevant that it would take me weeks to cover it all (and I've barely even read half of it yet).

I will try to get back to you on that. I just started reading it this morning, so I only just started the fourth chapter.

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

AJ — Tue, 24 Aug 2010 14:52:11 GMT

Could you pick some particular point? The paper raises so many subtle issues and points that I agree with, disagree with, or find relevant/irrelevant that it would take me weeks to cover it all (and I've barely even read half of it yet).

Plus Long is writing with an entirely different goal, and the points I find interesting are sometimes perhaps only incidental to the overall arc of his argument. I think he is writing to show how Wittgenstein backs up Mises, but I am writing here to espouse a more general perspective that happens to touch on some of the issues therein. So even where I take issue with the points raised I wouldn't be refuting the paper but rather talking about tangential issues of only eventual relevance (if any) to the paper itself.

Re: Mises, Quine, and the analytic/synthetic distinction.

I. Ryan — Tue, 24 Aug 2010 14:44:48 GMT

AJ:

I'd like to respond to Long's paper at length,

Do it.

AJ:

I can probably respond to specific points if anyone cares.

I care.