Economics Questions

Re: A Question

eliotn — Sun, 05 Jul 2009 18:12:23 GMT

Thanks everybody!

Re: A Question

hayekianxyz — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 17:27:46 GMT

Eliotn, one more point. In terms of pure economic theory, it isn't necessary to prove that all individuals in the economy are actors in the Misesian sense (that can never be proven in any case, even if you and I are debating all it proves is that we are acting, not any body else in the economy). All that is necessary is that we assume that everybody in an economy is an actor. In terms of empirical applications of Austrian theory, then we must assume that actors in the economy are indeed actors, in the Austrian usage of the word. All things given, it isn't such an unrealistic assumption, especially when compared with the mainstream defintions of economic man, who is a perfectly "rational" optimizing individual with perfect knowledge of his own value scales and perfect knowledge of all goods for sale.

Re: A Question

Nitroadict — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 05:49:55 GMT

Stranger:
Nitroadict:
Maybe not for human action, but wouldn't the costs of maintaining living standards for the coma patients be pertinent to economic analysis? I'd imagine it would be very important given the possible effects of a given overall economy or healthcare system on the standards of maintience on coma patients, who cannot economically act for themselves.

As I said, this cannot be decided by the person in a coma, who cannot act. It can only be decided by acting people who will decide the fate of the comatose person.

Indeed, dunno how I missed that when the last sentence refers to next of kin. A bit embarassing, actually.

Re: A Question

Stranger — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 05:39:31 GMT

Nitroadict:
Maybe not for human action, but wouldn't the costs of maintaining living standards for the coma patients be pertinent to economic analysis? I'd imagine it would be very important given the possible effects of a given overall economy or healthcare system on the standards of maintience on coma patients, who cannot economically act for themselves.

As I said, this cannot be decided by the person in a coma, who cannot act. It can only be decided by acting people who will decide the fate of the comatose person.

Re: A Question

Knight_of_BAAWA — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 05:04:06 GMT

Wilmot of Rochester:
You mentioned DNA as an afterthought.

No, I didn't. Literary devices can confuse those unfamiliar.

Re: A Question

Nitroadict — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 04:49:44 GMT

Stranger:
People in a coma do not act, and so they are not pertinent to economic analysis.

Maybe not for human action, but wouldn't the costs of maintaining living standards for the coma patients be pertinent to economic analysis? I'd imagine it would be very important given the possible effects of a given overall economy or healthcare system on the standards of maintience on coma patients, who cannot economically act for themselves.

Re: A Question

Wilmot of Rochester — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 04:43:44 GMT

Stranger:

People in a coma do not act, and so they are not pertinent to economic analysis.

The action axiom is the starting point. If we act, then such and such is logically consequent. And if you deny that we act, your denial is an action and you are in a performative contradiction. No one in a coma is going to deny that he acts.

Because people in a coma do not act, choices concerning them must be made by next-of-kin or by way of a written will.

Is the idea of praxeology only applicable to economics? If so, fair enough.

To be perfectly honest, I don't really know the value in praxeology.

Re: A Question

Wilmot of Rochester — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 04:41:14 GMT

Knight_of_BAAWA:

Wilmot of Rochester:
You addressed pre compa and post coma, but not the state of the coma itself.
Actually, I did. Re-read the part about DNA. Helps to read the whole post, y'know.

You mentioned DNA as an afterthought. Your previous argument didn't really concern it, but if you're now saying that DNA is the qualifier for being human, then that's pretty good. I agree that biology does tend to make a human being.

That said, however, I find that the definition of human is usually more about what others perceive than what actually is, seeing as the thing in itself is more or less unknowable - at least according to Kant.

Re: A Question

Wilmot of Rochester — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 04:37:32 GMT

BobT:

It does not say "Humans are always acting," it says that humans do act. A person who has acted before the coma and will act after is by definition a being who does act. He just does not happen to be acting at that exact moment. It is the same for a sleeping person.

So a child born into a coma - something that occurs - and never acts or who never will act, is he a human being?

I'm saying that there are serious flaws I can see and that having to rely on grammar to patch up the holes isn't going to work out too well in real debates.

Re: A Question

Stranger — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 03:51:12 GMT

People in a coma do not act, and so they are not pertinent to economic analysis.

The action axiom is the starting point. If we act, then such and such is logically consequent. And if you deny that we act, your denial is an action and you are in a performative contradiction. No one in a coma is going to deny that he acts.

Because people in a coma do not act, choices concerning them must be made by next-of-kin or by way of a written will.

Re: A Question

Knight_of_BAAWA — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 03:46:09 GMT

Wilmot of Rochester:
You addressed pre compa and post coma, but not the state of the coma itself.

Actually, I did. Re-read the part about DNA. Helps to read the whole post, y'know.

Re: A Question

Daniel James Sanchez — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 20:48:36 GMT

BobT:
Actually he says those who are unchangeably unfit for action. It is reasonable to assume that a person in a coma can recover and continue to act.

Yes, that's why I wrote, "at least one in a permanent coma".

Re: A Question

BobT — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 16:17:54 GMT

Lilburne:

In Human Action, Chapter 1, Section 2, Mises wrote:

Beings of human descent who either from birth or from acquired defects are unchangeably unfit for any action (in the strict sense of the term and not merely in the legal sense) are practically not human.

Therefore, I believe Mises would characterize a person in a coma (at least one in a permanent coma) as not being practically human.

Mises's definition of human seems to be "that which acts"; the action axiom seems to be a tautology.

Actually he says those who are unchangeably unfit for action. It is reasonable to assume that a person in a coma can recover and continue to act.

Wilmot of Rochester:
You addressed pre compa and post coma, but not the state of the coma itself. He acted before, he acts after. OK. So is it like a "praxeology baptist" thing? Once an actor always an actors? I thin the original poster raises a fine point. If we are to take it that all men act, then what about those that do not act?

It does not say "Humans are always acting," it says that humans do act. A person who has acted before the coma and will act after is by definition a being who does act. He just does not happen to be acting at that exact moment. It is the same for a sleeping person.

Re: A Question

hayekianxyz — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 13:56:18 GMT

In my opinion, people concern themselves far too much with the action axiom. The whole of praxeology is hypothetical in any case, meaning, catallactics is hypothetical, it assumes that those who the analysis concerns are acting human beings. The whole point of the action axiom was to provide a solid basis from which economic analysis could proceed, and it acheived that. Even if one could find an obscure situation in which the action axiom did not apply, I daresay it would not have too much of an impact on the Austrian analysis of the economy. I've yet to see many economists devote huge amounts of time to the role of vegetables in the business cycle, so I don't see why Austrians should.

Re: A Question

wombatron — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 06:47:09 GMT

earlgrey:

We must distinguish between the biological term "Human" (homo Sapian) and the praxeologic term "Human" (acting being). The two are differnent and usin them interchangably will reasult in error and confusion.

This. Also, the action axiom applies to other hypothetical sapient beings.