Economics Questions

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

nirgrahamUK — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 23:03:42 GMT

scineram:
Have you never compared prices between stores? Mileage between cars?

it seems you didn't understand what jon asked you.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

scineram — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 22:53:15 GMT

Have you never compared prices between stores? Mileage between cars?

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

Jon Irenicus — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 19:42:38 GMT

Then please give me the cardinal units by which action is motivated, that'd allow you to say in terms of what I prefer chocolate to vanilla 3.9030878x more.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

scineram — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 15:31:13 GMT

wilderness:
Meaningful implies value.

Why? What do you mean?

wilderness:
Human action is ordinal not cardinal

No. The world is cardinal, and you act in it.

wilderness:
cardinal is mathematical/symbolic logic.

No.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

wilderness — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 15:24:43 GMT

Adam Knott:
Maybe not necessarily that they cannot, but simply if they do not, then they don't conceive human action, human purpose, human intentionality, but instead, something else....

Yes, I believe you are correct. Not necessarily that they cannot (the confusion of a double-negative), as I said in my first post in this thread it possibly can happen; but I don't know about the technicals of symbolic logic to do it myself. But Jon pointed out earlier in the thread that he has taken a class on logic in which I assume he has practiced the technicals and he states it is possible but would be very complicated.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

chloe732 — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 06:34:38 GMT

There are several books on methodology that I should read to get to the bottom of this. However, after reading everyone's replies, I would like to attempt to boil it down this way (a certain theme is repeated for clarity):

Rothbard points out the difference between human action, of which we do know the underlying cause (motivated man), and the rest of nature, of which we cannot know the underlying cause, because nature (the universe) is unmotivated.

In nature, we only see "facts", perhaps Rothbard means "effects" (?). For example, given we can only see the "effect" of gravity, then Fg = Gm1m2/r^2 is the appropriate use of symbology to explain the effect we are seeing. Regarding Rothbard's use of the term "meaningless", what meaning does the above equation have without reference to gravity itself? It has "operational meaning", but not meaning within itself.

And, as Rothbard explains, a mathematical expression will be modified upon receipt of additional empirical information, such as the discovery of general relativity for example, which requires a new set of symbols to explain more generally the effects we are seeing. We can never know the underlying causes in nature, only the effects. We can only refine our explanation of these effects, with increasing precision, but we can never get to the cause, because, nature is unmotivated. Think about the mainstream approach, and their attempt to treat human action like "natural" phenomenon; they are constantly using empirical data to compare to their equations, and their equations will be revised if needed to determine a more "general" equation. The cause (human action) is right in front of them but they choose to ignore the implications of this.

It is inappropriate to use mathematical logic in praxeology to describe human action because, for example, the statement "humans act" contains Rothbard's "meaning" within itself. Reducing this to a mathematical form could be done, but I believe Rothbard is saying it would be pointless to do so since the statement has already been reduced to its most elemental form (Occam's Razor comes into play) and the statement of "verbal logic" describes the cause itself with absolute certainty. In other words, when we say "humans act", we are done. In the study of human action, there is no more precision to be gained that can get us closer to the “cause” or "root" of the matter, as general relativity did with Newton’s Fg=Gm1m2/r^2.

And today, quantum physics tries to unify the “very large” (general relativity) with the “very small” (the quantum), i.e., they are trying to come up with a more “general” theory to explain the “effects” observed in the universe. Mathematical methodology is superior for this type of analysis, but they will never get to the cause, for the reasons explained above.

My "boiled down" explanation was longer than I intended, but it did help me get these ideas out of my mind and into written form. Thanks for your patience.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

Adam Knott — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 04:24:18 GMT

Good points Wilderness.

"Mathematical or symbolic logic doesn't explain value,..."

Or even: To the extent that such schemes do not incorporate the concept of value, then to this extent do they not incorporate the (or a) fundamental concept of human action (purpose, intentionality, etc.).

Maybe not necessarily that they cannot, but simply if they do not, then they don't conceive human action, human purpose, human intentionality, but instead, something else....

I agree with Nir too.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

nirgrahamUK — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 03:22:34 GMT

well formal logic notation can be applied to ordinal schemes, but I just think, wahts the point. truly the onus is on those who feel that there are benefits to translating the informal logical arguments into formal logical arguments to do it and to start reaping the benefits. I won't object to efforts to translate economic understanding into a 'formal' form, so long as those that would formalize won't object to be held to account if their 'translations' fall short

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

wilderness — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 03:18:04 GMT

I've been thinking about this. I know explanations have already been given in the thread and I agree with them, but I don't believe this has been explained in the following manner:

Meaningful implies value. Mathematical or symbolic logic doesn't explain value, anybody correct me if I'm wrong. Therefore the difference is as explained by ordinal and cardinal. Human action is ordinal not cardinal and cardinal is mathematical/symbolic logic. Thus symbolic logic doesn't explain value or in other words, doesn't explain human action. To leave out meaning(ful) or value and still try to explain human action is nonsensical. Human action is implicitly predicated by value. That's why symbolic logic isn't meaningful. It doesn't explain the basic underlying deductions of human action, which is value.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

scineram — Wed, 24 Feb 2010 22:41:12 GMT

I don't think it's different. But logistics is a completely unrelated something.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

chloe732 — Wed, 24 Feb 2010 04:12:05 GMT

scineram:
I wonder why does that make formal logic unsuitable for praxeology. Why would the statements be meaningless? It only uses the language you want it to. I think he maybe misunderstood formalization.

Adam Knott:
Good point !

Scineram, Adam: Can you explain what you mean by "formal logic"? Do you mean what is described here? Rothbard refers to "mathematical logic", "logistics" and "logical symbols"; is this different from what you are refering to above by "formal logic"?

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

Adam Knott — Tue, 23 Feb 2010 15:44:13 GMT

scineram:

Adam Knott:
So I would interpret Rothbard (at this stage of his career where he is a student of Mises), as trying to make the point that the concepts of praxeology are human meaning concepts (striving, attainment, value, supply, means, ends, happiness, unhappiness, etc...), whereas the concepts of mathematics, dealing with the location of objects conceived to be independent of human intention (1, 2, 3, x, y, z, etc...), are not concepts of human meaning.

I wonder why does that make formal logic unsuitable for praxeology. Why would the statements be meaningless? It only uses the language you want it to. I think he maybe misunderstood formalization.

Good point !

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

scineram — Tue, 23 Feb 2010 11:43:46 GMT

Adam Knott:
So I would interpret Rothbard (at this stage of his career where he is a student of Mises), as trying to make the point that the concepts of praxeology are human meaning concepts (striving, attainment, value, supply, means, ends, happiness, unhappiness, etc...), whereas the concepts of mathematics, dealing with the location of objects conceived to be independent of human intention (1, 2, 3, x, y, z, etc...), are not concepts of human meaning.

I wonder why does that make formal logic unsuitable for praxeology. Why would the statements be meaningless? It only uses the language you want it to. I think he maybe misunderstood formalization.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

Esuric — Mon, 22 Feb 2010 08:06:53 GMT

Adam Knott:

chloe732:

Here's my take:

Mathematics is the exact science of spatiotemporal nature. According to Heisenberg:

"It may be said that classical physics is just that idealization in which we can speak about parts of the world without any reference to ourselves." (Physics and Philosophy)

So the idea is that mathematical logic refers to a realm, an ideal realm, that is independent of human action. The idea is that whether a planet is over here or over there is really not important to human well-being. Such an event is thought to be neutral with respect to human happiness and unhappiness, human satisfaction and dissatisfaction, human intention, human well-being, etc..   Thus, the formal logic of nature, when nature is conceived as independent of human intention, is "not meaningful." This logic applies to a realm absent human intention, and thus absent the categories of human action.

By contrast, the concepts of praxeology are human meaning categories.   They are definitely categories that refer to human action and human intention.

Human action is the phenomenon of "aiming at ends."    In this formal system, there is a category or conception of "what the actor has" (the state of affairs that exists now for the actor), and, "what the actor is aiming for" (the state of affairs the actor is aiming for).

These categories (what I have now, versus what I want) are human meaning categories. They matter to me, or to the actor concerned. They are not, as Heisenberg writes, an idealization in which we can speak about the world without any reference to our selves. Quite the contrary, these concepts directly refer to ourselves: our wants and our attainments.

So I would interpret Rothbard (at this stage of his career where he is a student of Mises), as trying to make the point that the concepts of praxeology are human meaning concepts (striving, attainment, value, supply, means, ends, happiness, unhappiness, etc...), whereas the concepts of mathematics, dealing with the location of objects conceived to be independent of human intention (1, 2, 3, x, y, z, etc...), are not concepts of human meaning.

That is what I believe he is trying to convey.

Awesome. Well said. This makes perfect sense.

Re: Praxeology; what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful"?

Adam Knott — Mon, 22 Feb 2010 07:22:38 GMT

chloe732:

Here's my take:

Mathematics is the exact science of spatiotemporal nature. According to Heisenberg:

"It may be said that classical physics is just that idealization in which we can speak about parts of the world without any reference to ourselves." (Physics and Philosophy)

So the idea is that mathematical logic refers to a realm, an ideal realm, that is independent of human action. The idea is that whether a planet is over here or over there is really not important to human well-being. Such an event is thought to be neutral with respect to human happiness and unhappiness, human satisfaction and dissatisfaction, human intention, human well-being, etc.. Thus, the formal logic of nature, when nature is conceived as independent of human intention, is "not meaningful." This logic applies to a realm absent human intention, and thus absent the categories of human action.

By contrast, the concepts of praxeology are human meaning categories. They are definitely categories that refer to human action and human intention.

Human action is the phenomenon of "aiming at ends." In this formal system, there is a category or conception of "what the actor has" (the state of affairs that exists now for the actor), and, "what the actor is aiming for" (the state of affairs the actor is aiming for).

These categories (what I have now, versus what I want) are human meaning categories. They matter to me, or to the actor concerned. They are not, as Heisenberg writes, an idealization in which we can speak about the world without any reference to our selves. Quite the contrary, these concepts directly refer to ourselves: our wants and our attainments.

So I would interpret Rothbard (at this stage of his career where he is a student of Mises), as trying to make the point that the concepts of praxeology are human meaning concepts (striving, attainment, value, supply, means, ends, happiness, unhappiness, etc...), whereas the concepts of mathematics, dealing with the location of objects conceived to be independent of human intention (1, 2, 3, x, y, z, etc...), are not concepts of human meaning.

That is what I believe he is trying to convey.