Economics Questions

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Lagrange multiplier — Fri, 06 Aug 2010 00:34:53 GMT

To what objects does the "category of action" apply and what rule(s) can be used to determine its usage?

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Daniel James Sanchez — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 23:50:36 GMT

A priori doesn't mean perfect reducability. Quite the opposite, it means irreducability. Neither does it imply applicability to everything. Teleology is an a priori, yet it is inapplicable to stones. Inferring mechanistic causality from regular contiguity/succession is an a priori, yet it fails when answering fundamentally teleological questions like why prices fluctuate. Also, I don't like the term free will. Depending on how it is defined it is either pleonastic or non-existent. To speak of simply will is better.

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Lagrange multiplier — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 22:27:55 GMT

I use the approach of heterophenomenology. That is, what persons say also is included in my epistemology (thus, viewing the signing of a deed isn't too problematic). Here's my point: you could derive a notion of "use" purely from observable phenomena.

Let me quote Dennett, Just what kinds of things does this methodology commit us to? Beyond the unproblematic things all of science is committed to (neurons and electrons, clocks and microscopes, . . . ) just to beliefs—the beliefs expressed by subjects and deemed constitutive of their subjectivity. And what kind of things are beliefs? Are they sentences in the head written in brain writing? Are they nonphysical states of dualist ectoplasm? Are they structures composed of proteins or neural assemblies or electrical fields? We may stay maximally noncommittal about this by adopting, at least for the time being (I recommend: for ever), the position I have defended (Dennett, 1971; 1987; 1991) that treats beliefs from the intentional stance as theorists’ fictions similar to centres of mass, the Equator, and parallelograms of forces. In short, we may treat beliefs as abstractions that measure or describe the complex cognitive state of a subject rather the way horsepower indirectly but accurately measures the power of engines (don’t look in the engine for the horses). As Churchland (1979) has pointed out, physics already has hundreds of well-understood measure predicates, such as x has weight-in-grams n, or x is moving up at n meters per second, which describe a physical property of x by relating it to a number. Statements that attribute beliefs using the standard propositional attitude format, x believes that p, describe x’s internal state by relating it to a proposition, another kind of useful abstraction, systematized in logic, not arithmetic. We need beliefs anyway for the rest of social science, which is almost entirely conducted in terms of the intentional stance, so this is a conservative exploitation of already quite well-behaved and well-understood methods.

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Daniel James Sanchez — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 21:26:33 GMT

What is possession without the notion of "use"? How do you tell the difference between the possesion and mere proximity? And what about distant assets? Without regard to intentionality, how could you think a signing of a deed has anything to do with a house miles away? You still have yet to provide a non-teleological definition of asset. Nobody's trying to do magic. We're just recognizing that market phenomena are matters of human intentionality, and must be studied as such. The matters (wealth, prices, interest rates, etc) which impel us to formulate economics in the first place are matters of intentionality. You cannot explain matters of intentionality while ignoring intentionality at the same time.

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Lagrange multiplier — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 21:05:45 GMT

I did address that I don't believe "causality" is a priori, since there isn't even a consensus on what it means or how to apply it unproblematically.

I want to now ask a question: how can free will be understood if causality is a priori? That is, I am viewing all molecules as determined, even ones that comprise you and me. If that is somehow imposed upon the world from a pre-empirical intuition, then whence choice?

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Lagrange multiplier — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 20:46:09 GMT

If I observed an animal maintaining property (a possession, perhaps a nest) at the expense of energy resources, I would consider that an "asset."

I mean, I'm okay with ascribing "the intentional stance" to objects, but I don't want that to be mistaken for anything too magical--it's all based upon empirical data. That's all there can be--a theory of "action" based upon highly complex bodily movements.

The more I think about methodological dualism, the more I'm struck by its pragmatism (at least by Mises); if I am interpreting him correctly, methodology is being substituted for a metaphyics--our use of "methodological dualism" is purely practical, nothing more. I like that better than Rothbard's approach, which seems to suggest that a priori knowledge rests upon empirical "self-evidence."

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Daniel James Sanchez — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 20:22:25 GMT

Ok then do so with "assett". Because, unless you can, you've given me a decideadly teleological definition of "money".

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Lagrange multiplier — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 20:09:35 GMT

I would define all terms according to observable bodily movements (I assume "preference" according to demonstrated behavior, for instance).

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Daniel James Sanchez — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 18:42:09 GMT

Sounds teleological to me: unless you can define "liquidity" (saleability) and "asset" in some new, non-teleological sense.

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Lagrange multiplier — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 18:26:36 GMT

The most liquid asset.

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Daniel James Sanchez — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 18:08:27 GMT

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Daniel James Sanchez — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 04:43:58 GMT

Oh, one more thing, Neoclassical.

Can you please define "money" without reference to any teleological notions?

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Daniel James Sanchez — Wed, 04 Aug 2010 21:40:47 GMT

Well, that last post of yours was pretty vague and unenlightening, so I guess that means this debate has run its course. Thank you for a stimulating conversation. Feel free to address the posts in the sidelines thread now.

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Lagrange multiplier — Wed, 04 Aug 2010 15:11:45 GMT

I don't believe causality is as clear-cut as you do: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality.

Re: Methodological Dualism: a debate between Neoclassical and Lilburne

Daniel James Sanchez — Wed, 04 Aug 2010 15:07:21 GMT

Our minds are obviously equipped to process colors, but that's different from what I'm talking about. In discussing a prioris I'm discussing what Mises calls "the logical structure of the human mind": built-in inferences that are ultimately given, because they cannot be inferred from any principles outside of themselves...

inferring final causes
the categories of deductive logic
inferring causation from regular contiguity/succession
inferring future regularity from past regularity (induction)