Economics Questions

Re: Means and Ends

I. Ryan — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 22:21:43 GMT

Adam Knott:

every sentence and phrase is disputed or contended

I was asking for clarification, not disputing or contending anything.

Adam Knott:

So be it.

Why give up on me that easily?

Adam Knott:

As I mentioned, why not start a thread on it ?

Well, I plan to, but it might take me a while to write it up and whatever.

Re: Means and Ends

Adam Knott — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 22:15:30 GMT

I Ryan:

When we get to the point where virtually every sentence and phrase is disputed or contended, that may be the point where we can leave a discussion that has reached the point of diminishing returns and start a different discussion.

I think my previous post makes an important insight, and does so by showing how the commonalities between the two proposals that you and AJ made indicate a principle similar to what I've been trying to convey. Your comments above imply you got nothing out of it. So be it.

If you have an alternate theory or vision I'm open to discussing it. As I mentioned, why not start a thread on it ?

Re: Means and Ends

I. Ryan — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 21:32:33 GMT

By the way, could you try to be a little bit more direct with your posts?

For one, I'm sort of confused about where (or whether!) you're disagreeing with me in this.

Adam Knott:

Thus, the concept of distinction, as opposed to a particular distinction, has no perceptual (distinguishable) content.

What would it mean for an unspecified distinction to have no distinguishable content?

Adam Knott:

We are referring to "something" that has no perceptual content (that can't be distinguished or perceived).

Can't be distinguished or perceived by who?

Adam Knott:

That is the unavoidable circumstance of action.

I assume that you already explained why in this thread, so could you link to it for future reference?

Adam Knott:

My point is that in the theory of action, this "something" that has no perceptual (distinguishable) content is the category of ends.

But can't you strive for one end rather than another?

(Might be an annoying question, but I'm putting it out there because I think that the answer might be helpful for understanding your position.)

Adam Knott:

The end stands in the same relation to the means as the concept of distinction stands in relation to a particular distinction.

What exactly is that relation?

Adam Knott:

Only the means can be distinguishable.

Wait, how could you distinguish one means from another in pure praxeology?

If you say that somebody uses means A, it would always be possible to conceive of the opposite (not using means A).

Re: Means and Ends

Adam Knott — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 21:13:02 GMT

I.Ryan:

I think you and AJ have both indicated something similar. Using what you have both proposed, I'll try to illustrate what I'm talking about.

Here is your suggestion:

"Anyway, in pure praxeology, we need the distinction between means and ends.........but it doesn't follow that we need to use a specific distinction for it .........we could simply say that they must be different..........it's simply that the means are different than the ends. That's it. It's not as if we need this or that distinction; it's simply that we need a distinction......"

Here is AJ's:

"Wouldn't it be all right for the theory to reference two types of perceptions, just calling them A and B, without specifying anything about what distinguishes them, only that they are distinct for the actor? In other words, what you've explained here seems to prohibit the theory from saying, "These two categories are distinguished in this [such-and-such particular] way," but it does not seem to prohibit the theory from saying, "There are two categories distinguished in some way by the actor.""

******

These are essentially the same suggestions.

Both of these passages put forth the notion that we assume the existence of a distinction, but we do not assert the particular nature of the distinction.

We are not referring to a particular distinction such as blue versus red.

But we are referring to distinction.

Thus, we are referring to distinction....in general (distinction universally), i.e., the concept of distinction.

Thus, the concept of distinction, as opposed to a particular distinction, has no perceptual (distinguishable) content.

This is/was contained in our original premise or axiom when we assumed the existence of something with no distinctions.

We are referring to "something" that has no perceptual content (that can't be distinguished or perceived). That is the unavoidable circumstance of action.

******

My point is that in the theory of action, this "something" that has no perceptual (distinguishable) content is the category of ends.

The end stands in the same relation to the means as the concept of distinction stands in relation to a particular distinction.

The end cannot have distinguishable content. Only the means can be distinguishable.

Re: Means and Ends

I. Ryan — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 18:55:27 GMT

Adam Knott:

If you have a new proposal, could you start a thread on it ?

Sure, but it might be a while.

Anyway, in the meantime, do you have any thoughts on the prospect of that idea?

Re: Means and Ends

I. Ryan — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 17:46:19 GMT

As to this post.

As you probably remember, I like to distinguish between pure praxeology and applied praxeology:

Pure praxeology: The praxeology of every conceivable world. What's left of it after we strip off everything "accidental". A theory which applies to every single conceivable action.
Applied praxeology: The praxeology of a specific world. It could be about the real world, or any imagined world. For example, Misesian economics is a part of a specific kind of applied praxeology.

For pure praxeology, we can't "meaningfully think of the negation of what it asserts", for we can't think of a world without at least some kind of action. But, for applied praxeology, we can always do that ("meaningfully think of the negation of what it asserts"), for we can always think of a world without a specific kind of action.

Anyway, as JohnnyFive wrote, "praxeological" statements try to apply to every single action (past, present, and future). If there's even just one possible action that it doesn't try to describe, it's simply not praxeological. But of course he was referring to pure praxeology there. If there's even just one conceivable action that it doesn't attempt to characterize, it's simply not purely praxeological!

Now, as you said, we venture out of pure praxeology and into applied praxeology ("refer to content") as soon as we make any distinctions between any of our perceptions (e.g. black vs. red, vivid vs. dull, lasting vs. fleeting). Well yeah. I mean, I find that I remember things much more vividly and lastingly than I merely imagine them, but of course it wouldn't need to be that way; it could be some other way. It would be conceivable that I would find my memories brighter than what I simply imagine (instead of more vivid and lasting), or that I would see a red dot in the upper right corner of my visual field when it's a memory and nothing when I'm simply imagining something, or whatever. It's not a part of pure praxeology to say that I remember things much more vividly and lastingly than I simply imagine them (even though that's true!), for I can "meaningfully think of the negation of what [that] asserts"; its opposite is thinkable.

Anyway, in pure praxeology, we need the distinction between means and ends, because that distinction is "present" in every conceivable action (right?), but it doesn't follow that we need to use a specific distinction for it (such as the vivid vs. dull one); we could simply say that they must be different. It's not that one (the means) is "vivid", and the other (the ends) is "dull"; it's simply that the means are different than the ends. That's it. It's not as if we need this or that distinction; it's simply that we need a distinction. And, if you want to call that distinction the perceptible vs. imperceptible one, that's fine. I think that it's pretty misleading, but whatever. If I know your meaning, I won't let the words do me any harm!

Thoughts?

Re: Means and Ends

AJ — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 10:51:02 GMT

...and it looks like we both feel that these arguments are played out for the moment, and that an alternative conception needs to be presented to advance discussion.

I can already see possible ways to make some of these concepts you consider imperceptible perceptible, but I have held off mentioning them so far because the discussion was heavy enough as it was that I barely had time to keep up. I will post in the new thread if I. Ryan creates one, since it might be off-topic for this one.

Re: Means and Ends

AJ — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 10:38:11 GMT

Adam Knott:

AJ:

A: "I am using no competing theory to evaluate yours."

B: "My contention is, once again, that the rejection of the visualizable/experienceable is not an effective way to proceed."

B is a theory. It doesn't matter that you refuse to refer to it as such.

"My contention is that in doing X, you will not be able to achieve Y."

"He who thinks a causal relation thinks a theorem." (HA)

The underlined is a theory, yes, but not a competing one, and certainly not one I'm using to evaluate yours: I haven't even found a possible interpretation of yours yet, remember? So I obviously cannot evaluate it. The underlined is simply supplementary advice on how to communicate your theory so that I (or anyone) might understanding it in order to evaluate it, since it felt stonewall-ish for me to simply say I didn't understand and give you no suggestions for how you might be able to get me to understand.

Re: Means and Ends

Adam Knott — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 05:13:51 GMT

I. Ryan:

" Would you change your mind if I were to point to how to reduce those things (concepts, universals, other minds, the future, and so on) to the "immediately given" (our perceptions)?"

If you have a new proposal, could you start a thread on it ?

Re: Means and Ends

I. Ryan — Thu, 10 Feb 2011 17:40:09 GMT

Adam Knott:

a. the back of the basketball

I can't figure out how to interpret those words without perceiving a certain sequence of 2D images (rotating the basketball in my mind).

Adam Knott:

In referring to something that does not appear to us perceptually, and in our inability to do otherwise (as one might argue), we find grounds for the notion of a category of fundamental unobservability.

Adam Knott:

Theoretically, I think this concept [imperceptibles, unobservables, or whatever] proves its usefulness. Consider the notions of: gravity, strong force, weak force, other minds, concepts, universals, etc..

Would you change your mind if I were to point to how to reduce those things (concepts, universals, other minds, the future, and so on) to the "immediately given" (our perceptions)?

Re: Means and Ends

Adam Knott — Wed, 09 Feb 2011 17:17:43 GMT

AJ:

A: "I am using no competing theory to evaluate yours."

B: "My contention is, once again, that the rejection of the visualizable/experienceable is not an effective way to proceed."

B is a theory. It doesn't matter that you refuse to refer to it as such.

"My contention is that in doing X, you will not be able to achieve Y."

"He who thinks a causal relation thinks a theorem." (HA)

Re: Means and Ends

AJ — Wed, 09 Feb 2011 10:37:44 GMT

Adam Knott:

"...my goal is simply to find some way to experience what you experienced that prompted you to write what you are writing"

I can provide an answer to this, but this won't solve the problem you are trying to solve. Because you are trying to make the ideas I'm advocating square with your already formed ideas on consciousness and perceptions, i.e., your own theory of action or consciousness. And your theory precludes the conception of unobservability which mine contains.

You don't seem to take it seriously when I tell you I am simply trying to understand what you mean, as it is not obvious to me. This is a gesture of charity to your theory. If you insist that I take your words at face value, I would simply have to discard the theory as obviously contradictory. I know you are highly intelligent, so I hold out the possibility that you actually do have something coherent to propose, and maybe just the words are not reaching me. That could well be my fault, but whatever the case this is the process I must go through in order to have a chance at evaluating what you want to say.

Adam Knott:
I can communicate what an unobservable is probably well enough to someone who may have reached the point where they are convinced that the solution to the problems concerned cannot be solved by standard, familiar, 'objective,' and/or common sense ideas. But I may not be able to convince one who is advocating an alternate or competing theory.

I am using no competing theory to evaluate yours. This is purely a practical matter of me not being able to interpret your wording in a charitable way, and asking for help. Now yes, I have high standards for rigor in communication, which is why I demand definitions for things like objective ethics. It is not because I have an ethical theory of my own, but because I just don't understand what the words even mean. In such situations, one can only await a coherent definition. Some often said to me, in effect, that they could communicate what "objective ethics" is well enough to one who isn't already a utilitatarian/legal-positivist or whatever they thought my theory was, so they couldn't understand why I didn't get what they meant by it. It never occurred to them that perhaps they were the ones wedded to a theory that was keeping them from being able to understand my basic practical point: that the words meant nothing to me.

Adam Knott:
By 'unobservables,' I mean "things" such as:

a. the back of the basketball

b. another person's thoughts, opinions, ends, purposes, intentions,etc.

c. universals

d. the future

I'm not making the argument that no other theory of these phenomena can be advanced. I'm advancing a particular theory that conceives these things as "unobservables."

I'm arguing that the conception of a category of unobservability is required owing to certain theoretical presuppositions.

When we theoretically presuppose or assume a category of 'satisfaction' [usefulness, success, attainment, happiness, etc.], which we do in a theory of action, this formally or logically implies a category of 'dissatisfaction' [not useful, failure, non attainment, unhappiness].

Following up on what JohnnyFive wrote previously, the categories must be conceived or constructed such that each category is part of every action. Also, I believe the categories must be nonidentical.

Also, remember that the aim is exact laws, and the phenomena to be explained are social phenomena such as socialism, coercion, etc...

Again, if the contraints you are placing on the theory render things contradictory, why prefer to embrace the contradictory instead of removing the constraints if you're sure there is no way to construct a non-contradictory theory with those constraints on? It is certainly not a given that Menger's strict program is necessarily workable. It could well be that the constraints of pure formalism will make such a theory impossible. It sometimes seems as though you are taking its workability as a starting assumption. Again, if something seems impossible to formulate under certain constraints, why go all the way to internal contradiction as a way to preserve the constraints themselves, as if the constraints were sacred? The most obvious thing to do at that point seems to be to abandon the constraints, as you note most others have done in AE. I am not saying they need to be abandoned at all, just that if I were as sure as you seem to be that a non-contradictory theory within those constraints is impossible, I would abandon them.

Adam Knott:
AJ, I think you are working with a different theory of who Heisenberg is. I'm working with the Richard Feynman theory. : - )

Maybe I am arrogant, but I don't care who anyone is. I care about arguments. Doesn't it seem odd to take things on authority when the goal is a theory about apodictic certainty? The only thing I am taking exception to (at least for now) is the idea that both Bohr and Heisenberg mentioned of eschewing the requirement for visualizability. To me it seems like an economist casting off adherence to subjective value, and even though it is nonsensical to assert objective value they claim their field has come so far with - and indeed because of - that little internal inconsistency/incoherence. They would say that insistence on the complete adherence to subjective value would make economics impossible, and caution that he who insists on never uttering an error must remain silent. I don't mean to come off as irreverent to any historical figures, nor do I mean to come off as reverent, nor guess their motives. When I said...

"What one could imagine happened with Heisenberg and Bohr was that they came to something they could not explain, but instead of proposing a theory that would account for some of the data and not others, or a theory that would account for all of the data but was too general to yet be very useful, they instead chose a contradictory theory simply because it could be made to account for the most data the most "elegantly.""

...this was not an attack on these individuals, it was a hint of what my argument would entail regarding their scientific approach so you could prepare a response or pre-emption to the substance of it, rather than to any perceived irreverence toward the individuals involved.

Adam Knott:

"Heisenberg noticed, when he discovered the laws of quantum mechanics, that the new laws of nature that he had discovered could only be consistent if there were some basic limitation to our experimental abilities that had not been previously recognized."

"Heisenberg proposed his uncertainty principle which, stated in terms of our own experiment, is the following....'It is impossible to design any apparatus whatsoever to determine through which hole the electron passes that will not at the same time disturb the electron enough to destroy the interference pattern.' No one has found a way around this."

"Probability amplitudes are very strange, and the first thing you think is that the strange new ideas are clearly cock-eyed. Yet everything that can be deduced from the ideas of the existence of quantum mechanical probability amplitudes, strange though they are, do work, throughout the long list of strange particles, one hundred percent."

(The Character of Physical Law, emphasis added)

It is my claim that if such supposedly contradictory notions work it is because they are not actually contradictory, not interpreted in practice in a contradictory way, or the contradictory aspects of the theory were not employed in making the predictions. If such could be shown, then it would be clear that the contradiction had not helped, and more likely had hurt, if anything. It is not an authority that can make this argument, it is reasoning on why contradictory aspects of a theory are helpful. It is not rigorous to simply imitate the method of another field because in some eminent scientists' opinions it has been this approach that made for their successes, rather than this approach that has held them back from even greater successes. This is analogous to the argument that government regulation brought us out of the dark ages of the Industrial Revolution. As a non-economist, should I rely on Paul Krugman for the real scoop on that since he is so highly regarded in that field? Of course the answer is: only if he can make convincing arguments. Responding to logical points with appeals to authority, no matter how highly celebrated, is simply not persuasive.

Adam Knott:
The ideal of classical physics is/was the description of an objective real world entirely separate from the realm of human purposes. In other words, the goal of classical physics is a description of an objective nature that is absent the categories of human action and consciousness.

My contention is, once again, that the rejection of the visualizable/experienceable is not an effective way to proceed. It doesn't necessarily entail anything more than this even if most classical physicists might have said more; in particular I never mentioned objective/subjective, so I have no comment on those parts.

Adam Knott:
AJ:

"Wouldn't it be all right for the theory to reference two types of perceptions, just calling them A and B, without specifying anything about what distinguishes them, only that they are distinct for the actor? In other words, what you've explained here seems to prohibit the theory from saying, "These two categories are distinguished in this [such-and-such particular] way," but it does not seem to prohibit the theory from saying, "There are two categories distinguished insome way by the actor.""

I think this is the kind of question you would probably answer for yourself if you tried to construct a theory that seeks to explain social phenomena in terms of exact laws.

In social science and in social discourse we refer to things such as socialism versus capitalism, coerced action versus voluntary action, social interaction versus isolated action, etc... The aim of praxeological social theory is to explain these social phenomena in terms of exact laws. (a priori propositions, necessary truths, etc.) If you envision a theory along the lines of what you propose above that does explain social phenomena in terms of exact laws, I assume you would have to explain how your proposed categories relate to the social phenomena in question, and explain the sense in which your theory conceives laws of succession or co-presence as applying to the social phenomena in question.

Yeah, as long as we are trying to make a social theory with exact laws, the bolded part is just what I would expect would have to be done. I am asking why not try to do that instead of embracing contradictions? And if it is found that even doing that leads to contradictions (and if you're certain of that), why not scrap the whole endeavor?

But since I think you're saying you are not ruling out that such a thing could be done (but you await such an attempt), it seems to me that that is the work of actually figuring out what the subjective experience of action is for the actor. To me, it seems tautological that everything in one's experience is experienceable. So it seems that I am indeed experiencing something when I am taking action, and if the goal is to describe my experience, then, well, I need only describe things I experience.

EDIT: Perhaps the word sensations/perceptions is distracting? Does this change anything? I have been saying that all experience is sensations, but perhaps you don't agree. So what if I just only ever use the word experience? Does that make my points clearer?

Adam Knott:
"Here you make it clear that one cannot fully get at the concept of a "formal line," and of course it follows that no one can ever experience a "formal line" - they will instead experience some sensory phenomena that we all agree is not a formal line. But there is an elephant in the room here: If no one has ever experienced a formal line, how could they possibly - merely by coining a word - have conveyed that non-experience to anyone else?"

One answer is: I may "refer" to Y as opposed to "experiencing" Y perceptually. I can ask: what does X "imply" [answer: X implies Y] as opposed to asking: what does Y "look like" [answer: Y looks like Z].

We refer to concepts, universals, other minds, the future, etc... What does it imply if we refer to them but never experience them as perceptions?

If we refer to X, and if we do not experience X as a perception, what does this imply?

Nothing. That would just be playing with words or uttering noises, like if I spoke of zqwocsarg even though the word refers to none of my experience. You will perhaps say that is just my "theory," but what does that even mean? I think you might be confused, as the objective ethicists were, that when I say, "I don't know what you mean by other minds if you say they are not perceptions" (compare: "I don't know what you mean by should if you say there is no purpose behind it"), you think I am rejecting that there can be any concept of other minds or that I am obstinately refusing to interpret it. I may use those words (other minds, should) or not, but when I use them I do so because I know what I mean by them. Simply as a practical matter, I cannot just pretend that whatever my interpretation of those words is, is what others mean, usually because that would lead to them sounding unreasonable, crazy, or contradictory to me.

So I ask for clarification out of charity and in the interests of dialog, for they either have something useful to say that simply isn't being communicated effectively yet (which could well be my fault), or they have confused themselves with words and would benefit from being unstuck. Which is the situation I cannot know, hence asking for clarification, but both seem to be quite common.

Adam Knott:
In referring to something that does not appear to us perceptually, and in our inability to do otherwise (as one might argue), we find grounds for the notion of a category of fundamental unobservability.

Theoretically, I think this concept proves its usefulness. Consider the notions of: gravity, strong force, weak force, other minds, concepts, universals, etc.

Gravity, strong force, and weak force are useful in everyday talk and in science when we are being less rigorous, but - at least by their current definitions - not in rigorous conceptions like the one I think you are aiming for (nor in rigorous physics, I would argue, but I won't have time to make arguments for every single physics term). Or alternatively, they can be useful but they only mean things like "something will happen here"; they are not useful as nouns reified into physical objects as it were. If they are used to mean "something will happen here," then the other recent thread has my answer about why those are experiencable: we can only interpret "there is a force here" as a set of notions like "if I do X, Y will happen." Only if we obscure the nature of these if-then statements by turning them into nouns do we get supposed imperceptibility. My contention is that this should be seen for what it is: an abuse of language. That is operating under the assumption that the purpose of language is to clarify rather than obscure, which it seems that you share.

Other minds is useful in everyday talk and non-rigorous philosophy, and as long as it is understood as referring to subjective phenonena it could be useful in a rigorous first-person conception as well. (As for concepts and universals, those have too many meanings for me to address quickly.)

For the physics terms, I suppose you would like to see at least one argument showing why reified terms like strong force are not useful in a rigorous context even in physics, and I will supply one if you like. I don't believe I can show conclusively that they are not useful, but I believe I can call into question their usefulness and make a decent case that they only give the illusion of progress, leaving unanswered questions swept under the rug in the process.

I don't claim to know just what the contradictions or unvisualizable elements you found in physics that convinced you to agree with Heisenberg and Bohr, so if there is something specific - say the particle/wave duality, or anything you want - I will try to address it specifically. Since I will obviously be making a rather careful argument under the circumstances, it'd be better to pick one of the seemingly contradictory physical concepts that you personally found convincing and focus on that.

Adam Knott:
"Here you make it clear that one cannot fully get at the concept of a "formal line," and of course it follows that no one can ever experience a "formal line" - they will instead experience some sensory phenomena that we all agree is not a formal line. But there is an elephant in the room here: If no one has ever experienced a formal line, how could they possibly - merely by coining a word - have conveyed that non-experience to anyone else?"

I think that by phrasing the question the way you do, you miss the more important question.

You ask essentially: If A has never experienced a formal line as a perception, how could he by words (by perceptions) convey that formal line to B?

You imply that in constructing a theory of social interaction or communication one must answer positively whether what A experiences in/as his consciousness has or has not been experienced similarly in/for another person B's consciousness. The way you have phrased the question does not conceive B as an element(s) of A's consciousness, but rather B here is conceived as a person "existing" in his own right, independent of the consciousness of A...

Must even practical points be couched in the proper subjective language? If I asked you to write in longer paragraphs would you say that I was constructing a theory of social interaction or communication, or saying you "exist" independent of my consciousness? It feels like you're avoiding the practical issues I am raising here by calling everything I say that might force you to rethink things a "theory" of mine, as if it were just an opinion or methodological difference. What form of argument would you take as not being just "AJ's theory"?

Even if that is unconvincing, I do not think it is difficult to interpret all my statements as being about the subjective experiences of the frog, or the listener (but please correct me if I'm wrong). If you like I can make the same point about a dream I had where I saw what appeared to be a statement using the term "formal line" written in the sand. I grokked the words as grammatically well-formed, but I couldn't figure out what they might mean. I couldn't figure out how to experience anything in connection with those shapes (letters, words) in the sand. All I know is that whatever I experienced still didn't match up with the words. This is all subjective, isn't it. What now?

Re: Means and Ends

Adam Knott — Wed, 09 Feb 2011 03:41:52 GMT

AJ:

I think this is the kind of question you would probably answer for yourself if you tried to construct a theory that seeks to explain social phenomena in terms of exact laws.

In social science and in social discourse we refer to things such as socialism versus capitalism, coerced action versus voluntary action, social interaction versus isolated action, etc... The aim of praxeological social theory is to explain these social phenomena in terms of exact laws. (a priori propositions, necessary truths, etc.) If you envision a theory along the lines of what you propose above that does explain social phenomena in terms of exact laws, I assume you would have to explain how your proposed categories relate to the social phenomena in question, and explain the sense in which your theory conceives laws of succession or co-presence as applying to the social phenomena in question.

****

"Here you make it clear that one cannot fully get at the concept of a "formal line," and of course it follows that no one can ever experience a "formal line" - they will instead experience some sensory phenomena that we all agree is not a formal line. But there is an elephant in the room here: If no one has ever experienced a formal line, how could they possibly - merely by coining a word - have conveyed that non-experience to anyone else?"

One answer is: I may "refer" to Y as opposed to "experiencing" Y perceptually. I can ask: what does X "imply" [answer: X implies Y] as opposed to asking: what does Y "look like" [answer: Y looks like Z].

We refer to concepts, universals, other minds, the future, etc... What does it imply if we refer to them but never experience them as perceptions?

If we refer to X, and if we do not experience X as a perception, what does this imply?

Mises distinguishes between the action, and what is "inferred" from the action:

"We are wont to say that the need for A was more urgent than the need for B. This is a mode of expression that, under certain circumstances, may be quite expedient. But as an hypostatization of what was to be explained, it became a source of serious misunderstandings. It was forgotten that we are able to infer the need only from the action. Hence, the idea of an action not in conformity with needs is absurd." (Epistemological Problems of Economics)(emphasis added)

In referring to something that does not appear to us perceptually, and in our inability to do otherwise (as one might argue), we find grounds for the notion of a category of fundamental unobservability.

Theoretically, I think this concept proves its usefulness. Consider the notions of: gravity, strong force, weak force, other minds, concepts, universals, etc..

********

"Here you make it clear that one cannot fully get at the concept of a "formal line," and of course it follows that no one can ever experience a "formal line" - they will instead experience some sensory phenomena that we all agree is not a formal line. But there is an elephant in the room here: If no one has ever experienced a formal line, how could they possibly - merely by coining a word - have conveyed that non-experience to anyone else?"

I think that by phrasing the question the way you do, you miss the more important question.

You ask essentially: If A has never experienced a formal line as a perception, how could he by words (by perceptions) convey that formal line to B?

You imply that in constructing a theory of social interaction or communication, one must answer positively whether what A experiences in/as his consciousness has or has not been experienced similarly in/for another person B's consciousness. The way you have phrased the question does not conceive B as an element(s) of A's consciousness, but rather B here is conceived as a person "existing" in his own right, independent of the consciousness of A, and we are expected to assign a "yes" or "no" to the question of whether B experiences what A experiences after A attempts an act of communication.

We might say that your question is phrased in terms of "intersubjective objectivism." We are not talking exclusively about the experiences of subject A.

You have implicitly introduced a realistic conceptual framework (objective realism or ontological or metaphysical realism). You are saying in effect: There are two people, A and B. How can A or B know what is in the mind of the other ? You ask the reader or theorist to consider how one person, A, can successfully transmit a thought to another person, B. You are not conceiving B from the point of view of A, as an element(s) of A's consciousness. You presuppose B's real existence.

We can re-phrase this question in terms of methodological individualism and theoretical subjectivism. Something such as:

"If A experiences things only in terms of the categories of his consciousness, and one of those categories is/are perceptions, then to what category of A's consciousness can we assign another mind assuming that another mind does not appear perceptually to/for A?"

In phrasing the question this way, by methodological individualism/theoretical subjectivism, we do not posit the real existence or ontological reality of another person B. Instead, we conceive that for person A, any other person or object must be comprised of categorical elements of A's consciousness. If A's consciousness is comprised of 4 categories, q, r, s, and t, then an assumed person B, for A, must be constituted of elements belonging to categories q, r, s, and t, of A's consciousness.

Thus, the real existence or ontological reality of person B is not assumed. (Nor is it denied) Rather, person B is theoretically "constructed," as it were, out of the primary elements (i.e., categories) of A's action/consciousness.

"The nature of this exact orientation of theoretical research in the realm of ethical phenomena, however, consists in the fact that we reduce human phenomena to their most original and simplest constitutive factors. We join to the latter the measure corresponding to their nature, and finally try to investigate the laws by which more complicated human phenomena are formed from those simplest elements, thought of in their isolation."

(Menger, Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences)(emphasis added)

Obviously in the social sciences as opposed to the physical sciences, the 'simplest constitutive factors' or 'simplest elements' that Menger is referring to will be categorial elements of action/consciousness (such as "value," "supply," "purpose," "satisfaction," etc.) and not physical elements such as "proton," "electron," etc...

If we follow the program Menger outlines, and keep with the procedure of view of methodological individualism, then we will "construct" any activity A may undertake using the categories of A's consciousness (the "simplest constitutive factors" of A's consciousness). This includes such activities as communicating with B, coercing B, cooperating with B, etc... There will be in this approach (methodological individualism, theoretical subjectivism) no concept of other people, or of society, or of the market, in the objective sense. Every person or object, and every aspect of every person or object, will be conceived in terms of the categories of the mind of individual actor A, the actor who apprehends the person/object in question.

"It is important to remember that the...data, from which we set out in this sort of analysis [praxeology], are....all facts given to the person in question [person A], the things as they are known to (or believed by) him to exist, and not, strictly speaking, objective facts. It is only because of this that the propositions we deduce [in praxeology] are necessarily a priori valid and that we preserve the consistency of the argument."

(Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge")(bracketed and emphasis added)

Again, "the data from which we set out in this sort of analysis are ALL facts given to the person in question [person A], not objective facts."

The goal of this approach then, paraphrasing Menger, is to:

try to investigate the laws by which more complicated human phenomena (such as other people, other minds, the market, society, etc.) are formed from those simplest elements (the categories of A's consciousness)....

This is essentially what Mises is referring to when he writes things such as:

"The scope of praxeology is the explication of the category of human action.....All the concepts and theorems of praxeology are implied in the category of human action. The first task is to extract and to deduce them, to expound their implications...." (HA)

"Praxeology---and consequently economics too---is a deductive system. It draws its strength from the starting point of its deductions, from the category of action." (HA)

Explicating the category of action in this way is what Hayek is referring to when he writes:

"The claim to which I have referred follows directly from this character of the first part of our task as a branch of applied logic. But it sounds startling enough at first. It is that we can derive from the knowledge of our own mind in an "a priori" or "deductive" or "analytic" fashion, an (at least in principle) exhaustive classification of all the possible forms of intelligible behavior.....If we can understand only what is similar to our own mind, it necessarily follows that we must be able to find all that we can understand in our own mind." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

One of the primary reasons that this kind of praxeological study stalled in the 30's was the inability to figure out how "another mind" B could be conceived as a category or category-complex in/for the mind of person A.

The end of this kind of praxeological analysis was foreshadowed when Alfred Schutz, writing in his book The Phenomenology of the Social World, wrote:

"We must, then, leave unsolved the notoriously difficult problems which surround the constitution of the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience.....As important as these questions may be for epistemology and, therefore, for the social sciences, we may safely leave them aside in the present work.....The object we shall be studying, therefore, is the human being who is looking at the world from within the natural attitude.....The essence of his assumption about his fellow men may be put in this short formula: The Thou (or other person) is conscious, and his stream of consciousness is temporal in character, exhibiting the same basic form as mine." (p.98)(emphasis added)

In other words, other people "exist," objectively.

Thus, as I have argued, in order for the program of praxeology to once again be a living program that studies all forms of human action, and not merely a historical discipline concerned mainly with banking and finance or market phenomena, a way must be found, as Schutz puts it, to "constitute the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience." A way must be found to theoretically conceive things such as other minds, markets, coercion, and all other phenomena (e.g. "scarcity"), as subjective rather than objective phenomena.

Re: Means and Ends

Adam Knott — Tue, 08 Feb 2011 21:07:58 GMT

AJ:

"...my goal is simply to find some way to experience what you experienced that prompted you to write what you are writing"

I can provide an answer to this, but this won't solve the problem you are trying to solve. Because you are trying to make the ideas I'm advocating square with your already formed ideas on consciousness and perceptions, i.e., your own theory of action or consciousness. And your theory precludes the conception of unobservability which mine contains.

I can communicate what an unobservable is probably well enough to someone who may have reached the point where they are convinced that the solution to the problems concerned cannot be solved by standard, familiar, 'objective,' and/or common sense ideas. But I may not be able to convince one who is advocating an alternate or competing theory.

By 'unobservables,' I mean "things" such as:

a. the back of the basketball

b. another person's thoughts, opinions, ends, purposes, intentions,etc.

c. universals

d. the future

I'm not making the argument that no other theory of these phenomena can be advanced. I'm advancing a particular theory that conceives these things as "unobservables."

I'm arguing that the conception of a category of unobservability is required owing to certain theoretical presuppositions.

When we theoretically presuppose or assume a category of 'satisfaction' [usefulness, success, attainment, happiness, etc.], which we do in a theory of action, this formally or logically implies a category of 'dissatisfaction' [not useful, failure, non attainment, unhappiness].

Following up on what JohnnyFive wrote previously, the categories must be conceived or constructed such that each category is part of every action. Also, I believe the categories must be nonidentical.

Also, remember that the aim is exact laws, and the phenomena to be explained are social phenomena such as socialism, coercion, etc...

*****

AJ, I think you are working with a different theory of who Heisenberg is. I'm working with the Richard Feynman theory. : - )

"Heisenberg noticed, when he discovered the laws of quantum mechanics, that the new laws of nature that he had discovered could only be consistent if there were some basic limitation to our experimental abilities that had not been previously recognized."

"Heisenberg proposed his uncertainty principle which, stated in terms of our own experiment, is the following....'It is impossible to design any apparatus whatsoever to determine through which hole the electron passes that will not at the same time disturb the electron enough to destroy the interference pattern.' No one has found a way around this."

"Probability amplitudes are very strange, and the first thing you think is that the strange new ideas are clearly cock-eyed. Yet everything that can be deduced from the ideas of the existence of quantum mechanical probability amplitudes, strange though they are, do work, throughout the long list of strange particles, one hundred percent."

(The Character of Physical Law, emphasis added)

As I understand it, not only was Heisenberg the one who formulated physical science's counterpart to Hume's is-ought gap, but his positive theory of the behavior of atomic particles ranks as one of the greatest scientific achievements of the twentieth century.

What theory of Heisenberg are you working with ?

*****

I see. Your theory of Heisenberg.

I'll suggest an alternate theory:

The ideal of classical physics is/was the description of an objective real world entirely separate from the realm of human purposes. In other words, the goal of classical physics is a description of an objective nature that is absent the categories of human action and consciousness.

But there is a problem with this goal in that, as Eddington writes: "every item of physical knowledge, ....is an assertion of what has been or would be the result of carrying out a specified observational procedure."

The very method of physical science requires that the scientist perform a specific action, and then in a later action, observe what will be considered as the result of the previous action. Out of this series of actions is supposed to come a result that is entirely absent any reference to the categories of action.

The attempt to carry through the program of classical physics to its logical conclusion, led to the unexpected result that, the observation that would be expected to result from the specified action could only be successfully attained, by positing a phenomenon or situation that must necessarily be considered dissatisfactory by the standards of classical physics (the ideal of a description of nature without any reference to the categories of action).

In introducing the notion of success (happiness), classical physics was inadvertently introducing the notion of unhappiness, while the goal of classical physics was supposed to be a description of objective nature totally separate from action categories (separate from human intentionality and purpose).

We might say this in some way such as the following:

The attempt to achieve success in observation (all terms referring to action or action categories), and at the same time avoid reference to the categories of action, not only proved impossible, but led to the further and unexpected result that the necessary utilization of some action categories in physical science (attempt, observe, succeed, etc.) necessarily introduces all action categories into physical science, one of which is the formally implied logical correlate of [success, achieve, attain, etc.], .....[failure, non achievement, non attainment, etc.]. In short, introduction of the basic concept of happiness into the conceptual scheme necessarily implies the correlate unhappiness.

The formal categories of quantum physics arrived at this conclusion "indirectly" in the sense that "happiness" (a successful observation) is conceived in logical correlation to "unhappiness" which is conceived as a fundamental unobservability.

In other words, since physics contains action categories in its striving for successful observations, the systematization and formalization of physical concepts entails the systemization and formalization of praxeological concepts. As the notion satisfaction (success, etc.) is already implied in the endeavor of physics, the formal extension and systematization of physics necessarily entails the eventual conception of the logical correlate of satisfaction/success, and this manifested in quantum physics as the idea of a fundamental unobservable. In short, the physicists, through quantum mechanics, arrived indirectly and inadvertently at a formal definition of unhappiness.

Re: Means and Ends

AJ — Tue, 08 Feb 2011 13:05:09 GMT

ETA: Actually it may well be a few days, so feel free to respond to my partial comments in the meantime if you'd like to.