Economics Questions

Re: Objectivism and Action

Niccolò — Tue, 04 Dec 2007 03:56:44 GMT

JAlanKatz:
Thus far, I've come across two streams of denial of the a priori, a posteriori distinction, which I take would be a fatal blow to Austrian philosophy. Or, maybe it wouldn't, but I'm not sure how we'd formulate Austrian methodology without it. Anyone, one is the Quinean argument, which philosophers seem to look at, acknowledge, and then promptly ignore. Myself, I'm not terribly impressed with the Quinean objection, and in fact I wrote a paper some years back criticizing it, and don't worry much about it. The other one is the Randian objection, which I'm even less concerned about, because it strikes me as absurd, and little more than an assertion. My question, though, is not about defending the distinction, but rather about how an Objectivist would view Austrian arguments. In particular, since Rand asserts that the ultimate justification of any statement must be experience, she denies any a priori knowledge. So, what would she do with "Man acts." Logically, there's only two choices: deny it, or say it is justified by experience. But what experience could possibly justify it? We have experience of man behaving, and making choices, but on what experiential basis can we conclude that:a) They choose their most highly valued ends and b) this fact generalizes to other men, who we haven't observed? So denial is the logical possibility, and Rand would not accept the "standard" Austrian argument against denial, since it is not experience-bound. So far so bad, but then we see that Rand uses some form of it for her necessary/contingent metaphysics - natural facts not involving human intervention are necessary, but man-made actions are contingent in order to keep free will. So, man-made actions, alone among all facts, are not determined by their constituent parts. What, then, explains how a man acts? If she has already had to deny human action, and behavior is not naturally determined, what's left? Has she worked herself into a hole here, or am I missing something?

Cogito ergo sum. I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am.

Action can not exist without an actor.

Re: Objectivism and Action

robdailey — Mon, 03 Dec 2007 20:57:06 GMT

Donald Lingerfelt:

Also, I disagree that man always acts to maximize his values. Often I will do something that is not the highest on my marginal utility list, but something much lower. The difference is the variation in the concept of "now". If my highest priority in life is to get out of debt and a lower priority is to go to London for a vacation, I may still go on vacation (now) which opposes my higher priority. This implies that my overall marginal priority list may take a back seat to my immediate priority list. This doesn't mean that I have changed the order of my overall list of utilities, only that "now" my list has changed, or possibly that "now" I am concerned with a lower item on my list rather than the one higher.

Actually, what you "think" your priorities are and what you do can be contradictory. This shows that your "true" priority was to do what you actually do, not what you think you want to do.

So if your highest priority in life is to get out of debt you will not go to London. If you go to London it shows that the vacation is actually a higher priority than getting out of debt. What you actually do at every moment shows you highest priority. What you might like to do, or what you think you should do doesn't matter. Just because you think something is a higher or lower priority doesn't really matter either, only what you do matters and that is the action that you take. There is no such thing as an "overall marginal priority" and an "immediate marginal priority" list. There may be, what I would like to do, and what I actually do lists however. Motivations for doing something is more in the realm of psychology.

Re: Objectivism and Action

Hooper — Mon, 03 Dec 2007 18:26:56 GMT

There is no question that the basic view of the world (set of assumptions or observations, like the ones put forth by HeroicLife) that underlies Objectivism overlaps significantly with the one that underlies the Austrian School. Objectivism holds that “Reason is Man's only means of perceiving reality, his only source of knowledge, his only guide to action, and his basic means of survival,” and “The pursuit of [Man’s] own rational self-interest and of his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his life” (Source: http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/about/intro_ob.html). Taken separately, the second statement (axiom) might suggest that Man pursues an overall, “for the rest of his/her life” value. However, the combined two statements imply that, over time, Man’s knowledge changes, and so does his/her self-interest and happiness. And that, as I said earlier, further implies perpetual action, or continuous pursuit of a changing self-interest and happiness.

So, it seems to me that Objectivism and the Austrian School are actually complementing each other. Objectivism points out to the permanent existence of a highest value, or goal, of the moment, while the Austrian School points out the perpetual action generated by the pursuit of that value. Please correct me if I am wrong.

JAlanKatz’s initial questions, “What, then, explains how a man acts?” remains unanswered, though. Does Objectivism have any answers?

Re: Objectivism and Action

JAlanKatz — Sat, 01 Dec 2007 22:17:33 GMT

Donald Lingerfelt:
Also, I disagree that man always acts to maximize his values. Often I will do something that is not the highest on my marginal utility list, but something much lower. The difference is the variation in the concept of "now". If my highest priority in life is to get out of debt and a lower priority is to go to London for a vacation, I may still go on vacation (now) which opposes my higher priority.

I don't see anything in the Austrian literature which would indicate that "highest value" means "highest value for the rest of your life." Instead, the claim that man acts to maximize his values should be understood, marginally, as referring to his present value scale. Marginal analysis can only talk about what you prefer now. Goals, as lasting longer than now, can only be understood in terms of what present action they impel you to.

Re: Objectivism and Action

Donald Lingerfelt — Sat, 01 Dec 2007 17:08:02 GMT

Hooper:

Reality is objective - it has identity
Man qua man is a conceptual being
Consciousness perceives, but cannot change reality
Man's values are not automatic (he is volitional), and therefore he must choose which values to pursue
Man is capable of altering reality, if he acts in accordance with its nature
Man is a mortal being with limited resources at his disposal, and therefore cannot immediately achieve all values he could possible desire
Man must therefore choose which values to pursue out of all possible values
The act of pursuing certain values over others requires the volitional choice to prioritize certain values over others (whether done consciously or subconsciously)
Therefore, to the extent that man acts, he acts to maximize his values.

Does anyone besides me see an inconsistancy here? Points 3 and 5 cannot be both true. Either one can change reality or not. Reality itself cannot be changed but one can change his environment, condition or situation.

Also, I disagree that man always acts to maximize his values. Often I will do something that is not the highest on my marginal utility list, but something much lower. The difference is the variation in the concept of "now". If my highest priority in life is to get out of debt and a lower priority is to go to London for a vacation, I may still go on vacation (now) which opposes my higher priority. This implies that my overall marginal priority list may take a back seat to my immediate priority list. This doesn't mean that I have changed the order of my overall list of utilities, only that "now" my list has changed, or possibly that "now" I am concerned with a lower item on my list rather than the one higher.

IMHO I think Mises had a much better grasp on this than Rand.

Re: Objectivism and Action

Hooper — Fri, 30 Nov 2007 23:48:30 GMT

HeroicLife, you put forth the following observations:

Reality is objective - it has identity
Man qua man is a conceptual being
Consciousness perceives, but cannot change reality
Man's values are not automatic (he is volitional), and therefore he must choose which values to pursue
Man is capable of altering reality, if he acts in accordance with its nature
Man is a mortal being with limited resources at his disposal, and therefore cannot immediately achieve all values he could possible desire
Man must therefore choose which values to pursue out of all possible values
The act of pursuing certain values over others requires the volitional choice to prioritize certain values over others (whether done consciously or subconsciously)
Therefore, to the extent that man acts, he acts to maximize his values.

It appears to me, then, that there will always be a top "desired" value (need?) (which might change upon the circumstances) that Man pursues. And that translates into perpetual (human) action. Do you agree?

Re: Objectivism and Action

David V — Wed, 21 Nov 2007 16:57:34 GMT

Ah, so we grasp volition first, and no observation will force it upon us - is it not then a priori knowledge?

No, volition is self-evident. It's axiomatic. Any attempt to deny volition assumes that you have volition. Fore more, check out the Ayn Rand Lexicon's entry.

Also, check out my Wiki entry on axioms.

Re: Objectivism and Action

Dynamix — Wed, 21 Nov 2007 09:09:02 GMT

nirgrahamUK:

" Rand asserts that the ultimate justification of any statement must be experience, she denies any a priori knowledge"

rand assertion here that justification of statement must be experience, is she basing that on apriori knowledge or experience?

if she is basing it on apriori it denies itself

[if] she bases it on experience, well, how would that be done?

It can't be. The statement must assume its own truth in order to even attempt going about proving itself. "Every statement is justified in experience" does not allow the experience of an attempt at empirical falsification and thus cannot meet its own standard. Rather, it falls apart in a pile of self-contradiction.

I was going to make this very same post before you beat me to the punch.

Re: Objectivism and Action

Inquisitor — Wed, 21 Nov 2007 03:53:44 GMT

No, she was not a logical positivist; she was an Aristotelean. As I said, give that paper a read. It is illuminating.

Re: Objectivism and Action

nirgrahamUK — Wed, 21 Nov 2007 03:40:15 GMT

i havent read Rand, but the way JAlanKatz writes about her epistemology it sounds more like Logical Positivism than anything else

Re: Objectivism and Action

JAlanKatz — Wed, 21 Nov 2007 02:59:53 GMT

HeroicLife:
You can't derive purpose from merely perceiving action. It's necessary to grasp volition first. As volitional beings, we perceive it directly, and can extrapolate it to other men.

Ah, so we grasp volition first, and no observation will force it upon us - is it not then a priori knowledge?

Re: Objectivism and Action

Inquisitor — Wed, 21 Nov 2007 02:48:15 GMT

To understand Rand one must realize she is not dealing in Kantian terms (as Mises did); she is an Aristotelean. The paper I provided above does a good job of outlining how Aristoteleanism differs from Kantianism, though it is incomplete and doesn't include a section on Rand, yet.

Re: Objectivism and Action

nirgrahamUK — Wed, 21 Nov 2007 02:04:52 GMT

" Rand asserts that the ultimate justification of any statement must be experience, she denies any a priori knowledge"

rand assertion here that justification of statement must be experience, is she basing that on apriori knowledge or experience?

if she is basing it on apriori it denies itself

is she bases it on experience, well, how would that be done?

Re: Objectivism and Action

David V — Wed, 21 Nov 2007 00:42:07 GMT

to the extent that they can be observed - many don't seem amenable to observation either

You can't perceive philosophical abstractions directly. However all of the facts I mentioned can be derived from observation. It takes a full philosophical system to develop integrate epistemology and metaphysics, and by their application, form an integrated view of human nature. Hence, Objectivism.

But my question remains - will observing each of the things you point to lead me to conclude the truth of human action? Just why does any amount of observation allow me to know that any of the observed choices maximized any values?

My claim is than man acts to maximize values, not that actions maximize values. By going to the kitchen to make a ham sandwich I demonstrate a preference for a ham sandwich over continuing to watch the tube. But if I'm out of ham, I will not achieve the desired value because I need to the grocery instead.

Rather, that conclusion seems to be an interpretation I place upon the observations - the physical actions do not carry the import of action, only behavior.

You can't derive purpose from merely perceiving action. It's necessary to grasp volition first. As volitional beings, we perceive it directly, and can extrapolate it to other men.

Re: Objectivism and Action

Inquisitor — Wed, 21 Nov 2007 00:39:36 GMT

This is not a fatal blow to Austrianism, although it would be a fatal blow to any number of epistemological positions. Here is a good paper on Aristoteleanism (and by extension Objectivism) and the Austrian method:

http://www.veritasnoctis.net/docs/aristotelianapriorism.pdf