Economics Questions

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Wheylous — Wed, 03 Aug 2011 19:36:19 GMT

This may seem unrelated, but it seems like it may the place to ask:

What is the general libertarian stance on free speech? Is it always protected? Couldn't the laser be considered free speech?

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

JH2011 — Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:31:03 GMT

Chyd3nius:

All these kind of questions might be a problem by a Rothbardian view, but really, think about an an-cap society. Property owners won't read For a new Liberty when these problems arise, they will call to their lawyers. And problems will be solved on private courts. I really don't see any point with these kind of moral questions.

Sorry that it has taken me so long to respond. Chyd3nius, your response is intriguing. I don't feel that this thread has really settled the issues that the laser or rifle examples bring to light. But are you saying that isn't what we should be debating? Is the point that our discussion should not be aimed at determining exactly how many photons of light constitute a violation of one's private property, but rather, we should be explaining why a private court system settles the conflict far better than a system of public/gov't run courts?

Can anyone comment / critique / expand on this?

Said a little differently... If someone says "Ok, you're an an-cap, and you believe in a system of private property, including private courts. But how do you deal with the issue of... [insert laser/neighbor example here]."

Should the response be that my personal thoughts on what constitutes a violation of private property are not the issue we should be focusing on? But rather, we first understand that there will be conflicts between people and their private property, and an an-cap believes that a system of private courts is far better as settling and minimizing these conflicts than a public/gov't court system.

I would also appreciate if anyone can point me towards a source for an explanation of how a private court system would function. I've read about this Chaos Theory and in some pieces by Hans Hoppe, but i'd like to check out other sources. Thanks

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Conza88 — Sat, 16 Jul 2011 07:13:41 GMT

Law, Property Rights and Air Pollution - Rothbard

/thread

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Michael J Green — Sat, 16 Jul 2011 06:44:18 GMT

I believe the stumbling block is that you are packing a lot of things into JH's rule that are not there. For example, no one ever mentioned a judge. Indeed, even if he did, it isn't clear (based on this single simple rule) why I should give a hoot what he says anyways.

The judge was my own opinion as to how societies would/should determine what constitutes a disruption of another's property. I quickly regretted bringing it up, as 1) it may be inconsistent with the more Rothbardian framework which Friedman criticizes and JH likely means and 2) it is beside the point. I did not pack anything into the 'rule;' I clarified an obvious condition of the rule. The rule also does not actually say what property is; would I be adding/packing a lot into it by explaining what does and does not constitute property?

The laser beam disrupts the person's use of his private property, the lamp does not. The photons striking the property are not the grounds for a property rights violation; the photons disrupting the person's use of his property are the violation. I don't know how Rothbardians would determine the line between disruption and non-disruption, but that's a separate issue. You certainly cannot determine what constitutes a disruption from JH's rule itself, any more than you could determine what constitutes property!

This is why I think Friedman may be guilty of a strawman here. He defines interfering with property a certain way, and then draws conclusions from that definition. The question, then, is whether any libertarians arguing from the 'absolutist' position define interfering the way Friedman does. Perhaps there are some who do, but I've always understood it as interfering with a person's use of their property, not the strict physical sanctity of the property. A cantankerous man could insist that his neighbor's lamp interferes with the use of his living room, and there does need to be some way of telling him that this does not count as a disruption. Appealing to custom, as I suggest, is neither "judging legal rules by their consequences" nor is it "softening" the principle such that "its implications become far less clear."

Yes, I do dare to challenge Dr. Friedman (I also gave his recent novel only 4 out of 5 stars, cause I've got big brass ones!). But as I said, I agree with him and believe most of the other problems are well put. I think this is a fairly weak example, relying on a strawman of traditional conceptions of property rights. It's one small example among many; I'm not challenging his whole corpus of work here! Nor, for that matter, am I challenging his general point.

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Bill — Sat, 16 Jul 2011 05:04:55 GMT

please delete

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Student — Sat, 16 Jul 2011 04:54:21 GMT

MJG,

A good rule of thumb, I've found, is that if you think something written by DF can be "easily dismissed", you're probably not fully registering what he is saying.

I believe the stumbling block is that you are packing a lot of things into JH's rule that are not there. For example, no one ever mentioned a judge. Indeed, even if he did, it isn't clear (based on this single simple rule) why I should give a hoot what he says anyways. To get there you have to either start making new rules or amending the existing one, as I noted previously.

If you still Friedman is missing something obvious, I can only recommend re-reading the chapter more closely. If you still feel that way, I guess we can only agree to disagree. Good luck!

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Michael J Green — Sat, 16 Jul 2011 04:29:13 GMT

What? There were a few holes you could've poked in what I said, but I haven't changed anything. I am saying that popular opinion decides what it means to "disrupt someone else's private property." What constitutes a disruption is not clear, differs between cultures and changes over time. My point, which I didn't really bother stating, is that there is no contradiction here. No reconciling is necessary. He can still use this as a "guiding principle," once he properly understands what the principle says. This is true whether you believe a disruption could be deduced from some axiom, or you appeal to adjudicators/popular opinion as I have, or something else.

It is the same case with your, "Everyone has the absolute right to control his own property, provided that he does not use it to violate the corresponding rights of others." What constitutes people's rights - and therefore what actions constitute a violation of another's rights - is obviously not clarified within the sentence and is still up for discussion. What is at issue is not the pithy summarization, but the chain of arguments being summarized. Such as: what counts as disruption? What rights do people have? What is property, and what does it mean for your property to be secure? A non-utilitarian solution to these questions may not be persuasive, but it would be circular to say they are answered (or 'deduced') by the above statement.

Friedman is right and has many good examples of situations in which a strict property-rights approach causes problems, but this laser/lamp one is easily dismissed. It does not require mental gymnastics to offer a satisfactory answer, unlike, say, Friedman's rifle problem.

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Clayton — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 23:54:17 GMT

simple rules like "Everyone has the absolute right to control his own property, provided that he does not use it to violate the corresponding rights of others" do not serve as a good intellectual basis for a "libertarian" society. because those simple rules are not helpful in settling disputes like the laser and the lamp example.

I am surprised that we agree on this point. However, Friedman makes the point from a different approach than I would make it. It's not just that we can think of examples where simple property rules break down but that law is not about making rules in the first place. Furthermore, it is a foreseeable consequence of the fact of uncertainty that we could never design a rule-set which is so complete as to be applicable and satsifactory for all future conflicts that will ever happen between now and whenever humans go extinct. So, it's not just that our rule-set isn't complete enough, it's that it could not conceivably ever be complete. This is a much stronger statement than just that "we can think of situations where libertarian rules break down."

Clayton -

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Chyd3nius — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 23:42:23 GMT

All these kind of questions might be a problem by a Rothbardian view, but really, think about an an-cap society. Property owners won't read For a new Liberty when these problems arise, they will call to their lawyers. And problems will be solved on private courts. I really don't see any point with these kind of moral questions.

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

DD5 — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 22:44:31 GMT

Student:

^ i agree. i was just stressing the point that David Friedman made in the chapter mentioned in the OP. specifically, that simple rules like "Everyone has the absolute right to control his own property, provided that he does not use it to violate the corresponding rights of others" do not serve as a good intellectual basis for a "libertarian" society. because those simple rules are not helpful in settling disputes like the laser and the lamp example.

You sort of contradict yourself. These "simple rules" (or principles to be more accurate) are what define private property and self ownership and they are at the basis of any contractual society. At no point do the rules created by contractual agreements violate the main principle. Or to put it in other words, a contractual society that violates property rights is a contradictory of terms. For example, if you and I contractually agree to enslave John, then we longer have a contractual society, for our relationship to John is now hegemonic, and not contractual.

I agree there is some confusion over this. Rothbard may be partly responsible for this, but on the other hand, Rothbard also heavily relies on explanations based on precisely such contractual agreements to explain how the free society would provide all conceivable services currently preserves to the State.

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Student — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 21:47:36 GMT

^ i agree. i was just stressing the point that David Friedman made in the chapter mentioned in the OP. specifically, that simple rules like "Everyone has the absolute right to control his own property, provided that he does not use it to violate the corresponding rights of others" do not serve as a good intellectual basis for a "libertarian" society. because those simple rules are not helpful in settling disputes like the laser and the lamp example.

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

DD5 — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 21:37:18 GMT

Student:
really, it sounds to me like what you have in mind is more like contractualism

A society based on voluntary interpersonal exchange IS a contractual society. That's what the unhampered market is!

A contractual society IS a libertarian/voluntary society.

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Student — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 21:19:46 GMT

^ but now you're changing the rule. now the rule should read: "it is not ok to take/disrupt someone else’s private property against his or her will--unless a judge/neighbor association/mob says others wise". again, not very absolute.

really, it sounds to me like what you have in mind is more like contractualism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/), which is not too far removed from utilitarianism, than any sort of "rights" based scheme.

Which i think makes sense. Contractualism (and utilitarianism) has a better chance for realistically directing a libertarian society than some sort of "rights" based scheme for exactly the same reason we are seeing in this thread.

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Michael J Green — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 18:52:20 GMT

According to who?

Well... according to the property owner. If he's blind, he won't even think to complain; an issue would never arise. If he does anyway, someone informing him about the light, I doubt he would have a case. If he brings non-blind guests over, and the light disrupts his fancy party, there may be a conflict.

Once there's some conflict, the answer is then according to whomever customarily decides these issues. It may be up to a judge, a jury, a neighborhood association, or the town mob to decide who is in the right. What counts as a reasonable disruption of property be hashed out through adjudication and absorbed into custom.

Re: Testing the idea of the right to/defense of private property

Student — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 18:09:42 GMT

It is about whether the neighbor's actions disrupt the normal use of the person's property.

According to who? If my neighbor is blind, he may not even notice the laser or the lamp. On the other hand, if my neighbor is a dick, he may insist my lamp is keeping him up at night just to piss me off.

As I see it, if we actually try to apply JH's initial rule, that "it is not ok to take/disrupt someone else’s private property against his or her will", what we see pretty quickly is that how i use my property becomes just as dependent on my neighbor's whims as my own. what's so absolute about that?

--note, i don't plan to fully enter this discussion but will throw out helpful comments where i can--