Political Theory

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

nshore — Thu, 21 Feb 2008 01:53:08 GMT

I can't even go to the main site www.libertariannation.org. Can someone else get it to work?

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

Geoffrey Allan Plauché — Wed, 20 Feb 2008 05:29:34 GMT

Strange... It seems I can't edit my old post for some reason. Is that because it has been replied to?

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

Geoffrey Allan Plauché — Wed, 20 Feb 2008 05:27:13 GMT

It doesn't? Sorry about that. Maybe I screwed up the url.

Try this:

http://libertariannation.org/a/f22l1.html

I'll go back to my old post and see if I can fix the problem too.

I know there may be a tendency to only read what is posted here and not follow links, but I highly recommend everyone interested in this topic to read Roderick's essay. I'm also generalizing his argument in this essay from slavery contracts to the state in my dissertation.

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

nshore — Wed, 20 Feb 2008 05:00:22 GMT

That link doesn't seem to work. Is there another place where I can read his article. I always find Dr. Long's writings to be compelling.

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

pairunoyd — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 01:22:49 GMT

But what if the slave-like contract includes entertainment services? In other words, any efforts the party takes to escape the contract are agreed beforehand to be mere entertainment and insincere. If the 'enslaved' party tries to get out of it's contract, no matter what tactics they employ, it will be attributed to the terms of the contract i.e. the entertainment. Now, to avoid the contract the 'entertainer' might go to the authorities for assistance, but any such effort would be considered fraudulent since such appeals will be insincere, seeing how they're mere entertainment. So, he could avoid enslavement by breaking other laws and become imprisoned, but as long as he's free he can be pursued for re-ensalvement since such actions are deemed entertainment and mere show.

This is an extreme idea, but couldn't some sort of entertainment clause cover the 'changing will' idea if you make it so the true will of the person is unknowable via entertainment/acting/putting-on?

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

LUCHAC — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 00:58:51 GMT

Morty said: "That's only legitimate in situations where your labor contract has a section dealing with unilateral early termination of the contract. Let me ask you: if you signed a contract with At&T to provide phone service to you for three years and one year in AT&T decides that it will just stop providing phone service, do you have any legal recourse against AT&T for breach of contract? Or can they just do that whenever they want without penalty?"

We are talking here about 2 completely different theories of contract. On one side, we have the contemporary 'expectations' theory which holds that promises of future obligations are enforceable; and on the other -praised by Rothbard and Hobbes himself- is the traditional centuries long interpretation of contracts, which in part rely on natural rights and TITLE TRANSFER of private property. I keep making this distinction and I have the impression is not getting notice, so I'll try and explain it a bit better.

In the case of the contract with AT&T, unless I have paid some months in advance or that they have provided me with a service that is to be repaid in the future, exiting the contract by any of the parties DOES NOT cause any harm to the property of the other and thus IS NOT enforceable. It is only enforceable to the extent that the contract itself established as conditional penal bond such as "pay $200 to get out", but even in such case, NOBODY can force you to keep taking the service or AT&T to be in business indefinitely.

The same goes, for instance, on a contract for 'sexual services' or even marriage for that matter. Should those be 'enforceable' on other than moral grounds?

Here is some more Rothbard on the subject from "The Ethics of Liberty":

"Let us pursue more deeply our argument that mere promises or expectations should not be enforceable. The basic reason is that the only valid transfer of title of ownership in the free society is the case where the property is, in fact and in the nature of man, alienable by man. All physical property owned by a person is alienable, i.e., in natural fact it can be given or transferred to the ownership and control of another party. I can give away or sell to another person my shoes, my house, my car, my money, etc. But there are certain vital things which, in natural fact and in the nature of man, are inalienable, i.e., they cannot in fact be alienated, even voluntarily. Specifically, a person cannot alienate his will, more particularly his control over his own mind and body. Each man has control over his own mind and body. Each man has control over his own will and person, and he is, if you wish, “stuck” with that inherent and inalienable ownership. Since his will and control over his own person are inalienable, then so also are his rights to control that person and will. That is the ground for the famous position of the Declaration of Independence that man’s natural rights are inalienable; that is, they cannot be surrendered, even if the person wishes to do so.

Or, as Williamson Evers points out, the philosophical defenses of human rights

are founded upon the natural fact that each human is the proprietor of his own will. To take rights like those of property and contractual freedom that are based on a foundation of the absolute self-ownership of the will and then to use those derived rights to destroy their own foundation is philosophically invalid.2

Hence, the unenforceability, in libertarian theory, of voluntary slave contracts. Suppose that Smith makes the following agreement with the Jones Corporation: Smith, for the rest of his life, will obey all orders, under whatever conditions, that the Jones Corporation wishes to lay down. Now, in libertarian theory there is nothing to prevent Smith from making this agreement, and from serving the Jones Corporation and from obeying the latter’s orders indefinitely. The problem comes when, at some later date, Smith changes his mind and decides to leave. Shall he be held to his former voluntary promise? Our contention—and one that is fortunately upheld under present law—is that Smith’s promise was not a valid (i.e., not an enforceable) contract. There is no transfer of title in Smith’s agreement, because Smith’s control over his own body and will are inalienable. Since that control cannot be alienated, the agreement was not a valid contract, and therefore should not be enforceable. Smith’s agreement was a mere promise, which it might be held he is morally obligated to keep, but which should not be legally obligatory."

Cheers!

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

pairunoyd — Sun, 17 Feb 2008 20:19:05 GMT

I've posted this before and it's silly, but nonetheless, can you point out how it's wrong:

I can agree to work for someone, doing whatever they ask until I die and for zero money or 1 cent. As part of the contract, any apparent breach in contract is contracted for as entertainment and is not an actual breach but the entertainment contracted for. As an example, the party may try to escape and may claim he is being held against his will, but these actions are part of what he agreed to perform. The serviced party may whip or chain the service provider as part of the entertainment the service provider agreed to supply. Basically, ANY actions by the service providing party will ALL be interpreted as entertainment and not a real attempt to breach the contract, as declared in the contract.

How can you defend against someone 'alienating' their rights when this so-called alientation is stated as being entertainment in the contract?

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

Morty — Sun, 17 Feb 2008 19:20:52 GMT

LUCHAC:
Morty, I think your argument is completely beside the point. How does the breach of an employment contract causes any 'damages' that require restitution to the employer?

I think your argument denies the validity of contracts themselves. How does any breach of contract cause damages?

It is no less than fraud to breach a contract. You sold something and didn't deliver.

An obligation asumed to 'work' in the future DOES NOT transfer title over your body to the employer, it is simply a promise to transfer the results of your labor (transferable property) in a future date, but nothing more than a promise with moral but not legal (material) implications.

It depends on the contract. In a slave contract, you WOULD be signing over the title to your body for X amount of time. Of course, there would be restrictions (like, you would probably demand that your employer refrain from killing you), but otherwise you have signed over your body.

And this covers even the 'expectation' of the employer and his investment, which are completely subjective and dependant only on the employer himself. The employees act of quitting is simply exercise of free will.

That's only legitimate in situations where your labor contract has a section dealing with unilateral early termination of the contract. Let me ask you: if you signed a contract with At&T to provide phone service to you for three years and one year in AT&T decides that it will just stop providing phone service, do you have any legal recourse against AT&T for breach of contract? Or can they just do that whenever they want without penalty?

There is another argument that goes somewhat like this: "if a free man enters into a slave contract, after serving his master for some time, how does he (the slave) keep working under the contractual obligation if he is no longer a free man? how can he really be delivering 'his' labor to his master if he is in fact no longer a man at all? is there any contract left after the fact?".

Just because he is no longer a free man does not invalidate the contract. At the time of the signing, he was a free man and so it stands. When the contract expires, he becomes free once again. There is plenty of precedence for this, think of the indentured servants who came over to America, worked for a few years, and then were free.

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

LUCHAC — Sun, 17 Feb 2008 17:56:16 GMT

Morty, I think your argument is completely beside the point. How does the breach of an employment contract causes any 'damages' that require restitution to the employer?

An obligation asumed to 'work' in the future DOES NOT transfer title over your body to the employer, it is simply a promise to transfer the results of your labor (transferable property) in a future date, but nothing more than a promise with moral but not legal (material) implications.

And this covers even the 'expectation' of the employer and his investment, which are completely subjective and dependant only on the employer himself. The employees act of quitting is simply exercise of free will.

There is another argument that goes somewhat like this: "if a free man enters into a slave contract, after serving his master for some time, how does he (the slave) keep working under the contractual obligation if he is no longer a free man? how can he really be delivering 'his' labor to his master if he is in fact no longer a man at all? is there any contract left after the fact?".

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

TomG — Sun, 17 Feb 2008 17:44:32 GMT

http://maggiesfarm.anotherdotcom.com/

as pertains slavery, take a look at photo on right side of the above site's Sunday posting ;)

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

Morty — Sun, 17 Feb 2008 16:12:12 GMT

nshore:
I find this position to be somewhat nontenable. I don't like contractual obligations couched in terms of "this would likely happen." Does an employer have a right to enforce the labor contract should the laborer decide against the work at a later date?

I suppose it would depend on what the contract said. I think we can assume that most all contracts would have some clause dealing with early termination, there isn't really any reason to believe they wouldn't. But, if they didn't, I don't think that the company would be legally doing anything wrong if they held the worker to it - the problem is how would they hold the worker to it? They can't use force to keep the worker there unless the contract explicitly allowed the employer to do so (as a slave contract, by its very nature, would), so they would basically be limited to just giving the worker a choice between continuing to work or facing legal action for restitution.

If they break the contract, obviously the employer would be entitled to some type of monetary restitution to cover lost time and effort, or else laborers would be able to get away with roundabout ways of theft.

Well, then, the question is what happens if the worker spends all his money and then breaks the contract? What is left for the company to get restitution besides forced labor?

As far as contractual slavery goes, the question is much more precise: can an individual sell themselves into slavery and be forced to labor even if they no longer consent to the slavery?

If they agree in the contract to allow someone to use force against them (which is what slavery is) for a certain duration of time, then yes, they can have force used against them for that period of time. We would go down a troubling path if we start denying freedom of contract in some areas, because it will only lead to more infringements.

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

LUCHAC — Sun, 17 Feb 2008 14:30:58 GMT

I agree with nshore.

The main problem with the enforceability of contracts is NOT the commitment itself or the alleged damages caused by the 'expectation', but the transferability of PROPERTY TITLES. Rothbards draws the difference between these two theories of contracts in that a breach of contract where property has been transferred implies THEFT.

I find it difficult to imagine how quitting your job could ever be considered a form a theft other than advance payments. Even the initial investment your employer makes for your training is a risk nobody but himself decided to assume, although it could very well be established in the contract for compensation as a CONDITIONAL PENAL BOND. But there can NEVER be a 'conditional penal bond' that entails forced labor, since it does not imply a crime or theft by itself.

Only when a man commits a crime or the breach of contract entails theft, then he looses his natural rights, but only to the extent he has transgressed others'. This is the only situation where there can be forced labor, according to Rothbard, as s form of punishment and mostly for 'restitution' to the victims.

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

Geoffrey Allan Plauché — Sun, 17 Feb 2008 07:54:58 GMT

See Roderick Long's "Slavery Contracts and Inalienable Rights" for a good argument against the legitimacy of slavery contracts.

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

nshore — Sun, 17 Feb 2008 07:11:29 GMT

Morty:
I would have to disagree with Rothbard on this point. If the contract stipulated that you would work for that amount of time and you decide not to, that is a breach of contract and is enforceable. Now, I find it doubtful that they will simply force you to fulfill your contractual obligations because they would realize that your services would be half-hearted at best. Rather, monetary compensation would be demanded (all money you received in the contract, plus some for the breach, sort of a termination fee, I would assume). I imagine this would all be stipulated in the contract itself, but even if it wasn't, you would still be liable. Unless a clause exists which provides for terminating the contract, then by doing so you have committed fraud. You have sold something (in this case, your labor for 3 years) and then not given it after the transaction occurred. This requires you to pay back what you had defrauded from your victim, and since it was willful, pay it back in double (according to the "two eyes for an eye, and two teeth for a tooth" theory of libertarian compensation), perhaps with additional compensation for the money the company spent seeking you out, time lost, and the cost of finding a new worker.

I find this position to be somewhat nontenable. I don't like contractual obligations couched in terms of "this would likely happen." Does an employer have a right to enforce the labor contract should the laborer decide against the work at a later date?

I don't think even Dr. Block would agree with your position. In terms of a implicit contracts, no one ever consents in a labor contract to "forced labor." They merely consent to voluntary labor for a certain time period. If they break the contract, obviously the employer would be entitled to some type of monetary restitution to cover lost time and effort, or else laborers would be able to get away with roundabout ways of theft.

As far as contractual slavery goes, the question is much more precise: can an individual sell themselves into slavery and be forced to labor even if they no longer consent to the slavery? Questions of ordinary, voluntary employment are another matter altogether.

Re: Slave Contracts and the Alienability of the Will?

Morty — Sat, 16 Feb 2008 18:30:55 GMT

I would have to disagree with Rothbard on this point. If the contract stipulated that you would work for that amount of time and you decide not to, that is a breach of contract and is enforceable. Now, I find it doubtful that they will simply force you to fulfill your contractual obligations because they would realize that your services would be half-hearted at best. Rather, monetary compensation would be demanded (all money you received in the contract, plus some for the breach, sort of a termination fee, I would assume). I imagine this would all be stipulated in the contract itself, but even if it wasn't, you would still be liable. Unless a clause exists which provides for terminating the contract, then by doing so you have committed fraud. You have sold something (in this case, your labor for 3 years) and then not given it after the transaction occurred. This requires you to pay back what you had defrauded from your victim, and since it was willful, pay it back in double (according to the "two eyes for an eye, and two teeth for a tooth" theory of libertarian compensation), perhaps with additional compensation for the money the company spent seeking you out, time lost, and the cost of finding a new worker.