Political Theory

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

pauled — Thu, 06 Mar 2008 02:14:28 GMT

Donny with an A:

Pauled, it's not true that it's "generally held" that discussions of ethics presume reciprocity. That view is representative of a doctrine which holds that if an entity is a moral patient, then it must be a full moral agent. To say that ethics does presume reciprocity is to beg the question. Of course it's true that if ethics presumes reciprocity, then animals can't have moral standing.

The idea of reciprocity being a necessary condition for rights, though, seems a little murky to me, even if you're willing to take the stance that all moral patients are moral agents. If you steal from me, you have violated my righ

Is a discussion on ethics a discussion about property rights? If it is, then i don't see how even your very own Socrates avoided this view of reciprocity:

Socrates: "Hold on, Jones. You're getting ahead of yourself. Let's get out in the open that I agree that ethical systems should apply to all people; if I have the right to self-ownership, then you do too. We agree on that, right?"

You do subscribe to this do you not? Or was Socrates also begging the question.

On the other hand, if you are talking about ethics as being general morality, then this is outside of what i intend to discuss. I am only interested in the ethics of property, the justified rules that allow for coercion, or as we might entitle it: The Ethics of Liberty.

"...If you steal from me, you have violated my rights. But does that mean that you lose all of your rights?"

No it does not.

"Can I kidnap, torture, and kill you without doing anything wrong?"

No you cannot.

"Or does it mean that you lose your right not to be stolen from?"

Not exactly. It means that you give up your right to complain when your victim takes back his property from you and also exacts further restitution for his troubles.

"If you take a flower from my garden, can I justly break into your house and steal everything you own?"

Nope.

"Maybe you lose your rights to the extent that I should be able to acquire some fair restitution for your crime?"

There you go.

"But how would we determine what was "fair"?"

Shall i answer that from my armchair? Proportionality is the principle that would come into play in practice. How do you answer this question?

"Would I get to judge that according to my evaluation of your crime, or would you have the right to a fair trial?"

Perhaps. What is your thinking on the question?

"As for your claim that I would be justified in killing a murderer, I don't see how that's so obviously true that no one could reasonably disagree."

Perhaps it's open for debate. But certainly killing someone who is trying to murder you is allowed. Do you agree?

"But I should point out that my murderer example was a really awful one; there can be no reciprocity between a murderer and his victim."

It's a special case where the victim cannot seek justice for himself. If justice is to be served, there must be a presumed agent to speak on his behalf.

"The idea that others would be justified in punishing the murderer, given that no violation of reciprocity had occurred, would need to be justified in a way that relied on something other than reciprocity."

It would be justified along the lines that the victim had a reciprocal right to inflict an equal harm on the aggressor. There is no chance for restoration. And of course someone would be presumed willing and able to stand in as the victim's agent - to claim a right to justice on behalf of the victim. Do you dispute the validity of this approach?

"Perhaps something like the Lockean notion that a rights violator, by disrespecting the natural law, proves himself as a danger to mankind, and must be punished so as to ensure his repentance. That's not reciprocity, but I can see why you might have used the term to refer to something like that."

I would argue that the murder has lost his right to object to being killed for committing the murder. This is Kinsella’s Estoppel thesis. Justice is in killing a murderer, just as justice would be in beating, or perhaps raping a rapist. In any case, I think you introduced the term "reciprocity" into the discussion. But it seems as good a word as any for the idea that when it comes to agreeing to property norms, the ones that can be agreed upon, are those that can be agreed upon by both parties as fair. "I can't poke your eye out, and you can't poke out mine."

"However, you might run into trouble when you suggest that I can justly use force against a person who wrongs someone who isn't me."

If a victim has a right to justice, his agents can be given the right to seek it on his behalf.

"This is the entire idea behind there being a possible difference between moral agents and moral patients. Just as we would think it okay to punish a murderer, even though the dead person can't possibly demand that her rights be respected, we might say that someone who wrongs an animal can be stopped or punished, even though that animal can't possibly demand the protection of its rights."

My argument is not that a particular animal may be prevented by some circumstance from claiming a right that keeps it from having rights. My argument is that the lower animal is incapable of claiming rights because, by its very nature - it lacks the ability of abstraction to understand rights - just as Plauche argues it. It is a significant difference and it is relevant in a discussion of property rights.

"You'd have to argue that yes, we can stand up for others when they are wronged and can't stand up for themselves, but we can't do wrong to an animal."

I would argue that we can represent and claim a right for a rights bearing individual as his agent. But we cannot do the same for a non-rights bearing animal, that itself is by its nature, unable to understand or claim a right for itself.

"That seems to me to be plainly false (though that wouldn't establish that animals have rights, of course)."

So hopefully this shows why i think a human who is unable to communicate due to some circumstance, but could in principle do so because he is human, does have rights and others can act as his agent and claim these rights on his behalf. But other animals cannot, even in principle claim rights, and so neither can agents do so on their behalf.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Donny with an A — Thu, 06 Mar 2008 00:43:13 GMT

Pauled, it's not true that it's "generally held" that discussions of ethics presume reciprocity. That view is representative of a doctrine which holds that if an entity is a moral patient, then it must be a full moral agent. To say that ethics does presume reciprocity is to beg the question. Of course it's true that if ethics presumes reciprocity, then animals can't have moral standing.

The idea of reciprocity being a necessary condition for rights, though, seems a little murky to me, even if you're willing to take the stance that all moral patients are moral agents. If you steal from me, you have violated my rights. But does that mean that you lose all of your rights? Can I kidnap, torture, and kill you without doing anything wrong? Or does it mean that you lose your right not to be stolen from? If you take a flower from my garden, can I justly break into your house and steal everything you own? Maybe you lose your rights to the extent that I should be able to acquire some fair restitution for your crime? But how would we determine what was "fair"? Would I get to judge that according to my evaluation of your crime, or would you have the right to a fair trial?

As for your claim that I would be justified in killing a murderer, I don't see how that's so obviously true that no one could reasonably disagree. But I should point out that my murderer example was a really awful one; there can be no reciprocity between a murderer and his victim. The idea that others would be justified in punishing the murderer, given that no violation of reciprocity had occurred, would need to be justified in a way that relied on something other than reciprocity. Perhaps something like the Lockean notion that a rights violator, by disrespecting the natural law, proves himself as a danger to mankind, and must be punished so as to ensure his repentance. That's not reciprocity, but I can see why you might have used the term to refer to something like that.

However, you might run into trouble when you suggest that I can justly use force against a person who wrongs someone who isn't me. This is the entire idea behind there being a possible difference between moral agents and moral patients. Just as we would think it okay to punish a murderer, even though the dead person can't possibly demand that her rights be respected, we might say that someone who wrongs an animal can be stopped or punished, even though that animal can't possibly demand the protection of its rights. You'd have to argue that yes, we can stand up for others when they are wronged and can't stand up for themselves, but we can't do wrong to an animal. That seems to me to be plainly false (though that wouldn't establish that animals have rights, of course).

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Geoffrey Allan Plauché — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 17:50:13 GMT

Charles Anthony:
gplauche:
It is not acting as if it has rights. It is just defending itself.
I insist that they are observably the same behaviors.

Depends on the observer.

Charles Anthony:
third-person's perspective, the behaviors are observably the same. The outside observer can not assume to know what is in the mind of the human.
You are re-inforcing my point: acting in self-defence is observably the same as if one is acting as if one has rights. The key here is that one can not observe a creature's beliefs or sense of morality.
Therefore, I re-iterate my parallel: if a person rejects the non-aggression principle, it would be wise to treat that person as you would treat an animal. In other words, do not trust that person.

No, I'm not. You're taking a positivist approach to this whole thing. The behaviors are not necessarily the same from a third-person observer's perspective. Again, it depends on the observer. We don't just observe bodily movement in a vacuum, apart from all of our prior knowledge and apart from how our minds work. And we don't have to know what is in the minds of other humans, i.e., what they are thinking or whatever. It is a praxeological truth that rational beings require morality and their behavior must be interpreted as having reasons and as being justified or not, as right or wrong. As human beings ourselves, knowing that human beings are rational beings and moral agents, our thymological interpretation of the behavior is constitutive of our perception of said behaviors. Likewise with the hypothetical aliens, if they understand that human beings are rational beings. If they don't understand that human beings are rational beings, this is an empirical issue; their interpretation of the human-to-human scenario will have been mistaken because they were mistaken about the nature of human beings.

Even if I grant you your positivist claim for the sake of argument, which I don't, it still would be mistaken to impose the moral categories of justice and rights onto the behavior of other animals because morality does not apply to them. It is a needless anthropomorphism that will only sow confusion about justice and rights with regard to other animals. I've seen plenty of this confusion already on this thread and one or two others. Another related reason it would be a mistake is that fighting back is neither necessary nor sufficient evidence for having rights or even behaving as if one has rights. This is because the basis for rights is reason, and consequently moral agency, not a particular type of bodily movement. Fighting back is not sufficient, because non-rational animals fight back. Fighting back is not necessary either, because it is quite possible for a person to have rights without fighting back when his rights are violated. Even verbally asserting that one has rights is neither necessary nor sufficient for having rights because one could train a parrot or program a (non-AI) computer to say it has rights, but neither possesses the faculty of reason, neither are moral agents. So we return back to the needless anthropomorphism that sows confusion.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Charles Anthony — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 15:43:48 GMT

gplauche:
It is not acting as if it has rights. It is just defending itself.

I insist that they are observably the same behaviors.

gplauche:
Well, if they don't yet understand that human beings are rational,

Wait a minute. You are agreeing with me. From an objective third-person's perspective, the behaviors are observably the same. The outside observer can not assume to know what is in the mind of the human.

You are re-inforcing my point: acting in self-defence is observably the same as if one is acting as if one has rights. The key here is that one can not observe a creature's beliefs or sense of morality.

Therefore, I re-iterate my parallel: if a person rejects the non-aggression principle, it would be wise to treat that person as you would treat an animal. In other words, do not trust that person.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Geoffrey Allan Plauché — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 05:29:44 GMT

Charles Anthony:
I think I know where the confusion lies in my position. For further clarity, let me say this:
1) I am not trying to prove that animals have rights (although, if I was not a Christian, I think I would tend to believe they do have rights)
2) I am insisting that a person who comes face-to-face with a wild animal -- if only for that person's own safety -- should be ready for the animal to act in self-defense
3) an animal who acts in self-defense, is effectively acting as if it has rights
4) my intent is solely to draw a parallel on how to treat people who reject the non-aggression principle; specifically, those people should not be trusted any more than a wild animal

Okay. I see what you're trying to do. I still think it is a mistake. #3 is false. It is not acting as if it has rights. It is just defending itself. There is no comprehension of rights on its part and it is a needless anthropomorphism to conceive of it as acting as if it is defending its right. #4 is fine but it doesn't depend on #3.

Charles Anthony:
Imagine yourself to be an extra-terrestrial looking down at the Earth. You observe the following:
1) woman camping in the woods being approached by a wild bear
2) woman walking in the middle of the night being approached by an other man
What reason do you have to consider the two scenarios to be different? I believe the answer is NONE. It is rational to expect the woman to treat the approaching man in the same way as she would treat the wild bear. If the bear attacks, the bear should not be trusted and the woman should be ready for mortal combat. If the man attacks (or refuses to accept the non-aggression principle as a moral code), the man should not be trusted and the woman should be ready for mortal combat.

Well, if they don't yet understand that human beings are rational, then they will (mistakenly) view both scenarios as just two non-rational animals reacting instinctively to defend themselves from other non-rational animals. If they understand that human beings are rational, then they will understand that the man who attacks the woman is violating her rights, that he ought not to attack her, and that she has a right to defend herself. They will quite rightly not think these very same things about the woman and bear scenario. Rights are only applicable to relationships between rational beings. The woman does not have a right not to be attacked by the bear. The bear does not have a moral obligation not to attack the woman. The bear lacks moral agency. The difference, then, in the two scenarios is that in #2 the issue of justice and rights arises and in #1 it does not. It is a mistake to try to impose the moral categories of justice and rights onto the bear in scenario #1.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Charles Anthony — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 03:16:41 GMT

I think I know where the confusion lies in my position. For further clarity, let me say this:

1) I am not trying to prove that animals have rights (although, if I was not a Christian, I think I would tend to believe they do have rights)

2) I am insisting that a person who comes face-to-face with a wild animal -- if only for that person's own safety -- should be ready for the animal to act in self-defense

3) an animal who acts in self-defense, is effectively acting as if it has rights

4) my intent is solely to draw a parallel on how to treat people who reject the non-aggression principle; specifically, those people should not be trusted any more than a wild animal

gplauche:
What does it mean to treat something as if it had rights?

It means that if you attack an animal, you are ready to meet resistance and you expect it to act in self-defense. The animal's behavior is the same as the animal defending his rights. Also, if you are clearly not a threat to the animal, the animal might leave you alone.

gplauche:
In the standard libertarian view,

I do not think the standard libertarian view is relevant here. I am talking about what rational strategy a human should use when confronted with a wild animal. [My intention is to draw a logical parallel to dealing with people who behave contrary to standard libertarian views.]

gplauche:
Are you saying that we should not hunt wild animals? Or otherwise attack them because it would in all cases be immoral to do so?

No. I am just saying that if you hunt wild animals, you should reasonably expect the animal to act in self-defense otherwise, you are poor hunter. That should be self-evident.

gplauche:
It's not. Fighting back is not evidence of having rights or "behaving as if one has rights."

From a third-party's point of view, I am insisting that the behaviors are indistinguishable.

gplauche:
No, it's not. "Fighting back" does not equal "behaving as if you have rights."

I am not saying they are "equal" but rather, I am saying that they are observably the same behaviors.

I can not believe you just wrote this:

gplauche:
This makes no sense to me. We don't refrain from threatening or using initiatory physical force only because the other person or animal can fight back.

Yes, we (I am referring to the entire human race, anarchists and non-anarchists alike) do. Not everybody is a moral and saintly anarchist. Some people would commit crimes if they had the power. Heck, some people actually commit crimes anyway!

gplauche:
We so refrain because it would be immoral to do otherwise.

I am not trying to advocate support for animal rights as a libertarian principle. I am trying to describe strategic behavior with respect to animals. My intention is to draw a parallel: a person who consciously rejects the non-aggression principle should rationally be treated as a wild animal. [I adopted this perspective from LenB, by the way.]

gplauche:
You don't seem to understand the fundamental source of rights, a source with non-rational animals lack. Being careful not to antagonize animals is not the same thing as respecting the rights of human beings.

I did not say that it was and I went to great pains to spell that out before. You do not seem to understand the parallel that I am drawing. I challenge you to answer this:

Imagine yourself to be an extra-terrestrial looking down at the Earth. You observe the following:

1) woman camping in the woods being approached by a wild bear

2) woman walking in the middle of the night being approached by an other man

What reason do you have to consider the two scenarios to be different? I believe the answer is NONE. It is rational to expect the woman to treat the approaching man in the same way as she would treat the wild bear. If the bear attacks, the bear should not be trusted and the woman should be ready for mortal combat. If the man attacks (or refuses to accept the non-aggression principle as a moral code), the man should not be trusted and the woman should be ready for mortal combat.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Inquisitor — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 02:24:26 GMT

Please keep the discussion civil and avoid terms like 'Randian psychos'...

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

pauled — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 01:11:25 GMT

Donny with an A:
First, you're saying that respect of rights is contingent on reciprocity.

Yes. It is generally held that discussions of property rights and ethics presume reciprocity.

Donny with an A:
Second, you're saying that all moral patients must also be moral agents. That's not something that everyone thinks. For example, I can't just treat a murderer any way I like. Certainly, there are ways that I can treat her that wouldn't be acceptable with non-murderers, but I wouldn't be justified in doing anything I wanted.

You, as next of kin to a murder victim, would be justified in killing the known murderer. You could also negotiate other terms. Some terms may be morally questionable, but they would be legally justified.

Donny with an A:
And even if my dog isn't a moral agent, it does seem as though I have duties to it; I can't just kick it if I feel like it. That would be wrong.

I agree. It would be wrong in my view to abuse a dog. And yet, the dog still has no property rights. It is a question of morality how someone treats their dog. But it is a fact of justice and property that people can justify dog ownership.

Donny with an A:
Now, perhaps you want to make an argument about rights, as opposed to moral standing which is different from rights. But that's a different kind of argument than you're presently advancing.

My interest is purely in arguments about the validity of property rights, how they come about, and their status as being grounded in reason and what is, rather than opinion or what ought to be. If my arguments give an impression different from that, then that may be my mistake.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

JCFolsom — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 00:33:53 GMT

A topic that will, when examined, bring out some of the truly repellent, hard-core Randian psychos to the fore. For instance, if I were to ask, "What about infants?", some would say, "They don't have rights either. Becuase they can't talk. You can leave them to starve or pop them in a blender. Yum. Same goes for retards, by the way."

Treating living beings as property, however convenient it might be, is grotesque. This idea that you can agress against something that means you no harm, that can clearly feel pain and emotion, without legal or moral consequence, is repugnant.

Now, as I say in another thread, given that one believes animal flesh is necessary for physical health (as many do), or that once you get down as far as fishes and such, most are rather close to automatons (as many do), then things change a bit. But for something as clearly emotional and sensitive as a dog, to treat it as an inanimate piece of property is horrible and evil.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Geoffrey Allan Plauché — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 23:02:11 GMT

Charles Anthony:
gplauche:
The ability to fight back, or actually fighting back, or our expecting something to fight back, is not a source of rights.
That is not what I am saying. I am saying that a rational person should treat a wild animal as if the wild animal had rights. To put it a different way, a rational person should treat the animal as if it would fight back.

What does it mean to treat something as if it had rights? In the standard libertarian view, it is not to threaten or use initiatory physical force against it. Are you saying that we should not hunt wild animals? Or otherwise attack them because it would in all cases be immoral to do so?

Charles Anthony:
gplauche:
Animals don't have rights because they fight back or because we expect them to fight back.
Many animals behave as if they have rights. This should be self-evident.

It's not. Fighting back is not evidence of having rights or "behaving as if one has rights."

Charles Anthony:
Maybe I am not being clear. Fighting back = behaving as if you have rights

No, it's not. "Fighting back" does not equal "behaving as if you have rights."

Charles Anthony:
gplauche:
Our expecting them to fight back does not mean we treat them as if they have rights.
I am saying you are wrong.
From a third-party observer's perspective, whether or not you consciously attribute "animal rights" to the animal is irrelevent.
Furthermore, I would say that is highly foolhardy to treat any creature that has the ability to fight back in any manner other than as if it had rights if only for your own safety.

This makes no sense to me. We don't refrain from threatening or using initiatory physical force only because the other person or animal can fight back. We so refrain because it would be immoral to do otherwise. You don't seem to understand the fundamental source of rights, a source with non-rational animals lack. Being careful not to antagonize animals is not the same thing as respecting the rights of human beings.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Charles Anthony — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 22:45:00 GMT

gplauche:
The ability to fight back, or actually fighting back, or our expecting something to fight back, is not a source of rights.

That is not what I am saying. I am saying that a rational person should treat a wild animal as if the wild animal had rights. To put it a different way, a rational person should treat the animal as if it would fight back.

gplauche:
Animals don't have rights because they fight back or because we expect them to fight back.

Many animals behave as if they have rights. This should be self-evident.

Maybe I am not being clear. Fighting back = behaving as if you have rights

gplauche:
Our expecting them to fight back does not mean we treat them as if they have rights.

I am saying you are wrong.

From a third-party observer's perspective, whether or not you consciously attribute "animal rights" to the animal is irrelevent.

Furthermore, I would say that is highly foolhardy to treat any creature that has the ability to fight back in any manner other than as if it had rights if only for your own safety.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Donny with an A — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 22:11:22 GMT

You have to recognize the ethical presuppositions you make when you say that. First, you're saying that respect of rights is contingent on reciprocity. Second, you're saying that all moral patients must also be moral agents. That's not something that everyone thinks. For example, I can't just treat a murderer any way I like. Certainly, there are ways that I can treat her that wouldn't be acceptable with non-murderers, but I wouldn't be justified in doing anything I wanted. And even if my dog isn't a moral agent, it does seem as though I have duties to it; I can't just kick it if I feel like it. That would be wrong.

Now, perhaps you want to make an argument about rights, as opposed to moral standing which is different from rights. But that's a different kind of argument than you're presently advancing.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

pauled — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 21:56:41 GMT

Tuneman:

We can't communicate with them, so under this reasoning why should we have property rights? Anyways I think we would all understand that a lion has claimed a certain territory if we came to close to it. In fact, he would be communicating with us in that respect... The idea that they need to speak the human language is arbitrary.

Men only claim and acknowledge property rights with other men who do likewise. Other animals don't. So in answer to the scenario of the lion, he cannot reason with you, nor is he concerned with the possibility that you had been gardening a certain plot of land for years. He will not ask you to justify that you were there first, and he will likewise present no such justification to you. The lion is incapable of such dialogue. His world is might makes right, if he were even capable of perceiving such a concept. Which he is not - or at least cannot demonstrate that he is.

I also think it is confused to think of lower animals as possessing an abstract language that we cannot interpret, yet reflects abstract rationality. If they could think abstractly in terms of language, they would use a language and we would be able to learn it.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

Tuneman — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 21:37:35 GMT

pauled:

Non-humans, on a species-by-species consideration, have exactly the property rights that they can claim for themselves and acknowledge to others. Since all non-humans lack the ability to reason abstractly enough to form a language, they are not, in principle able to claim and acknowledge property rights. Therefore, the concept of property rights has no meaning to them, which is to say, they can have no property rights.

We can't communicate with them, so under this reasoning why should we have property rights? Anyways I think we would all understand that a lion has claimed a certain territory if we came to close to it. In fact, he would be communicating with us in that respect... The idea that they need to speak the human language is arbitrary.

Re: Animal Rights (Dont laugh)

pauled — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 21:33:40 GMT

Tuneman:
I know this isn't an econ quesiton, however I think it is safe to say that we all agree that we support a society with an extremley high amount of human freedom. How do you translate this to nonhumans? What rights should they have, or not have? And on what basis should they have less? If it is because they are much less intellegent, what happens if we encounter a alien race far smarter than us. Should we have certain freedoms taken away from us?

Non-humans, on a species-by-species consideration, have exactly the property rights that they can claim for themselves and acknowledge to others. Since all non-humans lack the ability to reason abstractly enough to form a language, they are not, in principle able to claim and acknowledge property rights. Therefore, the concept of property rights has no meaning to them, which is to say, they can have no property rights.

On the question of aliens who are smarter than us, they will recognize that humans are rational, with language, and an ability to claim and recognize property. Therefore they, as justifying beings themselves, will recognize that logic dictates that they must accord humans the same rights they accord themselves.