Political Theory

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Luming Zhou — Thu, 13 Aug 2009 05:00:07 GMT

Juan:
AM:
The assertion "right and wrong are value-judgments" can be interpreted in many ways:

"Right and wrong are not value-judgments" in the sense that determining if an action constitutes as either 'right' or 'wrong' requires human thought and reasoning.

"Right and wrong are value-judgments" in the sense that humans feel positively if they hear the word "right" and react negatively if they hear he word "wrong."

"Right and wrong are not value-judgments" in the sense that 'value-judgments' (in the sense of aesthetics) are unnecessary for the judgment whether if an action confirms or violates the anarchist moral code.

"Right and wrong are value-judgments" in the sense that it requires empathy, which you classify as a 'value-judgment', to determine if an action constitutes 'right' or 'wrong'.

AM, if I say "the cat is meowing" , there's no way for that sentence to be interpreted as "the cat is NOT meowing".

We should interpret the meaning of the sentence-as-a-whole, not the literal grammar.

Smith heard a meowing noise. Brown didn't heard any meowing noise. Smith had written the sentence "the cat is meowing." Brown saw it as 'false'.
The cat is meowing. Five seconds later, the cat is not meowing.
The cat didn't meow. The "meowing" noise was actually a ringtone from Jones' cellphone.

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

wilderness — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 21:37:42 GMT

a coma patient is living and life is an act...

the coma patient potentially can intellectually apprehend principles for the coma patient is human...

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

ladyattis — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 18:00:57 GMT

Action in the case of the coma patient is one of potential action (with some anticipation of some future action based on past action(s)).

Equally, I think natural rights can be framed on the action axiom easier than on the is/ought distinction issue.

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Angurse — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 04:23:41 GMT

Laughing Man:
The Terminator and Robocop are fictional character portrayed by actors and don't actually exist therefore then can be no 'arse kicking' in the first place.

And in their fictional worlds Terminator would kick Robo's arse.

Is common sense really that difficult?

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Angurse — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 04:16:56 GMT

Laughing Man:
Really?

Yes. Did you see the difference between what I actually said and your attempt, it was clearly there?

Laughing Man:

I'm growing tired of this. Truly I am. You give here an example of the Easter Bunny hopping house to house delievering things, committing actions thereby establishing its existence and then you think you can say...well this thing doesn't actually exist yet it capable of hopping and exchange. You must either concede that the Easter bunny does exist because it commits action and therefore needs form in order to do such or concede that the Easter bunny doesn't exist and therefore anything you say on it is useless for you cannot conceptualize what doesn't exist and then give it action.

Couldn't you just understand what context means, a wee bit? Committing an action in a fictional world only establishes existence within that fictional world, it doesn't imply existence anywhere else, such as the physical world.

Honestly, are all fiction writers just insane too you?

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Andrew Cain — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 04:09:11 GMT

Angurse:
The Terminator would kick Robocop's arse in a fight, no?

The Terminator and Robocop are fictional character portrayed by actors and don't actually exist therefore then can be no 'arse kicking' in the first place.

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Andrew Cain — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 04:07:55 GMT

Angurse:
How surprising you've gotten my position wrong...again.

Really?

Angurse:

Yes and I've already explained why, just as you and I can engage in debate on the Easter Bunny without establishing the existence of the Easter Bunny itself. As I've said repeatedly, view it within context. All you've done is repeat an assertion (and contradict yourself).

I'll help this along, I think the Easter Bunny would hop house to house when delivering baskets as opposed to jogging from house to house.

Now you must prove that with my mere speculation that I do believe in the Easter Bunny.

I'm growing tired of this. Truly I am. You give here an example of the Easter Bunny hopping house to house delievering things, committing actions thereby establishing its existence and then you think you can say...well this thing doesn't actually exist yet it capable of hopping and exchange. You must either concede that the Easter bunny does exist because it commits action and therefore needs form in order to do such or concede that the Easter bunny doesn't exist and therefore anything you say on it is useless for you cannot conceptualize what doesn't exist and then give it action.

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Angurse — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 03:58:59 GMT

Laughing Man:
He seems to think that one can speculate on the actions of a nonexistent entity

The Terminator would kick Robocop's arse in a fight, no?

See, its quite easy to speculate on the actions of the nonexistent.

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Angurse — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 03:56:44 GMT

Laughing Man:

Angurse said we can speculate on the actions and demeanor of the Easter Bunny without actually establishing its existence.

How surprising you've gotten my position wrong...again.

Angurse:

I'm saying that fiction doesn't exist. Period. And when people argue about it they aren't implying that they really believe it does exist.

Angurse:
Discussing what actions it does or what kind of demeanor it has may be illogical, but that still doesn't imply belief in its existence.

Establishing an existence and belief in existence are two entirely different things.

I'll try to make this as clear as I can:

Take the statement "the Easter Bunny hops"

One can certainly reason that to the statement "the Easter Bunny exists," it does not follow that the I am implying that the Easter Bunny actually exist (as in physically, made of atoms), but rather that the Easter Bunny exists within context, the context of modern childrens legends. Again context must be understood.

I'm still waiting for the proof of how making such a statement shows that one actually believes in that an anthropomorphic rabbit physically exists.

I've heard many debates over who would win in a fight between the Terminator and Robocop, I never once thought that any debator actually believed in either of them, because that would be completely absurd.

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Andrew Cain — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 03:33:27 GMT

Wilmot of Rochester:
For if he could think, he would exist, right?

Ask that to Angurse. He seems to think that one can speculate on the actions of a nonexistent entity

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Angurse — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 03:05:51 GMT

Laughing Man:
Being in a coma is an action. Incapatication is a state of being. Your heart still beats, your mind still works to some degree, your body is still committing action in order to sustain yourself. These actions are controlled by the mind and if the mind still functions then you are in a state of existence albeit a severely lacking existence.

You need to seriously read up on the philosophy of action, or just read my previous comment. You've completely ignored the requirements of action, in fact you basically ignored the entire post, as usual.

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Wilmot of Rochester — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 02:41:23 GMT

Laughing Man:

Well we have to see if he is under the impression that the Easter Bunny is currently in a coma thereby proving [ according to him ] we can discuss the actions of the Easter Bunny without actually establishing its existence because like you said and according to Descartes, the existence of action assumes existence of the entity in the first place. Yet even if it is in a coma, that would mean it would need to exist to devolve into a coma state.

I don't see how this contradicts Descartes. After all, the inability to exist or the being of non-existence precludes actions like thought. That the Easter Bunny does not exist doesn't really say much. Descartes would merely say, well of course the Easter Bunny does not exist, but he does not think either.

Are you trying to make the point that because we can see that the Easter Bunny does not exist, it means that his thought would not prove his existence? I'm confused, though. For if he could think, he would exist, right? I think the point, however, is much more that he cannot think or devolve into a coma because he does not exist and if he could do either of those things, we could show quite undoubtedly that the Easter Bunny does exist.

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Andrew Cain — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 02:29:20 GMT

Juan:
Descartes proved the existence of the easter bunny ?? I don't think they mention that in "Fantastic Easter Special".

No Descartes stated 'I think therefore I am' meaning by the action of thought, I establish I exist in the world. Angurse said we can speculate on the actions and demeanor of the Easter Bunny without actually establishing its existence.

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Juan — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 02:25:39 GMT

Descartes proved the existence of the easter bunny ?? I don't think they mention that in "Fantastic Easter Special".

Re: How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

Andrew Cain — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 02:16:09 GMT

Well we have to see if he is under the impression that the Easter Bunny is currently in a coma thereby proving [ according to him ] we can discuss the actions of the Easter Bunny without actually establishing its existence because like you said and according to Descartes, the existence of action assumes existence of the entity in the first place. Yet even if it is in a coma, that would mean it would need to exist to devolve into a coma state.