Political Theory

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

twistedbydsign99 — Tue, 25 Aug 2009 16:40:28 GMT

AJ:
Thanks for the clarification. Would you object at this being called a type of consequentialism?

No I wouldnt't object, I would say I believe that good consequences specified over a long enough span of time come from acting properly and the converse is true as well. But there are sticking points for me in that parasites enjoy good consequences and is it true that planning longer term versus shorter term is actually rewarded more. And there is the deeper question of why is this the case.

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

AJ — Tue, 25 Aug 2009 01:36:35 GMT

twistedbydsign99:
The laws of nature and what it means to suceed in this world does give us on average a set of things we all believe. Logic over illogic, argument over physical fight, life over death, cooperation over isolation. Any man can choose to disobey any of these, which is why I said there is no absolute set, but he disobeys at his own peril, which is why on average we obey.

Thanks for the clarification. Would you object at this being called a type of consequentialism?

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

twistedbydsign99 — Mon, 24 Aug 2009 20:56:37 GMT

Yea I am in the process of trying to get this morass of thoughts into something that resembles a straight line of thought haha. I have two sticking points right now, first parasitism could be considered a success if success is defined as merely propogating dna so its something I'm trying to refine, and second even if I was to have something that resembles a proof of some objective set of values that is "preferred" it doesn't answer the question that matters to me, of why. Long ellaborated on this, but the evolutionary answer is just kind of hollow, but it is an answer.

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

Adam Knott — Mon, 24 Aug 2009 20:01:51 GMT

twistedbydsign99:

AJ:
Under that definition, do you believe in "objective values"? And if so, would that mean something other than "things that everyone deems important now and forever"?

So the answer to the second question is it wouldn't mean anything different. The first question, is there an objective set of goals all of humanity has that constrains them in some way, something like honesty, or preferring life over death. In an absolute sense no, but on average yes. The laws of nature and what it means to suceed in this world does give us on average a set of things we all believe. Logic over illogic, argument over physical fight, life over death, cooperation over isolation. Any man can choose to disobey any of these, which is why I said there is no absolute set, but he disobeys at his own peril, which is why on average we obey. The limit as time goes to infinity of the goals mankind will hold, includes these things :)

twistedbydsign99:

Regarding your passage above, here is your starting point:

Part 1:

Logic over illogic, argument over physical fight, life over death, cooperation over isolation. Any man can choose to disobey any of these, which is why I said there is no absolute set,...

Here is your theory of ethics, or theory of human ethical action:

Part 2:

The laws of nature and what it means to suceed in this world does give us on average a set of things we all believe....

there is no absolute set, but he disobeys at his own peril, which is why on average we obey. The limit as time goes to infinity of the goals mankind will hold, includes these things :)

Part 2 constitutes your thesis or theory. That is the part that I would want to see elaborated or explained further and rigorously in essay or book form.

Adam

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

twistedbydsign99 — Mon, 24 Aug 2009 18:32:44 GMT

AJ:
Under that definition, do you believe in "objective values"? And if so, would that mean something other than "things that everyone deems important now and forever"?

So the answer to the second question is it wouldn't mean anything different. The first question, is there an objective set of goals all of humanity has that constrains them in some way, something like honesty, or preferring life over death. In an absolute sense no, but on average yes. The laws of nature and what it means to suceed in this world does give us on average a set of things we all believe. Logic over illogic, argument over physical fight, life over death, cooperation over isolation. Any man can choose to disobey any of these, which is why I said there is no absolute set, but he disobeys at his own peril, which is why on average we obey. The limit as time goes to infinity of the goals mankind will hold, includes these things :)

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

AJ — Fri, 21 Aug 2009 23:26:59 GMT

twistedbydsign99:
When I use objective, I mean true now and forever for all people independant of anyones opinion on the subject.

Under that definition, do you believe in "objective values"? And if so, would that mean something other than "things that everyone deems important now and forever"?

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

Juan — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 20:57:17 GMT

twistedbydsign99:
Notice that given my definition of morality it actually applies to itself. The selection of an end is an action. There is a manner we should select our goals, and murdering for fun should not be chosen.

I see. Well I've no quarrel then. I originally objected to this...

Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective.

...because, if one says nothing about the ends, then morality becomes just a practical recipe to achieve any arbitrary end. If, for instance, my end is to kill people without ever paying for my crimes, then an objectively expedient way to do that is to join the military. Of course, none of my actions as a soldier would be objectively, morally, good.

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

twistedbydsign99 — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 16:51:41 GMT

AJ:

That's OK. I think some of the issues you raised are why I find objective a problematic term in talking about morality. To give more of an idea why, here are a few possible interpretations that spring to mind:

When I use objective, I mean true now and forever for all people independant of anyones opinion on the subject. I guess that is 2.

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

twistedbydsign99 — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 16:46:25 GMT

Juan:
That's not morality.

At that point you usually give a more accurate definition, so give it. My definition is morality is the way a man should act. So elaborate.

Juan:
Actually, the only important problem is whether 'subjective' ends, such as butchering your neighbor if you feel like it, are morally justified or not. Morality as far as I can tell is not concerned with food tastes or cooking, cooking being a metaphor for the utilitarian formula

Morality is not conerned with, but applies to cooking given my definition which I'm assuming you are going to refine. Notice that given my definition of morality it actually applies to itself. The selection of an end is an action. There is a manner we should select our goals, and murdering for fun should not be chosen. Of course the murder would believe he is acting morally, but he would be mistaken.

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

AJ — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 03:07:37 GMT

That's OK. I think some of the issues you raised are why I find objective a problematic term in talking about morality. To give more of an idea why, here are a few possible interpretations that spring to mind:

1. Objective moral truth: A valid syllogism of the form "is -> ought" (individual consequentialism) or "ought -> ought" (persuasion to a person) for a given person/agent under discussion.

2. Objective moral truth: A valid syllogism of the form "is -> ought" (universal consequentialism) or "ought -> ought" (persuasion to a group), valid for all people.

3. Objective moral truth: An empirically established fact that provides insights into the consequences of human actions regardless of agent.

4. Objective moral truth: Something regarded as a situational "moral truth" by the majority, or everyone, or a certain class or group of people, possibly "authorities."

5. Objective moral truth: Something regarded as a universal "moral truth" by the majority, or everyone, or a certain class or group of people, possibly "authorities."

6. Objective moral truth: Something nonsensical, that people insist on calling "objective moral truth" while refusing to define which of the previous five interpretations - or another interpretation - they really mean. This one has the effect of making any statement about such an "objective moral truth" very hard to refute, because any and all refutations can be labeled strawmans.

There is of course some overlap, which makes things even messier, not to even mention that people mean different things by their oughts.

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

Adam Knott — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 01:12:00 GMT

AJ:

My point above was simply that posters using the words objective and subjective could actually be in agreement, because the definitions of those two words are so malleable that one can nearly mean the other.

Oh. Sorry. I didn't catch that. I interpreted it as implying that the meaning of the term objective was clearly understood by all concerned.

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

AJ — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 01:00:22 GMT

Adam Knott:

AJ:

To recap, the consequentialist ought is "objective" in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, but "subjective" in the sense that each man's goals (and hence ways of achieving them) are his own. So why not replace subjective with individual for clarity?

Jason:

I'm not entirely clear on the above. When we say that the ought is objective in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, I assume we do not mean, merely objectively ascertainable by the actor himself.

If this is right, then objectively ascertainable means something like "publicly" ascertainable; ascertainable by a number of others besides the actor himself.

Then, when we say that this goal is objectively ascertainable by a group of people besides the actor himself, does this mean "perceptible" by them?

What constitutes a goal of an individual actor that is objectively ascertainable by a group of other people? Does this mean they must all be able to perceive this goal? Or what is the definition or conception of this type of objectivity?

Adam, the above was intended only as my interpretation of Lilburne and other's positions, so I would turn your questions over to them. I was trying to demonstrate that a charitable interpretation of both sides (in those particular posts) would not necessarily result in any disagreement.

To give my own take, the consequentialist ought, being a mere prescription to "do X if you want Y results," can in theory be logically and/or scientifically demonstrated (praxeology?). If I were stating my own position, I wouldn't want to bring in a word like objective, which I feel is ambiguous exactly where precision is needed. My point above was simply that posters using the words objective and subjective could actually be in agreement, because the definitions of those two words are so malleable that one can nearly mean the other. The part you quoted was meant to show a way to resolve the disagreement (or encourage clarification from the other parties).

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

Adam Knott — Wed, 19 Aug 2009 23:18:19 GMT

AJ:

To recap, the consequentialist ought is "objective" in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, but "subjective" in the sense that each man's goals (and hence ways of achieving them) are his own. So why not replace subjective with individual for clarity?

Jason:

I'm not entirely clear on the above. When we say that the ought is objective in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, I assume we do not mean, merely objectively ascertainable by the actor himself.

If this is right, then objectively ascertainable means something like "publicly" ascertainable; ascertainable by a number of others besides the actor himself.

Then, when we say that this goal is objectively ascertainable by a group of people besides the actor himself, does this mean "perceptible" by them?

What constitutes a goal of an individual actor that is objectively ascertainable by a group of other people? Does this mean they must all be able to perceive this goal? Or what is the definition or conception of this type of objectivity?

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

AJ — Wed, 19 Aug 2009 21:52:42 GMT

Jon Irenicus:

To recap, the consequentialist ought is "objective" in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, but "subjective" in the sense that each man's goals (and hence ways of achieving them) are his own. So why not replace subjective with individual for clarity?

Agent-relative is a term I like in relation to this.

That does seem a lot clearer than "subjective."

Re: David Osterfeld on natural rights

Jon Irenicus — Wed, 19 Aug 2009 21:35:55 GMT

To recap, the consequentialist ought is "objective" in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, but "subjective" in the sense that each man's goals (and hence ways of achieving them) are his own. So why not replace subjective with individual for clarity?

Agent-relative is a term I like in relation to this.