Political Theory

Re: Rights while asleep?

twistedbydsign99 — Fri, 04 Dec 2009 17:37:31 GMT

hashem:
It is, though. The brain controls itself, as far as I know (which isn't saying much). :) A brain can control itself; indeed, the brain does control itself.

I think the brain works off of its current state and the state of its sensory perceptions to put itself in a new state. I'd say that is control. I've heard it said that thoughts preceed emotions as well.

Re: Rights while asleep?

hashem — Fri, 04 Dec 2009 12:08:50 GMT

I. Ryan:
[You claim] the thoughts "can be controlled", what exactly, if it is not either (a) the other thoughts or (b) the other brain activity, "control[s]" them?...what exactly, if it is not...

It is, though. The brain controls itself, as far as I know (which isn't saying much). :) A brain can control itself; indeed, the brain does control itself.

I hear the objection often that something can't own/control itself, but I'm not convinced that's necessarily true, or that it's even fundamentally sound.

Re: Rights while asleep?

I. Ryan — Fri, 04 Dec 2009 11:45:18 GMT

hashem:

While that's not impossible (thoughts are brain activity, and therefore can be controlled), it doesn't follow that we therefore can't control it (indeed, the opposite is true).

If you claim that the "thoughts are brain activity" and, therefore, that the thoughts "can be controlled", what exactly, if it is not either (a) the other thoughts or (b) the other brain activity, "control[s]" them?

hashem:

Your objection is based on the premise that the mind is the thoughts. [...] Rather, the mind produces thoughts. [...]

In my previous post, I wrote "If one controls the thoughts of oneself, what, if it does not refer to the thoughts, does "one" refer to?". If you want to dispute that the mind of oneself is the thoughts of oneself, you must address that question, directly or indirectly.

I already addressed and answered this question:

I. Ryan:

If you desire to maintain the use of the notion of "control", you must, in order to avoid the infinite regression outlined in #2, assume that a "final controller" of the movements of the body of an actor exists. The "final controller" is what we refer to when we refer to the "consciousness" of the body of an actor.

hashem:

Finally, it ignores the distinction between the fact of ownership and the right to it. Right to ownership doesn't follow directly and necessarily from the fact of control.

I never said that it does. I never even mentioned the "right to ownership".

hashem:

Thoughts, however, can't justifiably be absolutely owned for reasons outlined by Stephen Kinsella, and also because once they are produced, they are no longer subject to control (ownership).

In the above passage, you conflated the actual thought with the content of that thought. In the writings of Stephan Kinsella, he addressed only whether one can "own" the content of a thought, not whether one can "own" the actual thought itself. In my recent posts, I addressed only whether one can "own" the actual thought itself, not whether one can "own" the content of that thought.

Re: Rights while asleep?

Angurse — Fri, 04 Dec 2009 07:29:13 GMT

twistedbydsign99:
I wonder, could you own your body in the same way you own your mind? Apriori?

I'd say no. "You" are your mind. C.S. Lewis had a famous line - "You don't have a soul, you are a soul. You have a body." Just swap out soul for mind, consciousness, or ego.

Re: Rights while asleep?

Nielsio — Fri, 04 Dec 2009 07:04:57 GMT

scineram:

What human society could possibly exist that failed to defend its members while unconscious?

This is part of the answer, but not the full answer.

I believe this is:

Sleep and coma

If someone is asleep they are, for all intents and purposes, still a productive member of society. Hurting someone who is asleep (or taking their property) is just as detrimental to society as hurting someone who is awake. The same is true for someone who is in a coma, if it can be reasonable assumed that they will wake up.

From: Morality, From a Societal Perspective (by me)

Re: Rights while asleep?

hashem — Fri, 04 Dec 2009 04:50:11 GMT

scineram:

What human society could possibly exist that failed to defend its members while unconscious?

That's what I was getting at earlier when I responded, "It slipped my mind...This should have been obvious because the other scenario taken to it's logical extreme is a reductio ad absurdum (nobody having rights while they sleep = humans extinct)."

I. Ryan:

twistedbydsign99:

I wonder, could you own your body in the same way you own your mind? Apriori?

I believe that the claim that one owns the mind of oneself, which means the thoughts of oneself...

Your objection is based on the premise that the mind is the thoughts. While that's not impossible (thoughts are brain activity, and therefore can be controlled), it doesn't follow that we therefore can't control it (indeed, the opposite is true). Rather, the mind produces thoughts. One's body might produce a third leg, it doesn't follow that one therefore can't control, or therefore doesn't own that leg. Thoughts, however, can't justifiably be absolutely owned for reasons outlined by Stephen Kinsella, and also because once they are produced, they are no longer subject to control (ownership).

It also assumes that you can't control something that you are. But I am my arm (among other things) and I control my arm.

Finally, it ignores the distinction between the fact of ownership and the right to it. Right to ownership doesn't follow directly and necessarily from the fact of control.

Re: Rights while asleep?

scineram — Fri, 04 Dec 2009 03:47:50 GMT

What human society could possibly exist that failed to defend its members while unconscious?

Re: Rights while asleep?

I. Ryan — Fri, 04 Dec 2009 02:50:20 GMT

twistedbydsign99:

I wonder, could you own your body in the same way you own your mind? Apriori?

I believe that the claim that one owns the mind of oneself, which means the thoughts of oneself, is, at the least, metaphorical and, at the most, non-sensical.

1. If one controls the thoughts of oneself, what, if it does not refer to the thoughts, does "one" refer to?

2. If one controls the thoughts of oneself, what controls oneself who controls the thoughts of oneself? and what controls what controls oneself who controls the thoughts of oneself? et cetera, ad infinitum. In that inquiry, therefore, one necessarily encounters a regressus ad infinitum, a regression which human reason cannot exhaust.

If you desire to maintain the use of the notion of "control", you must, in order to avoid the infinite regression outlined in #2, assume that a "final controller" of the movements of the body of an actor exists. The "final controller" is what we refer to when we refer to the "consciousness" of the body of an actor.

Re: Rights while asleep?

hashem — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 22:57:52 GMT

twistedbydsign99:
I wonder, could you own your body in the same way you own your mind? Apriori?

I think so. Control denotes ownership. Since you control your body, you own it. This is the fact of ownership, not to be conflated with the right of ownership.

Re: Rights while asleep?

twistedbydsign99 — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 22:07:24 GMT

I. Ryan:
If the agent described is a "mindbody", the notion, as an example, of control, of property, is nonsensical. If the nature of my mind derives solely from the nature of my body, my mind is my body and my body is my mind. If, then, I claim that I own myself, that I possess exclusive control of myself, my statement is incoherent. For, if I control myself, what controls me who controls myself? and what controls what controls me who controls myself? et cetera, ad infinitum. In order to form a coherent notion of control, of property, one must somehow extirpate that infinite regression. In order to do so, you must assume that a "first cause" of movement exists, a consciousness existent apart from the body that it controls.

I wonder, could you own your body in the same way you own your mind? Apriori?

I. Ryan:
Is a nation more than merely a collection of individuals?

By definition a nation is nothing more, but does a collection of people do things that cannot be attributed to an individual? Such as justice? Is justice the property of one person? Or can you only find justice in the collection. I'm not saying nation isn't reducible to people, just that in reduction you lose some things. I thought of another good example, language isn't the property of an individual right?

Re: Rights while asleep?

hashem — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 21:05:05 GMT

Libertarian_for_Life:

wombatron:

ErikNikolai:

It's morally wrong to initiate sexual intercourse with women who are asleep, if that's what you're asking. Nice try though.

;-)

Actually, I would say that's contextual. If it's asked for before hand...

I can see that going horribly wrong...

Some guy has sex with some drunk passed out girl and then later he claims she said he could right before she passed out, lol.

Welcome to college ahaha.

Re: Rights while asleep?

I. Ryan — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 20:36:29 GMT

twistedbydsign99:

Does it truly matter if your agent of action is a mind or a mindbody? I feel that the mind body combination removes some of the trouble surrounding rights changing as our state changes.

If the agent described is a "mindbody", the notion, as an example, of control, of property, is nonsensical. If the nature of my mind derives solely from the nature of my body, my mind is my body and my body is my mind. If, then, I claim that I own myself, that I possess exclusive control of myself, my statement is incoherent. For, if I control myself, what controls me who controls myself? and what controls what controls me who controls myself? et cetera, ad infinitum. In order to form a coherent notion of control, of property, one must somehow extirpate that infinite regression. In order to do so, you must assume that a "first cause" of movement exists, a consciousness existent apart from the body that it controls.

twistedbydsign99:

Not exactly, the group behaviors of atoms is different that the behavior of an atom. The group behavior of cells is different that the group behavior of proteins.
To what degree could you say you know how a cell works based on your knowledge of proteins? The system has a different description than its component parts right? We would not attribute the concept of "thinking" to a neuron, but we would to a mass of them.

In the above argument, you remain trapped within the paradigm of levels of description. If, as I mentioned in my previous post, one were to entirely and completely understand the laws and concepts of the lowest level of description, one would necessarily entirely and completely understand the laws and concepts of any of the higher levels of description. But those higher levels of description would become obsolete. For we only employ "levels of description" because our knowledge is incomplete. And, with only one level of description, the notion of a "level" becomes incoherent. If we could reduce biology to physics, biology would not be an autonomous science anymore, it would merely be an arbitrary and meaningless demarcation within physics.

twistedbydsign99:

[...] the group behaviors of atoms is different that the behavior of an atom. [...] The system has a different description than its component parts right?

Is a nation more than merely a collection of individuals?

twistedbydsign99:

To what degree could you say you know how a cell works based on your knowledge of proteins?

Are the proteins the only components of the cell?

Re: Rights while asleep?

twistedbydsign99 — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 19:49:45 GMT

I. Ryan:
I do not really understand what point you meant to advance in your response, above. I, in the post that you quoted, just meant to imply that whether the mind and the body are separate or whether they are distinct, praxeology, as an autonomous science, considers them to be the former, separate. So, unless you can reduce economics to biology, to mechanics, vel cetera, you must acquiesce to the method of praxeology, to consider that the mind and the body are separate, that the mind controls the body.

Does it truly matter if your agent of action is a mind or a mindbody? I feel that the mind body combination removes some of the trouble surrounding rights changing as our state changes.

I. Ryan:
"The physics of atoms does not explain the physics of planets" only because our knowledge of the "physics of atoms" is incomplete.

Not exactly, the group behaviors of atoms is different that the behavior of an atom. The group behavior of cells is different that the group behavior of proteins.
To what degree could you say you know how a cell works based on your knowledge of proteins? The system has a different description than its component parts right? We would not attribute the concept of "thinking" to a neuron, but we would to a mass of them.

Re: Rights while asleep?

Libertarian_for_Life — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 19:19:03 GMT

wombatron:

ErikNikolai:

It's morally wrong to initiate sexual intercourse with women who are asleep, if that's what you're asking. Nice try though.

;-)

Actually, I would say that's contextual. If it's asked for before hand...

I can see that going horribly wrong...

Some guy has sex with some drunk passed out girl and then later he claims she said he could right before she passed out, lol.

Re: Rights while asleep?

wombatron — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 18:21:21 GMT

ErikNikolai:

It's morally wrong to initiate sexual intercourse with women who are asleep, if that's what you're asking. Nice try though.

;-)

Actually, I would say that's contextual. If it's asked for before hand...