Political Theory

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

Adam Knott — Tue, 03 Aug 2010 19:17:11 GMT

I started a new thread to discuss this:

http://mises.org/Community/forums/p/18709/353142.aspx#353142

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

AJ — Mon, 02 Aug 2010 22:14:20 GMT

I sense that as well, and this is the part of his theory that I find myself closest to intuitively agreeing with (although I may just be agreeing with what I think it means). I don't mean it's a flaw in his work, but that for whatever reason I have not understood it. I don't understand most of Menger's writing either. Something just, again, is not crossing the inferential gap. I'm not making sense of the words and sentences as they're presented, and I often cannot isolate just one particular meaning in each sentence - I quickly amass a pretty wide array of possible interpretations before I get into the meat of the theory. I suspect it's partly a difference in our respective quirks of writing or thinking styles, severely compounded by the difficulty of using language at this extremely deep level of analysis.

Here's an example that seems very important to Adam's analysis, but I cannot read between the lines enough to figure out why he wrote the last sentence at the point he did (sentence bolded by me; from http://www.praxeology.com/downloads/8642_Knott_TR2.pdf).

An instructive example of social interaction which I have used previously is that of a person who, upon walking into a park, sees a bronze statue. As he nears the statue, he realizes that it is a person who has painted himself, and is posing as a statue. As he approaches closer, he now realizes that no, it is a statue, and not a person. When he thought that the object he saw was a person posing as a statue, he thought that the object in front of him was an object having a human consciousness, i.e., an acting being. He thus attempted to place or locate “action” or consciousness spatiotemporally.

I just don't see that there's any attempting necessarily implied here. The man perceived the object as a person, OK...so what's this about attempting? It seems to come out of nowhere and yet the text that follows entirely relies on that fact that the man is in fact attempting something. It not only doesn't seem to be "missing a step," but missing several steps. It's pretty difficult to fill in the blanks when there seem to be several steps removed, and this seems to happen in rapid succession from near the beginning of each of the texts.

Adam repeats his explanations over and over and at great length, but the same details I'm looking for clarification on (usually one sentence for each would do) always seem to be missing or somehow not obvious to me. Or not missing, but just interpretable in more than one way, and then the next sentence also seems interpretable in more than one way, until I find myself trying to keep track of 20 or 30 possible permutations of interpretations on his overall meaning. The same happens with Menger, but in Menger's case I literally can't understand hardly a single sentence he writes. Mises I understand quite clearly, but with Menger I find myself trying to judge among 5 or 6 possible interpretations by the time I'm two sentences in. There's clearly some unspoken context in both cases that I'm lacking.

For instance, even if I assume Adam means that the attempt to "place or locate" happened in the above scenario when the person tried to interact with the performer, it still doesn't make sense to me that he in so doing would necessarily be attempting to place or locate a consciousness. Or even if he must for some reason place or locate a consciousness in realizing that the statue is really a person, it seems more natural to say, "He thus judged that there was a conscious person existing spatiotemporally (over in that part of the park)," or at least that there was a consciousness that could be accessed through that object (a person's body) over there. And perhaps the person thereby assumed, say, that the performer would react to his approach (by moving, speaking, etc.), whereas a statue wouldn't.

If, however, we were to add in the step that the man attempted to ask the performer the time, or ask how it felt to stand still for so long, then I could see an attempt taking place. Yet still, not an attempt to "locate or place a consciousness," but an attempt to get information (no matter where the consciousness really resides, if anywhere) through the object* before him (the performer's body, which he is not attempting to locate because he already knows where it is).

*Regarding this, I suppose Adam may object here and say that I am conceiving the situation as the man treating the performer as an object, not an acting being. However, such a distinction seems to be one of the things he is setting out to demonstrate with the text, not a starting assumption.

Anyway, that would make sense to me, but that is so far from what Adam seems to have intended that I feel pretty uncomfortable making such a deep assumption, and even if I do that's just one of several possible ways I can think of to interpret the text, each of them likely not what he had in mind. Yet this seems to be a crucial part of his exposition, so there's a pretty big problem if I can't figure out precisely what the intended meaning or significance is and how the conclusion was arrived at.

I wrote the above not to start a discussion about the above passage, but just to show a typical example of what I meant by the words not crossing the inferential gap. They seem to cross it for others, but for some reason I find myself routinely not able to get at his intended meaning, even after extensive clarification. The sentences often just don't seem to flow in a way that corresponds with any familiar sort of progression that I can isolate or unambiguously identify.

I hasten to add that I have seen Adam write in ways that seemed utterly clear and convincing to me on other topics (natural rights, etc.), and I know for sure that he is choosing his words very carefully because of the nature of the investigations he's undertaking. Perhaps the difficulty is that his words are chosen so carefully that they have become something of a special-purpose language with which I am not yet conversant, or perhaps just not yet able to disambiguate well enough to bring the total number of permutations of possible meanings down to something where I can reasonably infer what he's talking about. Basically when I read Adam on praxeology I constantly have the feeling of juggling several possible interpretations almost from the outset, and it multiplies into an unmanageable number of possibilities from there. I can sure guess as to what he means, but every time I do I seem to miss.

An instructive example of social interaction which I have used

previously is that of a person who, upon walking into a park, sees a

bronze statue. As he nears the statue, he realizes that it is a person

who has painted himself, and is posing as a statue. As he

approaches closer, he now realizes that no, it is a statue, and not a

person. When he thought that the object he saw was a person

posing as a statue, he thought that the object in front of him was an

object having a human consciousness, i.e., an acting being. He thus

attempted to place or locate “action” or consciousness

spatiotemporally

An instructive example of social interaction which I have used

previously is that of a person who, upon walking into a park, sees a

bronze statue. As he nears the statue, he realizes that it is a person

who has painted himself, and is posing as a statue. As he

approaches closer, he now realizes that no, it is a statue, and not a

person. When he thought that the object he saw was a person

posing as a statue, he thought that the object in front of him was an

object having a human consciousness, i.e., an acting being. He thus

attempted to place or locate “action” or consciousness

spatiotemporally.An instructive example of social interaction which I have used

previously is that of a person who, upon walking into a park, sees a

bronze statue. As he nears the statue, he realizes that it is a person

who has painted himself, and is posing as a statue. As he

approaches closer, he now realizes that no, it is a statue, and not a

person. When he thought that the object he saw was a person

posing as a statue, he thought that the object in front of him was an

object having a human consciousness, i.e., an acting being. He thus

attempted to place or locate “action” or consciousness

spatiotemporally.

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

Wade — Mon, 02 Aug 2010 19:00:49 GMT

"There is some kind of inferential gap that I haven't been able to cross to see what you exactly intend with the text(s)..."

Hi AJ,

I thought that this sentence in your post was interesting. Having read a lot of Adam's work, I wanted to say that it may help to take the parts of Adam's work that you describe as "inferential gaps" and attempt to understand them not as some kind of flaw in Adam's work, but an attempt by Adam to convey that aspect of his theory that stands alone only as "attempt". That Adam's attempt to convey the part of his theory which cannot be pointed to, visualized, or perceived is an example of the category "attempt".

Adam's struggle to convey what he knows fundamentally cannot be conveyed, and your struggle to understand it are both examples of a category of human action which we could call "struggle". I think that Adam's latest essay on Hayek elaborates well on this phenomenon that all theorists encounter.

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

AJ — Thu, 29 Jul 2010 13:11:45 GMT

Adam,

"But if we don't anchor the discussion in a prior agreement on some fundamental notions, then we could conceivably continue comparing conceptions indefinitely and continually find that they don't match, agree, or convey the same meaning."

I agree completely, but this is the thing to say when someone else has indicated or implied that they disagree about such fundamental notions. I, on the other hand, have not contradicted the fundamental notion you mention.

"Everything is based on the foundational notion that there is a state of affairs I am presently faced with, and I attempt to bring to presence a state of affairs different from the one I'm faced with presently."

I haven't confirmed it explicitly in my comments, but I also don't think I've said anything to negate or undermine it, either implicitly or explicitly. After all, it is an obvious fact.

I forgot about the social science aspect...I have read most or all of Striving and Attainment, and quite of few passages from your other books. I guess I was thinking specifically about praxeology in terms of economics, as I find that more readily graspable. I don't really feel I have properly understood your books, to be honest. There is some kind of inferential gap that I haven't been able to cross to see what you exactly intend with the text(s), and I don't think it's because I haven't read them completely because the gaps usually starts to yawn pretty wide after the first few chapters.

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

Adam Knott — Thu, 29 Jul 2010 05:27:21 GMT

Hi AJ

"Despite all the rephrasing, is not the strict program of praxeology you're engaging in ultimately equivalent to the cataloging of thinking errors and "spooks"?"

I think we may be analyzing one another's theoretical notions each from the point of view of our own theoretical notions. But if we don't anchor the discussion in a prior agreement on some fundamental notions, then we could conceivably continue comparing conceptions indefinitely and continually find that they don't match, agree, or convey the same meaning.

The primary "reference phenomenon" that Mises uses, and which I use as a student of Mises, is the self-evident or at least apparently self-evident phenomenon of my own goal-directed activity.

"The starting point of praxeology is a self-evident truth, the cognition of action, that is, the cognition of the fact that there is such a thing as consciously aiming at ends." (UF, p.5)

Everything is based on the foundational notion that there is a state of affairs I am presently faced with, and I attempt to bring to presence a state of affairs different from the one I'm faced with presently.

If we are not in agreement that this is the primary object of study, then it could well be that you are studying a different phenomenon and building a system of concepts using that as a reference. Then we compare our concepts and find that there are few that match or agree.

******

"What I am really looking for to validate the program of praxeology you're pursuing is just at least some demonstration, argument, or hint toward why we might expect the program to yield results on a higher level. For instance, if your derivation of the law of marginal utility is valid, can it be used to derive yet other results? I suppose so, but I'm not sure if I've heard you explicitly mention that you think this will happen. Are you just being conservative for purposes of prudence, or is it that this isn't what you anticipate or isn't what makes you see good prospects for the program?"

I've written several short books and essays on this subject. They are, in order:

A Praxeology of Coercion, First Edition, March 2006
A Praxeology of Coercion, Second Edition, December 2006
Striving and Attainment, August 2008
The Logic of Happiness, March 2009

With supplemental writings that contain explanations of some of the key concepts:

Praxeology and Ethics, October 2008
Adam Knott - A Summary, June 2009

A Praxeology of Coercion, both first and second editions, I consider older works that have been superseded by Striving and Attainment and The Logic of Happiness. I consider the 2008/2009 writings a closer approximation to my current thinking.

"For instance, if your derivation of the law of marginal utility is valid, can it be used to derive yet other results?"

Yes, definitely. What I refer to as a law of ethical action. This theory is elaborated in the four 2008/2009 books/essays above. These are all accessible on my website praxeology.com.

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

AJ — Thu, 29 Jul 2010 00:06:13 GMT

Hi Adam, (Note to other readers: the term "praxeology" herein refers to Adam Knott's conception of it)

"You are treating thinking not as a form of action, but as a 'neutral existent' or 'neutral process,' that may possibly examine action, or examine logic, but that itself is not a form of action."

What makes you think I'm doing that? I don't believe I have indicated such explicitly, so it seems charitable to assume I did not mean that, rather than assuming I did. My intended point is again merely that rephrasing in terms of "logic" or "praxeological laws" are equivalent. Both are just words, and the possibility I raise is that both might only be useful in referring to accurate thinking as opposed to flawed thinking. In other words, would we need praxeology if no one made thinking errors? ...is another way of framing the issue I would like to discuss.

Now I would do well to stop and note that the common perception of "logic" is highly confused. I use the term only to talk about situations where it is literally impossible to imagine or conceive of anything to the contrary, like how it's impossible to imagine something could be both true and not true, in order to distinguish from other more casual uses of the word "impossible," "incorrect" and so on. Most importantly, I have no need for the term "logic" in my own mind and thinking, only as a communication device to clarify my meaning to others. I bolded that because I think what underlies that seemingly innocent fact will turn out to be the pivotal aspect of this whole discussion (in fact most every discussion!). I believe this is the true point of confusion, or disagreement if there really is any.

So when you write,

"Under the sway and influence of natural science, mathematics, and logic, they consider this circumstance an objective feature of their surrounding "outside" world (objectivism), rather than considering this circumstance as a feature of the goal directed activity of an individual subject (subjectivism)."

It makes me think you are touching on Husserl's point about bracketing: assertions don't actually make complete sense as communication, only as private thoughts in one's own mind. The whole undertaking of "asserting a theory" has subtle fundamental problems that only surface at this level of analysis, because when we communicate we have to do double-duty by also explaining things in a way that leaves plenty of margin for others to understand. After all, if I were to lay out a praxeological law in perfect form, I may only be able to say two words, "It's obvious." Explanations are special arrangements of words designed to build a bridge to those who don't yet see what one means to convey. So they can never be phrased purely within the strict language of the theory, at least not at this fine level of analysis.

The fact that we have to use language to communicate means we will inevitably be forced to resort to certain words and phrasings that aren't ideal and may give the wrong impression. Better to put them out there are hash out the intended meaning piece by piece that try to lay out perfection in one post. For other subjects that may be possible, but I don't think it is here. You must be aware of such difficulties in terms of your own writing because you take a lot of care in explaining, but I sometimes wonder if you are fully aware of these difficulties as they are faced by other writers.

"Here you have phrased the problem almost entirely in terms of plain logic, with almost no (explicit) reference made topraxeological notions. Here is the problem I see with this:"

From here you go on to explain that all the observations I made about plain logic can be rephrased in terms of praxeology. But that is precisely my point. Despite all the rephrasing, is not the strict program of praxeology you're engaging in ultimately equivalent to the cataloging of thinking errors and "spooks"?

In answer to this in the negative, you give an argument for an apodictic conception of the law of marginal utility. The key point you makes seems to be in represented in this sentence:

"I can't be aware of coming into a supply of something, without concomittantly "un-awaring" myself of striving for that which I do not have (valuing)."

Regarding this,

1. I'm not sure what you mean exactly. Are you referring to the idea that we can only be aware of one thing at a time, or only of a certain number of things at a time, or that we can only devote a certain amount of attention to something at one time? Since that seems to be more a physiological issue, I suppose it cannot be what you intended. It seems prima facie that one could at least be aware of both coming into a supply of something while concomittantly being aware of striving for more. I don't say it's necessary to prove this point, but of course it would be nice.

2. Is this still not just cataloging thinking errors? This question is a little unfair perhaps, because we could call any proof in the world of logic or math just a cataloging of errors...indeed it's just a matter of degree in those fields: when the theorems get advanced enough, there is no way a reasonable person could call them "obvious." What I am really looking for to validate the program of praxeology you're pursuing is just at least some demonstration, argument, or hint toward why we might expect the program to yield results on a higher level. For instance, if your derivation of the law of marginal utility is valid, can it be used to derive yet other results? I suppose so, but I'm not sure if I've heard you explicitly mention that you think this will happen. Are you just being conservative for purposes of prudence, or is it that this isn't what you anticipate or isn't what makes you see good prospects for the program?

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

filc — Wed, 28 Jul 2010 21:09:32 GMT

Yes I'm not saying Menger did not play a roll in the creation of praxeology. I just don't understand why it's called "Menger's Praxeology". If Menger wanted it called Praxeology he would have called it that instead of theoretical exact science.

Sorry to nitpick but that detail misleads people into the understanding of the development of that framework. It's an error in the history of AE as far as my opinion takes me.

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

Adam Knott — Wed, 28 Jul 2010 20:58:09 GMT

filc:

Menger's Investigations Into The Method of the Social Sciences, Book 1, chapters 1 through 5 are entirely devoted to a defense of praxeology.

He refers to this science as theoretical exact science. Hayek refers to it as the Pure Logic of Choice. Mises refers to it as praxeology.

They are all talking about the same thing.

Mises is persuing Menger's vision.

Here is the vision:

"The aim of this orientation, which in the future we will call the exact one, an aim which research pursues in the same way in all realms of the world of phenomena, is the determination of strict laws of phenomena, of regularities in the succession of phenomena which do not present themselves to us as absolute, but which in respect to the approaches to cognition by which we attain to them simply bear within themselves the guarantee of absoluteness. It is the determination of laws of phenomena which commonly are called "laws of nature," but more correctly should be designated by the expression exact laws." (Menger, Investigation Into The Method of the Social Sciences, Book 1, chapter 4)

Adam

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

Adam Knott — Wed, 28 Jul 2010 20:51:24 GMT

Hi AJ

Great to hear from you. And great question.

Here is Mises touching on this issue:

"Epistemology deals with the mental phenomena of human life, with man as he thinks and acts. The main deficiency of traditional epistemological attempts is to be seen in their neglect of the praxeological aspects. The epistemologists dealt with thinking as if it were a separate field cut off from other manifestations of human endeavor. They dealt with the problems of logic and mathematics, but they failed to see the practical aspects of thinking, They ignored the praxeological a priori." (Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p.2) (emphasis added)

I think this addresses your question, and your approach, directly. Because you write:

"...it would seem more efficient and direct to simply focus on educating people about logical errors and how to think clearly and examine their basic assumptions."

Here, you are doing exactly what Mises is describing: considering things not with respect to their praxeological aspect, but instead, with respect to their logical aspect. You are treating thinking not as a form of action, but as a 'neutral existent' or 'neutral process,' that may possibly examine action, or examine logic, but that itself is not a form of action. You are considering thinking and logical reasoning as some kind of objective process or existent, and not as the goal-directed activity of an acting subject---as action. This is exactly what Mises is referring to.

In praxeology, thinking and reasoning are forms of action, since thinking and reasoning are "trying to"....solve a problem, reach a conclusion, decide between alternatives, etc.... In praxeology thinking is a form of action since it is viewed as an attempt to attain an end.

So this is the first point, and this is the path toward the solution to the apparent problem you raise.

****

"To use the familiar example, imagine someone were to claim, "I can walk north without moving away from the South Pole." And further imagine that this nonsensical notion had become the basis for a whole ideologies. Then someone like Hume definitively identifies the logical error, pointing out that the notion itself is nonsensical."

"It hence is regarded as a prohibitionary law of human action that it is impossible to move north along the globe without moving away from the South Pole."

"All right, but then the obvious question is why would people miss such a thing?"

Answer:

They don't miss such a thing. Rather, they consider it, as you do, a logical phenomenon rather than a praxeological phenomenon. Under the sway and influence of natural science, mathematics, and logic, they consider this circumstance an objective feature of their surrounding "outside" world (objectivism), rather than considering this circumstance as a feature of the goal directed activity of an individual subject (subjectivism).

That is Mises's point in the opening quote.

****

"If I prove a praxeological law that says, "raising the minimum wage must [by logic] increase unemployment,"* that proof must entail an unpacking of the fundamental assumptions and a demonstration that such is logically necessary, which of course then implies that raising minimum wage while decreasing unemployment (ceteris paribus) is [logically] impossible. But this seems, again, roundabout. Why not just get people - whether those in academia or those on the street - to look at the basic assumptions and point out the logical error? Is it just a strategic consideration: to try to make inroads into academia by having a [logically] "proven theory" rather than the far more mundane act of simply identifying a logical error or admonishing people to "dissect your assumptions and think clearly"?" (bold added, bracketed content added)

Here you have phrased the problem almost entirely in terms of plain logic, with almost no (explicit) reference made to praxeological notions. Here is the problem I see with this:

Consider case 1 and case 2.

In case 1, we assume that person A will be dissatisfied if the result of his theoretical activity is a contradiction. We assume that he is interested in avoiding a logical contradiction. So we tell him that if he does X (constructs a theory of a given sort) that Y will be the result (a logical contradiction). The clear meaning of this, and our assertions and admonitions to A, is that by changing his theory he can avoid the logical contradiction in question.

In case 2, we assume that person A will be dissatisfied if the result of his policy is unemployment. We assume that he is interested in avoiding unemplotyment. So we tell him that if he does X (increases the legal minimum wage above the market wage rate), that Y will be the result (unemployment). The clear meaning of this, and our assertions and admonitions to A, is that by changing his policy he can avoid the unemployment in question.

How are our instructions in case 1 in principle any different than in case 2?

Why is it sensible to tell A how he can avoid a logical contradiction he wants to avoid, but nonsensical to tell A how he can avoid the unemployment he wants to avoid?

What have we done here? We have simply stated your example more explicitly in terms of praxeology (the logic of action---the logic of goal directed activity), rather than in terms of simple logic, which does not explicitly refer to the conceptions of praxeology.

******

Incidentally, this is the same situation that exists with Hoppe's argumentation ethics. Hoppe considers his theory to be not a theory of action in the Misesian sense, but rather a theory arriving at intersubjective norms and justifiable ends. (see A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p.130, 132)

But the form in which Hoppe presents his theory in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, Chapter 10, p.203-208, simply masks or plays down the praxeological aspect of his theory by keeping the praxeological aspects implicit, rather than making them explicit.

He assumes that an actor, A, will want to avoid contradictions in his argument, and will want to avoid having his argument falsified and his claims unjustified, and he assumes that an actor A will want to avoid other drastic consequences of his actions such as "we would all cease to exist," "neither we, or forefathers, nor or progeny could, do or will survive," etc. Then Hoppe proceeds to demonstate, at least to his own satisfaction and that of his adherents, that if person A does X (argues against the libertarian ethic as Hoppe conceives it) the results of doing X will be Y: person A will contradict himself; A's claims and arguments will be unjustified; and A will potentially bring about the drastic social consequences Hoppe mentions on page 206.

In order to avoid these things, actor A is instructed by Hoppe to abstain from arguing against libertarianism.

If A is willing to accept these results or consequences, the argumentation ethics provides no reasons for actor A to abstain from arguing against a libertarian ethic.

Hoppe simply keeps the meaning of his theory implicit, and this is because avoiding what he consideres Mises's utilitarianism is an imperative of this kind of normative and ends-seeking ethical theory.

However, Hoppe has not succeeded in overcoming a "utilitarian" means/ends analysis. He has simply proposed a means/ends analysis that is controversial.

Here is a quote from Mises that applies to both cases above:

"The starting point of experimental knowledge is the cognition that an A is uniformly followed by a B. The utilization of this knowledge either for the production of B or for the avoidance of the emergence of B is called action. The primary objective of action is either to bring about B or to prevent its happening." (The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p.20)

*****

"In light of these issues, I am interested if you know of any law that satisfies the following two requirements:

1. You (Adam Knott) believe it is actually a true apodictic law of human action in the Mengerian-Misesean sense (I think you agree that the law of marginal utility as understood by most Austrians presently is not)

2. It does something other than simply identify or catalogue a logical error."

OK I'll argue that the law of marginal utility, properly conceived, is such a law.

Here is my argument:

The law of marginal utility expresses the unavoidable accompaniment an individual actor will experience upon coming into possession of a unit of "supply."

To see this, we conceive that action is comprised of two fundamental categories. The fundamental categories of action are means and ends. However, in the history of economic thought, these same categories have been referred to by various names such as value and supply, demand and supply, etc... In praxeology, these same categories have been referred to by various names such as satisfaction and dissatisfaction, ease and unease, pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, striving and attainment, etc..

Menger's law of marginal utility is phrased in terms of value and supply.

The gist of the law is that an individual actor will experience something we may refer to as a "decrease in value" upon coming into possession of a unit of supply.

In this conception, we call the actor's "supply" that which he has now, and we call that which he does not have now, but which he seeks, that which he "values." In this conception "value" is essentially synonymous with "seeking," "trying," "attempting," etc... It refers to the categorial counterpart, in action, to that which is already attained in action, the actor's "supply."

The law of marginal utility expresses that when an individual comes into a unit of supply, there is an unavoidable experience that accompanies such an event. Since by our original assumptions there are only two categories of action, supply and value, then when we consider or refer to an actor's supply in isolation, we thereby omit or diminish reference to that which is "value" (seeking) in that individual's action.

Coming into a unit of supply necessarily diminishes "value" since when/if we consider coming into a unit of supply as an isolated event, we make no reference to seeking---seeking here considered identical to valuing.

I can't be aware of coming into a supply of something, without concomittantly "un-awaring" myself of striving for that which I do not have (valuing).

(for this reason, and by this law, in "full empirical reality" an increase in supply is necessarily accomanied by a decrease in value)

As you inidicated AJ, this is obviously not the generally accepted conception of the law of marginal utility. But I believe this answers your question.

I'll close this post with one of the best definitions of praxeology I know of:

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

filc — Wed, 28 Jul 2010 20:06:53 GMT

Side question,

A) What does Menger have anything to do with Praxeology? Aside from heavily influencing Mises on building the framework?

B) How is marginal utility disconnected from the "laws of human action" as stated. I simply don't understand this.

Finally, try not to let this get carried away into a he said/she said debate. In that case the dispute is actually over a difference of opinion regarding interpretations of various texts. Thats how different denominations of religions were born. Those types of debates go on forever and never address the actual discrepancy. If possible find a common ground on where you can agree on what praxeology is, build up from there and address any discrepancies that arise.

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

Jon Irenicus — Wed, 28 Jul 2010 17:20:57 GMT

I'm talking here very specifically about the strict Misesean approach to praxeology, which I think Adam (and probably I also) believe others since Mises to have departed from, and perhaps even Mises not to have followed perfectly in deriving the laws of human action such as marginal utility.

According to whom?

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

AJ — Wed, 28 Jul 2010 11:52:18 GMT

Adam Knott:

The main point here is to demonstrate that what Hume has essentially done is to uncover laws of human action. These are laws that demonstrate that when the attempt is made to do X, the result will not be Y as had been previously assumed or believed, but instead Z.

This was a great post, Adam. Very elucidating.

However, something about this approach seems, not wrong, but roundabout. To me Hume has merely identified a logical error. It is true that we can derive a prohibitive law of human action from his observation on the is-ought gap (actually infinitely many such laws), but we can do the same with the pointing out of any logical error.

To use the familiar example, imagine someone were to claim, "I can walk north without moving away from the South Pole." And further imagine that this nonsensical notion had become the basis for a whole ideologies. Then someone like Hume definitively identifies the logical error, pointing out that the notion itself is nonsensical.

It hence is regarded as a prohibitionary law of human action that it is impossible to move north along the globe without moving away from the South Pole.

All right, but then the obvious question is why would people miss such a thing? People are perfectly capable of logical thought, at least to that degree, as long as nothing is interfering with their natural ability to do so. After all, they use their logical reasoning abilities to successfully navigate all other areas of life every minute of every day. It seems to me that the reason people miss such things could be more directly phrased as being because they are distracted by something else, or they have never actually analyzed the fundamental assumptions of the issue. (This applies both to intellectuals and common people.)

If I prove a praxeological law that says, "raising the minimum wage must increase unemployment,"* that proof must entail an unpacking of the fundamental assumptions and a demonstration that such is logically necessary, which of course then implies that raising minimum wage while decreasing unemployment (ceteris paribus) is impossible. But this seems, again, roundabout. Why not just get people - whether those in academia or those on the street - to look at the basic assumptions and point out the logical error? Is it just a strategic consideration: to try to make inroads into academia by having a "proven theory" rather than the far more mundane act of simply identifying a logical error or admonishing people to "dissect your assumptions and think clearly"?

*Leaving aside the issue of whether this is really apodictic, ceteris paribus conditions, etc.

In light of these issues, I am interested if you know of any law that satisfies the following two requirements:

2. It does something other than simply identify or catalogue a logical error.

It seems much of the currently accepted body of praxeology that departs methodologically from the Menger-Mises approach satisfies 2, and several (and perhaps all) correct identifications of common reasoning errors can derive a law that satisfies 1. But what satisfies both?

If there is nothing that satisfies both 1 and 2, it seems that either (a) praxeology is simply the catalogueing of logical errors people make particularly in regard to human action, or (b) we are just in the unfortunate situation of not yet having discovered any valid praxeological laws (besides those that point out basic reasoning errors).

If (a), it would seem more efficient and direct to simply focus on educating people about logical errors and how to think clearly and examine their basic assumptions. If (b), there is of course the question of why we should expect any such laws to be discovered. I am certainly not saying that any heretofore non-discovery of such laws rules out future discovery, but it seems natural to ask what the original reasons are for believing that the Mengerian-Misesian program leads anywhere in the absence of such an already-discovered "track record" of valid laws.* I hope you can see why this would be something anyone who is considering devoting time to the strict program of Mengerian-Misesian praxeology would want to know.

*Note to other readers: I'm talking here very specifically about the strict Misesean approach to praxeology, which I think Adam (and probably I also) believe others since Mises to have departed from, and perhaps even Mises not to have followed perfectly in deriving the laws of human action such as marginal utility. I am not addressing the issue of whether the praxeological laws that are part of Austrian economics are valid or not.

Note also, I may be long in replying, as I have far less free time than I did before.

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

Adam Knott — Sat, 01 May 2010 14:42:04 GMT

"If I've understood you correctly, you're in favor of a value-neutral approach. If so, then what is your disagreement with Liberté regarding the fact that no objective statement can by itself possess the power to motivate action?"

*****

Zavoi:

Following Mises, I conceive a distinction between value-neutral or value-free science or the pursuit of such, and value advocacy.

I don't have a particular objection to that part of Liberte's formulation.

My point was that theoretical subjectivism need not refer to the idea of randomness or arbitrariness.

In the theory of action we can conceive that "value" is a category of action in formal relation to another category or categories, while the object of value, or that which is valued (the content), is not specified (since praxeology is formal and does not specify content).

Thus, we would have two formal categories: value and object of value.

We can call this subjectivism since we conceive these two categories as constituting the formal construct of an individual subject. Meaning, we conceive the category of value (of desire, of aiming at ends, of purpose, etc.) as an aspect of a subject.

We need not conceive the concept subjectivism as referring to randomness or arbitrariness.

The content of action; the object of action, is not specified, since the the theory is presented in formal terms.

Randomness or arbitrariness, referring to the way specific content comes to be, is not part of this analysis.

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

Zavoi — Sat, 01 May 2010 06:42:43 GMT

Liberté (emphasis added):
It's not a problem for me, but it is a problem for your theory; since a value which gives no one any reason to act is not a value.

Where have I suggested that "my theory" is a theory of objective values? I hope I haven't come across as trying to prove "objective values," since that's not my intention. Rather, my claim is that the Kinsella-type jurisprudential argument is in some sense all that is necessary, and whether or not you call it "ethics/values" is really beside the point.

In arguing for this position, I would prefer to avoid using the term "ethics," since that carries with it all sorts of preexisting connotations. Instead, I'd like to begin by asking: are you with me so far on this earlier post?

Adam Knott:
Is this Feng Shui ?

If someone answers yes or no, they accept the underlying premise and thus accept the theory implied by the term blessed, justified, and Feng Shui.

If by this question you mean "Is this arranged in such a way as to invoke favorable spirits?" or whatever, then the Feng-Shui-skeptic can still answer "no" without accepting the underlying theory. You would answer, "No, of course not - there's no such thing as 'favorable spirits.'"

Adam Knott:

"There are actions which are conducive to the process of civilization and being a member of human society, and then there are those which run counter to it."

I'm in support of this kind of approach. I do think this begins the process of taking things in a direction away from the theories of the some of the influential libertarian ethicists of the last century, and obviously toward a more Misesian view of things.

If I've understood you correctly, you're in favor of a value-neutral approach. If so, then what is your disagreement with Liberté regarding the fact that no objective statement can by itself possess the power to motivate action?

Re: Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

I. Ryan — Sat, 01 May 2010 03:47:17 GMT

zefreak:

wilderness:

"Hence, strictly speaking, according to empiricism, predictions are epistemologically impossible. It is irrational to want to predict, because the very possibility of prediction cannot be rationally established. And this, then, is also the ultimate reason for empiricism's skeptical stand regarding the possibility of scientific progress. For if one cannot rationally defend the very idea of causality, how can one expect anything from science but an array of incommensurable observational statements? Progress, as it is commonly understood, is the advancement of predictive knowledge. But surely no such thing can be possible if prediction itself cannot be established as possible." - Hoppe referencing McCloskey.

This kind of analysis betrays a complete misunderstanding of the basic tenets of empiricism and explains why I have never heard of McCloskey. He is not alone; I would argue that even the venerated Karl Popper misunderstood Hume's paradigm (which perhaps explains the widespread misconceptions of Hume's philosophy).

Firstly, empiricism does not pronounce prediction to be epistemologically impossible. One of Hume's accomplishments was to prove the illegitimacy of any rationalist account for induction. This was the problem that Popper attempted to solve via his falsification principle, although as has been shown by people on this forum and elsewhere it is not a sufficient formulation of induction. This is not a problem for empiricists, who have made great strides in formalizing induction via kolmogorov complexity, solomonoff and bayesian induction. However, the probabilistic nature means that such formalizations, while logically coherent and useful, do not overcome Hume's problem of induction. Empiricists accept such models to be justified by their success and explanatory power, as fitting the world around them. This is why Hume rejected rationalism; logic by itself was insufficient to tell us anything about the world.

McCloskey argues that empiricists cannot rationally establish causality. He can mean two things here. If he uses the word rational to mean they cannot establish causal relations between objects in the world using logic then he is correct, although such is not specific to empiricists. He seems to imply that this means empiricists reject causation and are skeptical of scientific progress; this is an interesting assertion considering the relation of empirical philosophers to science (the two often coincide) and that almost all breakthroughs in philosophy of science have been by empiricists.

In reality, empiricists are not skeptical of causality or the scientific method not because they have discovered within logic a justification of induction. Rather, they accept induction on its own terms, within which logic is but a tool to clarify and discover necessary relations between matters of fact. It is the rationalist who propounds logic as the one true source of knowledge and it should be the rationalist who is skeptical of causality and induction.

This caricature of Hume as an anti-science skeptic needs to disappear. It betrays an ignorance within the field of philosophy which can only be compared to that between Creationists and science.

Excellent post. Thank you.