Political Theory

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

cognitivist — Sun, 30 May 2010 04:13:49 GMT

Snowflake:

This approach frustrates any attempt to sacrifice one for the many, because it must rely on some conception of aggregate good, which is meaningless.

Because aggregate good is a preference, that does not mean that it is meaningless. If we could, we would have killed Hitler. Or Stalin. Or any of the other brutal dictators to rake this earth of a huge sum of entirely non-aggressive peoples. But in other situations it would possess little to no significance. it is contrary to the NAP though.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Sieben — Sun, 30 May 2010 03:50:23 GMT

Smiling Dave:
I have no units to measure it. So what? I think every person who ever existed on the face of the Earth would agree that yes, the world is more miserable from that transaction.

My caveman brain agrees too. We have evolved to have ideas about what our fellow man is experiencing. This says nothing about the philosophical validity of this empathy.

Smiling Dave:
"Nope, no way of knowing, ridiculous to even ask, if the world is unhappier from that," I see it as a flaw in the theory.

Rather than paint the world as less happy, I am proposing that we can say such a world is unjust, or disutilitarian (my conception).

Smiling Dave:
All plans are equally good..

What you mean is that "all plans are equal in aggregate good". No plan can ever be evaluated for this parameter becuase it does not exist. Aggregate 'good' is a linguistic invention, nothing more. It only holds our attention because of our evolutionary instincts that I explained about.

Thus my Utilitarianism abandons trying to maximize 'overall good' or whatever. The only good that can be advanced is subjective and individual. You cannot make interpersonal comparisons of this property. The only way to promote this kind of good is to preserve people's freedom to pursue their goals.

This approach frustrates any attempt to sacrifice one for the many, because it must rely on some conception of aggregate good, which is meaningless.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

cognitivist — Sun, 30 May 2010 03:45:00 GMT

He is reserved the choice. What we cannot see is this man's potential guilt, should he not sacrifice himself. Perhaps there is an optimality in GHP comparing the potential loss of life and one man's guilt?

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Smiling Dave — Sun, 30 May 2010 03:24:22 GMT

Snowflake:

I have no units to measure it. So what? I think every person who ever existed on the face of the Earth would agree that yes, the world is more miserable from that transaction.

Theories are meant to organize and sharpen our understanding of the real world. If a theory says "Nope, no way of knowing, ridiculous to even ask, if the world is unhappier from that," I see it as a flaw in the theory.

I see a flaw also in your rebuttal of Utilitarianism. Because if we can't really tell what's best, why not do whatever we please? All plans are equally good.. Why not just go wherever cunning and force leads us? Maybe the world as it is right now is perfect, because Obama is happy. Why expend energy fighting it?

My thoughts on Utilitarianism. Say the world contracts a rare disease and everyone will die, except one person. That fellow has something in his blood that makes him immune. Now for some odd reason, it turns out that if he was to be crucified, his blood bleeding on the cross would save the world. He doesn't like the idea at all.

I think that indeed the sum total of human happiness would be greater if he was killed. But I think that he has the right to say "I don't care about the sum total of human happiness. I care about me more than the whole world put together, and that's my privilege. It's my body and my blood, and I will do with it as I please."

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Smiling Dave — Sun, 30 May 2010 03:01:24 GMT

Are you aware that what Caplan is criticizing is Rothbard claiming that market exchanges are always Pareto improvements?

That's right. Didn't notice that.

So yeah, Rothbard missed the boat here. Absolutely.

I would have argued differently.

Every govt action makes the owner of his own property unhappy, by taking it away from him withthe threat of force.

Every exchange makes the owners happier. As for the rest of the world being jealous or whatever, that's their problem. Deal with it, rest of the woirld. Grow up, whatever. No reason for anyone to consider your emotional state when you should be minding your own business.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Sieben — Sun, 30 May 2010 03:00:58 GMT

Smiling Dave:
So if one person permanently cripples the whole world [but himself] because he likes hearing their shrieks of despair, we cannot make a judgement that the world as a whole is a sadder place?

And what units would you measure it in? Sadmeters? Its reprehensible for a ton of different reasons. Libertarian, obviously...

But, now most Utilitarians don't think like this, but I think they should, that since you can't ever make interpersonal comparisons of utility you *can't* evaluate the effifacy of different plans for the world. You have to let people engage in voluntary relationships because that's the only way you can for sure increase their subjective wellbeing. From this position, a Utilitarian cannot even consider harming one for the good of the many, but rather must find an equal moral worth in each human being, wishing them the greatest possible good in their each of their lives.

This idea is highly undeveloped, but i've been toying with it for a while. Hopefully something good comes out of it.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Smiling Dave — Sun, 30 May 2010 02:51:19 GMT

I'm saying you can't even make this judgement without presupposing that some people can be objectively happier than others. Its nonsense.

1. That may be so. However, both Rothbard and Caplan disagree with you [as shown in the Caplan article] and assume that there might be such a thing. Rothbard just says we can't know someone is truly jealous, Caplan is claiming [quite rightly, it seems to me] that of course we can.

2. So if one person permanently cripples the whole world [but himself] because he likes hearing their shrieks of despair, we cannot make a judgement that the world as a whole is a sadder place?

I can't accept a premise that concludes this.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

scineram — Sun, 30 May 2010 02:46:07 GMT

Are you aware that what Caplan is criticizing is Rothbard claiming that market exchanges are always Pareto improvements?

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Sieben — Sun, 30 May 2010 02:40:21 GMT

scineram:
This scenario does not exist. What are you talking about?

The example I'm using? Pay attention.

scineram:
I never said their unhappiness is greater. Only that it exists. This dooms Pareto improvement.

I'm not claiming pareto efficiency.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Sieben — Sun, 30 May 2010 02:37:51 GMT

Smiling Dave:
then IT MIGHT BE the case that everyone else is so jealous of the two people making the exchange that MAYBE the world as a whole is worse off

I'm saying you can't even make this judgement without presupposing that some people can be objectively happier than others. Its nonsense.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

scineram — Sun, 30 May 2010 02:34:33 GMT

The bigots pay the gays not to get married. We let the price levels determine the outcome.

This scenario does not exist. What are you talking about?

Holding that it is possible for one group's happiness to cause greater unhappiness in another group presupposes the ability to compare interpersonal utility.

I never said their unhappiness is greater. Only that it exists. This dooms Pareto improvement.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Smiling Dave — Sun, 30 May 2010 02:33:34 GMT

Why should exchange increase welfare of third parties? Why does austrian economics need to claim that? There is no reason ican see for it. Only the welfare of the participants involved need meet the criteria

Because he is discussing a claim Rothbard made. Here's the relevant paragraph from Caplan:

"While Rothbard and Mises had similar objections to mainstream utility theory, Rothbard went one step further by "reconstructing" welfare economics along Austrian lines. His main conclusions are simple and austere: every market transaction benefits all participants, while every act of government intervention benefits some people at the expense of others. Rothbard goes on to make a seemingly stronger claim: "If we allow ourselves to use the term 'society' to depict the pattern of all individual exchanges, then we may say that the free market 'maximizes' social utility, since everyone gains in utility."[20] This claim might be re-phrased to say simply that each voluntary exchange benefits all participants, and the free market permits the implementation of all desired voluntary exchanges."

The idea being that the two people who exchange both gain, everyone else in the world in unaffected, therefor the "whole world" gains.

Now for Snowflake's objection, that "Holding that it is possible for one group's happiness to cause greater unhappiness in another group presupposes the ability to compare interpersonal utility."

Caplan is not saying that. He is saying that, since we indeed cannot make that comparison, then IT MIGHT BE the case that everyone else is so jealous of the two people making the exchange that MAYBE the world as a whole is worse off [=more unhappy]. That's all he's claiming. And he's saying this to refute Rothbard, who claims that when A and B exchange, everyone else is MUST BE considered neutral about it.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Sieben — Sat, 29 May 2010 21:14:56 GMT

scineram:
This looks like the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. But still not Pareto improvement, why would the gays pay the bigots when they can ignore them?

You're confused. The bigots pay the gays not to get married. We let the price levels determine the outcome.

scineram:
No one compared interpersonal utility. Fail.

Holding that it is possible for one group's happiness to cause greater unhappiness in another group presupposes the ability to compare interpersonal utility.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

scineram — Sat, 29 May 2010 18:58:47 GMT

For example, if a gay couple wishes to get married and there's a bunch of rednecks who don't want it to go through, they could offer to pay the couple not to marry. In this way, the interests of actors on the market are harmonized.

This looks like the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. But still not Pareto improvement, why would the gays pay the bigots when they can ignore them?

The objection presupposes that we can engage in interpersonal comparisons of utility, because it relies on the idea that the happiness of one group could be offset by the happiness of the other group. Can't compare subjective utility. Fail.

No one compared interpersonal utility. Fail.

Re: Actual vs. Percieved Social Utility (Neo-Classical & Austrians)

Sieben — Sat, 29 May 2010 17:40:31 GMT

scineram:
and claim that since there is no "ironclad proof" that third parties do not object to other people's voluntary exchanges,

This information would be transmitted on the market in the form of prices. For example, if a gay couple wishes to get married and there's a bunch of rednecks who don't want it to go through, they could offer to pay the couple not to marry. In this way, the interests of actors on the market are harmonized.

The objection presupposes that we can engage in interpersonal comparisons of utility, because it relies on the idea that the happiness of one group could be offset by the happiness of the other group. Can't compare subjective utility. Fail.