Political Theory

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

Ricky James Moore II — Tue, 08 Feb 2011 03:57:46 GMT

It never ceases to amaze me how widespread the Venus Project nonsense is on the Internet. I run into it everywhere from blogs to debate forums (that have nothing to do with money or economics) to even comments on online news articles.

A friend of mine is a very libertarian fellow by nature and had a lot of interest in the Venus Project. I easily got him to come 'round to my view that their moneyless economy was nonsense, though we both agree that the concept of applied hypertechnology is quite appealing.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

Clayton — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 20:29:54 GMT

Universalizability is a highly controversial topic in ethics and metaethics. I think you are far too cavalier with it here. Neither Aristotle nor Roderick Long consider universalizability necessary or sufficient for a moral theory. Indeed, it is questionable whether universalizabilty actually makes any sense. Why stop at humans? Why should not moral principles also be applicable to rocks? If there are relevant differences in humans the Aristotilian view would be that there can be relevant moral differences thereby; just as there are moral differences between men and rocks.

Because rocks can't fight or argue. If you and me get involved into a dispute and we are roughly peers, how can I reasonably expect you to agree to a resolution of the dispute that I would not, in principle, agree to if the situation was reversed? This is where universalizability applies. I think the problem with the metaphysical treatment of universalizability - ala Kant's CI - is that it is not tied to the real world of human affairs... costs, benefits, human emotions and motives, etc. This is how you end up at the absurd state of affairs where rocks have the same right to exist unmoved as any man has. But if you start from human disputes between peers* and consider what are the realistically possible resolutions to such disputes, you quickly realize that some sort of universalizability must hold.

This line of reasoning does, however, lead to the uncomfortable (for me) conclusion that the State is no more illegitimate than the human family. Both involve some level of coercion, extortion and redistribution. However, I think there are some "methodological deficiencies" in the legal systems of the world that, if corrected, could result in a drastically reduced State footprint and a dramatic improvement in the human condition. One of these methodological improvements is removing the conflict of interest in permitting the Prince's courts to rule in disputes between the Prince and his subjects. A second methodological improvement would be the (re-)emergence of competitive production of court services. My specific proposal is to eliminate the idea of a "World Criminal Court" and instead permit those whose convictions are upheld by the highest court in a land to appeal to the court system of another nation. For example, if I'm convicted of some crime in the United States and my appeals fail all the way to the Supreme Court, I should be able to take my case to the courts in another nation because perhaps the courts of the United States are themselves biased and I am being convicted as a result of a systemic problem. The World Criminal Court suffers from the same absurd conflict of interest as any territorial legal monopolist but if I can appeal to competitive jurisdictions, perhaps I stand a chance of getting a fair hearing.

Clayton -

*This is an important point, disputes between non-peers, e.g. between the Prince and one of his subjects, do not obey the same dynamic

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

Clayton — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 20:13:21 GMT

I don't find the NAP to be conceptually useful. Under any legal system 'non-aggression' is tautological; the question is 'what counts as aggression?'

One anti-libertarian tendency that I see as highly pronounced is the mistrust money and monetary exchanges; ranging across many political ideologies. Money is the non plus ultra of both indirect coordination and the 'unseen'. Money's particular usefulness is almost nil (aside from its non-montary functions) and it only comes into its own in exchange, thus making it seem as people are demanding and accumulating something which is on the face of it useless; that people are starving for want of a commodity that has no obvious function. Likewise money is the prime coordinator of the production processes, making capitalists and financial markets appearing to the layman nothing more than useless shuffling around of a useless commodity.

Insightful. Add to that the monetary machinations and manipulations of the Prince and his rent-seeking entourage (the "Establishment") and it is easy to see how people begin to view money as a problem in itself. It never ceases to amaze me how widespread the Venus Project nonsense is on the Internet. I run into it everywhere from blogs to debate forums (that have nothing to do with money or economics) to even comments on online news articles.

Clayton -

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

thelion — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 20:10:16 GMT

Kantian Universality (from his book on Law) is just a restatement of Confucius' Golden Rule.

It is part of all coherentist philosophies, say Brand Blanshard's (although he thought ethics and morals do exist--his example, which is not quite correct, that people dying in gladiator fights for entertainment is immoral--Mises would counter death cannot ever aid division of labour, hence it is immoral, not for any other reason).

It does not mean that you must not lie to a murderer. You can always choose to lie to a murderer, and always choose to tell the truth to non-murderers.

If you accept mathematical postulates are reality, a priori, as Mises did, you are implying coherentist and universalist principles of ethics. E.g., Hazlitt and Mises: anything that aids division of labour is "good", if the word is to exist at all; everything else, ethically "bad", because a priori, only division of labour is a general rule to increase pleasure irrespective of particular preferences--its true for whatever preferences you have.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

James — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 10:04:14 GMT

This is not at all 'obvious'. It also ignores internal circumstances - such as the values and aims of the actor in a given situation. And what circumstances count as 'the same'? No two historical events are ever 'the same circumstances'.

You have gained nothing by way of clarification, nor have you addressed the arbitrariness of universalizability as a criterion for moral rules..

It's not at all obvious that if there's a moral rule proscribing a given action, it must apply to everyone?

Imagine that an ethical code alleged the definition of murder to be: "The voluntary killing of another moral actor by means of an initiation of force, unless the moral actor in question has red hair."

It doesn't matter how this ethical principle was derived, the fact of the matter is that people with red hair are not going to pay very much attention to it. This is an obvious praxeological truth. It cannot possibly be a valid moral system if an entire class of its putative moral actors have got absolutely no rational self-interest in abiding by its terms in the absence of someone forcing them to do so. A moral actor abiding by what he believes to be a valid ethical code behaves as he does because he expects others to abide by the same ethical principles vis-a-vis himself. He knows that if he murders, he cannot argue that he himself should not be murdered. Red-haired people would have no such incentive under this ethical system, and yet they are held to be moral actors in terms of it. It must be invalid.

Likewise, a hypothetical ethical system which accepts the non-aggression principle in terms of adults, but not in terms of children, is invalid in much the same way. Children are held to be moral actors as surely as adults are. They are punished and rewarded by their parents constantly in terms of what their parents tell them is morally appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. In fact, they are punished for minor infractions far more severely than the typical adult, punished for behaviour which would not be considered immoral by adults etc. They are punished if they are simply not aesthetically appealing to adults - if they don't dress in a manner arbitrarily prescribed for them, or if they don't speak in a subservient, self-deprecating fashion at all times, or if they express an opinion which is unpopular. The notion that parents exist, or should exist, as benevolent guardians who function to assist their children to become fully developed adults equipped to pursue their own destiny, and exercising authority over them exclusively in terms of what is in the child's best interests, is an extremely recent one, historically. Its emergence is mirrored extremely closely by the emergence of governments which are justified as benevolent guiding influences necessary to regulate society in terms of its best interests, and provide for it inasmuch as it cannot provide for itself through non-coercive means.

For most of human history, children were produced by the vast majority of parents to function as labour devices and sex toys. Children existed primarily to benefit and serve their parents. They were slaves, which could be sold or exchanged like livestock. It's not a pretty story, and it doesn't deserve prettying up. During this time, there were no flowery justifications for the state in terms of it being a fundamentally benevolent institution gently guiding humanity along the right path. It was, of course, deemed to be essential to civilization as they knew it; but still there was no illusion that it existed as a benevolent guiding entity to serve the people's needs. The people existed to serve the sovereign's needs, and by his mercy they may be allowed to subsist on his table scraps.

The rhetorical character of the idealised state mirrors the rhetorical character of the idealised family. This is not just a coincidence. It happens because there is and always has been immense pressure on the young child to internalize and accept their parents' ethical systems as valid. There's immense pressure for the young child to accept everything the parent says about the world to be valid and true. There's probably an underlying genetic component to this. I'm sure children with an inherent tendency to listen to their parents when told not to play with snakes etc were more survivable than those which weren't - and of course parents would just kill or trade into slavery children they didn't want.

The reason why so many people seem to have an emotional adverse reaction to libertarian-minded inquiry and argumentation - the fundamental stuff - is because they would have been punished - or at least conditioned against - that kind of thinking when they were very young children under the care of their parents. "As long as you live under my roof..." is exactly the same moral justification as "If you don't like the rules in this country, you should leave". To reject the latter and accept the former is to court cognitive dissonance. To accept both is to admit that your parents were, to some extent, evil, and that you might be evil to some extent yourself.

I'm sorry, folks, you're not going to see a more libertarian society until you start seeing more libertarian families. Most people can't handle the sort of contradictions that arise otherwise.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

garegin — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 07:01:47 GMT

kant tried to be newtonian about it. i think he was on the right path. whats good for the goose...

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

Ricky James Moore II — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 06:16:52 GMT

I'm simply saying that if the NAP - or any other proposed moral principle - is not universal in the sense that it applies to all actors under the same circumstances, then it's obviously not a valid moral principle.

This is not at all 'obvious'. It also ignores internal circumstances - such as the values and aims of the actor in a given situation. And what circumstances count as 'the same'? No two historical events are ever 'the same circumstances'.

You have gained nothing by way of clarification, nor have you addressed the arbitrariness of universalizability as a criterion for moral rules.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

James — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 06:09:54 GMT

Your definitions seem arbitrary and hardly uncontroversial.

You describe not only my definitions, sir, but my whole life.

Furthermore, you did not address the fact that universalizability is a Kantian notion; part of a system which is considered utterly exploded by almost every philosopher alive. Even the Neo-Kantians would not defend Kantian universalizability as a criterion, Kant himself pointed out that it led to absurd and ghastly conclusions.

I simply do not thin universalizability is either true or useful; if it is even coherent.

I'm not a believer in the categorical imperative.

To clarify:

Kant thought that every single thing you ever did had to be justified ethically in terms of whether it could 'rationally' be willed to become universal law. You'd be obliged to tell a murderer where his victim was hiding, because lying is universally undesirable etc. Obviously it's nonsense.

I'm simply saying that if the NAP - or any other proposed moral principle - is not universal in the sense that it applies to all actors under the same circumstances, then it's obviously not a valid moral principle. If the reason you're choosing to abandon the NAP for children is because they are less experienced, wizened and knowledgeable than adults, then you should abandon the NAP for all actors who are less experienced, wizened and knowledgeable than a given arbitrary standard. Government should be able to do what it likes because it knows best and we're living under its roof. If we don't like it, we should leave.

At the very least, libertarianism is reduced to hit-and-miss argument-from-effect tactics. And government ultimately stands as judge in its own case, just as parents do.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

Ricky James Moore II — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 04:49:00 GMT

Morality qualifies action, hence only that which acts can be subject to moral principles.

Your definitions seem arbitrary and hardly uncontroversial. Furthermore, you did not address the fact that universalizability is a Kantian notion; part of a system which is considered utterly exploded by almost every philosopher alive. Even the Neo-Kantians would not defend Kantian universalizability as a criterion, Kant himself pointed out that it led to absurd and ghastly conclusions.

I simply do not thin universalizability is either true or useful; if it is even coherent.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

James — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 04:46:01 GMT

Universalizability is a highly controversial topic in ethics and metaethics. I think you are far too cavalier with it here. Neither Aristotle nor Roderick Long consider universalizability necessary or sufficient for a moral theory. Indeed, it is questionable whether universalizabilty actually makes any sense. Why stop at humans? Why should not moral principles also be applicable to rocks? If there are relevant differences in humans the Aristotilian view would be that there can be relevant moral differences thereby; just as there are moral differences between men and rocks.

Morality qualifies action, hence only that which acts can be subject to moral principles.

Moral principles do apply to rocks, by proxy, if they are someone's property. ;)

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

garegin — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 04:38:14 GMT

movements have cachet when they get victories. everyone is anti-hitler because germany lost the war not because average folk value habeas corpus and individual rights. we need statism to loose too.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

Ricky James Moore II — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 04:25:59 GMT

Universalizability is a highly controversial topic in ethics and metaethics. I think you are far too cavalier with it here. Neither Aristotle nor Roderick Long consider universalizability necessary or sufficient for a moral theory. Indeed, it is questionable whether universalizabilty actually makes any sense. Why stop at humans? Why should not moral principles also be applicable to rocks? If there are relevant differences in humans the Aristotilian view would be that there can be relevant moral differences thereby; just as there are moral differences between men and rocks.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

James — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 04:19:50 GMT

Nonsense. A small child* is utterly unable to care for itself. In a primitive environment, without constant tending from a parent, a child would perish in a matter of hours, not days. All other mammals that I'm aware of exercise coercive force on their youngsters. I understand that the coercive family breaks the Non-Aggression Principle but that's tough. When reality collides with your paradigm, it's the paradigm that has to change. Reality is what it is. This is why I reject the NAP as a universal norm... it simply doesn't work when thoroughly and consistently applied to human behavior.

What do you mean by universal "norm"? It's a moral principle. Whether or not it's the "norm" of recorded human behaviour up to this point is irrelevant in terms of its validity as a universal moral principle. Statism, war, chattel slavery and genocide are all 'normal' human behaviours, Clayton.

Anyway, it must apply universally as a principle - regardless of whether anyone is currently paying attention to it - because otherwise you can't justify it logically. You can't justify actual aggression against dependent children in a family and then say that aggression against citizens by a state is fundamentally wrong in all cases. The fundamental justifications for the existence of the family and the state are the same. They always have been. Of course you have to understand what 'aggression' actually is - shoving a small child out of the way of an oncoming truck isn't aggression, because that wouldn't be aggression if you did it to anyone else in the same situation. Nor would batting a bottle of poison out of their hand if they were about to drink it. I don't know what you're envisioning exactly. We can accept the obvious premise that the young child's faculties, wisdom and knowledge of the world are comparatively undeveloped relative to those of the average healthy adult without, by necessity, accepting that the NAP does not apply to children. What about people who are intoxicated, senile, mentally ill, neurologically or developmentally impaired? Does the NAP suddenly not apply to them either? What about people with lower IQ's? What about people who aren't 'experts' in a given field, annointed as such by society? Shouldn't those who know better be allowed to override the wishes of simpler people to do what's best for them?

The reality, of course, is that the vast majority of children are not raised under a system of ethics which respects the non-aggression principle towards them, so it's really no surprise that they grow up with no respect for it as adults.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

Ricky James Moore II — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 03:52:52 GMT

I find MacDonald to vastly overstate his case and be eurocentric in his judgments of the nature and quality of Western cutlure. Western culture is, for the most part, as socialist and mystical as the Fiji Islander's. Likewise it seems to me that modern Asia is more pro-commercial than any substantial group in the West.

The economist Gregory Clark argues in his book A Farewell to Alms that the rise of the industrial revolution may have something to do with the 'survival of the most miserly', to which Hans Hoppe would probably add a lower-time preferences and heightened intelligence.

Re: The socio-biological explanation for human's aversion to libertarianism

newson — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 03:43:43 GMT

http://www.toqonline.com/archives/v2n2/TOQv2n2MacDonald.pdf

a social-evolutionist's view on the uniqueness of western culture, and why western liberalism (in the old sense of the word) is not likely to spread to all corners of the globe.