Political Theory

Re: Libertarian ethics

AnonLLF — Mon, 03 Jan 2011 19:36:05 GMT

Natural rights,Natural law, Virtue Ethics,Enlightened self Interest,a dash of consequentialism and Eudaimoniaism.

Re: Libertarian ethics

Autolykos — Fri, 22 Oct 2010 03:29:34 GMT

I. Ryan:
Of course.

(And a problem with this which I didn't mention in that post is that the "goals" which natural selection "had in mind" when it "designed" our moral sentiments, tastes, and so on, could be different than the goals which we now consciously have in mind, which is something which we should take into consideration when we evaluate the advice from our subconsciousness!)

Most definitely. As we've only been practicing agriculture for the last 12,000 years at most, our minds are still firmly in the evolutionary context of relatively small and isolated hunter-gatherer groups living out in the open.

Re: Libertarian ethics

I. Ryan — Fri, 22 Oct 2010 03:03:31 GMT

Autolykos:

Of course, that presumes we have certain goals and not others. There's no way to prove which goals are the "correct" ones without first presuming at least one goal as a given.

Of course.

(And a problem with this which I didn't mention in that post is that the "goals" which natural selection "had in mind" when it "designed" our moral sentiments, tastes, and so on, could be different than the goals which we now consciously have in mind, which is something which we should take into consideration when we evaluate the advice from our subconsciousness!)

Re: Libertarian ethics

liberty student — Fri, 22 Oct 2010 01:44:59 GMT

Autolykos:

GooPC:
I’ve got a question for you folks who are discussing the is-ought problem. How do interpret “unethical” actions of the state. For example, on LewRockwell.com writers are constantly referring to politicians as murders, criminals, thieves, etc. But these are just subjective moral.

Do you agree or disagree with these moral condemnations of the state? If you agree with them, don’t you still have to admit that these actions are only unethical according to a subjective morality?

Yes.

Re: Libertarian ethics

Autolykos — Fri, 22 Oct 2010 01:14:02 GMT

GooPC:
I’ve got a question for you folks who are discussing the is-ought problem. How do interpret “unethical” actions of the state. For example, on LewRockwell.com writers are constantly referring to politicians as murders, criminals, thieves, etc. But these are just subjective moral.

Do you agree or disagree with these moral condemnations of the state? If you agree with them, don’t you still have to admit that these actions are only unethical according to a subjective morality?

Yes.

Re: Libertarian ethics

GooPC — Fri, 22 Oct 2010 01:12:16 GMT

I’ve got a question for you folks who are discussing the is-ought problem. How do interpret “unethical” actions of the state. For example, on LewRockwell.com writers are constantly referring to politicians as murders, criminals, thieves, etc. But these are just subjective moral.

Do you agree or disagree with these moral condemnations of the state? If you agree with them, don’t you still have to admit that these actions are only unethical according to a subjective morality?

Re: Libertarian ethics

John Ess — Fri, 22 Oct 2010 00:05:47 GMT

Morals are ontologically subjective, while epistemologically objective. (a moral is not a physical object, but is necessarily made to apply to more than one subject and so is objective in the sense of numbers, math, etc.). A moral that is subjective is nonsensical, like a house you can't live in nor use to serve as a model.

That people can keep a system of morality is good enough that it can be an objective system. All collections of statements can be considered 'objective' (not as things in themselves, but our reflections on them and their availability to more than one person), regardless of if they make sense or not. On the other hand, saying that 'moral arguments' are wrong to make only draws people into morality, rather than reject it. It merely begs the question.

From here, it seems the job of ethics is to untangle whether someone's system is consistent or can be consistent. Within the realm of logic.

Aesthetics is a result of our systems and the value system we hold; an outgrowth of it. That doesn't mean the system is always good (many people have 'feelings' for no reason they can figure out and that is not healthy) -- or even conscious -- but the proof that we have systems regardless of if we decide to make them rational through philosophical pursuit or not. Rational people can explore their premises that drive their emotions and preferences. Not to get rid of their emotions nor to justify their emotions, but to know the meaning behind it. But morals and aesthetics are not the same, for this very reason.

Re: Libertarian ethics

Daniel James Sanchez — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 23:54:29 GMT

ladyphoenix:

(Hooray for first posts!)

Welcome to the Mises forums!

Re: Libertarian ethics

Autolykos — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 23:53:01 GMT

Jonathan M. F. Catalán:
Ladyphoenix,

So, not to put words in your mouth, but it would seem you're saying that empirical truth of a specific moral tenet is impossible to determine? However, it is possible to empirically determine (though not necessarily so) that a person holds to a specific moral tenet?

I'm not sure, it could be that you and I are saying the same thing. I believe that if a specific moral proposition is held by every individual on the planet it is because every individual on the planet subjectively believes that proposition to be true, not because the proposition is inherently or objectively true as a matter of prescribed natural morality. Or, in other words, morality is a belief.

It sounds like your answers to both of her questions are yes. :)

I'd add that, as I've said before, a specific moral proposition is held by (nearly) every individual on the planet because it is part of their set of "moral instincts". StrangeLoop has been saying basically the same thing here.

Speaking of which...

StrangeLoop:
I would only add that if morals are only non-factual beliefs, then there is no rational, deliberative process to arrive at conclusively true morals.

I agree. I'd say the crux is the is-ought problem: the fact that something is so in no way implies or proves that it should be so. To be honest, I think a better name for the is-ought problem is the fact-value problem.

Indeed, I see morality as just another kind of valuation by individuals. Can anyone prove that a given value for a car is the correct one? Hence since morality consists of values, and values are subjective, morality is subjective.

I. Ryan:
So our moral sentiments are an adaptation to achieve social cooperation. And, in economics, we ask how we should interact with each other to achieve our goals. So we have two ways to figure out how we should interact with each other: the advice from our subconsciousness (our moral sentiments), and our conscious thought (our "moral ideas").

Of course, that presumes we have certain goals and not others. There's no way to prove which goals are the "correct" ones without first presuming at least one goal as a given.

Interestingly enough, though, nearly all people have an instinct that I call "the social instinct". It's more than a desire to cooperate with one another -- it's a desire to be (or feel) accepted by those around us. I think it's this social instinct that compels us to seek out one another and subsequently cooperate. Of course, that instinct itself arose through evolution.

GooPC:
When are you even absent any prior premises, Crouse on his island? But he’s all alone so there really is no concept of ethics, properly rights, or self-ownership when there is only one person.

It seems that we might be using the word "premise" in different ways. I'm using it in the context of pure deductive logic.

GooPC:
I guess if someone is just going to go around shooting people, they aren’t arguing over ethics and we can’t say their ethics are wrong. The problem arises when that person explains why they are killing people. The act of argumentation creates certain premises, namely that humans ought to have a right to self-ownership.

I’m not totally sure about all this, I’m new of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics, but it seems to work out to me.

If someone is just going to go around shooting people, I'll sure as hell still say that I consider his ethics to be wrong. :P

While commend Hoppe on his insight, his argumentation ethics is only valid for arguments. He himself admits this, of course. My point is that morality and ethics have bearing well outside philosphy. I'd say they're one of the main drivers for human action in general.

Re: Libertarian ethics

liberty student — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 22:33:51 GMT

StrangeLoop:
liberty student, when you share your thoughts like that, sometimes I think I could learn to like you.

Let's not get carried away here...

StrangeLoop:
Likewise, I outright deny moral statements can be objectively validated, and so I too abstain from employing moral arguments.

I'm fine with all of us appealing to moral sentiments, our temperaments, and cognitively-appetizing principles (e.g., self-ownership), but I consider all of that more rhetoric than fact. For instance, every time I argue for the legalization for drugs, I typically ask the opposing camp, "Don't you believe you own your own body?" However, such moral principles, I believe, actually bear no factual content.

I operate somewhat like this. As I explained to someone else, just because I dissect an argument, doesn't mean I am for the opposite. I don't particularly care what your morals are (and yes, I do believe you have them) as long as we're transparent about it when discussing issues where morals apply.

So if you say it is ok to steal to accomplish a particular end, I might pursue that to an extreme and ask where you draw the line with stealing, and how you can rationalize it. Most people don't take their rationalization to an extreme and doing so is a very effective tool for getting people to re-evaluate their positions, particularly blatantly, logically incoherent ones like statism.

Now if someone says, I wanna be a dictator and rape and pillage, I'm not going to argue with them. I believe they are a small part of society that is anti-social and dangerous, and I am happy they have identified themselves to me, so I can be careful around them.

But most people I believe, are copacetic (psychologically) with the golden rule. And if I can point out that some ideas are in contradiction to the golden rule, they more often than not, come around to a more libertarian POV. Which is good for me, because my ideal is a world where aggression is not only considered bad (as it is now) but it is understood in most of its forms, which I believe will lead to less chance of aggression occurring and more opportunities for market outcomes.

I can accept answers like "I don't know", "I want to kill you", "I think murder is wrong". I struggle with contradictions and false premises. I also get agitated when people speak through other thinkers, because I am no closer to understanding what THEY think. Just the act of articulating ones own beliefs, much like pedagogy, helps exposes weaknesses in our reasoning and moves us closer to reason, which is a good thing IMO.

Too frequent block quoting of authorities (by anyone) is sloth in my eyes.

Re: Libertarian ethics

GooPC — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 22:15:00 GMT

What I'm talking about is a person believing that something is right or wrong absent any prior premises. For example, one can believe that violating self-ownership is wrong a priori. But can he or anyone else prove that belief to be correct or incorrect? No.

When are you even absent any prior premises, Crouse on his island? But he’s all alone so there really is no concept of ethics, properly rights, or self-ownership when there is only one person.

why would I need to convince that you don't own yourself when I can just steal your stuff, beat you, and/or shoot you

I guess if someone is just going to go around shooting people, they aren’t arguing over ethics and we can’t say their ethics are wrong. The problem arises when that person explains why they are killing people. The act of argumentation creates certain premises, namely that humans ought to have a right to self-ownership.

I’m not totally sure about all this, I’m new of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics, but it seems to work out to me.

Re: Libertarian ethics

I. Ryan — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 22:06:48 GMT

StrangeLoop:

Reproductive fitness, in the long run.

But, let's say you feel morally compelled to take care of your children. That's evolutionarily easy to explain: you especially cherish your own children since they share half of your genes. If you didn't care so strongly for them, your children would be at a disadvantage compared to children who had parents with an adaptive want to nurture their offspring.

For the most part, I believe moral sentiments achieve social cooperation (e.g., punish free riders, recriprocate gifts, etc.).

So our moral sentiments are an adaptation to achieve social cooperation. And, in economics, we ask how we should interact with each other to achieve our goals. So we have two ways to figure out how we should interact with each other: the advice from our subconsciousness (our moral sentiments), and our conscious thought (our "moral ideas").

It is very important to understand that distinction, because, in almost every conversation about morality, conflating them leads to everybody talking past each other. If you want to talk sense about morality, you have to specify whether you are talking about our moral sentiments, our moral ideas, or both.

Let me switch gears for a second.

Consider a different kind of action: choosing what to eat. Instead of talking about how we should interact with other people, let's talk about what we should eat. (Of course not specifically.)

We have have two ways to figure out what we should eat: the advice from our subconsciousness (our taste faculty), and our conscious thought (our ideas about food). We can eat what tastes good, or we can eat what we think is the healthiest (if we are looking for what is the healthiest). Most people do a combination of them. Most people eat what tastes good, but also curb their cravings based on conscious ideas about how "healthy" each food is.

In that sense, people often receive the advice from their subconsciousness about food (cravings for something), but tend to disagree with that advice pretty often. Could we call that disagreeing? Could we say that our taste is "wrong"? If we are trying to eat what is the most healthy, would our subconsciousness be "wrong" if it advises us to eat something which would make us sickly?

Our taste faculty developed during a time in which most of the foods which people eat in the developed countries didn't exist. Pizza, grain-fed beef, chips, and so on didn't exist. So how "reliable" should we expect that faculty to be now, considering it developed to deal with totally different input than we give it now? If we design a program to deal with certain input, should we expect it to be reliable if we give it totally different input?

Let's move back to moral sentiments.

Did our "moral faculty" (what produces our moral sentiments) develop in a time in which most of the interactions which we have now didn't exist? Yes, I think so. Wouldn't it be reasonable to say that our "moral faculty" developed during a time before big, market economies came into existence? Wouldn't it be reasonable to say that our "moral faculty" developed during a time in which we lived in hunter-gatherer tribes, or something similar to that?

To conclude, our moral sentiments and our moral thoughts try to answer similar questions.

If we think that interacting with people in a way which our moral sentiments (such as our ordinary emotions about "price guaging" or something like that) prescribe wouldn't be the means to our ends, it would be fair to say that we think that they are "wrong" from our point of view. And, in the same, way, if I think that you interacting with people in a way which your moral thoughts (such as your conscious thoughts about economics) prescribe wouldn't be the means to your ends, it would be fair to say that I think that they are "wrong" from your point of view.

Our moral sentiments try to answer certain questions. They can be wrong. And our moral ideas also try to answer those questions. They can also be wrong. But both of them can only be wrong from the point of view of an actor with ends in mind.

We could call this subjectivism applied to morality.

This should clear up a lot of the confusion.

Re: Libertarian ethics

Lagrange multiplier — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 21:28:51 GMT

I. Ryan:
What are our moral sentiments an adaptation for?

Reproductive fitness, in the long run.

But, let's say you feel morally compelled to take care of your children. That's evolutionarily easy to explain: you especially cherish your own children since they share half of your genes. If you didn't care so strongly for them, your children would be at a disadvantage compared to children who had parents with an adaptive want to nurture their offspring.

For the most part, I believe moral sentiments achieve social cooperation (e.g., punish free riders, recriprocate gifts, etc.).

Re: Libertarian ethics

Lagrange multiplier — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 21:24:54 GMT

liberty student, when you share your thoughts like that, sometimes I think I could learn to like you.

I think we agree about the differences between a moral skeptic and a moral nihilist; the difference is that I believe that if a person abstains from arguing for his moral beliefs, then the arguments actually used can also be employed by a moral nihilist. That is, the same arguments--once purged of moral foundations--can be used by moral skeptics and moral nihilists alike.

That is, if we believe Friedman when he states, "I don't have any solid basis for my own moral beliefs, any way of proving to a reasonable and open minded skeptic that they are correct," then he doesn't attempt such a futile task (e.g., proving to others his moral beliefs, since he has no way "of proving...that they are correct"). Likewise, I outright deny moral statements can be objectively validated, and so I too abstain from employing moral arguments.

I'm fine with all of us appealing to moral sentiments, our temperaments, and cognitively-appetizing principles (e.g., self-ownership), but I consider all of that more rhetoric than fact. For instance, every time I argue for the legalization for drugs, I typically ask the opposing camp, "Don't you believe you own your own body?" However, such moral principles, I believe, actually bear no factual content.

Re: Libertarian ethics

I. Ryan — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 21:24:07 GMT

StrangeLoop:

Natural selection. I believe fundamental parts of our psyche are generated by genetic adaptations.

What are our moral sentiments an adaptation for?