Political Theory

Re: Rationality in Society

I. Ryan — Sun, 07 Nov 2010 04:07:00 GMT

Brainpolice:

These are the senses in which I'm calling it trivial.

Fair enough.

Re: Rationality in Society

JackCuyler — Sun, 07 Nov 2010 03:42:21 GMT

The issue, among other things, is that this "axiom" can essentially function as an appeal to what noone is going to debate in order to try to convince them of something that is debatable.

Since no one is going to debate it, persumably even you, why don't you actually debate what you term "debatable"? If you're not convinced, please tell us why.

But I would also say that nothing is an axiom if this means that what's being asserted is claimed to be inherently true and immune from all scrutiny. Philosophers always run into serious problems the moment that they try to give anything such a status.

Since that is the definition of axiom, I guess you just don't believe in axioms. That's fine. I hope you never have to buy carpet.

And, to be frank, the performative contradiction style of argument for such things is philosophically laughable and perhaps even amateur for a multitude of reasons. If anything, it is a perfect formula for fallacious and even manipulative debating (and debate-shutting-down) tactics.

You just said no one would debate the (alleged) axiom, but rather only the conclusions drawn from the (alleged) axiom. I'm just waiting for you to start.

Re: Rationality in Society

z1235 — Sun, 07 Nov 2010 03:31:31 GMT

Brainpolice:
But I would also say that nothing is an axiom if this means that what's being asserted is claimed to be inherently true and immune from all scrutiny.

All logical constructs are build on the basis of such "assertions" (premises, axioms). No logical construct can float unsuspended in thin air.

If anything, it is a perfect formula for fallacious and even manipulative debating (and debate-shutting-down) tactics.

Premises and axioms are either accepted or not. Nothing manipulative or fallacious about this. I like your posts but this thread may not be one of your best ones.

Re: Rationality in Society

Brainpolice — Sun, 07 Nov 2010 03:07:26 GMT

Which is precisely what an axiom is supposed to be. Would you prefer a more "interesting" world in which axioms are debatable and/or subject to proofs, as opposed to merely obvious and "trivial"?

The issue, among other things, is that this "axiom" can essentially function as an appeal to what noone is going to debate in order to try to convince them of something that is debatable. But I would also say that nothing is an axiom if this means that what's being asserted is claimed to be inherently true and immune from all scrutiny. Philosophers always run into serious problems the moment that they try to give anything such a status. And, to be frank, the performative contradiction style of argument for such things is philosophically laughable and perhaps even amateur for a multitude of reasons. If anything, it is a perfect formula for fallacious and even manipulative debating (and debate-shutting-down) tactics.

Re: Rationality in Society

z1235 — Sun, 07 Nov 2010 02:57:31 GMT

Brainpolice:
I meant that the words "humans act", in and of itself, is something that almost noone is going to disagree with.

Which is precisely what an axiom is supposed to be. Would you prefer a more "interesting" world in which axioms are debatable and/or subject to proofs, as opposed to merely obvious and "trivial"?

Re: Rationality in Society

Brainpolice — Sun, 07 Nov 2010 02:44:21 GMT

The category of action obviously isn't trivial, considering it is the foundation of economics.

Did you mean to deny that?

I meant that the words "humans act", in and of itself, is something that almost noone is going to disagree with. The special status that Austrianism (or some Austrians) puts on it, appealing to it almost as a reccuring rhetorical devise with which to justify other things that one is claiming (much like "A is A" functioned for Rand), is unwarranted. It's also something that one wouldn't state in any ordinary context, functioning more as a background assumption that isn't discussed (who asserts "humans act" other than austrians?). These are the senses in which I'm calling it trivial. It does not communicate very much or anything particularly controversial, and when it is used it's always cited as an unquestionable first principle from which every other belief that happens to be up for debate derives, when such a logical connection can be dubious.

Re: Rationality in Society

bcyclwutztht — Sun, 07 Nov 2010 01:41:48 GMT

My goal was nothing other than to defend Misesian methodology. If you are just attacking the crude offshoots of that (of which there are countless!), well, my response doesn't apply.

The differences between Misesian economics (i.e. praxeological economics) and its crude offshoots are fundamental (usually epistemological, no?). This fact ought to be taught widely, and at every opportunity, and be common knowledge within the Austrian school---For, if it can't be common knowledge even here, how possibly can such a distinction clearly be made to others outside of the Austrian school. Unfortunately, at present, it seems that the distinction is hidden from the view of many Austrians, who don't understand, or reject altogether, the importance of epistemology. As a result, they render themselves particularly vulnerable to the suasion of fallacious economic reasoning and unsound doctrines (indeed, I think this criticism applies to many Austrians of the past as well).

Re: Rationality in Society

JackCuyler — Sun, 07 Nov 2010 00:07:51 GMT

Indeed. And in the context of Austrian economics, the opposite of rational would be not rational. Human action is rational. Photosynthesis is not rational.

Didn't you just confirm or repeat precisely what the problem is? You've reasserted a definition of rationality that excludes the possibility of irrationality in any human context.

No, because in this context, the opposite of rational is not rational. The concept of irrational simply doesn't apply in this context. Humans think about their actions. That is, they use their reason or rationale. It has nothing to do with the soundness of their reasoning, or if it makes sense to others. The process of evaluation is what Austrians call rational. You used to understand this, but now you seem more interested debating the definition of a (possibly) misused word than debating the concepts it is being used to represent. This is a logical fallacy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equivocation

Austrians claim that humans evaluate their actions prior to acting, and call these actions "rational". It doesn't matter that they call it though. If you disagree that humans evaluate thier actions prior to acting, please supply an argument for the disagreement.

Re: Rationality in Society

I. Ryan — Sat, 06 Nov 2010 22:32:36 GMT

Brainpolice:

I would deny that "humans act" is known a priori

To be clear, I agree.

The category of action is known a priori (in the sense that it is a matter of fact of your private world which you can't conceive of as different), but whether it applies to anything isn't.

Brainpolice:

and I would say that "humans act" is a triviality that hardly anyone disagrees with

The category of action obviously isn't trivial, considering it is the foundation of economics.

Did you mean to deny that?

Brainpolice:

However, this "axiom" is generally used in a way that is loaded with much more specific premises, or a whole slew of claims and an entire social theory is said to deductively derive from it with absolute truth value (which I find to be an extraordinary claim).

[...]

What people find bizarre is the claim that everything else you claim is somehow justified by these two words.

Well, I agree. I think that a lot of people on here (and even some of the big names!) are guilty of this.

My goal was nothing other than to defend Misesian methodology. If you are just attacking the crude offshoots of that (of which there are countless!), well, my response doesn't apply.

Re: Rationality in Society

Esuric — Sat, 06 Nov 2010 22:29:48 GMT

I. Ryan: if what was in dispute was nothing more than two words ("humans act"), then I wouldn't be debating in this thread (although I would deny that "humans act" is known a priori, and I would say that "humans act" is a triviality that hardly anyone disagrees with). However, this "axiom" is generally used in a way that is loaded with much more specific premises, or a whole slew of claims and an entire social theory is said to deductively derive from it with absolute truth value (which I find to be an extraordinary claim).

So why don't you try to refute the arguments that are deduced from this premise, which you admit is so obviously true, and which no one would disagree with? To be honest, it seems like this thread is a reaction to the fact that you could not demonstrate that a voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange can be, at the same time, exploitative. In other words, you don't like the fact that economics, a value-free science, reveals that your subjective normative judgements are entirely arbitrary.

Re: Rationality in Society

Brainpolice — Sat, 06 Nov 2010 22:22:13 GMT

I. Ryan: if what was in dispute was nothing more than two words ("humans act"), then I wouldn't be debating in this thread (although I would deny that "humans act" is known a priori, and I would say that "humans act" is a triviality that hardly anyone disagrees with). However, this "axiom" is generally used in a way that is loaded with much more specific premises, or a whole slew of claims and an entire social theory is said to deductively derive from it with absolute truth value (which I find to be an extraordinary claim). If one doesn't believe in foundationalism, such a project would seem to be doomed from the start. It would be possible for at least some of its claims to be valid but for completely different reasons, and it wouldn't stand up as a complete theory. What people find bizarre is the claim that everything else you claim is somehow justified by these two words.

Re: Rationality in Society

Brainpolice — Sat, 06 Nov 2010 21:59:30 GMT

Here are three separate meanings:

1. If goal directed conduct, then XYZ   (formal/epistemological meaning)

2. That being over there is an acting being.   (zoological or ontological meaning)

3. If he does not believe that being over there is an acting being, he is a fraud and a liar.   (ethical and moral meaning)

Praxeology consistently carried through only needs and only relies on #1.

Part of the problem I'm having here is the restriction of the category "epistemological" to only the more broad, general formal sense that does not consider any particular question of truth value. What's "epistemological" is not exhausted by talk of what is construed as the basic necessities of thought. It's not simply that praxeology only relies on #1 vs. #3 I'm taking issue with, but #1 vs. the unmentioned rest of epistemology as something that can be applied to something more particular.

Perhaps. But this falls far short of a demonstration of how the tautology presented above is invalid. Thus, one is on reasonable grounds in believing that the tautology is valid. We are on reasonable grounds in believing that in walking toward one location we will be walking away from another location, until a more useful fiction (theory) is developed.

That's because it was not presented as a proof that it is invalid. It was presented as a possibility, or in reaction to the justification that such things are necessities of thought. I'm presenting, at some level, the Neitzschian alternative to Kant on the issue of "a priori knowledge".

As evidence of how difficult it is to avoid referring to action and its categories, both of your proposed substitutes refer to action:

"Useful fictions" Fictions that are used (i.e. utilized) for some assumed purpose.

"Practicalities" X has been found to be a practical means to attaining Y.

So what? What's in dispute isn't action itself. It's that the specific claims put foreward as a priori "axioms" are not necessarily truths at all so much as unavoidable foundations ingrained into the way that our minds function - in a sense that is neither provable or disprovable. We simply cannot concieve of them not being the case. Both formal skepticism and certain-knowledge just don't apply in this murky territory.

Again, perhaps. But then we need to compare the open system side by side with the axiomatic system and see which system provides a more satisfactory explanation. Austrian theory did this in supplanting the older objective or labor theory of value. Currently Austrian theory is competing with other theories to explain the current economic situation. If you believe there exists an 'open' theory or system that explains economic, ethical, or moral phenomena better than Austrian or formal analysis, then I assume you will be referring readers to that theory as embodied in particular essays or books.

When I talk about open vs. closed systems, I'm not saying that an open system is an alternative to Austrian theory. I'm talking about, even if we agreed on the theory, how it is treated in relation to what is outside of its borders, so to speak. It's a question of how Austrian theory is treated, I.E. as a complete ideology in and of itself (closed system) or as a useful yet incomplete theory that can only give us part of the picture and be used side by side with other methodologies, only working within a certain context. I'm a methodological pluralist about epistemologies.

Or you might mean that you don't care for Austrian analysis, and you believe that in the future a normative-oriented theory will emerge that surpasses Austrian theory?

I mean that even if Austrian theory is 100% correct, it would not negate normative theories in other domains. The moment it has the pretense of doing this, I think that it's being overextended into an all-encompassing philosophy.

Re: Rationality in Society

I. Ryan — Sat, 06 Nov 2010 21:54:22 GMT

Brainpolice:

Didn't you just confirm or repeat precisely what the problem is? You've reasserted a definition of rationality that excludes the possibility of irrationality in any human context.

This whole issue is solved easily if you just think of the idea of action, rationality, or whatever as a model that we can use to understand regularities in spatial movements, which could be useful or not. And we find that it is very useful, in that modeling other people as "rational", or as "actors" tends to let us predict how their body will move in the future. And, of course, that model is also very useful in predicting how the bodies of animals will move in the future!

We don't need to have some sort of aprioristic reason why other people are rational. We just look inside ourselves, come up with the idea of our own action (I presume you can do this, but maybe you can't, I don't know), and then use that idea as a model to predict the movements of other people and animals. In that sense it is an empirical question whether the "action axiom" even "applies" to anything. (And by "applies", again, I mean lets us understand the regularity in the succession of certain perceptions - that is lets us predict the future movements of other certain people or animals.)

Also note that Ludwig von Mises understood this. See the section in Human Action called "The Alter Ego". He admits that the question of whether his understanding of his own action applies to anything else is an "empirical" question solved by the fact that it "works". Nobody can deny that it works. And it should be admitted that it is impossible to say whether somebody else is "really" conscious. Who cares? The question is in vain. The point is that modeling them as conscious works!

Ask yourself this: What if somebody isn't an actor, but just moves like one? What if somebody isn't conscious, but his movement is exactly the same as that of everybody else? What would happen to Austrian economics? Would it cease to be "apodictically certain"? No. Saying that he moves like one is giving away the whole thing. The fact that he moves like an actor is enough to let the "action axiom" apply to him. In fact, we can't establish anything other than the fact that other people move like they are actors! I don't know whether you are "really" conscious, and that might be a meaningless question anyway.

Again, this whole issue is instantly solved if you just consider it like this: You look inside yourself, come up with an idea of your own volition or will, and then use that as a model to predict the movements of other people (and even animals). All of the metaphysical problems are gone, and all of your concerns are solved.

Your concerns are valid. But I think that my answer not only totally solves them, but isn't at all out of step with Ludwig von Mises.

Re: Rationality in Society

bcyclwutztht — Sat, 06 Nov 2010 21:51:42 GMT

You're balking at 'rational' because you're equivocating the term.

exactly.

Re: Rationality in Society

Brainpolice — Sat, 06 Nov 2010 21:41:10 GMT

It's not Austrian methodology that rules this out but rather the real world and discursive reasoning. Your objection extends far beyond the realm of economics; it's an attack on reason.

It's an attack on extreme rationalism, not reason qua reason.

The fact that I'm writing this response necessarily means that I value this action over all other known alternatives.

Only given a certain set of implied assumptions that people can debate about.

The fact that economic theory invalidates your entirely arbitrary and subjective value judgements is your problem, not ours.

Such a claim of invalidation is dubious, and declaring what are essentially epistemological objections "arbitrary and subjective value judgements" simply doesn't make sense.