Political Theory

Re: Praxeology refutations

Anonymous — Sat, 12 Feb 2011 22:59:44 GMT

Unfortunately, no. It would in fact be a great victory of behaviorist premises of policymaking. It would provide scientific for a framework of means of policy for ends of behavioral returns. In fact since statistically significant behavioral patterns exist(the causal nature of which action axiom in its dogmaticism denies) it is already used in policy making. In fact any kind of entrepreneurial or specualtive activity in regards to appealing to people is involved in that process: the process of creating theories over what the behavioral returns of people would be in reaction to stimuli presented by the entrepreneur.

Re: Praxeology refutations

vcif — Sat, 12 Feb 2011 04:11:47 GMT

Sorry to dredge up this thread, but I am starting to work through Human Action. The comments above have been helpful in grasping these concepts.

It seems that xarthaz's objection is irrelevant to the Misesian framework and even self-contradictory with respect to praxeology.

Since action is taken as the starting point for the aprioristic reasoning in praxeology, the teleologic nature of the action axiom is irrelevant.

Even if xarthaz's contention that there is a mechanistic explanation to human action is correct, the application of this as a means to nullify the methodology and conclusions of praxeology is self-contradictory. If there is some mechanistic ultimate cause of human action, then human action can be deduced aprioristically. Therefore, selecting human action as the starting point for aprioristic reasoning is actually strengthened by attempts to supplant a teleologic explanation of action with a mechanistic one.

Am I on the right track?

Re: Praxeology refutations

abskebabs — Thu, 23 Dec 2010 03:29:46 GMT

xarthaz, the whole praxeological approach, in which the actions of others are interpreted and analysed teleologically is the result of a methodological compromise as Mises explains in Human Action and other works. I recommend you to have a look at this to understand the reason for this method.

Praxeology does not deny the reductionist hypothesis through which it is asserted that one day all human action and its subsequent effects will be explained and predicted completely from the external stimuli which originally stir them. There are actually plenty of reasons to doubt the feasibillity of this both from a scientific and philosophical perspective, but praxeology does not actually deny the ultimate validity of this assertion.

it simply says that as long as we do not have such a monistic theory in which all human action and its effects can be explained "naturally" from the causes from which it arises, we simply acknowledge the existence of action as a given, and follow what must result from this starting point. Furthermore, Mises points out well how it is actually quite ridiculous that people think such a natural theory would end up "refuting" praxeology when the latter is simply based on the results of discursive logic applied to different modes of action.

Re: Praxeology refutations

nirgrahamUK — Thu, 23 Dec 2010 00:42:09 GMT

I don't know what precisely Blaug is referring to but perhaps he is confusing applying praxeology to concrete cases and formal praxeological analysis. (and my guess is that 'consistency of choices' is some fallacy related to time)

You are supposed to investigate the systems... just like if two mathematicians claim to have correctly reasoned through to a positive proof for opposed statements.

Re: Praxeology refutations

a.began — Thu, 23 Dec 2010 00:17:25 GMT

Smiling Dave:

Yoiu might want to sink your teeth into this: http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2010/10/mises-praxeology-critique.html

Having never read anything by Mises and being a total Austrian economics noob, I think this article does point out the weaknesses pretty well (assuming the quotes by Mises haven't been taken out of context). Summed up:

“[sc. there is a] the fundamental flaw in Ludwig von Mises’ ‘praxeology’: [sc. it is] the notion that purposive choice as a Kantian ‘a priori synthetic proposition’ is more than sufficient to account for negatively inclined demand curves. This ignores the fact that a number of a posteriori auxiliary propositions are also required, such as transitivity or consistency of choices ... To this day, this failure to recognize the limited power of a priori synthetic propositions to generate substantive implications for economic behaviour characterises neo-Austrian writings in defence of Mises” (Blaug 1994: 132–133, n. 14; see also Blaug 1997: 332ff.).

[...]

Another problem for Misesian economics is that it is not the only praxeological system. The fact is that there are a number of other systems of thought that are (allegedly) derived by deduction from universally true axioms. How do we choose between such systems? (Prychitko 1998: 81). For example, Marxists like M. Hollis and E. J. Nell have propounded a system using deduction from (allegedly) universally true axioms in their book Rational Economic Man (1975). Their system is the antithesis of Mises’ Austrian economics, but supposedly arrives at laws which are universally true. In other words, when competing praxeological systems are encountered, what method is available to the Austrian praxeologist to choose between them?

I'd love to read some criticisms of the points being raised.

Re: Praxeology refutations

JohnnyFive — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 20:31:26 GMT

Brainpolice - Could you point me towards these serious criticisms please?

Re: Praxeology refutations

I. Ryan — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 20:17:54 GMT

xarthaz:

Action axiom being teleological implies that it has no further explanation.

Not really.

Ludwig von Mises:

Mortal man does not know how the universe and all that it contains may appear to a superhuman intelligence. Perhaps such an exalted mind is in a position to elaborate a coherent and comprehensive monistic interpretation of all phenomena. Man—up to now, at least—has always gone lamentably amiss in his attempts to bridge the gulf that he sees yawning between mind and matter, between the rider and the horse, between the mason and the stone. It would be preposterous to view this failure as a sufficient demonstration of the soundness of a dualistic philosophy. All that we can infer from it is that science—at least for the time being—must adopt a dualistic approach, less as a philosophical explanation than as a methodological device.

Methodological dualism refrains from any proposition concerning essences and metaphysical constructs. It merely takes into account the fact that we do not know how external events—physical, chemical, and physiological—affect human thoughts, ideas, and judgments of value. This ignorance splits the realm of knowledge into two separate fields, the realm of external events, commonly called nature, and the realm of human thought and action.

But then again what could a "further explanation" even be?

Re: Praxeology refutations

filc — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 20:16:12 GMT

Brainpolice:

There are serious challenges to praxeology, but reductive physicalism isn't one of them.

Such as? Care to contribute at the request of the OP?

Re: Praxeology refutations

Smiling Dave — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 19:38:26 GMT

Good post about the fallacy of division, Autolykos

Re: Praxeology refutations

nirgrahamUK — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 19:33:26 GMT

>>Action axiom being teleological implies that it has no further explanation.

no it does not.

There may be a more ultimate explanation, but you are better of relying on this particular explanation than that 'more ultimate one' for pragmatic reasons and for the fact that this reason is not wrong.

This is Praxeology 101. read something.

Re: Praxeology refutations

Brainpolice — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 19:33:09 GMT

There are serious challenges to praxeology, but reductive physicalism isn't one of them.

Re: Praxeology refutations

hkarnoldson — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 19:26:55 GMT

xarthaz wrote: "There is no need for any deep philosophical analysis of it when it has a blatant gaping hole as its premise. Teleological foundation of action being the action axiom is incorrect, absurd, appeals to mysticism, rejects physics as the fundamental building blocks of the world and has no place in the thought of 21st century."

"A teleology is any philosophical account which holds that final causes exist in nature, meaning that design and purpose analogous to that found in human actions are inherent also in the rest of nature."

So the action axiom does not appear to be teleological since it applies to human action ... not the rest of nature.

If I understand this right saying that human action should be included in the concept of teleology and then saying that teleology is false. Which is what you seem to have done is simply just taking a completely deterministic view.

The problem with this is that in a deterministic world economics is meaningless, actually all scientific pursuits are pointless as is this discussion too. It just happens to be unavoidable also.

Much can be said on this and I can't disprove that position. What I will say is that it is utterly useless as a basis for scientific method cause we are unable to mentally accept it even if was true.So the action axiom does not appear to be teleological since it applies to human action ... not the rest of nature.

The problem with this is that in a deterministic world economics is meaningless, actually all scientific pursuits are pointless as is this discussion too. It just happens to be unavoidable also.

Much can be said on this and I can't disprove that position. What I will say is that it is utterly useless as a basis for scientific method cause we are unable to mentally accept the notion that we don't have free will and nothing productive can come out of it. Also we might as well accept that we have free will cause it make no difference that we do if we actually don't..

So the action axiom does not appear to be teleological since it applies to human action ... not the rest of nature.

The problem with this is that in a deterministic world economics is meaningless, actually all scientific pursuits are pointless as is this discussion too. It just happens to be unavoidable also.

Much can be said on this and I can't disprove that position. What I will say is that it is utterly useless as a basis for scientific method cause we are unable to mentally accept it even if was true.

Re: Praxeology refutations

Anonymous — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 19:25:30 GMT

No, that is not the idea. In fact you insult fellow forum members' intelligence by suggesting appeals to such simplistic fallacies. Action axiom being teleological implies that it has no further explanation. Same as religous dogma like "Thunder is god's creation". That statement rejects possibility of any physical inquiry to thunder's causes, aka rejects science. Hence praxeology being mysticist and stuck in the age of appeal to god.

Re: Praxeology refutations

nirgrahamUK — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 19:19:57 GMT

>>The action axiom denies this.

no it doesn't, and even if it did, wouldn't your naive reductionism be a more general problem?

Re: Praxeology refutations

Autolykos — Wed, 22 Dec 2010 19:00:15 GMT

xarthaz:
Dont let feelings fool you. The world consists of nothing but standard model particles/strings/whatever the correct theory of physics turns out to be. The action axiom denies this(as per the claim of action being teleological) and that is all there is to it.

Methinks you're committing the fallacy of division here. Your reasoning appears to go as follows:

"Action" is defined as "teleological behavior".
According to praxeology and the action axiom, human beings act.
According to physics, human beings are made of Standard Model particles.
Standard Model particles do not behave teleologically.
Therefore, Standard Model particles do not act.
Per clauses 3, 4, and 5, human beings do not act.
Per clause 6, praxeology and the action axiom are invalid.

Am I missing anything?