Political Theory

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

Porco Rosso — Sat, 10 Sep 2011 21:07:38 GMT

"The existential theory of property is based on meaning and the relationship between ends and means, and it provides a more solid basis for understanding property relations and property rights."

Semantics. Can you clarify what you think the difference is? Is it really substantial at all or is it mere quibbling?

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

edavismail — Sat, 10 Sep 2011 13:46:40 GMT

Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 34

Let us now return to our analysis of Crusoe's purposeful transformation

of nature-given data though the understanding of natural laws.

Crusoe finds virgin, unused land on the island; land, in short, unused

and uncontrolled by anyone, and hence unowned. By finding land resources,

by learning how to use them, and, in particular, by actually transforming

them into a more useful shape, Crusoe has, in the memorable phrase of John

Locke, "mixed his labor with the soil." In doing so, in stamping the imprint

of his personality and his energy on the land, he has naturally converted

the land and its fruits into his property. Hence, the isolated man owns what

he uses and transforms; therefore, in his case there is no problem of what

should be A's property as against B's. Any man's property is ipso facto what

he produces, i-e., what he transforms into use by his own effort.

Rothbard, following a labor theory of property, is preoccupied with defining use in terms of physical "transformation" of the object, while "use" in the sense I applied, following an existential theory of property, focuses on the object being meaninfully situated with respect the goals of an acting person. For example, you may use a rock to pound in a nail, then place the rock exactly where you found it, so that there is no evident physical "transformation" of the rock. In any case, you may well have used the rock in anticipation of using the rock again--as standing reserve--even though you placed it in the same spot you found it. A stronger example might be that Friday finds a cave on his deserted island, and he uses the cave as a shelter without really "transforming" it in any substantial way, and without exerting any effort on his part, but it is clear that the cave is meaningfully situated toward his end of having shelter. There remains a substantial difference between the existential theory of property and the labor theory of property, despite my use of the term 'use'.

The labor theory of property is based on the physical transformation of objects through labor, and gives birth to erroneous notions of property as tied to effort and mere physicality. The existential theory of property is based on meaning and the relationship between ends and means, and it provides a more solid basis for understanding property relations and property rights.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

AJ — Sun, 24 Apr 2011 09:14:40 GMT

edavismail:
It may not be an pristine a-priori understanding of property that we obtain, but at least a general one that can accommodate those who question property rights.

I think this limit on the applicability of such arguments is key. If the whole point of coming up with a general framework for property rights is to answer those who are skeptical of property rights, then the way these types of arguments are handled should be very different from how these arguments would be handled if they were proposals for central planning or theories of "how things will be" or "how things should be."

The problem I have is when arguments that were apparently originally intended to serve as examples for "how such a society could function" (as an answer to skeptics) end up being treated more and more as predictions and/or prescriptions. It seems like no matter how careful an author is to designate such a theory as merely a possibility and not a prediction/prescription, the idea will always show up somewhere else (and sometimes, unfortunately, by the same author, or even in the same book, essay, or post) as a prediction or prescription. It is a subtle and gradual shift, but people frequently end up arguing about how things will or should be, as witnessed in threads here on the forums every day.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

edavismail — Sun, 24 Apr 2011 08:06:45 GMT

Clayton:
My view is that we cannot know a priori what constitutes a valid claim of ownership. We cannot sit down in Thinking Man pose and dream up what is the One, True Criterion of valid ownership. The reality is that ownership is an unboundedly complex problem and the only way to solve it is through a free market in arbitration over property disputes. Over time, precedents will emerge that describe the criteria for ownership. We can make educated guesses based on existing law, history and praxeology about what these precedents would look like in an unhampered market in law.

I agree with the above, and I'm certainly not trying to offer a first philosophy or some kind of deductive system. It is clear that any substantive claim to ownership is typically made within an elaborate nexus of meaning and actual historical conditions. A friend of mine discribed that as the Moll Flanders model or understanding of the world as opposed to the Robinson Crusoe model. Because defining ownership is largely a matter of consensus formation, it has a tremendous variability. Friday may well state to Crusoe that the whole island is his, or vice versa, and if they both accept this it has a prima facie plausibility. It's, ironically, when we add more people to the scenario, approaching the Moll Flanders model of the world, that we are ever more in need of a general sense of property rights--that we need a philosophy of property, as it were. It may not be an pristine a-priori understanding of property that we obtain, but at least a general one that can accommodate those who question property rights. That's what I'm after. In specific situations property rights will be worked out in concrete ways.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

edavismail — Thu, 21 Apr 2011 12:46:43 GMT

Along these lines, see Hoppe's critique of Rothbard regarding liability.

http://mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae7_4_6.pdf

Hoppe:

Rothbard’s proposal must be criticized as overly “objectivistic,”

for it ignores important “subjective” conditions which must be combined

with objective indicators to determine liability.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

AJ — Thu, 21 Apr 2011 08:25:19 GMT

Clayton:
My view is that we cannot know a priori what constitutes a valid claim of ownership. We cannot sit down in Thinking Man pose and dream up what is the One, True Criterion of valid ownership. The reality is that ownership is an unboundedly complex problem and the only way to solve it is through a free market in arbitration over property disputes. Over time, precedents will emerge that describe the criteria for ownership. We can make educated guesses based on existing law, history and praxeology about what these precedents would look like in an unhampered market in law.

Well put.

Central planning of any stripe is always doomed to failure in a natural order. Since we currently live under central planning and have some miniscule chance of being able to change state policy, there is a residual tendency to think in terms of what would be a better way to centrally plan things assuming we cannot change the fact that it is centrally planned. These are certainly interesting questions for minarchists, or those who want to work within the state system, like that county commissioner guy that was posting in here recently.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

edavismail — Thu, 21 Apr 2011 06:47:14 GMT

Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 34

Let us now return to our analysis of Crusoe's purposeful transformation

of nature-given data though the understanding of natural laws.

Crusoe finds virgin, unused land on the island; land, in short, unused

and uncontrolled by anyone, and hence unowned. By finding land resources,

by learning how to use them, and, in particular, by actually transforming

them into a more useful shape, Crusoe has, in the memorable phrase of John

Locke, "mixed his labor with the soil." In doing so, in stamping the imprint

of his personality and his energy on the land, he has naturally converted

the land and its fruits into his property. Hence, the isolated man owns what

he uses and transforms; therefore, in his case there is no problem of what

should be A's property as against B's. Any man's property is ipso facto what

he produces, i-e., what he transforms into use by his own effort.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

Clayton — Tue, 19 Apr 2011 23:28:13 GMT

I think that one reason why someone's claim of ownership would be better than another's is she can show that she used the property first--that it is meaningfully situated with respect to her ongoing plans. I don't expect such a brief explanation of the existential or praxeological notion of property to explain everything right off the bat, but it's certainly an improvement on our basic understanding of property.

OK but you're essentially back to the labor-theory of property... Rothbard doesn't specify how much labor must be put into it (perhaps just building a fence around it is sufficient) but the point is that the property must be put to some use. Personally, I'm leaning toward saying that speculative uses should not count toward original appropriation since anyone can say "I'm planning to use this someday." The purpose of speculation is to reduce uncertainty by allocating scarce resources to the production of goods that entrepreneurs believe are being under-produced. Goods which are not yet appropriated from the public domain are, by definition, not scarce (else, they would already have been appropriate). Consider air, for example. Or oceans 200 years ago. So, if you're going to appropriate something from nature, you have to be actually using it, not just speculatively using it. After something has been originally appropriated, it can be traded away into speculative or other uses.

Clayton -

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

edavismail — Tue, 19 Apr 2011 12:59:59 GMT

While I agree that "laboring" on something may not be necessary to have a valid claim to having appropriated it from nature, simply having a "plan in mind" for something is certainly not sufficient to delimit property claims, see my argument above. The essential point is that given two people both making a claim to the same object which each is claiming to have appropriated from nature, one party must be able to give a reason that his claim is better than the other party's claim. If neither person can give a reason why their claim is better than the other person's, then the only fair allocation I can see would be to flip a coin.

I think that one reason why someone's claim of ownership would be better than another's is she can show that she used the property first--that it is meaningfully situated with respect to her ongoing plans. I don't expect such a brief explanation of the existential or praxeological notion of property to explain everything right off the bat, but it's certainly an improvement on our basic understanding of property.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

Clayton — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 19:28:20 GMT

edavismail:

I'm generally in agreement with the following:

http://blog.mises.org/7344/contra-the-labor-theory-of-property/

Regarding Clayton's post, it seems obvious that something is no longer meaningfully situated with regard to a person when that person is dead, so I think that it's a much more interesting question to ask why we honor the will of deceased persons.

Nice link. I agree with the author's reservations about the "labor theory of property" but I also think the author has not sufficiently considered the problems with his criterion for ownership. Consider the colonial European powers, when they landed on "undiscovered" islands and continents, they really did claim the whole damn thing. That was the whole point of planting the king's flag. The king, in essence, was saying "all lands connected to the dirt in which this flag is planted are hereby annexed to my kingdom to be put to use in the interests of the king and his subjects." This certainly meets the praxeological criterion for ownership - the king really plans to mine the gold and extract the other valuable natural resources in the new colonial territory.

Extending this line of thought even further, every ancient king claimed ownership of "the whole world" by divine right and intended to put it to use for their own purposes. Hence all the ancient Mesopotamian, North African and Mediterranean wars and empire-building. But these kings had the imagination to make plans to utilize the whole earth and this certainly constitutes a valid claim to ownership under the praxeological criterion. Their descendants - if they could identify themselves - would, then, have legitimate claim to own literally everything. But this is clearly absurd.

My view is that we cannot know a priori what constitutes a valid claim of ownership. We cannot sit down in Thinking Man pose and dream up what is the One, True Criterion of valid ownership. The reality is that ownership is an unboundedly complex problem and the only way to solve it is through a free market in arbitration over property disputes. Over time, precedents will emerge that describe the criteria for ownership. We can make educated guesses based on existing law, history and praxeology about what these precedents would look like in an unhampered market in law. You'd probably need objectively identifiable boundaries. You'd probably need to publicly announce your claim in a manner that is commonly understood to be a property claim. You'd probably have to evidence a will to maintain control over your claimed property in the face of contesting claims (these are Butler Shafer's three criteria for property). While I agree that "laboring" on something may not be necessary to have a valid claim to having appropriated it from nature, simply having a "plan in mind" for something is certainly not sufficient to delimit property claims, see my argument above. The essential point is that given two people both making a claim to the same object which each is claiming to have appropriated from nature, one party must be able to give a reason that his claim is better than the other party's claim. If neither person can give a reason why their claim is better than the other person's, then the only fair allocation I can see would be to flip a coin.

Clayton -

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

edavismail — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 18:42:09 GMT

nirgrahamUK,

Thanks for your comments. I was thinking more generally about the ways in which we relate to and honor the will of the deceased, for example the ways in which Friday might relate to his ancestors, but the last will and testament is certainly related.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

nirgrahamUK — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 17:57:28 GMT

the will, is a last will and testiment, it declares a transfer of particular property held by the 'dying' to those mentioned in his will. The document is evidence of the transfer of property rights (and act of charity towards the recipients). as such if some 3rd party interferes with the uniting of inheritors with their property, they are theives, their crime is not of interfering with the property of the deceased, but the property of the living inheritors who had the rights transferred to them at the instant of death.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

edavismail — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 17:51:06 GMT

I'm generally in agreement with the following:

http://blog.mises.org/7344/contra-the-labor-theory-of-property/

Regarding Clayton's post, it seems obvious that something is no longer meaningfully situated with regard to a person when that person is dead, so I think that it's a much more interesting question to ask why we honor the will of deceased persons.

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

Clayton — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 17:26:31 GMT

The difference between Friday alone on the island and Friday + Crusoe is explained by Mises here (with a lot less verbiage). I disagree that "situatedness" is a criterion for property - what if the disaster that befell Friday's tribe had also killed Friday? On finding the deserted island, would it be rude for Crusoe to throw a fish onto the ground that had been cooking before the disaster wiped everyone out? Would it be violent for Crusoe to demolish a one-time shelter of a now extinct tribe-member?

Clayton -

Re: Illegitimate Disturbance: A Brief Introduction

edavismail — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 17:10:39 GMT

liberty student:

So, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudaimonia ?

Yes, my sense of happiness comes from eudaimonia and Aristotle, while my sense of respect comes from Kant.