Political Theory

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

ThatOldGuy — Sun, 26 Feb 2012 15:46:55 GMT

Minarchist:

You are saying that a person cannot be the property of another person in practice because the slave is physically able to act contrary to the demands of the master? Well, if that's the case, then how can any animal be property: e.g. a stubbon mule?

As for the metaphysical argument, I don't follow. If I can sign a contract for a loan, and thereby consent to the creditor using violence against me to retake his money if I fail to pay, then why can't I sign a contract enslaving myself, and thereby consent to the master using violence against me if I fail to work (or try to leave, etc)? What's the difference?

The only reason why a person cannot voluntarily be the property of another person in practice is because the person who is enslaved is capable of changing his mind while in slavery. Because his rights are argumentatively and pracitcally inalienable, a person cannot possibly give up his rights to his body. The reason that a person has rights to his body is that he is capable of rational discourse regarding conflict resolution. Obviously, I cannot reason with an elephant over how property property rights are legitimate because doing so would be fruitless unless the elephant was capable of argumentation. Because property is a normative concept, it involves making a set of rules regarding the use of scarce goods by a mutually binding and intersubjectively ascertainable norms, normative concepts are only useful, and problems relying on their use only arise with communication and argumentation.

In your example, a stubborn mule, or any mule or any animal for that matter, is considered economic property because animals do not have rights. We can always question the morality of such and such an action against animals (while I disagree with groups who assert that animals have rights or, even further that whales have constitutional rights) as morally acceptable, there is no violation of rights being violated because animals cannot have rights. Because animals are categorically different from humans, they cannot be said to rightfully posess the rights of humans (ie property rights). For an in depth treatment of this subject, I would recommend you read Murray Rothbard's Ethics of Liberty, especially Chp. 21, The "Rights" of Animals.

In your latter paragraph, the difference is one of what constitutes a contract (as I defined in my post) and aggression vs. violent defense. I stated that slavery is acceptable as a punishment so long as it does not constitute an aggression against the person enslaved. I don't agree with the concept of a contract being signed by a person with a slavery clause, as you suggest, for the reasons that I have provided above. Slavery, in my opinion, can be used as a punishment. While the property rights in your posessions can be transferable, the property rights in your person cannot possibly be either reasonably or practically transferable in voluntary conditions. However, as property can be seized in retaliation for a crime done, insofar as such seizure does not constitute an aggression against the enslaved person (under the restitution theory of punishment favored by Rothbard in Ethics; cf. chp. 13), bodies can be seized as punishment for crimes, provided such seizure is nonaggressive, just as any other property can be seized as punishment, appropriately, for crimes done.

For instance, assume I have an tv that I bought and A destroys this tv. A is found and taken to court, but A has no property to seize as restitution for this crime, or at least no such property can be found as admissable restitution by the court. He can't simply go free because he has violated my property rights and he is poor; the poor can violate rights, just as the rich can violate rights. In my opinion, he is liable to perform labor services for a fixed time, under fixed conditions, until the court sees fit (perhaps as much labor services to the point that he is able to afford a replacement tv; he works a job and his paychecks are mine until I can afford a tv, that is).

Hope this helps.

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Minarchist — Sun, 26 Feb 2012 06:26:33 GMT

I suppose if one were to be consistent and not your typcial hypocrite they must also argue there ought not be a Supreme Promise of the Land.

What on earth does that mean?

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Minarchist — Sun, 26 Feb 2012 06:23:12 GMT

ThatOldGuy,

You are saying that a person cannot be the property of another person in practice because the slave is physically able to act contrary to the demands of the master? Well, if that's the case, then how can any animal be property: e.g. a stubbon mule?

As for the metaphysical argument, I don't follow. If I can sign a contract for a loan, and thereby consent to the creditor using violence against me to retake his money if I fail to pay, then why can't I sign a contract enslaving myself, and thereby consent to the master using violence against me if I fail to work (or try to leave, etc)? What's the difference?

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Live_Free_Or_Die — Sun, 26 Feb 2012 01:21:17 GMT

That is, a promise without a contractually specified consequence for the breaking of the promise cannot be enforced:

I suppose if one were to be consistent and not your typcial hypocrite they must also argue there ought not be a Supreme Promise of the Land.

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Caley McKibbin — Sat, 25 Feb 2012 23:29:11 GMT

What do you think would happen if you told your current employer that you require a termination of your current contract and a new one minus that covenant to continue with them?

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

ThatOldGuy — Sat, 25 Feb 2012 23:26:51 GMT

Minarchist:

Slavery is ok if you explicitly agree to it?

Sure, why not?

Slavery may be used justifiably as punishment for an aggression, provided it is not in itself an aggression, but it cannot be a contractually met obligation. The position of voluntary slavery is argumentatively unjustifiable because property rights are absolute: you can't argue that you have no property rights in your body without exercising the property rights you have in your body. The reason that it is practically unjustifiable is that you are always liable to change your mind, which leads to a conflict:

If you assert freedom during your enslavement who has property rights over your body? You, or your master?

You cannot possibly eliminate all rights to your body as you still possess exclusive control of your mind and body in proposing such a condition and in carrying out the "contract" which means that you still have property rights in your body (e.g. Master cannot move your arm unless he first moves his arm [explicit control and ownership] to then move your arm [not-explicit control and not-explicit ownership, but aggressed control and ownership]).

Because contracts are defined as the voluntary transaction of property titles to one person from another, the slavery contract ceases to be a contract entirely in light of these considerations.

Hope this helps.

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Minarchist — Sat, 25 Feb 2012 23:14:15 GMT

Slavery is ok if you explicitly agree to it?

Sure, why not? If I sign a contract agreeing to be someone's slave for some specific period of time (or indefinitely), and then force is subsequently used against me to compel compliance with the terms to which I have agreed, where's the injustice? Where's the violation of the NAP? There's no fundamental difference between using force to keep me a slave after I agreed to be a slave and using force to make me pay X after I agreed to pay X. Either "voluntary slavery" is not a violation of the NAP or every contract which binds a person to a future action under penalty of force is a violation of the NAP.

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Minarchist — Sat, 25 Feb 2012 23:08:18 GMT

Contracts can only be enforced when property rights are violated. When you sign this agreement and there is no property clause, then all you've broken is your word, and this cannot be punished. If, on the other hand, the contract says that you entitle your employer to some amount of money if you compete with them, the contract can be enforced, because as soon as you compete, property is transferred and they have full power over what used to be your money.

I agree, which is why the notion that promises can't be enforced is only true in a pedantic sense. That is, a promise without a contractually specified consequence for the breaking of the promise cannot be enforced: but any promise (however absurd) can be enforced if such a consequence is specified. I can contractually promise to wish someone happy birthday on their next birthday, and as long as the contract states that I will pay X if I don't wish them happy birthday, it's perfectly enforceable.

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

ThatOldGuy — Tue, 21 Feb 2012 02:40:55 GMT

12piecebucket:
I should probably just focus on one....but for some reason...this is how I have always "rolled".

Same thing here- I'd imagine we're not alone as well. :)

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Live_Free_Or_Die — Sat, 18 Feb 2012 09:19:34 GMT

What is the difference? Someone is being compelled. We're not gonna compel you to fullfil but were darn sure gonna compel you to pay. Where is the logical consistency in that line of reasoning?

That is like arguing voluntary slavery so long as it is explicit. Slavery is ok if you explicitly agree to it?

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Marko — Sat, 18 Feb 2012 08:26:52 GMT

I am with Wheylous on this one. I had a similar question a few months ago about association football players and their contracts and this was explained to me. You can not be compelled to fullfil a contract, but you can be compelled to pay any explicit contract-breaking fee.

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Live_Free_Or_Die — Sat, 18 Feb 2012 08:14:40 GMT

On what basis would a client be considered property and not a secret. Even if it isn't a secret I don't think the austrian definition of property includes clients.

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

12piecebucket — Sat, 18 Feb 2012 05:08:36 GMT

generally there is a geographic limitation. So not only is the employee not to compete on the employee's serviced clients but also barred from competing in a certain geography. The clients I assume would be considered employer "property". And thus if that property is violated it would be theft. However, how could unsold and unsolicited individuals/firms be considered "property" of the employer? There seems to be no property title in existence if business is unsolicited and not under contract by the employer and also the employer doesn't have title to "geography"?

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Live_Free_Or_Die — Sat, 18 Feb 2012 03:43:39 GMT

Did you miss my bolded Rothbard quote ^

I subsequently cited a Rothbard quote that explains his position specifically with regards to non-compete clauses and in my previous post I articulated the distinction Rothbard made in the actor example is one of promises made against a body versus property.

In addition to gambling some other good hypothetical examples would be 1) last will & testament or 2) power of attorney. Regarding the latter... should people be forced to transfer property that has been magically transferred per an executed contract by a contracted agent?

Re: What would Rothbard say about non-compete language in an employee contract?

Live_Free_Or_Die — Sat, 18 Feb 2012 01:32:14 GMT

In contemporary America, outside the glaring exception of the armed forces, everyone has the right to quit his job regardless of whatever promise or “contract” he had previously incurred.3 Unfortunately, however, the courts, while refusing to compel specific personal performance of an employee agreement (in short, refusing to enslave the worker) do prohibit the worker from working at a similar task for another employer for the term of the agreement. If someone has signed an agreement to work as an engineer for ARAMCO for five years, and he then quits the job, he is prohibited by the courts from working for a similar employer for the remainder of the five years. It should now be clear that this prohibited employment is only one step removed from direct compulsory slavery, and that it should be completely impermissible in a libertarian society.

Upon further consideration I am going to mount an objection to an assertion Rothbard makes but let me first set it up. Rothbard makes a distinction between transferring title to a body and transferring title to property. This is really the big objection Rothbard makes with regards to an actor showing up in the example you cited. A promise against the body is an unalienable promise. Rothbard does assert if a promise against the body takes on the form of property such as a performance bond it magically becomes alienable because now we are talking about property.

Where I am going to disagree with Rothbard is the assertion making a promise in a contract with regards to property magically becomes an enforceable act of transferring something. I would definately argue a transfer can only occur when title (proof of control) is physically transferred via action separate of executing a contract. A contract is not proof of ownership. Titles are proof of ownership. A contract is evidence of intent. I would further argue valid title is discerned from the thing being transferred. I would also argue a contract that has not been acted upon is merely a promise of control and until one party acts to transfer title of property, contracts with no transferring action are unenforcable. If no title has been physically transferred there is no risk.