Political Theory

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

Live_Free_Or_Die — Wed, 25 Apr 2012 05:29:48 GMT

RE: Voting is not aggression because it does not consent to being ruled.

Technically correct. That act occurs during voter registration.

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT:

(1)On the day of the next election I will have been a United States citizen for
at least one month, I will be at least 18 years of age, and I will have
resided in (state) and in my election district for at least 30 days;

(2)I am legally qualified to vote.

AND I HEREBY AFFIRM THAT the information I have provided in this registration
declaration is true. I understand that this registration declaration will be accepted
for all purposes as the equivalent of an affidavit; and if the registration contains a
materially false statement, I will be subject to penalties for perjury.

Is there some confusion as to the definition of a citizen. as in "United States citizen."

A legally recognized subject or national of a state or commonwealth, either native or naturalized.

Voluntarily pledging your allegiance as a citizen in order to be a subject of a state or commonwealth in sworn testimony is not consenting to be ruled? Give me a break. That is the very meaning of consenting to be ruled....

RE: Roads

The primary source of government funding for roads comes from property taxes. If you don't believe me go research it. There exists extensive analysis of how roads are paid debunking myths they are paid for soley by user fees such as fuel taxes, licensing, registration, etc. Considering property taxation is currently inescapable from any locality in the several states or other jurisdictions within the United States (at least until a libertarian enclave geographically organizes and abolishes it... just pointing out the voluntary nature of things in that it is not impossible to abolish it), it is a non argument to say someone ought not use that which has been stolen from them.

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

Graham Wright — Tue, 24 Apr 2012 19:21:30 GMT

Clayton:

This seems to conflict with your view of strict unlimited liability. Could you explain a little more?

Well, strict liability is "the way things oughtta be" but things aren't this way and I think that fundamentally alters the balance of culpability.

For example, consider a slaveowner who inherited his property from his father, who had inherited it from his father before him, and so on. In a society where slave ownership is legal, is this slaveowner really a "criminal" who needs to be tried once the laws are changed to abolish slavery? I think the answer is no and I think that, in general, we should not seek ex post facto liability for crimes committed under a corrupt legal order. Instead, we should seek to set the law straight (by opening up competition in the market for arbitrated resolution of disputes) and then hold people accountable to the law as it is/was when they committed the act in question. All forms of ex post facto evaluation of actions smacks of statism and inquisitionism.

I'm not saying slaves should be prohibited from suing their former slaveholders but I don't think that free-market law arbitrators are going to think that it makes sense to hold people liable for violation of the law as it is in 2012 for things that were not torts under the law as it was in 2011.

You contradict yourself here, as gotlucky already implied. What you say you're "not saying" is exactly what you are saying.

It's interesting that you think "All forms of ex post facto evaluation of actions smacks of statism and inquisitionism" because I feel the opposite way. It's the state that tends to change laws arbitrarily and abruptly and ignore actions that took place before the law was brought in. Like a few years ago, it was fine to smoke in pubs in the UK, and now it's illegal. So the state is trying to say that smoking in pubs is aggression, while at the same time saying that no one should be punished for doing so when it was not illegal. It's confusing... did morality change overnight? Private law would be much more stable, I feel, and court would have no problem with ex post facto evaluation of actions. In fact the whole idea of ex post facto doesn't make much sense in a private law context, where all laws are rightly viewed as resolutions to conflicts.

I also think this principle is important in reducing the resistance of a move towards liberty - a great deal of the resistance is generated by people who fear they could actually be held legally liable for the acts they committed under the old legal regime. Consider the many - obviously politicized - threats of war crimes charges against George Bush, for example - this illustrates the nature of the resistance. But introspecting on the past won't fix the only thing that we can change: the future. We shouldn't offer amnesty but neither should we promise a witch-hunt.

This is the totally separate question of strategy, of course. And here I agree with you in that we need to be forward-looking. So I'm saying in principle, there is a group of people, relatively small in number, who ought to be held responsible for the crimes of the state and duly punished, but strategically, this should not be the focus.

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

Graham Wright — Tue, 24 Apr 2012 19:02:27 GMT

Clayton:

@Graham: But I think there is something conceptually wrong with your "libertarian Nuremberg trials" - most of the people who presently work in the State order in an aggressive capacity simply would not be in their current line of work if libertarian law had sway all along. I don't mean this merely as a descriptive statement of fact but as an exoneration of a large part of their actual culpability.

This is why the role of law is so damned important. Without just law, morality itself is actually perverted. Many police officers are very upright individuals. In fact, the scum bullies are able to get away with what they do by leeching off the upright image which is the result of the genuine uprights within police forces. But - on a libertarian analysis - most of what even the upright officers are doing is inherently aggressive. If the law were otherwise, I do not believe that these same individuals would pursue the same career choice, "the law be damned". They're police officers precisely because the law is what it is.

I agree, but I don't see how that makes the idea "conceptually wrong". It makes it more complicated for the judge to determine who is really responsible, but that's all. You are just saying that the Nuremberg defense ("I did it because I was hired to") is valid for many state "hitmen", and I agree. Take a cop who confiscates/steals a bag of weed from someone the day before the revolution. Now the weed smoker goes to court to sue the (ex-)cop for theft. Is the cop guilty? You could well argue that he should not be punished, on the basis that he was only doing his job, and only doing what he thought was right at the time. This kind of defense wouldn't usually stand up, but in this case it might, given the pervasive influence of the state on morality that you talk about. In this case, the "hitman" (cop) is entirely innocent, and all the responsibility lies with the "hirer" (ruling class) who established and maintained the "law" that made weed illegal in the first place. That's not an unreasonable interpretation of the libertarian principle that individuals who are responsible for acts of aggression ought to be punished.

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

PeaceRequiresAnarchy — Tue, 24 Apr 2012 17:33:37 GMT

Thanks for the comments everybody; they are educational.

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

gotlucky — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 22:49:17 GMT

Clayton:

Well, strict liability is "the way things oughtta be" but things aren't this way and I think that fundamentally alters the balance of culpability.

I agree with this statement.

Clayton:

Instead, we should seek to set the law straight (by opening up competition in the market for arbitrated resolution of disputes) and then hold people accountable to the law as it is/was when they committed the act in question. All forms of ex post facto evaluation of actions smacks of statism and inquisitionism.

I like this idea, but your following statement seems to contradict it:

Clayton:

I'm not saying slaves should be prohibited from suing their former slaveholders but I don't think that free-market law arbitrators are going to think that it makes sense to hold people liable for violation of the law as it is in 2012 for things that were not torts under the law as it was in 2011.

The conflict that I see here is that you say that slaves should be allowed to sue in order to set the law straight, but that arbitrators would not hold the slave owners responsible. Am I misunderstanding you?

Clayton:

I also think this principle is important in reducing the resistance of a move towards liberty - a great deal of the resistance is generated by people who fear they could actually be held legally liable for the acts they committed under the old legal regime. Consider the many - obviously politicized - threats of war crimes charges against George Bush, for example - this illustrates the nature of the resistance. But introspecting on the past won't fix the only thing that we can change: the future. We shouldn't offer amnesty but neither should we promise a witch-hunt.

I agree with everything here except for the first sentence. I don't think there are actually that many people who could be held legally liable for their actions. Most people in society today are not aggressors, even those who work for the state. However, I think it shouldn't matter what the aggressors think - after all, they are benefitting under the system, why would they want to change it even if they were not going to be found liable? In other words, why would a slave owner support freedom for slaves even if he weren't going to be held legally liable? He benefits from the current system. And if he truly felt that slaves should be free, then he would have set his slaves free. So, why should we care what the slave owners think? They aren't going to change anything. We should care about what the victims and the rest of society think. They far outnumber the aggressors.

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

Clayton — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 22:15:08 GMT

This seems to conflict with your view of strict unlimited liability. Could you explain a little more?

Well, strict liability is "the way things oughtta be" but things aren't this way and I think that fundamentally alters the balance of culpability.

For example, consider a slaveowner who inherited his property from his father, who had inherited it from his father before him, and so on. In a society where slave ownership is legal, is this slaveowner really a "criminal" who needs to be tried once the laws are changed to abolish slavery? I think the answer is no and I think that, in general, we should not seek ex post facto liability for crimes committed under a corrupt legal order. Instead, we should seek to set the law straight (by opening up competition in the market for arbitrated resolution of disputes) and then hold people accountable to the law as it is/was when they committed the act in question. All forms of ex post facto evaluation of actions smacks of statism and inquisitionism.

I'm not saying slaves should be prohibited from suing their former slaveholders but I don't think that free-market law arbitrators are going to think that it makes sense to hold people liable for violation of the law as it is in 2012 for things that were not torts under the law as it was in 2011.

I also think this principle is important in reducing the resistance of a move towards liberty - a great deal of the resistance is generated by people who fear they could actually be held legally liable for the acts they committed under the old legal regime. Consider the many - obviously politicized - threats of war crimes charges against George Bush, for example - this illustrates the nature of the resistance. But introspecting on the past won't fix the only thing that we can change: the future. We shouldn't offer amnesty but neither should we promise a witch-hunt.

Clayton -

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

gotlucky — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 22:06:44 GMT

Clayton:

But I think there is something conceptually wrong with your "libertarian Nuremberg trials" - most of the people who presently work in the State order in an aggressive capacity simply would not be in their current line of work if libertarian law had sway all along. I don't mean this merely as a descriptive statement of fact but as an exoneration of a large part of their actual culpability...So, morality itself is perverted by bad law and I don't think even those who hold positions that are in violation of hypothetical libertarian law can be held legally or even morally responsible ex post facto for their actions under a non-libertarian legal order.

This seems to conflict with your view of strict unlimited liability. Could you explain a little more?

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

Clayton — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 21:18:44 GMT

@Graham: But I think there is something conceptually wrong with your "libertarian Nuremberg trials" - most of the people who presently work in the State order in an aggressive capacity simply would not be in their current line of work if libertarian law had sway all along. I don't mean this merely as a descriptive statement of fact but as an exoneration of a large part of their actual culpability.

This is why the role of law is so damned important. Without just law, morality itself is actually perverted. Many police officers are very upright individuals. In fact, the scum bullies are able to get away with what they do by leeching off the upright image which is the result of the genuine uprights within police forces. But - on a libertarian analysis - most of what even the upright officers are doing is inherently aggressive. If the law were otherwise, I do not believe that these same individuals would pursue the same career choice, "the law be damned". They're police officers precisely because the law is what it is.

So, morality itself is perverted by bad law and I don't think even those who hold positions that are in violation of hypothetical libertarian law can be held legally or even morally responsible ex post facto for their actions under a non-libertarian legal order.

I think the "ruling class" is extremely difficult to precisely define. I think a certain degree of "knowingness" - a purely subjective quality - is required. I think that those who engage in thuggery in the State must also have a mens rea regarding it in order to be truly a part of the ruling Elite (in my view). They have to not only engage in aggression but know that that's what they are doing.

Clayton -

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

Graham Wright — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 20:25:47 GMT

PeaceRequiresAnarchy:

Voting isn’t aggression....

Why is this so? I agreed with it initially, but what's the reason? If hiring a hitman is a crime then can't a vote for someone like Hitler similarly be construed as an act of aggression? Hitler and his obedient law enforcers could be viewed as agents to voters' acts of aggression. What's wrong with this?

Identifying specific actions in the real world and saying 'this is aggression' and 'this isn't aggression' is technically out of scope to the libertarian qua libertarian. In any specific given case, it is up to courts/judges to decide whether aggression was committed, based on the general principles laid out by libertarian philosophy. The same goes for applying words like 'homesteading' and 'threat' and 'consent' to the real world.

The libertarian can give a general idea of what is meant by these words and can give idealized examples, but when asked 'is this aggression?' the libertarian is technically answering not as a libertarian, but as a judge interpreting/applying libertarian principles. So 'is X aggression?' means 'do you think a judge applying libertarian principles would consider X to be aggression?'

Take the idealized hiring-a-hitman example. At the one extreme you could reduce the hitman to a mere tool and say he's entirely innocent (i.e. the Nuremberg defense). At the other extreme, you could say all the responsibility lies with the hitman, because he was the one who carried out the physical act. Now, we as libertarians cannot say in a given case where this responsibility lies; we do so only as judges. The task of a judge is to try to find out who is guilty of a crime (that is, who is responsible for a crime), and in most cases responsibility will probably lie between the two extremes, where both the hirer and hitman bear some responsibility for the aggressive act that occurred. They played different roles, and whether the hirer or the hitman should get the heavier punishment depends on the specifics of the case.

So put yourself in the role of a judge, at a hypothetical Nuremberg trial the day after a libertarian revolution, where people are charged with all the various crimes committed by the state before the revolution. Who is guilty? Who bears responsibility for all the many acts of aggression that have been committed by the state? One answer could be 'all government employees and no one else', but that is both too broad (because it includes all 'public workers' like schoolteachers, admin assistants at the local council office, etc) and too narrow (because it leaves out people who work in nominally private organizations but who are highly influential over state activities).

The answer must be that there is a particular group of people, whom we may call 'the ruling class,' who bear responsibility for the actions of the state, along with the 'hitmen' (maybe tax collectors, police, soldiers, etc). The difficult task of the judge is to identify who these people are and how much responsibility they each ought to bear.

So is voting aggression? If the answer is to be yes, then what we are saying is that voters are a member of this ruling class, which a judge at a "libertarian Nuremberg" should find guilty of bearing at least some responsibility for the crimes of the state. We can't say for sure, but is this likely? I don't think so. The connection between somebody who put an X in a box next to Obama's name, and the actual crimes being committed now by the US government is so remote, so tenous, that no reasonable judge would consider any responsibility to lie with the voter. There's just no chain of causation there, and this makes it totally unlike if the voter hired Obama as a hitman. There's no contract, only vague promises. There's not even any implied endorsement, since there are other reasons why one might vote for Obama than they endorse him, or they may only endorse part of what he promises. These are all relevant things for the judge to take into account, when he's deciding whether voters bear responsibility for specific crimes carried out by the state.

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

Clayton — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 07:41:21 GMT

would they really go to prison? Is he really threatening his inferiors in government with violence?

Yes.

Clayton -

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

PeaceRequiresAnarchy — Sun, 22 Apr 2012 22:35:56 GMT

"What he is liable for are the orders which he gives which are all backed with aggressive threats: obey this order or go to jail (e.g. court martial or whatever). That aggressive threat is propagated, layer-by-layer, rank-by-rank, all the way down to the foot-soldier who pulls the trigger."

I was under the impression that Obama's inferiors voluntarily obey his commands. If they were to disobey the instructions then perhaps they would lose their jobs, but would they really go to prison? Is he really threatening his inferiors in government with violence?

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

Clayton — Sun, 22 Apr 2012 19:59:55 GMT

@PRA: You falsely assume that the President is doing what the public "commands" him to do in the same way that the Joint Chiefs of Staff do what the President commands them to do. Of course, this is what you are taught in any high school civics course, that democracy "holds leaders accountable" and expresses "the will of the people" and other such theological nonsense.

Please re-read my first post: voting is like praying for God to destroy your enemies. It is an inconsequential act. Voting for Obama has no more causal connection to the deaths of Afghan villagers by US bombing raids than praying to God for their deaths would have. Both voting for a warmonger and praying to God to murder your enemies are despicable acts of bigotry. But they have no causal connection whatever to the eventual outcome.

Note that, in Rothbardian legal theory, the mafia lord that orders his guys to shoot is not liable for the deaths - he merely gave instructions, it was the trigger-men who caused the deaths. On first glance, this might seem to be a license to mafiosos but it is quite the opposite. Sure, you can organize a mafia and issue commands to kill scot-free, but you're going to have a hard time finding people to follow your silly commands when they are the ones who will be held liable for following them and when you can be held liable for whatever extortionate threats you used against your underlings in order to induce them to follow your commands.

Obama is not legally liable for the deaths of innocents in Afghanistan in my reading of Rothbardian legal theory. What he is liable for are the orders which he gives which are all backed with aggressive threats: obey this order or go to jail (e.g. court martial or whatever). That aggressive threat is propagated, layer-by-layer, rank-by-rank, all the way down to the foot-soldier who pulls the trigger.

The root cause of the problem (bombing of innocents) is the limitation of liability for all these criminal acts up and down the entire chain of command. And democracy - far from being a liability enforcement mechanism - is precisely a form of liability-limitation. "Well, Obama can't be held legally liable for the aggressive threats he makes to his inferiors because the people voted for him and so that makes Obama's criminal threats... not criminal." This is the crux of the issue - taking an opinion poll doesn't change your liability. It's like someone being charged with murder who calls for a show of hands whether he's innocent or not. "Well, judge, I'm sorry, but the majority of people here don't think I'm guilty, so, that means I'm not guilty." What a bunch of bullshit.

Clayton -

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

PeaceRequiresAnarchy — Sun, 22 Apr 2012 19:06:19 GMT

So when Obama commands soldiers to go attack others and blow things up, is he merely stating a preference rather than committing an act of aggression? Which of Obama's actions are in violation of libertarian principles? If voting for Obama to tell another person to commit an act of aggression does not count as aggression, then why would Obama's act of telling others to commit aggression count as aggression? Can only the law enforcement people be held liable for the aggression that they commit or can their superiors whose orders that they obey also be considered responsible?

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

Meistro — Sun, 22 Apr 2012 05:18:22 GMT

Voting is a mere statement of preference, nothing more.

Re: The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

vive la insurrection — Sun, 22 Apr 2012 04:29:33 GMT

if that is your criterea, that is your critere. Nothing can relly be done to refute it.

It isn't so much an argument as it is a type of "virtue ethic"